

Major Powers' Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan



Islamabad Policy Research Institute



Hamis Seidel Foundation

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	
Acronyms	
Introduction	1
Welcome Address	12
Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin	
Opening Remarks	
Kristof W. Duwaerts	15
Inaugural Address	
Admiral (R) Noman Bashir	19
Concluding Address	
Admiral (R) Muhammad Asif Sandila	25
Concluding Remarks	
Jacqueline Wilk	28
Vote of Thanks	
Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin	30
Recommendations	32
CHAPTER 1	
Piracy and Trafficking: Maritime and Security Policy Challenges	
Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury	36
CHAPTER 2	
Maritime and Naval Power Play: Competing Roles & Missions	
Rear Admiral (R) Pervaiz Asghar	61
CHAPTER 3	
Possible Implications of the Obama “Pivot” or “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” for the Indian Ocean Region	
Dr. David R. Jones	70
CHAPTER 4	
Blue-waters Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Possible Scenarios	
Dr. Nasser Hadian	80

CHAPTER 5

International Law and Order: The Indian Ocean and South China Sea

Dr. Wang Hanling 82

CHAPTER 6

Emerging Challenges in Indian Ocean Region: Role of Pakistan Navy

Muhammad Azam Khan 92

CHAPTER 7

Maritime Security Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Pak-China-India

Lt. Cdr. (R) Adil Rashid 111

CHAPTER 8

Contemporary Geopolitics of Indian Ocean and Great Power Competition over Gwadar

Dr A. Z. Hilali 124

CHAPTER 9

Strengthening Cooperation: Collective Security of Sea Lanes

Dr. Muhammad Khan 163

CHAPTER 10

Integration of Indian Ocean Community: Challenges and Dividends: Detering and Suppressing Transnational Organised Crime

Captain (R) Martin A. Sebastian 180

CHAPTER 11

Maritime Economic Cooperation: Hydrocarbons, Fisheries and Minerals

Dr. Shahid Amjad 197

Contributors 207

Index 210

IPRI Publications 215

Acronyms

AIS	Automatic Identification System
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGPCS	Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CMCP	Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
COMPSRON	Military Sealift Command Squadron
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSI	Container Security Initiative
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FPDA	Five Powers' Defense Arrangements
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRA	High Risk Area
IMC	International Maritime Conference
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim-Association of Regional Cooperation
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IOZP	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
JMICC	Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre

MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MDP	Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MSOs	Mission Security Operations
NALT	Naval Arms Limitation Treaty
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
PMPF	Puntland Maritime Police Force
PN	Pakistan Navy
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCS	South China Sea
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communications
SNMG	Standing Naval Maritime Group
TOC	Transnational Organised Crime
TTEG	Tripartite Technical Expert Group
US	United States

Acknowledgements

This volume is based on papers presented at the two-day international conference on “Major Powers’ Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan” held on November 18-19, 2014 at Serena Hotel, Islamabad. The Conference was jointly organized by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, (HSF), Islamabad.

IPRI is especially thankful to Mr. Kristof Duwaerts, Resident Representative, HSF, Islamabad, for his cooperation and sharing the financial expenses of the Conference.

For the papers presented in this volume, we are grateful to all participants from Pakistan and abroad, as well as the chief guests and chairpersons of the different sessions. We are also thankful to the scholars, students and professionals, who accepted our invitation to participate in the Conference.

The successful completion of the Conference owes much to the efforts and logistical support provided by the staff of the IPRI, especially Ms. Maria Syed, Assistant Research Officer, who also served as Stage Secretary.

Introduction

**Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin
Khalid Chandio and Khurram Abbas**

This volume is based on the papers read and presentations made at the two-day international conference on “Major Powers’ Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan” organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) in collaboration with Germany’s Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Islamabad on November 18-19, 2014 at Serena Hotel, Islamabad, Pakistan. The conference comprised four working sessions in addition to the inaugural and concluding sessions. Eleven presentations were made by eminent scholars from Pakistan, China, US, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Iran that covered various themes such as “Indian Ocean: Center Stage for the 21st Century”, “Major Powers’ Interests: Competition and Cooperation in Indian Ocean”, “Regional Power Play in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan” and “Working for Peaceful Indian Ocean Rim: A Win-Win Situation for All.” The conference helped in: (a) understanding geo-political and geo-economic importance of the Indian Ocean in contemporary times; (b) identifying interests of major powers in the region; (c) analysing the ongoing competition and cooperation among international and regional actors; (d) forwarding policy options for Pakistan; and (e) exploring possible mechanism for cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

A US naval strategist, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, once remarked, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.” The IOR, having 36 states around its littoral belt with additional eleven hinterland states, which though landlocked, make it important as these are all involved, one way or the other, in its politics and trade. The highest tonnage of the world’s goods, i.e., 65 per cent of world oil, and 35 per cent of gas, located in the littoral states, also passes through it. The region today stands amidst an arena of contemporary geopolitics and geo-economics as this major sea route connects the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. Travel across the IOR and passage from its waters into

neighbouring seas is both facilitated and potentially constrained by several choke points – the Mozambique Channel, the Bab el Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Straits, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait.

At present, there are many challenges as well as opportunities facing the IOR and the South China Sea (SCS) as these areas, with the passage of time, have emerged as central theatres of 21st century geopolitics. The Indian Ocean once regarded as a “neglected ocean” has, today, become the hub of political, strategic and economic activities due to the presence of conventional and nuclear vessels of the major powers and nuclear weapon states like Pakistan, China and India. Key regional powers are placing great reliance on the deployment of fleet missile submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for second strike capability as well as for maintaining balance of power in the region. The US had established its naval base in the IOR at Diego Garcia to protect the US vital interests in the region. There are significant implications attached to the US’ new “Asia Pivot” strategy. The Indo-US collusion in the IOR has naturally made Pakistan and China wary about the strategic balance in the IOR.

Regional and extra regional powers are now paying increasing attention on the IOR issues within a complex geopolitical framework where their interests and objectives are inextricably meshed. The post-Cold War scenario has somehow relegated the Atlantic Ocean to a less important position compared to the IOR as a conduit for Western military supplies and the Persian Gulf hydrocarbon resources. Add to this, the turbulent regional socio-political environment (including America’s military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), and the rise of China as a global power which together have made IOR an area of crucial geo-strategic importance. As a result, traditional maritime security concerns have become more important due to the conflict in the Persian Gulf and piracy by Somalians near Bab-el-Mandeb. Stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, the IOR has the potential to be the centre of global conflicts because most international commerce will flow through this route.

Pakistan is aware of its immediate and extended neighbourhood in IOR. Pakistan has to evaluate its options and come up prepared to face any challenges that IOR might offer in the near future as the Gwadar Port located at the end of the proposed “Pakistan-China Economic Corridor” is not only a shortcut to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea but also the shortest route for China to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Moreover,

Pakistan has to strive for a win-win situation in the IOR where most of the states should peacefully benefit from the dividends available in the region.

The book has two parts. The first includes the Welcome Address and Vote of Thanks by Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin, President IPRI, Opening Remarks by Mr. Kristof W. Duwaerts, Resident Representative, HSF, Concluding Remarks by Ms. Jacqueline Wilk, Programme Coordinator, HSF, Inaugural Address by the Chief Guest, Admiral (R) Noman Bashir, former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Pakistan Navy and Concluding Address by the Chief Guest, Admiral (R) Muhammad Said Sandila, former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Pakistan Navy. The second part of the book consists of 11 papers/presentations read/made at the conference. These are briefly described in the following paragraphs:

Mr. Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury, Head of Operations at BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh spoke on **“Piracy and Trafficking: Maritime and Security Policy Challenges.”** In his presentation, he described the incidence of piracy and trafficking in the Indian Ocean and how that affected South Asian nations' maritime and security policies. He said that piracy had economic, geo-strategic and security implications. It created insecurity on both regional and global levels as vital trade routes passed through the Indian Ocean. Trade was hampered and supplies delayed. Longer secure detours made shipping costlier and escorting involved additional security resources. He described illegal trafficking as more of a modern phenomenon. It involved human, arms, narcotics trafficking and logistics supply to militant groups. According to him the maritime milieu now represented the new ground zero of asymmetric threats such as terrorism, piracy and organized crime. These non-conventional threats, involving various types of low-intensity conflicts related to sea posed significant challenge to the good order at sea.

Explaining the causes he said that religio-political radicalization and ethnocentric clamour for political power were the two prime reasons for hostility in the Indian Ocean rim. Militant religious/sectarian radicalization was the biggest cause of concern to Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. These sub-region countries had turned into a competing playground for big powers. He concluded that a wider regional consensus in the affected regions was necessary based on honest actions against trafficking and piracy. In this regard, a holistic approach of cooperation, well supported by national and regional stakeholders was imperative to address trafficking and piracy issues in trans-IOR.

Rear Admiral (R) Pervaiz Asghar, former Director General of the National Centre for Maritime Policy Research at the Bahria University, Karachi Campus, in his paper on **“Maritime and Naval Power Play: Competing Roles and Missions”** described the current situation in its historical perspective from the 16th century trade competition among the colonial powers — the Portuguese, Dutch, French and the British to the time of the Second World War when large scale territorial occupation became unsustainable and Britain passed the baton to the US which transformed it into a huge naval and air base.

Explaining the Indian strategy towards the Indian Ocean, he said that India had always tried to play a dominant role but these efforts have been thwarted by the competing interests of the outside naval powers as well as its own naval inadequacy. Besides, in pursuance of its regional aspirations, the Indian Navy, despite its dwindling numerical strength, had been assiduously endeavouring to maintain a qualitative edge through the acquisition of a number of Soviet-built and indigenously constructed stealth warships. It is feared this could lead to regional instability. Pakistan's primary interest was in ensuring order along its coastal belt. It had been cooperating with the international community through its participation in maritime Combined Task Forces (CDF) 150 and 151 and other regional initiatives. About the Chinese maritime strategy he said it was centred on its economic interests but its efforts to establish its presence were forestalled by the US and India. Worried about the security of their oil trade through the Indian Ocean, the Chinese were focusing on helping countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to develop new ports and trade routes.

Dr. David R. Jones, Visiting Faculty, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad spoke on **“Possible Implications of the Obama “Pivot” or “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” for the Indian Ocean Region”**. He said, “the term ‘Pivot’ refers to the US tilt towards the region”. It was used by President Obama. In this context he referred to US military/naval power expansion in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific through cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the establishment of US defence facility at Darwin, Australia. He said that through naval cooperation with the littoral as well as the regional states, the US could exercise its control over the vital choke points. He said that Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was also was to get access to warm waters. “How far China can go in this struggle? Will the Chinese navy be able to build aircraft, blue water navy and sustain the minimum naval deterrence?” He also referred to the Chinese ‘Strings of

Pearl Strategy' and said Chinese ports in South Asia were aimed to expand its area of influence. On Indian regional role vis-à-vis China, he said, "India is trying to exploit the Sino-US competition to its advantage". India was being viewed as a potential counter weight to China and Indo-US strategic partnership, in particular their naval cooperation was a testament to this, he said.

Dr. Nasser Hadian, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Iran, speaking on "**Blue Waters Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Possible Scenarios**" said that every state viewed the region with its own perspective and the security complex of a state determined its interest in a particular region. The Indian Ocean due to its location, and the presence of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) had become a source of attraction for the regional as well as global powers. Another factor which had raised the region's stature globally was China's rapid growth. If China's growth continued it would have the potential to challenge the global world order. To counter such a scenario, US had reinforced its alliances with the regional states, in particular with Australia and Japan. He also referred to Indo-US strategic partnership and remarked that the alliance was to counterbalance Chinese preponderance in the region. Discussing US policy in the Middle East, he said the US was trying to pressurize Iran through its economic sanctions and through support to the GCC states to balance out the Iranian influence.

Dr. Wang Hanling, Director, Centre for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China gave a talk on "**International Law and Order: The Indian Ocean and South China Sea**". He discussed the challenges of maritime security in the Indian Ocean citing blockade and military threats to the safety and security of the straits particularly those in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait. The US excessive military build-up across the Hormuz was a threat to the maritime environment, he said. Discussing major powers' vested interests and the tendency to overpower the littoral states he remarked: "It seems that the US is not only making use of the Indian Ocean but also the South China Sea to serve the strategy of its pivot to Asia". He stated that the conflicting claims in the South China Sea were no more confined to the regional states. Outside actors, particularly the involvement of the US, had aggravated the dispute. He was of the opinion that the existing maritime mechanisms like UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery, the Indian Ocean Rim

Association (IORA), Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) had become ineffective due to “the inadequate participation of the states in the region.” He mentioned Malaysia and Indonesia which were littoral states but had hardly contributed towards anti-piracy. He suggested “a regional management, in which the regional states should lead, while the outside actors’ role should be limited”. Another major hurdle in anti-piracy operations was lack of finances due to which piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden could not be undertaken.

He concluded that for a conducive navigational environment and maintenance of legal order in the oceans and seas, peaceful settlement of maritime disputes was essential. Therefore, cooperative maritime mechanisms would not only strengthen the capacity building of regional states but would also deter the threats of piracy, drug and human trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and shipping of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) across the Indian Ocean. Besides, regional and global players’ collaboration could also enhance the capacity to counter natural disasters and incidents like the crash of Malaysian Flight 370, he said.

Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, Senior Research Fellow, Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore gave a talk on the “**Emerging Challenges in Indian Ocean Region: Role of Pakistan Navy**”. He dwelt on the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean on the world map where 100,000 ships traversed yearly; half of the world’s container traffic and 70 per cent of total traffic of petroleum trade passed through. Besides, the Indian Ocean was home to 65 per cent of strategic raw material reserves, 31 per cent of gas and more than half of the world’s oil exports”. He highlighted the Ocean’s vulnerability to conventional and non-conventional threats and pointed out that the Indian Ocean had many focal points — Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal by acquiring control over which littoral, regional or global players could influence world affairs. He said the Indian Ocean’s significance was evident from the presence of US bases over there which it was using to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He said that for China smooth flow of trade through the Malacca was important. Similarly, the closure of Hormuz strait could be catastrophic for the Indian economy.

On Pakistan’s role in international navigation he said that Pakistan’s 990 kms long coastline, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Gwadar port were vital for the country’s economic development if Pakistan wanted to safeguard its maritime interests, the country would have to focus on naval empowerment. The vision of Pak Navy was shared. He said that

Pakistan's Navy was "a modern potent Navy manned by motivated professionals that contributes effectively to deterrence and national security across the full conflict spectrum and capable of radiating influence region-wide with a global outlook". He described Pak Navy's participation in maritime exercises such as the multilateral counter terrorism exercise named 'Amman'. Pak Navy also participated alongside the international coalitions (CTF 150, CTF 151) in maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea.

Lieutenant Commander (R) Adil Rashid, Visiting Faculty National Centre for Maritime Policy Research, Bahria University, Karachi made a presentation on "**Maritime Security Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Pak-China-India**". He discussed the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, highlighted the major powers' growing interest and Pakistan's policy towards the Ocean. Discussing the major powers' interest in the IOR, he said that both established and emerging powers, were seeking to strengthen their foothold in the IOR. He said, "these players not only want to safeguard their commercial interests, but through the naval power they are trying to deter the enemy as well". Further China's economic interdependence on SLOCs was nearly 80 per cent of China's fuel imports from Middle East and North Africa. The Strait of Malacca and Hormuz were of primer significance to China, any blockade or disruption across these choke points could harm the Chinese economy. China, therefore, needed to develop a Blue Water Navy. Chinese 'Strings of Pearls' strategy was also a move to ensure an outlet for Chinese trade in a time of crisis. Discussing Indian policy, he pointed out that India had the Western and Southern Naval Commands deployed across the region in addition to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Besides, India had reinforced its naval cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. India had also funded 'the Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG)'; the group administered the Malacca strait. Militarily too India had expanded its presence in the IOR; it had set up posts in Seychelles, Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius. Recently, India had also gained berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam.

On US strategic interest in the region, he said its military cooperation with the littoral states and naval presence across the Malacca was critical to the movement of its forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The US trade was also navigated through these waterways. In this backdrop, the US strategic interest apart from ensuring the smooth flow of trade across the sea-lanes was also to reinforce its influence in the area to the extent that no other power could challenge its

supremacy. Discussing Pakistan's Naval policy he said it was defence-driven to protect the territorial waters, secure sea resources and to ensure smooth trade. But it lacked vision vis a vis other regional navies. It was not offensive nor was it designed to counterbalance other navies, rather the endeavour was to strengthen peace and security across the Arabian Sea. Pakistan Navy's cooperative ventures with the international community included collaboration with NATO in anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.

Professor Dr. A.Z. Hilali, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar spoke on **"Free Passage and Trade in Indian Ocean: Gwadar's Place"**. He referred to the power struggle among the regional and international players over trade and commerce since economic strength determined a country's political say in international politics. The Indian Ocean with its choke points was vital for world trade. To safeguard which countries were expanding their naval fleets. Pakistan's Gwadar port with its strategic location was a pivotal trade facility for regional countries. The port was not only a shortcut to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea but was also the shortest route for China to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. China had heavily invested in the port for its long term economic benefits. However, the perception that China's unprecedented investment in Gwadar was to acquire control over the world market was seen with suspicion by the US. Consequently, the US was monitoring Gwadar's development. The US concern had security implications which could be detrimental for Gwadar's future. To counter such a prospect, Pakistan needed a strong and well-equipped navy.

Dr. Muhammad Khan, Head, Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad, presented his paper on **"Strengthening Cooperation: Collective Security of Sea Lanes."** His main argument was that over 80 per cent of global trade was taking place through seas. Sea Lanes (SLs) were trade routes in the seas and each SL was typically designed to take advantage of a current or a prevailing wind to decrease travel time. In the Indian Ocean, there were three critical SLs extensively used for trade, commerce and transportation of global energy. These were the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Bab el-Mandab. The Strait of Hormuz was the most significant and busiest chokepoint in the Indian Ocean. An estimated 17 million barrels of crude oil passed through it daily as well as overall 40 per cent of world's seaborne trade. Approximately 15 million barrels of crude oil passed through the Strait of Malacca while an

average 3.3 million barrels of oil per day flowed through Bab el-Mandab to US, Europe and Asia. So any disruption even temporarily would cause international energy and trade crisis.

Identifying the security challenges to Indian Ocean's SLs, he said that they ranged from the traditional, state-closure of the Straits of Hormuz, to the non-traditional, like piracy and maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Some SLs like Malacca and those along the Somalian waters had been frequently attacked by pirates since ages. Furthermore, political instability in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) had raised security risks for the global shipping industry. So, there was dire need that regional states developed a strong collective security mechanism for the collective security of the Indian Ocean SLs. This was only possible through enhanced cooperation among the regional states. Furthermore, maritime security efforts could be strengthened through foreign assistance to regional states. There was a need for institutionalized use of the Best Management Practices (BMP) recommended by the shipping industry, as well as the use of armed security contractors aboard vessels transiting the High Risk Area (HRA). He suggested that India had to abandon its mindset that Indian Ocean was India's ocean only. An enhanced Indo-China cooperation and due share of littoral and Rim land states was necessary.

Captain (R) Martin A. Sebastian, Head and Fellow of the Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, presented his paper on **“Integration of Indian Ocean Community: Challenges and Dividends: Detering and Suppressing Transnational Organised Crime..”** He said that maritime crimes were a business and acted as a shadow economy. The economic impact of these crimes on business was rise in insurance premium due to threats, loss of business due to increased security, loss of property and life due to criminal acts and loss of revenue due to overfishing, poaching and pollution. The impact on government was loss of investment opportunities due to risks, loss of income from taxation revenue due to smuggling and trafficking, loss of income from fines and genuine dues due to unreported crimes, loss of valuable human capital due to attraction towards crime, increased expenditure on security, increased time and effort to cater for threat response, and loss of endemic and protected wildlife due to illegal deforestation and poaching. Other maritime related crimes were maritime fraud, insurance fraud and bunkering fraud. These crimes could be deterred and suppressed through regional cooperation and integration with existing

communities in building security complexes to break the logistics chain of crime. Holistic approach towards a joint inter-agency cell using capabilities provided by military, industry, media, NGOs and community policing was an option. Multi-Agency Task Force could be used to arrest those who fuel crime and derive proceeds from crime. The use of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing act (AMLATFA) including unlawful activities to freeze assets of crime lords and masterminds was needed. He suggested regional cooperation in combating maritime crimes. An Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) could work to promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the member states, and to create common ground for regional economic co-operation. The priority areas should be maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster risk management, technology, tourism and cultural exchanges. The holistic approach was to include all parties and reducing trust gap between government and people.

Dr. Shahid Amjad, former Director General, National Institute of Oceanography, Pakistan, spoke on “**Maritime Economic Cooperation: Hydrocarbons, Fisheries and Minerals.**” He said that unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans that were open from the North to the South Pole, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea in particular were semi-closed with very little water exchange taking place from the north. This coupled with monsoon reversal made the North Arabian Sea a unique region, making it one of the world’s highest productive areas. A third of the world’s population lived around the rim of the Indian Ocean that were dependent on the living and non-living resources. It offered products and services essential for development of coastal states. Coastal and offshore zones were capable of producing rich fisheries, mineral, oil and gas resources. The economic wealth of Pakistan’s coastal zone too was derived from living and non-living resources and products of direct market value, e.g., fish and fishery products, coastal dependent activities, maritime trade, port and shipping activities, beach recreation and tourism etc., which earned millions of US dollars in foreign exchange. Minerals from marine sources provided raw materials for manufacturing and construction sectors, energy for industrial and domestic use, and fertilizer for agriculture sector. Economically important minerals such as poly-metallic sulphide deposits were known to contain high concentrations of zinc, lead, copper, barium, silver and gold, while the cobalt-rich crust, commonly found on the flanks of seamounts, contained nickel, copper, zinc, iron and manganese as well as cobalt. Other resources such as oil and gas, phosphorites and precious

metals had also aroused the interest of research institutions and mining companies worldwide. Pakistan was fortunate to have a coastline of 990 kilometres, with an Exclusive Economic Zone of approximately 240,000 square kilometres. Highlighting the significance of marine mineral resources to the global economy, he said that more recent scientific discoveries suggested that the potential contribution of these resources to the global economy could be even greater. He recommended that an “Ocean Business Forum” should be established with members drawn from Indian Ocean coastal states and beyond to take advantage and share the technology for sustainable development of living and non-living marine resources, and contribute towards national economic development and progress. ■

Welcome Address

Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin
President IPRI

Admiral (R) Noman Bashir, Former Chief of Naval Staff,
Mr. Kristof Duwaerts, Resident Representative,
Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF),
Excellencies,
Distinguished Scholars,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good Morning!

I welcome Admiral (R) Noman Bashir, former Chief of Naval Staff, who has kindly accepted our invitation to be the Chief Guest at this conference. I also welcome all the distinguished scholars who would be presenting their papers in the two-day conference.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted that Islamabad Policy Research Institute together with Hans Siedel Foundation has been able to arrange such a brilliant get together of brain power and capacity to discuss this very important subject titled “Major Powers’ Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan”.

The Indian Ocean is very vast. It has 36 states around its littoral belt and an additional eleven hinterland states. Half of the world’s containerized freight and two-thirds of oil shipment travels through the Indian Ocean. Since it connects the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas, it is fast becoming an arena of geo-politics and geo-economics. Connecting East Asia with West Asia and beyond, Pakistan is at the center of this politico-economic competition or cooperation. By competition, I mean challenges and by cooperation, I am hinting at the opportunities.

The importance of the Indian Ocean is increasing with every passing day due to economic development in Asia and its growing dependence on natural resource flows to and from the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and the United States. The rise of China as a global power and also as a

major stake holder in the Indian Ocean and the interests of the United States in the region have made this region an area of crucial geo-strategic importance. At the same time, problems ranging from piracy and territorial disputes in the regional seas to global environmental pressures on coastal and marine resources are multiplying. These challenges pose significant governance problems for maritime policymakers around the Indian Ocean region.

It is also important to mention here that no single nation has the resources to address the challenges in the Indian Ocean single handedly. Interests of littoral states in the maritime domain are interlinked and interdependent. They will, therefore, have to fulfill their collective responsibility to deal with these challenges.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Indian Ocean besides being an important commercial artery is also a global security arena. Pakistan has to be watchful of what goes on in its immediate and extended neighbourhood and remain prepared for any eventuality or to benefit from opportunities that the Ocean offers. The Gwadar Port, as you all know, is being linked up with China through the "Pakistan-China Economic Corridor". This port is not only a shortcut to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea but also the shortest route between Pakistan and China to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

IPRI and Hans Seidel Foundation have organised this conference with a view to understanding the role that emerging political, military, commercial, environmental, and technological trends will play in shaping relationships between major regional and extra-regional powers. We intend to examine the manner in which the criss-crossing forces of economic growth, natural resource development, and political change will impact the coastal countries of the Indian Ocean in the coming years.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I once again warmly welcome Admiral Noman Bashir for agreeing to grace this occasion with his inaugural address. I also welcome distinguished scholars from Bangladesh, China, Iran, Malaysia and the United States. They will surely enrich this conference with their valuable input. We hope they carry pleasant memories of their stay in Islamabad. I also welcome eminent scholars from Pakistan who will be presenting their papers at the conference. I am sure that all the participants will benefit from the expert views of the speakers. Papers read here will later be compiled in the form of

a book which Islamabad Policy Research Institute together with Hans Seidel Foundation will publish soon after the Conference.

I thank you all.■

Opening Remarks

Kristof W. Duwaerts

Resident Representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Islamabad

Respected Admiral (R) Noman Bashir,
Dear Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin,
Knowledgeable speakers from near and far,
Dear Friends of IPRI and Hanns Seidel Foundation,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Good morning and Assalam u Alikum!

On behalf of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, I would like to very warmly welcome you to this international conference on major powers' interests in the Indian Ocean, looking at challenges and options for Pakistan. The Hanns Seidel Foundation is one of the five political foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany currently present in Pakistan, working on political issues and awareness with regard to Regional Dialogue, Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution, and Federalism. Our office in Pakistan, which is one out of more than sixty worldwide, was established in 1983 and we have been collaborating with IPRI since the early 2000s on a number of issues, lending hand in bringing out a number of widely read publications and policy recommendations for a primarily Pakistani audience.

Although water covers about two thirds of our globe, and thereby most of the international trade and economy are necessarily sea-bound, there has so far been surprisingly little talk about navies in the world. Even in Pakistan, people usually talk more about the army and the air force than of the navy.

Navies have been pivotal throughout human history. It was through navies that America was discovered in 1492 by Christopher Columbus, it was again through their navy, that the British were able to establish their Empire. On D-Day in 1944, the Allied Forces hit the Nazi armed forces hard by attacking the Normandy coast with a fleet comprising almost 7,000 vessels that proved to be a decisive strike in bringing down the Third Reich. The United States continues to assert their claim as the sole world-power on the basis of its naval presence in all oceans, maintaining naval bases in 17

countries¹ outside the United States, in addition to facilities from a number of partner navies. China has recently started building up its so called blue-water navy for long distance projection of its power, and the maintenance of its interests in the world oceans.

But such presence comes at a huge cost. Today, there are as many as 22 active aircraft carriers with an average crew size of 5,000 people. As aircraft carriers are extremely vulnerable, they are usually accompanied by number of smaller vessels. For instance, a US Carrier Strike Group consists of at least eight vessels, thereby bringing the total crew up to easily 8,000 sailors, which, at least in Germany, would be considered to be the population of a small town. Add to that the ground logistics, which again would double the human resources involved. This inevitably brings one to the question of what makes such large scale operations necessary or in a way profitable.

Today, the era of battle ships is over, and so is the era of naval wars. The somewhat romantic picture of a ship nudging a pirates' vessel on the broadside will remain a scene in the movies. We are living in an age in which most military power projections have become virtually meaningless. Economics has taken over as both the most important way of projecting national power and of influencing other countries.

This is where today's conference comes in. The Indian Ocean, which is the third largest of the world's oceans, serves as a major hub between the East and the West, as well as between the West and the East, and of course between regional countries. China and Japan as the two most important economic players in Asia are hugely dependent on the import of fossil fuels through the Indian Ocean from the Middle East. Pakistan itself has two major harbours in Karachi and Gwadar. Again the Chinese have pledged to help develop the latter in order to make imports more economically viable. It would not only save them almost two weeks of sea bound transport, but also the large-scale deployment of naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean which covers about 20 per cent of global waters.

Of late the Indian Ocean has become a dangerous place for maritime traffic. Somalia, which is strategically situated at the end of the bottleneck of the Red Sea has become a prime base of sea pirates. The area of reported pirate attacks has expanded to a few miles away from the Pakistani coast.

¹ Bahrain, British Indian Ocean Territory, Egypt, Cuba, Djibouti Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain & United Arab Emirates.

Over the past 15 years, voyages in the Ocean have become so risky the European Union launched a large scale naval operation Atalanta in 2008 under which European navies are patrolling the waters primarily in the West of the Indian Ocean to protect container ships from pirate attacks. Ransoms moneys paid for release of the pirated ships have become exorbitantly high.

Of course, such “successes” of the pirates don’t go unnoticed, and despite the large scale presence of foreign navies, piracy has rather spread than declined over the years, and is no longer only confined to Somalia. There have been reported attacks emanating from Pakistani, Indian, as well as Bangladeshi waters. It is here that deeper regional cooperation in countering piracy and other sea bound crimes becomes the need of the hour. In Southeast Asia, the riparian states of the Malacca Straits -- Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore -- resolved longstanding disputes in order to jointly patrol the Straits in 2004, when the number of piracy attacks reached almost one third of the worldwide piracy attacks.

Pakistan is among the biggest producers of rice, mangoes, and cotton in the world. Those are staples which are needed throughout the world, and still can only be transported economically by sea. Gwadar as a hub not only for the Pakistani economy per se, but also for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, is going to achieve great importance over the years to come, bringing economic benefits to the whole region. All this needs to be built up, protected and sustained, not through large-scale naval deployments, but rather custom-made solutions. With a coastline of little more than 1000 kms, Pakistan only ranks 74th worldwide, still, the oceanic access holds much importance for the future of the country, strategically, economically, as well as environmentally.

I hope that deliberations in the next two days will produce some viable solutions not only for Pakistani decision makers but for the region as a whole and suggest some recommendations about joint efforts in the region.

I would once again like to thank our dear partner institute, IPRI for bringing together such an exclusive group of experts. I am grateful to the speakers for having joined us today, and taking time out of their busy schedules. The last publication, which was published by the Hanns Seidel Foundation on “Regional Cooperation among Indian Ocean Countries” came out in 1999. I think it’s high time for having scholars deliver more timely insights.

I would like to wish you all and the conference the success it deserves, and am very much looking forward to listening to your valuable inputs. They will certainly be serving a better future.

Thank you. ■

Inaugural Address

Admiral (R) Noman Bashir

Former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Pakistan Navy

Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin,

Distinguished scholars,

Ladies and gentlemen!

I thank Ambassador (R) Amin for inviting me on the inaugural session of an important conference. Continental mindset in Pakistan and focus on issues on land especially towards West and East (Afghanistan and India) have distracted us from paying due attention to the developments in the Indian Ocean. I must appreciate Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) for taking this initiative to create awareness and to deliberate on the way ahead for Pakistan as regards this vital area.

Pakistan's strategic importance is primarily due to our location at the confluence of civilizations and our opening into the sea at the mouth of strategic waterways of the Gulf. Pakistan cannot remain oblivious to developments taking place in the Indian Ocean as it directly impinges on its security and prosperity.

Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean is characterized by emerging competition for influence and resources. Rising Asian economies, security of trade routes, access to energy resources and regional issues like terrorism are some of the factors shaping the geopolitics.

The Indian Ocean is an enclosed Ocean with access through choke points. Substantial energy resources are located in the periphery and are transported through it. The demand for POL is likely to continue and possibly increase in the foreseeable future.

The Indian Ocean is also a bridge between east and west. The economic progress in the East Asian countries has substantially increased the trade and it has become important to protect the sea lines of communication.

The emerging competition for influence and resources between the two principal actors i.e. the US and China is manifested in the concepts like US New Silk Route Initiative and Asia Pacific Pivot; and China's growing

economic footprint in Africa and littorals of the IOR. These emerging narratives of enlarging security parameter in tandem with widening regional economic and strategic links and the resultant surge in tensions will constitute a challenge to the stability and good order in the IOR.

Terrorism emanating from Afghanistan in the form of al Qaeda is another issue which has been of serious concern. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in increased presence of extra-regional forces. Though the terrorist networks have been dismantled to a large extent but the radical outfits have either spread or have influenced other extremist groups in the region. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and extremists in Somalia and other countries are some examples. The rise of the IS in Iraq and Syria and resultant involvement of regional and western countries in containing its extremist ideology is a sign of ever increasing turmoil in the Region.

Elimination of terrorism, access to energy resources, safety of trade routes and stability in the region is desired by all powers; Additionally, geopolitical imperatives dictate that the major powers would like to gain and retain control, have bases and influence events on land from the sea.

Gone are the days when the Indian Ocean was known as a British lake; the sustained presence of extra regional forces is a regular feature; although not evident yet but in future competition amongst aspiring powers to gain and retain control could manifest quite vividly.

US is directly involved in the area by presence of its task groups and military operations being rendered in assistance to a number of countries for its own interests.

US interests in terms of containing communism in the past and currently fighting terrorism is well known. US is also overtly concerned about security of Israel and countering Iran by equipping the armed forces of Arab countries. US and western countries maintain sustained presence in the area. They have military bases in the region and the concept of forward defence is in full evidence.

China has for the first time in its history after Zheng He, ventured into the Indian Ocean in anti-piracy deployments. China's dependence on Gulf oil and trade with the west necessitates protection of its vital interests. China has also assisted a number of countries to develop port and commercial facilities. This is seen by competing countries as China's aspiration of dominance in future. China is also wary of Indian ambitions and both see each other as a competitor of sorts.

China with dependence on energy resources from the region has huge stakes; China and India have a history of bilateral issues; the West also sees

China rising as a major global player; cognizant of the situation China has diversified sources for its energy supplies; pipelines from Serbia and Central Asia, upcoming energy and economic corridor through Pakistan are some examples. Historically China has been a continental power and first time in history after Zheng He we have seen PLA navy deployments in Indian Ocean essentially to assist international community in containing piracy.

India is another country which considers Indian Ocean as an Indian Lake; it wants to dominate the area and as a consequence is embarked on extensive modernization and developmental plans for its navy. The Indian navy is equipped with aircraft carriers, large surface fleet and has recently introduced nuclear submarines in its inventory. The power projection capability of the Indian navy is a visible sign of asserting in the region. Indian strategists have propounded dominance of Indian Ocean and argue that colonization of the subcontinent through East India Company was due to its weakness at sea. India also views with suspicion the Chinese Navy deployments, its influence in littoral countries and more recently Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan is heavily dependent on the Indian Ocean with 95 per cent of its trade through sea, 100 per cent of its POL supplies are also through the Arabian Sea. It has a reservoir of marine economic resources in its EEZ. Its Western Coast on the mouth of Gulf is of strategic importance. Pakistan also provides a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Russian dreams of getting access to the warm waters of Indian Ocean are well known. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jihad against Soviet aggression and the resultant turmoil led to rise of extremism and terrorism. Pakistan's current problems have genesis in the role of being the frontline state against erstwhile Soviet Union. Despite problems at home we are cognizant of the responsibilities bestowed due to geography. Pakistan has actively played its role in meeting the challenges in the Indian Ocean. Let me briefly highlight these challenges and also touch on the role of Pakistan.

Essentially these are terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, drug and narco-trade, human trafficking and transportation of illegal migrants, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and marine pollution.

After 9/11, there has been a mounting international concern related to the possibility of terrorists using relatively unguarded and vulnerable sea routes and ports to undertake acts of maritime terrorism. Although the world's oceans so far have not been a major focus of sustained terrorist activities, maritime domain is by design conducive to these types of threats.

The attacks on USS COLE in 2000 and the French tanker LIMBURG in 2002, both off Yemen, the suicide attack on Iraqi oil platforms in April 2004 and attack on MV STAR in 2010 off the Straits of Hormuz clearly demonstrate that the threat of terrorism at sea is a reality. Being located in close proximity to the strategic Straits of Hornuz, the sea area south of Pakistan's coast is vital for world's energy security and can be a potential target of maritime terrorism. The trans-national terrorists can use maritime routes for movement of personnel, weapons and finances. This threat is likely to become more significant in the context of post 2014 US/ISAF drawdown and the existing weak security apparatus in the war-torn Afghanistan.

To counter the threat of maritime terrorism Pakistan Navy joined Task Force 150 under Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) in April 2004. Since then Pakistan Navy has remained the most prolific regional participant and has successfully completed six command tenures of TF-150, while the current 7th tenure of PN Command is in progress. I may highlight here that the Command of Combined Task Force-150 by Pakistan Navy has brought synergy in coalition operations and helped in shaping maritime environment for enhanced interoperability and in leveraging influence for expanding regional participation.

Piracy is also a very Important Challenge

There are typically 35-45 warships and auxiliaries deployed in the Indian Ocean on counter-piracy operations drawn from some 28 states, and there remain three dedicated counter-piracy coalition forces — the EU's counter-piracy task force EU NAVAL FORCE (otherwise referred to as EU NAVFOR or Operation Atalanta), NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Group (SNMG) 1 and 2, and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151). Due to the operational necessity of concentrating these clearly limited resources in the most vital areas, the great majority of naval assets are deployed in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern Somali coast. Nevertheless, the area affected by Somali piracy remains vast, approximately 2.5 million square miles. The Combined Task Force 151 has been prosecuting the menace of piracy since 2009 in order to protect the freedom of navigation around the Horn of Africa.

Pakistan Navy ships have participated 20 times in this coalition and Pakistan Navy officers have also commanded this task force five times since joining in 2009. Apart from this, Pakistan Navy Ships regularly

undertake counter piracy operations in our EEZ due to which this area has been safe from any untoward incident.

Drugs and Arms Trafficking

An important adjunct to maritime terrorism is drugs and arms trafficking. With huge profit margins, drug trafficking is by far the most lucrative means of making quick money, which may be used to finance terrorist networks and arms trafficking. The unabated production of drugs and narcotics in Afghanistan makes it imperative for the international community to deny its trafficking to outside world. Since Afghanistan is a land-locked country, its drug trade passes through many routes, including the North Arabian Sea. Therefore, guarding the sea is vital to blocking this nefarious activity.

I must mention here that Pakistan has been proactively making efforts to check these activities and has developed maritime and coastal surveillance set up which augments and synergizes with Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Pakistan Coast Guards. Moreover, Pakistan Navy's proactive engagement with the international coalition has made it possible to effectively monitor and control drugs and arms smuggling in the North Arabian Sea. Pakistan Navy ships in conjunction with the coalition forces have successfully created deterrence amongst nefarious elements and curtailed their liberty of action.

Environmental Stresses

Environmental stresses including pollution increasingly threaten Indian Ocean biodiversity and marine life. By one estimate, some 40-trillion litres of sewage and 4 trillion litres of industrial effluents enter the region's coastal waters each year. It has also been alleged that several foreign companies taking advantage of the lawlessness in Somalia, dumped their radioactive and toxic waste containers along the country's troubled coast. These later broke following the 2004 tsunami to spill and wash the contents ashore. To top, in 2012 a record breaking number of 365 toxic laden ships were sent for breaking by European ship-owners to the beaches of South Asia including Pakistan and India.

Natural Calamities

Indian Ocean, particularly the North Arabian Sea, remains vulnerable to the devastating effects of natural disasters like cyclones and tsunamis etc., especially during the monsoon season. Cyclones in 2007, 2010 and 2011 are significant to mention in this regard. Pakistan has actively participated in rendering assistance at sea and ashore in all these natural calamities.

To conclude, let me reiterate that the Indian Ocean region will continue to play a crucial role in the global and regional politics well into the 21st century. It is now a considered opinion that the only way to ensure the 'freedom of navigation' on its highways and equitable use of its resources and counter future challenges is through a 'cooperative' approach. Detachment from the ingrained national narratives and entrenched obsessions accompanied by some bold steps holds promise for the region and world at large. Apart from conventional threat, the emergence of new challenges to maritime security, especially the asymmetric dimension of maritime terrorism is daunting, which makes our task even more challenging. Like other responsible states, Pakistan supports the traditional freedom of navigation on high seas and would not like to see the international law undermined. It is also against the domination of Indian Ocean by any single power.

I am confident that this Conference will evaluate the ground realities and identify emerging situation which could help define the way ahead for Pakistan. ■

Concluding Address

Admiral (R) Muhammad Asif Sandila

Former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Pakistan Navy

Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin,

Distinguished scholars,

Ladies and gentlemen!

First of all I thank Ambassador Amin for inviting me on the concluding session of an important conference.

I would like to highlight the following important issues:

Sea Blindness

Sea blindness is often discussed as mariners/sailors work at sea away from the eyes of the public. They operate hundreds of miles from the coast. Even their good work remains hidden and they do not get due appreciation. Even First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy Admiral Sir J. Band complained of sea blindness on the part of political leaders for the Island nation of Britain. Media, writers and intellectuals are urged to propagate usefulness of sea for the country. Sea blindness was when not enough people knew what the sea and shipping did for them. Marines, sailors, people and water were far away from human eye. Those good things were not often seen, so people forgot about that. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US Naval Strategist, whose concept of “sea power” had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of navies across the world, was recognized best in the US.

Gwadar

Gwadar port is very essential for Pakistan. China was net oil exporter till 1993. But now in 2014 due to the development and industrial growth has become the largest net oil importer. 55 per cent of its oil is imported from the Gulf. It is transported approximately 10,000 kms to ports on the east coast of China. Fuel needed for the western region has to be transported another 4,500 kms over land. This requirement can be met by off-loading at Gwadar and transportation over land covering only 3,000 kms. The longer

distance means more time, more fuel and more expenditure. It makes economic sense to utilize the port at Gwadar for transportation to China. For Pakistan, it is expected to help build roads, rail, give impetus to industrial development and hence progress and prosperity. The fears being pointed by the West and India are ill founded. Gwadar is being developed as a commercial port only. If people see a Pakistan Navy ship at Gwadar they give it a military connotation; let them say so. The world sees Gwadar as part of China's strategy of building a "string of pearls" presence on the Indian Ocean and as US strategy of "Asia Pivot." The fact is Gwadar is a commercial port. The crude oil processed and refined at the Gwadar oil refinery can be exported to China through the shortest possible route — Dubai-Gwadar-Urumqi — spanning only 3,500 km instead of the 14,500 kms of the present Dubai-Shanghai-Urumqi route. China's trade through Gwadar would save 22 days and considerable amount of freight charges. So, it was a win-win situation for Pakistan and China.

Regional Navies

Indian Ocean is a home to regional navies. IOR navies include navies from South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Iran, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia. The naval bases of US and France are also there. Pakistan Navy cooperated with the navies of Saudi Arabia and Oman as part of "Aman Exercises" to counter the threat of terrorism both at regional and international level. These regional navies are maintaining reasonable cooperation for security at Sea.

Piracy

Marines have faced pirates since times immemorial. It has been threatening shipping off the Straits of Malacca and more recently in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. It is the Somali pirates who have given a new dimension to piracy. They have been taking ships under their control and making crew hostages. They ask for huge ransom. There are a large number of people who profit from this loot. It has been established that approximately 40 per cent of the ransom money goes in the hands of beneficiaries outside Somalia. It has been pointed out that cutting off the financial trail is a must. Skeptics of piracy often ask who the beneficiaries could be i.e., insurance companies, financiers, pirates, middlemen, security

agencies etc. The maritime forces from around the globe have been able to reduce this menace to a great extent. It is estimated that about US \$ 238 million ransom was paid to Somali pirates in 2010, approximately 40 per cent i.e. US \$ 95 million went to beneficiaries outside Somalia. The elimination of piracy is possible only through regional cooperation.■

Concluding Remarks

Jacqueline Wilk

Programme Coordinator, Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Islamabad

Respected Admiral (R) Muhammad Asif Sandila,

Dear Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin,

Speakers and Guests from near and far,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Resident Representative Mr. Kristof W. Duewaerts, it is my honour to address you with some closing remarks of this international conference on the Major Powers' Interests in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Duwaerts had to excuse himself as he is heading with a Pakistani delegation to India at this moment. I am sure that they will actually not talk about the Indian Ocean, but these two events have something in common and are reflecting what the Hanns Seidel Foundation is trying to support in the region: cooperation and the rationalization of bilateral relations.

We have been talking a lot during the past two days about the importance of the Indian Ocean as a major economic hub between the East and the West and of course among the regional countries. But we have learnt that the Indian Ocean is not only a hub of trade and important for conventional economic activities, it is also a hub of the so-called shadow economies of this world. Drugs, weapons and even humans are being traded by organized criminal actors and rings. At the same time it has been emphasized by various speakers that all major powers do have historically growing and continuing stakes in the Indian Ocean, making it one of the most militarized oceans in the world today. What happens in the ocean always reflects what is happening on land and there is only one way to counter the multifaceted challenge posed to this region: cooperation.

There is a need to exchange knowledge, and discuss diverging views to assess the state of affairs and to chalk out the way forward which can be brought into the notice of the respective governments at home. By bringing eminent researchers and academics from various backgrounds and countries

like Malaysia, Iran, Bangladesh, China, US and Pakistan together, I think the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute are humbly trying to push into the right direction. Platforms like these can provide opportunities to influence future policies, leading to a more cooperative approach.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank our eminent speakers coming from near and far, who took time out of their busy schedule and enlightened us about pertinent issues and challenges. I would like to thank Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin and his whole team for not only organizing this conference, but so many others in the recent past and hopefully in the future as well. Last but not least I would like to thank my own team at HSF for their continuous efforts to follow our mission in the service of democracy, peace and development in Pakistan.

Thank you indeed!■

Vote of Thanks

Ambassador (R) Sohail Amin
President IPRI

Admiral (R) Muhammad Asif Sandila, Former Chief of Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy,
Mr. Jacqueline Wilks, Acting Resident Representative,
Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Pakistan Office,
Excellencies,
Distinguished Scholars,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good Afternoon!

As we now conclude the conference, I wish to reiterate that holding this conference was a source of great satisfaction and pride for the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

I sincerely thank Admiral Muhammad Said Sandila, former Chief of Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy for sparing time from out of his busy schedule and for enriching us with his concluding remarks as the Chief Guest. I take this opportunity to extend our most sincere thanks to all our guest scholars who came from different destinations for their contribution and support. I also thank the scholars from Pakistan who presented their papers at the conference and enhanced our understanding of the subject.

I also wish to thank the participants, for their interest in the conference and for their valuable contribution and gracious presence. I thank the Hanns Seidel Foundation for making the event possible. The Chief Guests at the inaugural and the concluding sessions, the Chairpersons of various sessions deserve special thanks. As a result of their contributions, we now have a greater understanding of geo-political and geo-economic considerations of the area around the Indian Ocean and even beyond. We have managed to formulate concrete recommendations.

Before concluding, I wish to inform that the proceedings of this conference will be compiled and published in the form of a book by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute in cooperation with the Hans Seidel Foundation very soon.

I thank you all. ■

Recommendations

In the light of the views expressed by the conference participants, Ms. Maria Syed, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI presented the following key recommendations:

- Pakistan cannot remain oblivious to the developments taking place in the Indian Ocean as these have an impact on our progress and prosperity. Pakistan should remain vigilant about the developments taking place in the Indian Ocean.
- Pakistan is more focused on continental issues hence the sea escapes its attention. There is a need to highlight the issues of maritime importance. Development of Navy is of vital importance for Pakistan.
- Safety and stability of Indian Ocean is the collective responsibility of the regional states. Regional states through resource sharing and as equal partners must cooperate in this regard.
- Pakistan is interested in maintaining stability and security in its immediate area of interest – the North Arabian Sea. It is cognisant of trans-boundary threats and has played a significant role in this regard as part of Combined Task Force-150 and Counter Piracy Task Force-151. Such international engagements of Pakistan should continue.
- In order to effectively move forward in the right direction, and counter the threat of maritime terrorism, it is imperative to simultaneously clamp down on all illegal activities including drug-smuggling, human trafficking and gun running. With the participation of regional countries, execution of the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan should be ensured.
- The Indian Ocean littoral states are cognisant that all such global and trans-boundary challenges necessitate a unified response through greater cooperation and collaboration. Hence, peaceful settlement of maritime disputes is essential for maintaining international legal order.

- Effective regional legal mechanisms have so far proved vital for maintaining the peaceful order of regional seas such as in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The littoral states should cooperate in further building on such legal structures.
- Full participation of all the states concerned in existing international and regional treaties and arrangements is important for the effective implementation of the UN convention on the Law of Seas.
- International and regional cooperation in maritime law enforcement as well as combating transnational maritime crimes is necessary for maintaining order in the regional seas.
- Socio-economic developments and simultaneous economic progress in all states is essential for peace and stability of the world as well as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The building of the Maritime Silk Road is conducive to the peace and prosperity of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean regions.
- Efforts should be made to resolve major bilateral disputes between littoral & hinterland states in the Indian Oceans Region, as it would end much of the arms trafficking in the affected areas.
- International, regional as well as bilateral laws formulated with an aim to curb arms trafficking should be comprehensive and should address all sensitive aspects of the issue.
- Drugs smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing and pollution at sea, are some of the challenges which require the attention of the international community as well as Pakistan's. A comprehensive international approach should be adopted to deal with these issues.
- Maritime disputes in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea can create difficulties in maritime cooperation and even adversely affect international peace. Therefore, effective regional legal mechanisms are vital for maintaining order on regional seas for which the littoral states should cooperate in building such mechanisms.
- To deter piracy, human trafficking and drug trafficking, regional as well as major powers should adopt cooperative approach.
- Illegal trafficking and piracy cannot be ignored by countries of the region. An anti-piracy multinational task force should be

established on the pattern of UN Peacekeeping Force. It should also be authorised to apply force when needed.

- Against the abuse of narcotics, an extensive and smart social campaign should be launched with the help of local coastal communities. Creating such awareness would discourage consumption of narcotics and eventually reduce market demand for drugs in the Indian Ocean rim.
- Cooperative regional efforts should be made to prevent the collapse of states like Somalia, and to undertake operations to explore and eliminate all possible pirate hubs present on the high seas.
- Better training should be provided and the capacity of the law enforcing agencies of the countries facing the menace of drug trafficking need to be enhanced. Friendly states and stakeholders may help develop such capacity in terms of manpower, resource and advanced training.
- To stop human trafficking, effective policies should be made to benefit from the knowledge and expertise of the developed countries.
- In the Malacca Strait, international and littoral states' interests traverse. On the one hand, the littoral states want to be responsible for security within their own jurisdictions and on the other hand, other states, especially the major powers, do not want to leave their vital interests to the littoral states' discretion. It is therefore, mandatory to alter this negative sum game into "a positive-sum game", which is only possible once there is cooperation among all stakeholders.
- The cooperative and collaborative regional mechanisms are often politically sensitive and their achievements are constrained by unsupportive attitude of one of the littoral states. Hence, solid commitment by all littoral states is necessary for cooperation to be successful.
- The Strait of Malacca is a global maritime strategic route and needs a cooperative solution. The littoral states should be considered decisive stakeholders in achieving cooperation for the sake of the Strait.
- Maritime security efforts can be strengthened through reorientation of foreign assistance to regional states. There is a

need that greater emphasis is laid on developing naval assistance programmes in collaboration with the Gulf Arab states.

- There is a need for the institutionalized use of the Best Management Practices recommended by the shipping industry, as well as the use of armed security contractors aboard vessels transiting the High Risk Area.
- Maritime forces are the first line of defense; they can be deployed quickly and can reach difficult locations. Maritime forces could be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in the international waters.
- Indian Ocean has emerged as a major centre of geostrategic interest. The US and China's strategic and military presence in the Indian Ocean is vital and inevitable. It is in the interest of concerned players of Indian Ocean to maintain a favourable and stable strategic equilibrium in the region.
- Friends of Indian Ocean Business Forum, comprising members drawn from Indian Ocean coastal states and beyond should share technology for sustainable development of marine resources and contribute towards national economic development and progress.
- Efforts should be made to bring ocean industries together, for exploration and sustainable development of oil, gas and mineral resources, fisheries development, aquaculture, underwater tourism, offshore renewables, etc.
- For productive and sustainable use of ocean resources, an ocean business community should be established as an advisory body of the Indian Ocean Business Forum.
- Pakistan is placed as the sixth most populous country in the world. To ensure food security for an expanding population, Pakistan will have to turn to the oceans in earnest.
- What is now needed is a national awakening to what may be conveniently called the 'Century of Oceans'. There is a need to understand the problems, establish a normative framework, build technical capacity and expand regional partnerships.

Chapter 1

Piracy and Trafficking: Maritime and Security Policy Challenges

Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury

Introduction

Both piracy and illegal trafficking are crimes, national or international; yet these can't be delinked from each national or regional causal context. The context often has political, international security and humanitarian angles. The piracy and illegal trafficking trends have been growing, in general, in recent years and are a major concern for many Indian Ocean rim countries and beyond.

The India Ocean, which also includes its affiliated seas, gulfs, straits etc, and its littoral countries form a trans-region. A mere 'region' status would be an underestimation. The Indian Ocean trans-region is vast and, in many respects, a domain of happenings. The ocean shores three continents Africa, Oceania and Asia by its west, east and northern sides and the trans-region constitutes quite a variety of regions spanning growth oriented South-East Asia, troubled yet indispensable Middle-East and anarchical East Africa. South Asia is perhaps a mixture of both growth and trouble.

It's a vast area in geographic and economic size, population and number of countries. Some key global supply and trade routes have passed through the ocean. Some have originated or ended at ports of the Indian Ocean. Australian Defence Minister, Stephen Smith (2010-13) opined, "The countries of the Indian Ocean Rim are home to more than 2.6 billion people, almost 40 per cent of the world's population. The Indian Ocean already ranks among the busiest routes for global trade. It will become a crucial global trading thoroughfare in the future."¹

The location of the world's biggest oil supplying region, the Middle East, adjacent to the north of the ocean, has provided a critical dimension to its significance. Sixty five per cent of the world's oil and 35 per cent of

¹ <http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/7552>

natural gas lies in the sub-surface of its littoral states. These states also hold 80.7 per cent of world extraction of gold, 56.6 per cent of Tin, 28.5 per cent of manganese, 25.2 per cent nickel and 77.3 per cent natural rubber². The Bab el Mandab strait between Yemen and Somalia and the Hormuz Strait in Persian Gulf on the ocean's north-west are the focus of traditional and emerging world powers' due to their significance as choke points in key sea routes.

Many thinkers already predict that we are entering the geo-energy era in which issues of energy security, both security of demand and security of supply, would reshape inter-state relations and might herald re-configuration of the global power hierarchy. Energy security is certain to be pivotal role player in generating conflict and alliance conditions.

Land is still not an alternative to sea. For example, it's cheaper to transport a ton of coal 5000 miles on a bulk carrier vessel than 500 km by rail³. Some 90 per cent of world trade is done through sea⁴.

There are many new developments in recent time in the Indian Ocean as Arabindu Acharya put it, "The maritime milieu now represents the new ground zero of asymmetric threats such as terrorism, piracy and organized crime. These non-conventional threats involving various types of low-intensity conflicts related to sea, pose significant challenge to the good order at seas"⁵.

Piracy is a rising security issue of Indian Ocean. Pirates around Somali coast, the most pirate infested part of Indian Ocean, attacked about 75 ships and hijacked 14 of them in 2012 whereas the global figure was 28 hijacks. The Yemen coast, waters of southern India and Sri Lanka, Sumatra coast of Indonesia and northern Bay of Bengal are the other pirate prone areas of the Indian Ocean. Arms smuggling, especially small arms and explosives, is a significant activity in Indian Ocean region. East Africa, Middle East, India and Afghan-Pak area are now major arms smuggling areas. Even semi-volatile places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh etc. are under threat to a great degree. Apart from traditional

² <http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/6521/>

³ Eric Grove, "Maritime Power- Concepts and Prognosis," in *Maritime Dimension of a New World Order*, edited by Ravi Vohra & Devbrated Chakraborty, (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2007)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Arabinda Acharya, "Threats to Good Order and Prognosis," in *Maritime Dimension of a New World Order*, edited by Ravi Vohra & Devbrated Chakraborty, (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2007), p.86.

worries of the smaller nations with regard to competition amongst the bigger powers in Indian Ocean region, these asymmetric threats pose the danger of entangling them at odds with the bigger powers. There are international agreements and conventions that do not allow unlawful arms supply through any country or its territory, yet acts of non-state actors and sometimes backing from states make things complex. By and large, it seems that international relations and strategic equations are still mired in the dilemma of realism and idealism.

Piracy and trafficking in the Indian Ocean are criminal as well as security and even geo-political issues. Piracy in the high waters and near the coasts has a long history from before classical antiquity through medieval ages till now. Ancient piracy that evolved and continued up to early modern era had been successfully quelled by colonial powers in 18th and 19th century. Recent piracy has a different context.

The increased modern piracy in the Indian Ocean is a significant development and has multifaceted ramifications. The implications are economic, geo-strategic and security related. The central problem with the phenomenon of piracy is its multiple and wider dimension. It's just not a law and order issue in the sea; sometimes it is linked to broader politico-military and even economic situation in certain states e.g. present Somalia, formerly northern Sri Lanka etc.

With the evolving balance of power the Indian Oceanic domain is already in a flux. China's emergence as a major player in this largely troubled domain is evoking preemptions and reactions. Resumption of normal trade and commerce including the vital energy supply is of paramount importance at this time of change.

Illegal trafficking is more of a modern phenomenon. But it involves a host of things e.g. human, arms, narcotics, logistics supplies to armed people etc. in addition to commerce. All the formerly mentioned elements have security, strategic and international political implications. Regions of the Indian Ocean's trans-region are infested with various types of politico-military troubles. Middle-East has now become the hotspot of deadly clashes between sectarian armies and militias. Mass persecution and killing of civilians are also taking place. Local and global terrorism is widespread in the Middle East. The Af-Pak sub-region at the convergence of Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia is supposedly the most infested area by local and global terrorism. East Africa is in an anarchical state with the situation in Somalia and South Sudan. Other semi-vulnerable countries include India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda,

Myanmar, Maldives etc. This volatility makes trafficking a vital issue in the area. The economic and humanitarian angles can't also be underestimated.

Trafficking of human beings in Indian Ocean trans-region is more of economic and humanitarian matter and partly a security issue. But at places it has quite some international relations dimension. Illegal arms trafficking on the other hand are a serious politico-military issue in Indian Ocean and its rim and require immediate attention. Trafficking of narcotics is both – an independent criminal act and also related to militants operating in lawless areas where these are produced and supplied from.

This paper examines the present state of piracy and trafficking in Indian Ocean, the contextual and causal links to the phenomenon and challenges faced by the security policy makers and finally make some recommendations.

Past, Present and Future of Piracy in Indian Ocean

The Past

There was the phenomenon of piracy in and around Malacca during the retreat of the fleet of Chinese Yuan empire in 13th century being betrayed by their Javanese ally. There was an element of vengeance in that.

The failed colonialists were one of the major reasons of piracy in Indian Ocean from late Medieval Ages to early modernity. The Portuguese and the Dutch are mentionable. There were local or regional pirates as well. *Mog* pirates from present day Rakhaine state of Myanmar created terror in the coastal waters of the Bay of Bengal.

Before that, the Moguls had to deal with European pirates. Arab piracy was also recorded after European conquest of South Asia. Some kingdoms like the *Chola* empire of south India sometimes made alliance with the pirates in return for their naval service.

In 18th century Maratha pirates dominated western Indian coastal waters. They even dared to ask for taxes from the merchant ships of East India Company. By 19th century piracy in Indian ocean was by and large suppressed with the consolidation of European colonial powers and their increasing naval strength.

The Current State of Affairs

Since the late 19th century both coastal and blue waters of Indian Ocean have enjoyed continuous peace from the pirates. That came to an end since

the Seventies of the past century but piracy did not spread in a significant scale. It rather grew gradually. Insurgency in many littoral states played some role in the increase.

The collapse of the Somalian state on African east coast has given a spectacular rise to piracy in that part of the Indian Ocean.

The significance of Indian Ocean in terms of energy supply and trade is simply immense. The Ocean and its affiliated seas hold the world's most important choke points for energy supply as demonstrated below:

Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Transported Through World Chokepoints, 2007-2011					
Location	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Bab el Mandab	4.6	4.5	2.9	2.7	3.4
Turkish Straits	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	N/A
Danish Straits	3.2	2.8	3.0	3.0	N/A
Strait of Hormuz	16.7	17.5	15.7	15.9	17.0
Panama Canal	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8
Crude Oil	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Petroleum Products	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline	4.7	4.6	3.0	3.1	3.8
Suez Crude Oil	1.3	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.8
Suez Petroleum Products	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4
SUMED Crude Oil	2.4	2.1	1.2	1.1	1.7
Notes: All estimates are in million barrels per day. "N/A" is not available.					
* The table does not include a breakdown of crude oil and petroleum products for most chokepoints because only the Panama Canal and Suez Canal have official data to confirm breakdown numbers. Adding crude oil and petroleum products may be different than the total because of rounding.					
** Data for Panama Canal is by fiscal years.					
<i>Source: EIA estimates based on APEX Tanker Data (Lloyd's Maritime Intelligence Unit). Panama Canal Authority and Suez Canal Authority,</i>					

Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Transported Through World Chokepoints, 2007-2011

Location	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<i>converted with EIA conversion factors.</i>					

The following detailed map illustrates the significance of the Indian Ocean in terms of vital sea energy supply and trade route including other factors like areas under security threats from pirates; also, it shows the major hinterland and littoral states including their level of access to sea.



Pirates around the Somali coast, the most pirate infested part of Indian Ocean, attacked about 75 ships and hijacked 14 of them in 2012 where as the global figure was 28 hijacks⁶. Yemen coast, waters of southern India and Sri Lanka, Sumatra coast of Indonesia and northern Bay of Bengal are the other pirate prone areas of Indian Ocean.

But north western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are way ahead in the degree of piracy than the other regions. Recognizing the hazard posed by piracy in the Arabian Sea, a number of international coalitions have

⁶ <http://www.ibtimes.com/pirates-global-waters-somalia-has-business-model-fallen-flatcriminals-oceans-high-sea-piracy>>

moved to address the issue. The United Nations established the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in 2009 under UN Security Council Resolution 1851. That includes more than 66 state participants. Also, the United Nations Development Programme–Somalia and the UN Political Office for Somalia collaborate on counter-piracy measures. Furthermore, there are three maritime forces that patrol the waters off Somalia: the European Union Naval Force's Operation Atalanta; NATO's Operation Ocean Shield; and the Combined Task Force 151. Many states also have unilaterally or multilaterally worked on counter-piracy efforts in this area⁷.

Most of these counter-piracy efforts have come in the form of maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Throughout the course of 2011, more than 30 countries have deployed naval vessels in this area, performing routine patrols for pirates and responding to distress calls. But the vastness of the pirate prone area and limited numbers of patrolling vessels has been a real issue.

What Lies in the Future

There seems to be tacit understanding and cooperation among the major powers in the north-western Indian Ocean with regards to suppressing Somali piracy. This is a constructive development, especially among some otherwise competing entities e.g. US, China, Russia, India. All these powers carry out anti-piracy patrolling, undertake rescue missions.

The de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland in the north of Somalia are more stable areas and are cooperating greatly in anti-piracy drive both on and off shore.

Despite the reluctance of international actors to involve themselves onshore, local and regional actors are more than willing to pursue pirates on land. Both the authorities of Puntland and Somaliland have set up counter-piracy forces in an effort to intercept and detain pirates. Especially the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was created to combat piracy from the land. In June 2012, the PMPF carried out a series of successful attacks on pirate bases, including an aerial assault on the residence of a notorious pirate and raids against the pirate-controlled towns of Bargal, Eyl, Hafun, and Hul-Anod. The PMPF and the government of Puntland are also

⁷ <http://csis.org/publication/combating-piracy-challenges-and-opportunities-regional-and-private-sector-involvement>

working to bring stability to those areas from which pirates have traditionally operated⁸.

It's important that such understanding holds and is getting better. There are instances in history that bad trends, which are monetarily beneficial to the impoverished, spread. There is no dearth of impoverished nations along the Indian Ocean rim.

The state fragility, especially of the east and southeast African countries and other countries like Yemen is a constant danger. Any Somalia-like collapse of a few of these could spread the danger of piracy to such a degree which would be difficult to suppress.

Spread of insurgency is another area to look out for. Insurgents like erstwhile LTTE, the Acheh militants etc. may give rise to acts of piracy as an easy means to gain money and materials.

The Scenario of Illegal Trafficking

Human Trafficking

Recently, *BBC Online* reported the heart-rending news of the discovery of 171 people, mainly Bangladeshis, from Thai jungle camps in appalling conditions. It seemed that they were victims of organised slave trade. Tempted by the prospect of jobs, they were taken to be sold as slaves. Illiterate Bangladeshi labourers seeking work in South East Asian countries like Malaysia, Thailand or Singapore are frequent victims of human trafficking. The Bay of Bengal and adjacent rivers is one common route of such crimes.

This is just one example. There are many such incidents happening in various corners of the Indian Ocean trans-region. Human trafficking is a global phenomenon. Patrick Belser of ILO estimated a global annual profit of \$31.6 billion in 2005. In 2008, the United Nations estimated nearly 2.5 million people from 127 different countries were being trafficked into 137 countries around the world⁹.

The United Nations have a protocol with respect to human trafficking called *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children*; in short *Trafficking Protocol*. This is an international agreement as a supplement under the UN Convention against

⁸ Ibid

⁹ http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081971.pdf

Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) which had come into force in December 2003. The Trafficking Protocol is the first universal, lawfully obligatory instrument on trafficking in many decades and it now has 163 signatories.

It has two principle purposes; one is to facilitate international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators and the other is to protect and help human victims with full respect for their rights as established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The trafficking protocol identifies human trafficking as:

- a) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
- b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
- c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this article;
- d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age¹⁰.

Sexual exploitation is the most common purpose of human trafficking (79%). The overwhelming proportion of the victims of sexual exploitation is women and girls. In some parts of the world, women traffic women. The next most regular aim of human trafficking is forced labour (18%), although forced labour is less frequently detected and reported than trafficking for sexual exploitation and thus there is chance of misrepresentation.

¹⁰ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx>

Globally, almost 20 per cent of all trafficking victims are children. In some parts of Africa and the Mekong region, children are the majority (up to 100% in parts of West Africa)¹¹.

While trafficking seems to imply people moving across vast geography, most exploitation takes place close to home. Figures show intra-regional and domestic trafficking is random.

The United Nations Protocol against Trafficking in Persons — the foremost international agreement in this area — entered into force in 2003. The report shows that in the past few years the number of member states seriously implementing the Protocol has more than doubled (from 54 to 125 out of the 155 States covered)¹². But, there are still many countries that don't have the needed legal instruments or political will.

Economic and criminal reasons are the foremost ones in case of human trafficking in the Indian Ocean trans-region. Also there is militancy and terrorism related trafficking. The latter is mostly on consensus basis and traffickers arrange movement of willing people to certain destinations. The traffickers themselves also could be part of those outfits or networks. The latter kind of trafficking is taking place in the Af-Pak sub-region, Middle East, Central Asia and also allegedly in South Asia.

The prime economic cause related human trafficking is routed from relatively impoverished nations to the more prosperous nations e.g. Bangladesh to Malaysia, Pakistan to Gulf countries, South East Asia to Australia etc. These are also routes from Asia to Europe through Middle East and North Africa. Indian Ocean is being used often in these activities.

The criminal human trafficking is related to forced labour, sexual slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, human organ trade etc. There is a host of international conventions and protocols against criminal human trafficking.

There is often an exploitation angle in human trafficking of economic migrants. The traffickers often allure economic migrants by depicting a brighter picture of the target destination which is not really the case. They deliberately hide the perils and sufferings the economic migrants may endure if they are trafficked to those places.

Sometimes human trafficking creates tension and deteriorates bilateral relations among originating and destination countries. The alleged

¹¹ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html>


¹² Ibid.

human trafficking from Bangladesh to India is worth mentioning. The 'Push Back/ Push In' effort of alleged victims of trafficking in the nineties made the stakes high between the two neighbours. The ups and downs in relations between Bangladesh-Malaysia and Bangladesh-Gulf States could be the other examples.

Trafficking of child jockeys from South and South East Asia for Camel race in some Gulf state is a humanitarian issue. The children endure health hazards and danger of injuries.

The following human trafficking index map¹³ shows the comparative vulnerability of Indian Ocean rim in this regards.

Trafficking Index 2013



Trafficking of Illegal Weapons

Numerous armed hostilities like counter insurgency and counter terrorism warfare, national or multi-national, sectarian and ethnic conflicts or insurgency etc. have made some sub-regions of Indian Ocean rim as violence infested areas in the world. There is high demand of illegal

¹³ http://www.greenhotelier.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Trafficking_2013_Press_Map_22.pdf

weapons in these areas. Hence supplies find their way into those places and often through Indian Ocean or its affiliated seas, gulfs, straights etc.

Illegal arms trafficking, especially small arms and explosives, is a frequent activity in Indian Ocean region. East Africa, Middle, India East and Afghan-Pak areas are now under major arms smuggling activities and threats therefrom. Even semi-volatile places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh etc. also face the danger of arms trafficking to a considerable extent. These asymmetric threats from non-state actors and at times allegedly state actors in disguise including the use of each nation's geographic area as routes for arms trafficking pose the danger of entangling them at loggerheads with the bigger powers. There are international agreements and conventions not to allow illegal arms supply through any country or its territory yet acts of non-state actors and sometimes states collaboration make things complicated.

To gauge the pervasiveness of the illegal arms trafficking and their use let's take the case of South Asian region of the Indian Ocean rim. In 2005, out of some 75 million firearms in South Asia, only 12 million were legal while there were 63 million illegal firearms in civilian hands. Indian and Pakistani civilians overwhelmingly account for 40 million and 20 million weapons while civilians in Nepal and Sri Lanka own the remaining three million. Around two million people were engaged directly or indirectly in illegal arms trafficking in South Asia. In Bangladesh alone at least 400,000 illegal and 25,000 licensed guns are used across the country for criminal activities¹⁴. The states have deteriorated since 2005 rather than strengthened. Alongside criminals, insurgents and radical non-state actors are the major users of these illegally trafficked arms in the Indian Ocean countries. Production of explosive materials locally, regionally or trans-regionally is another issues of severity. Suicide or planted bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is the most lethal tool being used by radicals and terrorists of the areas to devastating effect causing huge loss of lives, injuries, collateral damage, systemic dysfunction and thus hampering public life greatly. The social and psychological ramifications are immense.

Middle East and East Africa are two other most affected regions in the rim.

Gas operated small arms like AK-47 semi-automatic or its variants are relatively easier to replicate and in some areas local home grown weapon craftsmen are making these with local resources.

¹⁴ <http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/05/30/d6053001107.htm>

Also there are allegations of state sponsored illegal arms hauls through intelligence channels or hired people. Resolved or died down conflicts in some areas have made weapons redundant and hence lucrative for supply to conflict places where these are needed.

Narcotics

Narcotics or drug trafficking is an illicit trade worldwide involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws. Drugs cause serious harm to physical and mental health of its abusers and also addicted people commit a huge proportion of crimes in many countries including the countries of Indian Ocean rim.

A massive amount of illegal narcotics trade and trafficking takes place in Indian Ocean trans-region.


Presently, world heroin consumption (340 tons) and seizures correspond to a yearly trafficking of 430-450 tons of heroin into the global heroin market. Of that total, opium from Myanmar and Laos yields some 50 tons, while the rest, some 380 tons of heroin and morphine, is produced solely from Afghan opium. While about 5 tons are consumed and seized in Afghanistan, the residual bulk of 375 tons is trafficked all over the globe via routes flowing into and through the neighbouring countries.

The chief heroin trafficking corridors linking Afghanistan to the huge markets of the Russian Federation and Western Europe are the Balkan and Central Asian routes. The route to Western Europe traverses Iran frequently via Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across South-East Europe to the Western European markets. The value of this market is some \$20 billion. The size of the northern market is estimated to total \$13 billion per year and the route runs mainly through some of these central Asian countries Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The final destination is the Russian Federation.

Worldwide heroin seizures reached a record level of 73.7 metric tons in 2008. Most of the heroin was seized in North Africa and Middle East and South-West Asia (39 per cent of the global total), South-East Europe (24 per cent) and Western and Central Europe (10 per cent). The global swell in heroin seizures over the period 2006-2008 was driven largely by unrelenting growing seizures in Iran and Turkey. These two countries accounted for more than half of global heroin seizures and registered, for

the third consecutive year in 2008, as the highest and second highest seizures worldwide, respectively.

Global Heroin Flows from Asian Points of Origin




Production and trafficking of narcotics is almost inextricably linked to financing of armed militancy all over the world. The Golden Crescent (Afghanistan) and Golden Triangle (Northern Myanmar-Laos) are the prime geographic sources of opium. Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia and even Africa are infested by these phenomena. Such production and trafficking, locally and internationally, affect adversely the local population and also population of target region profoundly.

The following map illustrates drugs trafficking routes in and out of Pakistan¹⁵.

¹⁵ <https://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile.html>

Drugs Trafficking Routes in and out of Pakistan



The sheer number of routes in from the Golden Crescent indicates how badly the country is effected as the trafficking route and consequently use of drugs as well.

The Context and the Causality:

Political and Security

Arms-trafficking is the most dangerous among all these issues in contention. Obviously, a perilous act such as arms trafficking occurs in a politico-security backdrop following a sequence of causality. Indian Ocean trans-region is no exception to this.

It is important to understand certain socio-political and even economic contexts for an insight into the arms trafficking phenomena in this part of the world. Religio-political radicalization and ethnocentric clamour for political power are the two prime reasons for hostility in Indian Ocean rim. During cold war era it was also ideological, which is hardly a reality now. Inept external intervention often exacerbated situations.

Certain sub-region or countries have also turned into the playground for directly competing for influence of regional powers. Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Syria are the examples. Few other nations are the domains of strategic competition of major powers e.g. Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand etc. Even parts of bigger countries fall in this category e.g. North East of India and Kashmir, parts of Indonesia, North West of Pakistan etc.

Militant religious/sectarian radicalization is the biggest cause of them all. But these are often mixed with ethnic dimensions. Again there are numerous competing radical or semi-radical armed groups. Big powers are often linked to certain groups. Exclusion and state suppression of societal segments make things worse. All these, in combination, create scenarios where violence and hostility is greatly sought for implementing radical ideology, put up resistance or as a bargaining tool for gaining political power.

This demand-supply situation mostly follows market rules but in the black market reality. When the demand is more the supply of arms by trafficking or other means is also more. Illegal arms trafficking are also done under state sponsorship for gaining tactical/geo-strategic upper hand through proxies in key battle grounds for the sway. But these are conducted clandestinely for obvious reasons. Non-state people or networks are often utilized for this purpose.

In certain cases there was report of arms trafficking between leftist fractions of neighbouring countries. Collaboration on arms trafficking between Naxalites of Central India and Maoists of Nepal is worth mentioning.

There are links of some human trafficking to radical militancy. Often people of certain ideology living in other regions volunteer to fight in some other country side by side their ideological brethren. Afghanistan is a classic example, and now Syria and Iraq as well.

Narcotics trafficking route normally originates in a lawless militancy inflicted area and ends in the lucrative developed or middle income markets. Developing countries are also affected. Afghanistan and northern Myanmar are two such hotspots in the Indian Ocean trans-region.

Before the collapse of Somalia as a viable state, piracy was mostly a criminal issue in waters of northern Sri Lanka where some acts were linked to LTTE. But plunging of the most part of a sizable country like Somalia into militant anarchy which has a long stretch of exposure to busy commercial sea routes in Indian Ocean did open a floodgate of piracy in a

big chunk of oceanic waters. It began in the middle of the last decade, reached its pick around 2009-11 and still continues though with lower intensity. The pirates were of both types; independent gangs and groups linked to militias. The money and materials found in the victim ship and of course the ransom money for the hostages were linked to direct or indirect financing of the fractions, at least partly.

Economic

One of the outcomes of unequal development in various regions of Indian Ocean rim is labour migration, legal or illegal. The latter is closely linked with human trafficking. The illiterate redundant workers of overpopulated developing countries desperately need work abroad to live and maintain their families. Their situation is exploited by traffickers. They paint a hopeful picture of the destination country hiding the perils of the illegal trafficking which the victims would endure. Even many intending migrant workers are so desperate that despite getting some sense of the danger they are ready to take the risk. The usual routes are from South and South-East Asia to the Middle East; and recently from South Asia to South East Asia.

The trafficking of illegal arms clearly holds economic interest of the traders and traffickers. They could be plain illegal traffickers of ideologically motivated ones. In some regions quite a number of people are involved in such economic acts and that has noticeable economic influence on those communities. Af-Pak borders, North East India- Northern Myanmar etc. are the hotspots.

Trafficking of narcotics and piracy has similar economic reasons.

Humanitarian

Humanitarian situation develops when the trafficked human beings are stranded in difficult places on the way.. Their vessels often run out of essential supplies or even get sunk in the sea due to various reasons. Often the coast border guards chase them and stop them from reaching the destination making them destitute in a no man's land or waters.

The trafficked people despite reaching the destination often face dire humanitarian consequences in relation to their living condition, legal status, earnings, sexual exploitation or exploitation as slaves etc. Use of trafficked children as jockeys in the camel race in some Gulf States is an appalling example.

Impact

Piracy creates insecurity in both regionally and globally vital trade routes in the Indian Ocean. Trade and supplies are hampered and delayed. Longer detours raise the shipping cost. Escorting involves additional security resources.

Arms-trafficking stimulates violence. It also creates tension in international relations. It prolongs politico-military conflicts and often encourages armed crimes. Regions of Indian Ocean rim are some of the worst sufferers.

The intensity of illicit trafficking of narcotics in the countries of the trans-region is high and it causes youth decay. Edicts are increasingly engaging in criminal acts. Drugs production is also related to its abuse in the home country as well as misuse of the earnings.

Human trafficking is more of economic and humanitarian phenomena. Yet in some cases it has created some bilateral tensions among the countries of Indian Ocean rim.

The Pakistan Angle

Pakistan has one of the highest per capita rates of gun ownership in the world. Despite the lack of official figures, rough estimates put the total number of small arms at large in Pakistan at more than 20 million, half of them being illegal. KP alone is believed to have nearly half a million illegitimate small arms and light weapons¹⁶.

Raza Shah Khan, head of the Peshawar-based Sustainable Peace and Development Organisation (SPADO) explains “Tribesmen involved in illegal arms manufacturing already have basic skills, raw materials and their places of work. The government and international agencies can assist them in switching to making other things such as agricultural tools, surgical goods and car parts”.

Khan noted that illegal arms manufacturers were getting squeezed out of business by the propensity of smuggled weapons available in the region. He added “This is the time that the government can support them in regularising and diversifying the industry”. Activists have called for substitute jobs for those involved in Pakistan’s illegal arms manufacturing industry, located mostly in north-western parts of the country.

¹⁶ <http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34290>

This proliferation of arms began in reaction to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. An estimated 30 per cent of the weapons funnelled by US and Pakistani intelligence services¹⁷, in addition to the cross-border flow of weapons, to the Afghan Mujahedeen resistance during the conflict were diverted to other purposes both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, according to anti-small arms activists. The traditional free movement of Pashtun tribesmen through Af-Pak border even until now and the lack of border guards have harmed the cause. Eleven per cent of the Afghan economy derives from illicit arms trade and Pakistan is the worst affected by this outside Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, the illegal arms market supplies militant sectarian groups, terrorists, drug cartels, criminals and those seeking protection from such groups. In addition, tribal disputes in the frontier provinces of Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab are perpetrated by the abundance of cheaply available firearms.

Also in the southern port city of Karachi, nearly 18,000 people fell victim to gun violence between 1992 and 1998.

The situation hasn't improved in the last one decade or more rather it has worsened.

Policy Challenges

Dealing with piracy and illegal trafficking isn't easy in the context of Indian Ocean trans-region. Policy makers at national and international level are faced with multifarious problems in this respect.

The Level of Threat

In some countries and sub-regions the level of threat of illegal arms and narcotics trafficking is high enough to merit major effort of both hard and soft power. On the one hand, it requires security or law enforcing agencies operations which sometimes evoke reactions. Also reconciliatory and rehabilitation measures are imperative alongside. The difficult terrain of the most infested areas is another challenge. Sometimes, it appears that some states aren't simply strong and resourceful enough to suppress the phenomenon smartly.

¹⁷ Ibid

Involvement of armed radicals has made the situation worse. The Pak-Afghan border region is an example.

Asymmetric Nature of Threat

Efforts for wider international cooperation in the Indian Ocean rim on piracy and trafficking often face the obstacle due to the asymmetric nature of threat faced by different countries.

In the Pak Afghan sub-region trafficking of weapons and drugs are the greatest worries for rich Gulf States, for the well off South East Asia it's the human trafficking. Australia also concentrates on preventing illegal human trafficking to its shores.

In the waters adjacent to Africa's east coast piracy is the main worry for major trading nations.

Despite various international conventions and protocols regional cooperation appears to fall short of what is required.

The Question of Coherence

Both at national and regional levels it appears that successive leaderships have failed to maintain an appropriate momentum necessary to quell both trafficking and piracy, especially the former. There is a sense that sometimes such shifts are for regional political reasons. After a change of government or regime the new leaders often lower or discontinue pre-existing endeavour. The reverse is also true in some instances.

The Question of Consensus

The passing by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) last year is a noteworthy accomplishment considering the traditional resistance to dealing with conventional armaments, and in particular small arms and light weapons (SALW) within the UN framework as well as the huge weight of the lobbies that opposed such a treaty¹⁸.

The treaty will reinforce the in vogue, rather weak, instruments to prevent illicit trafficking, in particular of SALW, which cause the most violence and victims both during conflict and peacetime.

¹⁸ <http://www.gcsp.ch/Emerging-Security-Challenges/Publications/GCSP-Publications/Policy-Papers/The-Arms-Trade-Treaty-Half-Full-or-Half-Empty>

The execution of the treaty will depend on national resources required in particular for export and import control, reporting, legislation, border control, etc., which can be challenging for developing countries.

A wider regional consensus, in the affected regions, is a must that is based on honest actions against trafficking and piracy by one nation and reciprocity from the concerned others. The consensus has to be both on principles and the modus operandi. International conventions and protocols are useful yet there are always grey areas which are required to be addressed at national and regional level.

Regional politics and geo-strategic competition are also mired by these perilous phenomena.

Legal Conundrums

Every nation of the globe has its own laws and these are hardly synchronized. Hence, there are loopholes in cases of trafficking and piracy where more than one nation's law is involved. Legal actions often get disputed or procedure becomes stagnant against pirates, traffickers and their actions. Indian Ocean rim is no exception to these predicaments.

Sometimes perpetrators can't be deported to the appropriate country where he did these acts just because of the lack of extradition agreements.

Rachel Stohl of International Relations and Security Network (ISN) has rightly identified three legal issues with respect to illegal arms trafficking which are relevant for Indian Ocean rim countries as well — linkages between legal and illicit, complacency challenges and challenges in national regulations vs. international control¹⁹.

- a. *Linkages between Legal and Illicit*: The legal trade of conventional weapons is inextricably linked to illicit arms transfers. Although legal ambiguities and intentional or unintentional loopholes in national legislation may make it difficult to categorize a sale as purely legal or illicit, nearly all illegal arms sales begin as legal transactions. Further complicating control efforts, some arms sales may be legal under one country's national laws but violate international standards or even humanitarian or human rights law. Often these weak or unclear national laws and practices — which contribute to

¹⁹ <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail?id=182905>

- increased risk of diversion, theft, looting, and corruption — allow legal arms to move quickly and easily to the illicit market, using the tools of globalization to circumvent controls.
- b. ***Compliance Challenges:*** The lack of consistent controls also creates compliance challenges for the legal defence industry engaging in the global arms trade. Without knowing the specific rules and regulations for all countries involved in various aspects of the international trade, companies may inadvertently violate national laws and find it challenging to ensure compliance with the myriad regulations in place. These challenges may then lead defence industries to support, wittingly or unwittingly, illicit arms flows.
 - c. ***National Regulation vs. International Control:*** Although the arms trade is increasingly more global, conventional arms regulation mechanisms tend to be more national in nature. These incongruous control mechanisms can contribute to the ease with which violent actors can attain weapons at the global level.”

The Extraordinary Difficulty Faced by Pakistan

Pakistan is caught in the contradiction, especially in case of arms trafficking and use locally and across boarder, between the strong militant and independent traditionalism especially of the Pashtun and responsibility of a modern Weberian state. The latter is supposed to have the monopoly over legitimate use of force within its boundary which is extremely difficult to implement.

Already the focus has more been on the containment, at least for time being, rather than reversing the arms possession and use traditions, be the weapon legal or illegal. Making the entire Pakistani society illegal arms free in one continuous go is probably unrealistic. Again putting an inner border inside Pakistan along the less regulated tribal agencies could in itself be a strange and potentially divisive act. Hence, that option is perhaps not looked into. However, devising a smart path to demilitarize society is a must for the future of Pakistan. The irony is armed radical and militants in Pakistan are targeting Pakistanis more than its traditionally perceived enemies.

Majority of the mainstream political forces in Pakistan appear to be in a tacit agreement about not tolerating the limitless acts of the armed

radicals, yet the softer stand of some emerging political forces creates confusion.

A reasonable penetration of state apparatus in the less or no regulated tribal FATA is imperative for any change to happen. Anti-narcotics campaign and drives would also be possible then.

Conclusion

The very geography of the Indian Ocean has created a natural sphere of related activities. This is a natural and continuous maritime trans-region along with its associated land mass and any major development or phenomenon can't be seen in isolation. Moreover, the countries are increasingly getting closer due to the unpredictable trends of regionalism in line with the undeniable ethos of globalization of this post-modern era.

Trafficking and piracy are indeed major issues in Indian Ocean. The multi faced links of the phenomena to other factors indicate that these are complex issues. A holistic approach well supported by national and regional stake holders is imperative to address these trafficking and piracy issues in the Indian Ocean trans-region.

Recommendations

- a. Anti-piracy efforts in Somali Coast in vogue are more of individual major power acts as and when they feel necessary. Surely better coordination and fool-proof anti-piracy measures are a must. Major powers of Indian Ocean will have to take initiative for that and others can also contribute. Instead of uncoordinated individual endeavours, it's better to deploy a maritime anti-piracy task force under UN sanctions where detailed measures and role of each contributor would be clearly delineated.
- b. To prevent pirates using the Somali shores, bringing aboard the Somali factions under some sustainable explicit or tacit understanding is essential. Certain Somali factions like Al-Shabab are declared terrorist by many major powers. Therefore, some mechanism has to be devised so as to bring out lasting commitment from them that areas under their control won't be used as launching hub for pirates.
- c. Anarchy in Somalia has to stop for piracy in the adjacent waters to come to a permanent end. Similarly state collapse in any vulnerable

sub-region in the Indian Ocean rim may herald similar situation. Therefore it's also the responsibility of the international community to undertake pre-emptive measures to prevent that.

- d. For countering human trafficking it's imperative to align laws of each land in these areas with the international conventions and protocols. Regional organizations like ASEAN, SAARC, GCC may do this oversight alongside the global bodies like the UN and ILO etc.
- e. Better training and capacity for the law enforcing agencies of the countries of origin of human trafficking would help preventing it at the very beginning. Affected wealthy nations may help developing such capacity in terms of manpower, resource and advanced training.
- f. But eventually unless growth and development is spread in the populous underdeveloped countries of Indian Ocean rim it would be difficult to completely stop human trafficking.
- g. To bring trafficking of arms to an end requires the greatest possible understanding and both short and long terms regional political and international political settlements. Regional politics and geo-strategic completion have to be taken out of the dangerous phenomena of arms and drugs trafficking. Situations in flux countries like Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia, Uganda etc. are the real problems where it's not clear which group is the winner or what would happen in future. Although very difficult yet a greater effort is to be undertaken case by case to delink all external actors from these scenarios with a mechanism of check and balance for honesty. That, if successful, would end state sponsored and some non-state arms trafficking to a great extent.
- h. Major bilateral disputes e.g. Kashmir are required to be resolved both short and long term. That would prevent some enthusiastic non-state actors from indulging in arms trafficking. Also state vigilance and deterrence action are necessary to stop non-state actors from arms and narcotics trafficking.
- i. International conventions/ laws with respect to arms and narcotics trafficking are required to be comprehensive rather than just brief protocols and national laws will have to be properly synchronized/amended in line with the international ones.

- j. For Pakistan incremental yet continuous disarmament of illegal weapons of every segment of the society appears to be a more logical course rather than rapid actions which are likely to evoke armed reactions and cause more bloodshed.
- k. Social campaign involving the locals against abuse of narcotics may help its eradication in Pakistan. ■

Chapter 2

Maritime and Naval Power Play: Competing Roles and Missions

Rear Admiral (R) Pervaiz Asghar

Abstract

The Indian Ocean region since times immemorial had been an oasis of peace and prosperity, propelled largely by an overt and mutual dependence on trade. Colonial powers like the Portuguese, Dutch, French and the British, which made their presence felt from the dawn of the 16th century, transformed it into an arena for securing their trade interests and gaining over all influence in the region. In the wake of the Second World War, when territorial occupation became unsustainable for Britain, it sought to pass the baton on to a reliable partner. As country after country attained independence, Britain absorbed the Chagos Archipelago as a British Indian Ocean Territory and a year later in 1966, leased one of its Atolls, Diego Garcia, to the US, which proceeded to transform it into a huge naval and air base. Firmly entrenched thus, the US used this leverage to safeguard the energy corridor, neutralise Soviet regional influence and deploy its Soviet-oriented submarine-based ballistic missiles. The introduction of the US Trident missile in particular forced the Soviets to maintain their own presence in the area to counteract this threat. Following the end of the Cold War, the US had to increase rather than decrease its naval presence in order to effectively respond to the various crises that wracked the region. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in the setting up of a number of maritime Combined Task Forces geared towards regional stability. India, for geographical, historical and socio-economic reasons, has always eyed a dominant role for itself, though its ambition has been thwarted by the competing interests of the outside naval powers as well as its own naval inadequacy. With the US having recently signalled its intention for a strategic shift from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Navy stands ready to assert itself. China,

whose Navy has been largely kept out of the Indian Ocean through US and Indian machinations, is trying to assist regional countries in developing ports and trade routes. Pakistan's primary interest lies in ensuring order along its coastal belt, in the pursuit of which it has been cooperating with the international community through its participation in CTF 150 and 151 and other regional initiatives. The most disturbing development by far was the Pokhran nuclear test by India in 1974, which subsequently led to the more massive ones by both India and Pakistan some 24 years later. The planned integration of nuclear-tipped land-attack cruise missiles on board the indigenously-developed nuclear submarine INS Arihant does not augur well for future regional stability. The bottom line is that all stakeholders should join hands to work towards the common aim of promoting regional stability and security.

The Indian Ocean, since times immemorial, used to be an oasis of peace and prosperity, propelled largely by regional interdependence on trade. Geography, too, had conspired to make the Ocean what it was, being encircled on three sides by a land mass, while the fourth towards the South was guarded by a natural barrier, the roaring Forties and the fearsome Fifties. Another peculiarity of the Indian Ocean is that it is ringed by seas and straits which facilitate extra regional sea trade. This was used to good advantage by traders, who were given free rein by the rulers, as such trade was to everyone's benefit. The best way to do justice to the subject of maritime power play is thus to follow the fluctuating fortunes of the region in more or less a chronological sequence.

The brusque intrusion of the Portuguese, armed as they were with missionary zeal and equally powerful cannons, into these waters, followed by the Dutch, the British and the French, signalled the advent of adventurism and colonialism, which lasted for the next four centuries. What each of these countries tried to do in their own specific way was to control and exploit regional trade to their own benefit. The Portuguese strategy was to seize all strategic points abutting the main trade routes, the by-product being the extraction of tributes from the local rulers. The first of such treaties, extracted under duress, after a brief bombardment of the port city of Ormuz, was with its Ruler, and which served as a model for future endeavours.

The waning power of Spain, which was ruling Portugal at the time, convinced the Dutch traders in control of the spice trade within Europe, that the time had come for direct trade with India, with the first sortie of Dutch ships in 1595 proving to be a commercial success. This gave them other ideas, but with the Portuguese firmly entrenched, they devised the strategy of first gaining a foothold in Java on the outskirts of the Indian Ocean, and working their way inwards thereafter, capturing port after port from the Portuguese.

The Dutch East India Company, established in 1602, raked in fabulous profits after having established a near monopoly in the trade of fine spices, though its fortunes started waning some 190 years later, when it came close to bankruptcy, owing to a variety of external factors. The English and the French, following in the wake of the Dutch, set up their own Indian Companies in 1600 and 1604 respectively. Apart from setting up some small trade settlements in India, the French East India Company managed to obtain the perpetual grant of Madagascar and the neighbouring islands and in time occupied Mauritius, which it converted into a fortified naval base. The British East India Company, after having acquired some ports and some trading posts, tried to move on to the next stage, that of participation in production.

While the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French promoted the ports and markets that they conquered to the detriment of the traditional ports, the English went a step further: they created new port cities virtually from scratch, to serve their own economic and military interests.

The initial staunch opposition to the European maritime onslaught came from the Zamorins of Calicut, whose naval might was ably represented by the worthy Admirals of the Ali Marakar family, who continued to defy the Portuguese for well-nigh a century. The powerful Kings of Ceylon also kept the Portuguese at bay till Colombo was finally overcome through a determined Dutch onslaught in 1654. As the British gradually built up their authority in the factory towns of Surat, Madras and Calcutta, the Sidis held unchallenged sway over the Koncan Coast North of Goa till 1683, when the new star on the Indian horizon, Sidhoji Gujar and his successors, the Angrias, not only made short work of the Sidis, the Dutch and the waning Portuguese might, but also threatened the growing British presence. The English stranglehold over the Indian Ocean came about after it destroyed the power of the Angrias through a land and sea offensive against their principal fortress. On the other side of the Indian mainland in Bengal, the English had already commenced buying land there,

but their military takeover materialised after the decisive battle of Plassey in 1756. British rule in the coastal areas of Madras and Bengal was firmly consolidated during the next 30 years. The tragic Bengal famine (1769-1773), which exposed the corrupt practises of the Company officials, forced the British Government to assume partial administrative control over their Indian domain through the appointment of a Governor General.

Using these South Western and North Eastern enclaves as pivots, the British kept expanding into the Indian heartland, aided as they were through an adroit exploitation of regional rivalries and an equally dexterous exercise of maritime control from the port cities that they had established. The East India Company was finally abolished in 1857 when the British Crown, after ruthlessly crushing the Indian uprising, gained complete domination.

Five major developments had fuelled the British Indian Ocean enterprise: the ascendancy of the Royal Navy in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the Industrial Revolution, the advent of steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal to sea traffic. After capturing or creating a number of ports like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Penang, Sydney, Colombo, Capetown, Singapore, Aden and beyond the Ocean in Hong Kong, the British achieved near total domination of the Indian Ocean region, which lasted throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th. Under the British, the traditional ports, traditional trade patterns, traditional manufacturing centres and skills, all fell into decline and mainland India, which used to be self-sufficient in all respects, now became the biggest receptacle for British goods. British shipping likewise thrived under this regime, with a full 63 per cent of the combined ship tonnage sailing under the British flag by the end of the 19th century.

The strategic importance of the region gained further traction with the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908. Search for oil in the Arab countries around the Gulf was considerably stepped up in the period following the First World War, with American and British companies well positioned to control world oil supplies and prices. The Standard Oil Company of California took advantage of the straitened circumstances of King Saud of the newly set-up Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to negotiate an extremely favourable 60 year drilling concession.

Britain's hold over the region came under severe strain owing to the debilitating impact of the Second World War, and as country after country gained independence, it sought to pass the baton on to a trusted ally. The United States was equally keen and a number of exchanges between the two at the highest levels led to forging an understanding. The US was

particularly receptive towards setting up a base at a depopulated Diego Garcia and Britain accordingly obliged, through a carrot and stick policy towards Mauritius: while promising independence to Mauritius in 1965, it imposed the condition of relinquishing a part of their territory, the Chagos peninsula, which was renamed the British Indian Ocean Territory, with the deal being sweetened with a three million pounds developmental assistance. One of its islands, Diego Garcia, with an area of about 11 sq miles, was leased a year later to the United States and for the next six years Britain furtively relocated its 1000 odd residents to Mauritius to fend on their own. The United States gradually built up the Island into a formidable yet secretive naval, air and communications base and used its ideal location to telling effect, both for surveillance purposes as well as for reacting swiftly to emerging regional crises.

It is generally believed that the US had initially decided to step in to fill a void left by the departure of the British and to ensure the safety of the oil trade. In consonance with the acquisition of Diego Garcia, two parallel developments, namely the advent of the Polaris A3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile with a range of 2500 nautical miles, on board the Lafayette Class SSBNs and the signing of an agreement between Australia and the United States for the construction of a Very Low Frequency communications centre in North West Cape for facilitating communications with submerged submarines, were indicative of more subtler designs.

The deployment of these Polaris missiles so alarmed the Soviets that they had as early as 1964 promoted the creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy was thus forced to maintain some sort of a surface vessel presence in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, which they endeavoured to achieve from 1969 onwards, despite being hampered in this quest by a lack of base facilities in the area. The situation became even more alarming for the Soviets when facilities at their major hosting ground at the port of Berbera, Somalia, were denied to them in 1977 in the wake of the prevailing political turmoil and more so, when the Polaris SLBMs were replaced by the more capable and longer range Poseidon and Trident ballistic missiles.

Three nearly concurrent events of wide-ranging geopolitical significance, namely the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the deposition of the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi assault on Iran, forced the United States to visibly enhance its naval presence in the Gulf and in the Arabian Sea. The Rapid Deployment Force, which had hitherto remained as just a strategic concept since 1958, now became a reality 32 years later (1 March 1980) as

part of the Readiness Command at MacDill Air Force Base. It was soon incorporated into the US Central Command, which was established as a separate unified command responsible for the region surrounding the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea (excluding India and Egypt).

One would have imagined that the end of the Cold War in 1989 should have resulted in toning down the US Naval presence as well. This didn't unfortunately happen, as despite the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, crisis after crisis continued to plague the region. The tragic 9/11 terrorist attack, which precipitated the UN-mandated invasion of Afghanistan the same year followed by that of Iraq two years later, resulted in the setting up of a number of Combined Task Forces to enforce UN sanctions and monitor all illegal activities in the Gulf as well as the Arabian Sea. A separate Combined Task Force 151 was created when Somalia-based piracy assumed threatening dimensions. The European Union also got into the act, with its naval task force primarily employed in affording protection to the World Food Programme aid shipments. Along with a NATO task force, naval deployments from as many as 27 different countries made their way to the coast of Somalia to protect their own shipping in particular and world trade in general.

Despite its recently expressed intention to shift its maritime centre of gravity from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, the US finds itself unable to do so, as a series of regional crises demand its attention, from the need to display an aggressive stance to back up its 'all options on the table' threat over the Iran nuclear standoff, to the Syrian uprising. The recent emergence of the Islamic State, after having occupied large swathes of Iraqi and Syrian territory, has again resulted in the cobbling together of an international coalition, which is engrossed at the moment in the provision of intensive air support to Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

In the wake of the turbulence generated by the Second World War, Britain kept being divested of its former colonies and its residual influence until its regional role was reduced to that of a sidekick to the US. While continuing to maintain a small presence, it figured prominently in all the international coalitions cobbled together by the US. The likelihood of the Royal Navy to play a more prominent role may register an increase once its two aircraft carriers under construction become operational towards the end of the decade.

France has also consistently maintained an autonomous naval presence in the region. After having been forced to vacate its well-established air and naval base in Madagascar in 1975, France was lucky to

obtain a foothold in Mayotte Island which it continues to maintain along with its strategically important base at Djibouti. The French military has been a part of the coalition engaged in the invasion of Afghanistan as well as the current aerial offensive against the Islamic State.

China has long been conscious of its economic interests and vulnerabilities in the region, though its possible attempts at a sustained naval presence have been forestalled by US and Indian opposition. While worried about the security of its oil trade through the Indian Ocean, the Chinese have been focusing on helping countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to develop new ports and trade routes. Its economic interests having extended to mining in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the African continent, the Chinese continue to keep a wary eye on the regional situation. With two aircraft carriers under construction, the Chinese Navy appears determined to protect their ever expanding regional stakes in the future.

A major local aspirant to this high stakes game, India, has always eyed, for geographical, historical and socio-economic reasons, a dominant role for itself, though it's ambitions have been thwarted thus far by the competing regional designs of outside naval powers as well as its own military inadequacy. In the pursuance of its regional aspirations, the Indian Navy, despite its dwindling numerical strength, has been assiduously endeavouring to maintain a qualitative edge through the acquisition of a number of Soviet-built and indigenously constructed stealth warships. With the recent addition in its arsenal of a fully refurbished aircraft carrier, and a leased as well as an indigenously constructed nuclear submarine, the Indian Navy appears well poised to assert itself. Such blatant flexing of military muscle may boost a country's power credentials, but to its neighbours it is indicative of a disruptive and disquieting mindset. Such acquisitions, which are way beyond a country's legitimate defensive needs, can only lead to regional instability.

Pakistan's primary interest on the other hand lies in maintaining stability and security in its immediate area of interest, the North Arabian Sea. It remains cognisant at the same time of the trans-boundary threats which are a part of the landscape and the need to confront them through cooperative endeavours. It is through this realisation that the Pakistan Navy has been a part of the Combined Task Force 150 since 2005 and been entrusted with its command a number of times since. And when the Coalition Maritime Headquarters in Bahrain, in response to the growing spectre of Somalian piracy, decided to set up a dedicated counter piracy Combined Task Force 151, the Pakistan Navy immediately joined up in the

enterprise and a year and a half later became the first regional navy to be honoured with its command.

The most disturbing regional development by far was the so-called peaceful detonation of a nuclear device by India in Pokhran in May 1974. The spectre of a nuclear-armed hostile neighbour so alarmed Pakistan that it felt it had no option but to tread the same path. The next series of nuclear tests by India some 24 years later forced Pakistan yet again to follow suit with its own set of detonations. Both countries thus came out of the closet, revealing themselves to be what everyone else already suspected. To the dismay of the international community, both countries have spent and continue to allocate massive sums of money dedicated to the building up and upgradation of their nuclear arsenal. This has come about at a huge cost, to the detriment of the welfare and well-being of their respective citizens. The nuclear arms race having thus far been restricted to the land and the air, now threatens to spill over to the sea. The first of a series of indigenously constructed nuclear powered submarines is currently undergoing operational trials at sea, with the Indian Navy contemplating the integration of the nuclear-tipped Sagarika Land Attack Cruise Missile on board. This will not only add to the prevailing turmoil, but spread further disquiet amongst the littoral states dotting the Indian Ocean. One can only hope that good sense prevails and Pakistan in its turn disregards the temptation to react to this display of aggressive intent in a manner detrimental to the shared interests of the region.

All is not doom and gloom, however. Sri Lanka, which sits smack in the middle of the ocean, is one country that has always been sponsoring laudable initiatives aimed at ensuring peace and harmonious living. The proposal for declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was taken up by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister in January 1971, the underlying idea being to terminate the 'trend toward militarisation of the Indian Ocean and convert the negative concept of a power vacuum to the positive idea of a peace zone'. The Ad hoc Committee established by the UN General Assembly to pursue the matter kept at it till 1997, when it had completed its 450th meeting, but had to ultimately give up when the US Secretary of State publicly called for its disbanding on grounds of 'financial wastefulness'.

Two other notable initiatives with focus on regional cooperation and harmony are the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) of 1985 and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) of 1997. Of these two, the former has been more methodical while the latter boasts a much larger membership base, due in no small part

to the star power of its three major sponsors, Australia, India and South Africa. It is time, however, to ditch petty considerations in favour of a unified approach to the overall benefit of the littoral states.

Coastal states are becoming increasingly aware of the broader challenges that confront them, challenges that transcend national boundaries. Climate change has emerged as the single most major challenge confronting humanity, a threat that can only be effectively combatted in unison. The looming spectre of terrorism as a weapon of indiscriminate destruction became a major source of concern in the 21st century. A number of international maritime incidents like the bombing of the MV Limburg and the USS Cole had given rise to worries about the shape future terrorist strikes may take. Such concerns, which became more palpable in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist act, led to the formulation of the International Ship & Port Security Code, which called on all signatories of the SOLAS Convention to tighten and streamline security measures in ports and on board ships, for the overall safety of global trade.

In order to effectively tackle the threat of maritime terrorism, it became imperative to simultaneously clamp down on illegal activities like drug-smuggling (which constitutes a lucrative source of terrorist funding), human trafficking (which is used for transporting potential terrorists) and gun running (which keeps the terrorists well stocked in terms of weapons, ammo and explosives).

A Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan, with the voluntary participation of a number of countries, was chalked out for closely monitoring the Gulf region as well as the North Arabian Sea. When Somalian piracy began to pose a major threat to shipping by 2008, a large number of countries ventured forth into the area to protect their own merchant traffic as well as global trade as a whole. Apart from the joint initiatives of the EU and NATO, a dedicated Combined Task Force 151 for countering piracy was also set up with the willing participation of the countries involved in executing the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan.

The Indian Ocean littoral states are cognisant that all such global and trans-boundary challenges necessitate a unified response through greater cooperation and collaboration. Once this realisation takes on a more practical shape and narrow parochial interests give way to broader overarching common objectives, better days may be around the corner. ■

Chapter 3

Possible Implications of the Obama “Pivot” or “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” for the Indian Ocean Region*

David R. Jones

Despite the tendency of social scientists in general, as well as many strategists, to seek clear-cut conclusions that fit a range of theoretical perspectives, our ability to predict future developments remains questionable at best. Reality is usually much more complex and unpredictable than we are prepared to admit. Indeed a knowledge of the strategic-military, political-economic, cultural and technical factors required for a careful analysis of what Soviet soldiers once called the “correlation of forces” remains daunting. And as Moscow’s disastrous decision to invade Afghanistan in late 1979, or Washington’s optimistic assessments of its own Afghan and Iraq adventures after 9/11 indicate, the utility of war as a means of pursuing policy, however well calculated, will usually end by being little more than a throw of the deadly dice of death. For this reason what follows will suggest possible factors that policy-makers might consider in their calculations, and not provide them with inevitably flawed prescriptions for future action. After all, if the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is part of some “New Great Game,” zero-sum or otherwise, it is still a Game. And, as in all games, the unexpected must be expected and luck may not always be a lady.

To begin with, we must be aware of our assumptions. We should never forget that the global expansion of Europe after 1700 extended its “Westphalian” state system which in 1945 became codified in the so-called “United Nations.” With this concept of the sovereign state came our accepted concepts of international relations, be they a “Realist” concept of “power” or an “Idealist” hope for the creation of an effective regime of international law that is based on the recognized competence of some appropriate institutional architecture. I have no intention of arguing for

* This paper summarizes a much longer detailed and fully documented study. DRJ.

either case here. Instead, I simply want to point out that alternative and indigenous concepts of foreign relations may well still exert an influence on policy-makers outside the Euro-Atlantic “West.” Thus, for example, China may pursue policies that are logical within that country’s own long traditions of dealing with the world beyond its borders, but which are not immediately apparent to analysts elsewhere. Similarly, I doubt whether either Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland” or Nicholas Spykman’s “Rimland” strike the same responsive chord in the hearts of Chinese geo-politicians as they do those of their Western counterparts. Even so, it might be wise for Western leaders to drop the use of the term “pivot,” with its clearly threatening geopolitical implications, from their rhetorical vocabulary.

My point is that we must always beware of assuming that just because a possible opponent’s course of action seems to resemble or parallel our own, their objectives and motives must do likewise. Here the IOR has an instructive history for those with eyes to see and ears to hear. To begin with, there is the “Great Game” itself, and its attendant myth of Russia’s (and later Germany’s) search for a “warm water port” from which to challenge Britain’s (today America’s) regional naval supremacy. Whatever the reality of the “Russian threat” to the British Raj, and this was always highly questionable, fears of the Imperial (in the 1980s, Soviet) Russian or German Navies establishing a base in the Gulf were simply the delusional musings of armchair strategists who, quite simply, lacked the necessary practical and technical expertise. The same often is true of professional alarmists who motivated by a range of domestic and international political agendas. A case in point, incidentally, is true of China’s alleged “String of Pearls,” a series of possible bases supposedly aimed at ensuring Beijing’s future hegemony within the IOR. Apart from the costs of converting commercial facilities such as Gwadar into active naval ports, those of defending, let alone of providing secure logistical support for these “Pearls,” would be horrendous, and they would still remain low-hanging fruit, ready for picking, in the case of future hostilities. For while the United States is still fully capable of maintaining its base at Diego Garcia (which remains a major irritant to Indian navalists), China is decades away from acquiring this ability – even assuming it desires to do so and the host nations would permit such transformations.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, Chinese naval aspirations seem certain to focus on its interests east of Malacca, in the bordering East and South China Seas. This brings us to the second lesson to be learned from the recent history of the IOR — that of mirror-imaging the aims and

motives of possible future opponents. Some of us are still ancient enough to recall the alarmist furors aroused by the appearance in the Indian Ocean of elements the USSR's *Voенно-Morskoi Flot* (VMF) after London resolved to withdraw its assets East of Suez. Coupling this Soviet deployment to Moscow's initiatives in the Middle East, support of East African "liberation movements," and growing friendship with India, alarmists through the 1970s-1980s insisted that the VMF intended to challenge the US Navy for control of the IOR. Yet as the retired British naval-intelligence officer Michael Mcc Gwire pointed out, the lead-times required for the actual planning, construction and arming of these vessels, meant that the decision to build them had been taken in the early 1960s. On this basis he argued convincingly (to me at least) that they were intended to counter the deployment of American Polaris SLBM-armed nuclear submarines in the IOR, and not as a direct challenge to the US Navy's overall dominance in the region. Indeed, as ex-Soviet naval men recently admitted, the Soviet government rejected any thought of such a naval race as being prohibitively costly.

Here, too, is an instructive lesson for those warning of Chinese naval ambitions west of Malacca. Ignoring the very real technical and fiscal constraints on the growth of the Chinese Navy (PLAN), they base their highly speculative conclusions on facile comparisons of warship classes and numbers, and such like. Worse still, they assume that the PLAN's planners are driven by the same doctrinal imperatives as those accepted by their Western and Indian counterparts: Alfred T. Mahan's demand for "command of the sea," or the "global commons," along with his supposed reference to the Indian Ocean's central significance, and Julian Corbett's lessons on the vital significance of "sea control," or as the Russian's understood it, "sea denial." But if these doctrinal precepts are accepted by most Western and, at a regional level, by Indian naval thinkers, their significance for China's planners are questionable. And in fact, the latter have their own traditions of maritime commerce and naval diplomacy that date at least from the early 1400s and the voyages of the Ming Dynasty's Admiral Zheng He. While naval presence and trade-protection were primary goals, permanent dominance was not – a position that is well illustrated by the PLAN's anti-piracy operations conducted off Somalia since 2008. Consequently, I suspect China is seeking a stable maritime environment in the IOR for its diverse commercial and economic projects, and not pursuing some long-range plan to become its naval hegemon.

The same cannot be said, however, about the other emerging regional naval power. This, of course, is India. Thanks to an extended essay of the great historian K.K. Panikkar, who often is proclaimed the founder of his nation's naval doctrine, it is largely shaped by the precepts of Mahan and Corbett as inherited from Britain's Royal Navy (RN). Writing on the eve of independence in 1945, Panikkar foresaw the infant Indian Navy (IN) as initially joining with the RN to jointly dominate the IOR "commons." Although any such hopes of cooperation were crushed by Britain's withdrawal from the region in the late 1960s, Panikkar's doctrinal teachings on regional dominance remained intact, if immediately unrealizable. This largely was because New Delhi's defense policies long focused on the northern land frontiers (with Pakistan and China), and so were formed largely by the soldiers who dominated the Defense Ministry. Needless to say, the defence budgets were allocated accordingly.

Furthermore, India's somewhat ambivalent relationship with Washington long hindered any close cooperation with the US Navy, the RN's successor as watchdog on the region's maritime commons. Resentment of the new American base at Diego Garcia remained (and probably still remains) strong in Indian naval circles. This was stoked still further by Henry Kissinger's deployment of the US *Enterprise* carrier group into the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Indeed, the so-called "Enterprise Syndrome" was still being mentioned in naval writings well into the present century, and this despite the superficial camaraderie on show during the joint US-Indian "Malabar" naval exercises held periodically since the mid-1990s. Indeed, until that decade the American presence was still regarded as a troubling factor in the minds of many Indian strategists, and the US Navy seen as an interloper in the region. This attitude only began changing when the ghost of Zheng He reappeared west of Malacca in the mid-1980s, and with the collapse of the USSR -- India's major arms supplier -- in early 1990s. Then Indian strategists began reassessing the possible value of a limited partnership with the United States. Yet they never abandoned their hopes of eventually achieving regional maritime dominance and over the last decade, they have increasingly defined their region of competence as comprising all the waters extending from the Cape of Good Hope in the west to the coasts of Japan in the east (and indeed, beyond, all of which they call the "Indo-Pacific" (not Asia-Pacific). The IN's attitude is aptly summed up in the story of an Indian frigate captain who was called upon to explain his vessel's presence in the Arabian Gulf by a NATO vessel. "I'm an *Indian* warship sailing in the

Indian Ocean,” he allegedly replied, and then tartly added: “But what are *you* doing here?”

Attitudes in Washington also were changing. Despite the growing presence of the VMF, the US Navy’s regional dominance seemed secure. Yet India remained suspect, both because of its ties with the USSR and New Delhi’s past support of the Non-aligned Movement and of a proposed “Indian Ocean Zone of Peace” (IOZP) closed to non-regional fleets. But matters changed drastically in 1979 when the Iranian Revolution deprived Washington of a trusted regional ally and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly raised the level of Cold War concern over Communist expansion into the region. Under the Reagan Administration the Diego Garcia base was expanded, and in 1983 a new regional Central Command was set up with its headquarters at Bahrain, to which a US Fifth Fleet would be added in 1995. Meanwhile, with the Shah deposed, a search began for a new partner with whom to police the region. Until August 1990 and the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq seemed the most likely candidate but thereafter, the search began anew. Consequently, by the early 1990s India, now deprived of Moscow’s support and alarmed by a perceived “Chinese threat,” looked increasingly attractive. As a consequence, in 1991 Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter arrived in New Delhi to open negotiations that led to a range of technical transfers, as well as of regular joint exercises. Although disrupted by the BJP government’s nuclear tests of May 1998, the relationship soon resumed and continues to this day. Even so, India has remained coy throughout in what has become an ongoing courtship in which Washington has played the role of an increasingly ardent suitor.

As was to be expected, new issues emerged to plague this process after George W. Bush opened his “War on Terror” after 9/11 2001. By that date the Americans were already becoming concerned by al Qaeda’s strikes against American targets in Africa and the Gulf, but less concerned than India by the growing frequency of piracy in the Strait of Malacca. Initially, of course, New Delhi did offer the US support for their Afghanistan campaign in 2001, and agreed to escort American merchantmen through the Strait in 2002. Thereafter, however, the IN held aloof from Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and from the subsequent anti-terrorist and anti-proliferation patrols mounted off the Iraqi, and, subsequently, the Somalian coasts. Throughout, India also continued to purchase arms from a range of countries, the United States included, and the IN’s exercises, which were similarly diversified, meanwhile extended to the Sea of Japan in the east

and to the French coast in the west. So, although the negotiations with Washington resulted in regular strategic dialogues, the Defence Framework Agreement of 2005, and steps towards finalizing the later deal on peaceful nuclear technology, New Delhi clearly was chary of entering too closely into the American embrace. In part this multi-track policy undoubtedly reflected Indian irritation over the role being assigned Pakistan in the War on Terror, the activities of Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) included. At the same time, however, this flexibility also may have resulted from anxiety over Washington's own "dual-track" towards Beijing. For while the Bush and early Obama Administrations did seem willing to contain, or perhaps more correctly, "constrain" China's perceived ambitions, the Americans clearly did not share fully India's more alarmist fears of Beijing's intentions west of Malacca. Indeed, even the most recent policy declarations consistently reaffirm Washington's hopes of finding acceptable "rules of the road" for all those navigating the Asia-Pacific maritime "commons," the South China Sea included, as an essential step for the future development of all regional and extra-regional stakeholders.

As noted, New Delhi had hesitated to actively join the ongoing operations in the western IOR. Even so, by 2004 officers of the IN — both retired and active — were seeking to raise public consciousness over the need for a stronger fleet. To this end they had worked out the appropriate doctrinal justifications (2004) and, partly by citing China's ongoing naval expansion, obtained budgetary funds for building their own "bluewater" fleet. Nonetheless, they were clearly champing at the bit when a series of UN Security Council resolutions opened the way for a range of international naval actors (NATO, the European Union, China, Russia, Iran, and so on) to join with the existing Combined Task Forces (CTF-150, CTF-151) in the effort to stem the rising tide of Somalian piracy. In October 2008, the northwestern corner of *their* ocean was becoming definitely crowded and the IN, arguing that their seafarers deserved protection, finally won the Defence Ministry's permission to dispatch a vessels for this purpose.

While their initial successes seemingly justified the navy's decision, an event at home a few weeks later was far more important for raising domestic awareness and support for the fleet. This, of course, was the Mumbai carnage of 26 November (11/26), as a result of which the navy was charged with creating a greatly strengthened system of coastal security. While the resulting diversion of funds weakened the planned shipbuilding programme, Indian naval men emerged with enhanced clout within the their

defence establishment, and adjusted accordingly. In addition, they also adopted the US Navy's tactic of linking piracy with terrorism so as to justify a more aggressive effort at naval diplomacy aimed at forging bilateral links with other navies around the IOR, and playing a more active role in a range of regional fora. Significantly, however, the IN retained its independence from the US Navy while cooperating with their American counterparts. It therefore resolutely refused to become part of the anti-piracy coalition organized and managed by CENTCOM and the US Fifth Fleet, which is known as "the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction System" (SHADE), which entailed accepting the degree of interoperability in the form of the US CENTRIXS communications network. Consequently, this aspect of the earlier Defence Framework Agreement remained unfulfilled and Washington's courtship continued.

During 2007-2008, the US Navy had been revising its own doctrine. This was published in November 2007 under the title "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." Although its authors foresaw the need for a "1000-ship navy," they understood full-well that the American economy alone could not build or sustain such a fleet. But drawing on the recent successes of the CTFs and SHADE, they hoped to achieve this goal through a "Global Maritime Partnership" In this context, Washington's efforts to secure the full cooperation of the IN, the strongest of the regional forces and now recognized as a "net security provider," naturally assumed considerable significance. Yet despite the PLAN's increasing bold stance in the South China Sea after 2007, the Obama Administration continued to adopt a "proactive hedging policy" towards Beijing. Critics condemned this at home and more importantly, it aroused unease among America's active and proposed partners in Southeast Asia, India included. Signs of a change came only in July 2009. Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted in New Delhi that US policy in East Asia needed a "makeover." In that November, President Obama himself indicated that a change in focus was coming when he announced to a Tokyo audience that he was his country's "first Pacific president." Over the next year the outlines emerged of Obama's proposed "rebalance," which received final official form in his "Strategic Guidance," issued jointly by the White House and Pentagon in January 2012.

Since the Obama rebalance largely focused on the region east of Malacca, in some ways its significance for the IOR proper can be seen as negative: the region was expected to become a secondary theatre of concern and, while both the Fifth Fleet and Diego Garcia base would remain active,

the overall policing of the vast IOR commons could be safely handed over to India and other regional fleet units. Needless to say, as heir to the Mahanian legacy, Pentagon planners assumed that the US Navy would remain the senior partner. But unfortunately, this scenario of a prosperous South Asian future -- guaranteed by an American naval hegemon -- is based on a number of assumptions that may well prove to be unfounded. The first and most obvious, perhaps, is the expectation that Washington could wind down its commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq so as to concentrate on the so-called Asia-Pacific. Unfortunately, the process has proved more difficult than expected thanks to the rise of the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); the spread of similar extremist groups in Muslim Africa; the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan; and the chaos in Yemen. Although all are often regarded superficially as sectarian conflicts, in many cases they clearly are proxy struggles between Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates on the one hand, and the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran on the other, for regional dominance in the Near and Middle East. And since this power struggle may well develop into a Muslim equivalent of Europe's Thirty Years' War, it may well prove impossible (and seem undesirable) for Obama's successors to maintain the force structures envisaged by his "pivot."

Among other "wild cards" are the possible future contours of Indian foreign policy as pursued by Mr. Modi and his nationalist BJP, and its own possible adventurism regarding Pakistan, the northern China-India frontier zone, and defensive agreements with Vietnam, Japan and other players in the unfolding drama of the South China Sea. To my mind, Modi's policies in these regions often seem somewhat idiosyncratic, to put it kindly, and (like other policies elsewhere) to be motivated more by domestic concerns than by any overall strategic vision. This is equally true of the much trumpeted Indo-American "strategic partnership," supposedly sealed during Obama's visit of late January 2015. As in the past, Washington's anxiety to overcome Indian coyness has led to industrial, technological and arms gifts that are much valued by the prospective bride, as well as another marriage contract in the form of a new, ten-year Defence Framework Agreement. But until the nuptials are consummated by the introduction of real interoperability between the partners' armed services, and especially their navies, the reality of the union will remain in doubt.

Another issue also threatens Indo-American marital bliss. As already pointed out, both navies are driven by Mahanian inspired doctrines that seek to exert command over the maritime commons. But Chinese naval planners

appear to have the much more modest goals of asserting sea control and sea denial in waters more immediately adjacent to the homeland. Consequently, although the South China Sea remains a flashpoint, Beijing seems highly unlikely to challenge either the United States west of Malacca on the trade routes passing through the IOR. Furthermore, proposals for new “silkroads” on land and sea, along with the development of economic corridors like that which may link Pakistan’s Gwadar with western China, are in part intended to bypass the Malacca “choke-point” by providing alternative routes for Gulf oil and other commodities. I might note as well that during the anti-piracy operations of Somalia, the PLAN seemed much more willing to cooperate closely with SHADE than did the IN. If the latter may be willing to cooperate with the US Navy in policing the IOR’s sea-lanes, the IN clearly has no intention of remaining a “junior” partner. By their subtle and quiet programme of naval diplomacy, India’s naval leaders have built up their own influence with a number of coastal and island states within the IOR. So barring a spillover of conflict from the South China Sea, in the long-run Indo-American maritime friction is perhaps more likely than a Sino-American rupture in the IOR. Yet while such may develop, for the moment Indian navalists can only grit their teeth and accept American naval superiority. Yet given their memories of the *Enterprise* incident of 1971, their resentment over the base at Diego Garcia, their experience of sanctions imposed on weapons technologies after the nuclear tests of 1998, their resentments over Washington’s insistence on providing aid to Pakistan, and their doubts about its dual-track policies toward China, Indian strategic and naval planners seem likely to strive to retain their independence of action, and probably will seek to avoid being dragged into any Sino-American confrontation that does not immediately accord with their own immediate and long-term interests.

A final wild card that may affect the naval balance in the IOR is the role of the Iranian Navy. Unlike their Saudi and Gulf State rivals, its leaders have not been able to depend on the US Fifth Fleet for their Republic’s maritime security. Rather, on occasion the Americans and Iranians (usually the Republican Guards) come close to major combat. As for the Iranian Navy proper, it has quietly been building up its naval power. Apart from its participation in the anti-piracy campaign, in late 2014/early 2015 it held a series of widespread exercises in the Gulf and publically announced that an Iranian flotilla intended to cruise off the North American coast in mid-2015. It thus in some ways resembles the Indian fleet of 2000, and it clearly has its own ambitions for future development. Consequently, if an agreement is

reached over its nuclear programme, an expansion of conventional Iranian naval power might be one result. If so, this not only would complicate matters for the Saudis and the Americans, but also might present New Delhi with an unexpected regional rival for domination of the waters of the IOR.

In conclusion, then, the IOR's future remains as complicated and unpredictable as ever. In this regard we must not forget that Obama's "pivot" is only the last of the series of such rebalances made since the US Navy assumed responsibility for protecting Western interests east of Suez in the early 1970s. Perhaps more significant is the fact that it represents a shift in focus further eastward from the Indian Ocean proper to the South China Sea, and so signals Washington's growing concerns with Chinese actions there rather than in the Bay of Bengal or Western Indian Ocean. This should gladden the hearts of New Delhi's strategists, who have concluded their own defence and basing agreements with Japan, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states, Australia included. Yet it remains to be seen whether or not the IN will actively join its American and other counterparts in some future confrontation over China's territorial claims and "island-building" in the South China Sea, or sit cheering its allies on from the sidelines. But whatever the case, Indian naval planners cannot forget that if the US Navy is no longer fixated on the western IOR and Gulf, it still remains the area's dominant maritime power. In addition, the Diego Garcia retains its watching brief and is capable of supporting a "surge" of American naval force should that be made necessary by future developments in the Middle East or elsewhere in the region. This, and the possible rise of an Iranian rival, means that while a time may come when India's navalists can realize their dream of asserting command over their regional waters, it has not come yet. ■

Chapter 4

Blue-Waters Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Possible Scenarios

Dr. Nasser Hadian

*The following is the gist of Dr. Hadian's talk transcribed
from audio recording.*

Regions are not discovered rather these are constructed by human beings either to understand or communicate with people easily.

The Middle East is not a useful concept for Iran as we call ourselves Muslims. Saudi Arabian policies vary from country to country. The US has different approaches towards Palestine, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Middle East concept has been left behind and the nation-state concept has been strongly accepted by the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Sometimes we become hostage to our own constructions. Therefore, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is not a useful concept as it would confine the security complex to some states.

Asia is becoming more important due to growing economic activities there. The rise of China as global power is very important for the world. The US would not hold such kind of stature in the world as it had in the 1990s due to its over-stretched military expenses. The US economy needs surplus to sustain the country's hegemonic power while it has been facing deficit for many years. China can afford a large army as it has surplus resources coupled with technology and manpower. Therefore, the US has announced "Pivot to Asia" policy in order to contain China.

Though Middle East is important for the US, however no Middle Eastern country would challenge world hegemony of the US as China can in the next couple of decades. The US has adopted "offshore balancing" policy against China by supporting India, Japan, South Korea and Australia. The US has adopted the same policy in the Persian Gulf by supporting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) through arms and finance in order to challenge Iran.

The US policy towards Iran is of containment coupled with selective engagement. For the containment of Iran, the US had adopted four strategies, i.e., securitization of Iran, sanctions, diplomatic measures and offshore balancing. ■

Chapter 5

International Law and Order: The Indian Ocean and South China Sea

Dr. Wang Hanling

I was assigned by the conference organizer to address this particular topic. At first sight, I think these two sea areas are incomparable due to their differences not only in geopolitics but also in many legal aspects. However, it seems that the US not only makes use of the South China Sea (SCS) issue but also the Indian Ocean (IO) to serve the strategy of its pivot to Asia. The SCS and IO become more and more interrelated or are mentioned in the same breath in American policy studies.¹ From a Chinese perspective, this paper mainly discusses the international legal order in the IO, China's practice in international law in the IO, and the implications of some lessons learned in the SCS on the IO.

The International Legal Order in the Indian Ocean

The international order of the seas and oceans has been established and defined by international and national laws. The international law concerned mainly includes the UN Charter, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), IMO conventions and other marine-related treaties including regional and bilateral agreements. The national laws refer to marine-related national legislation adopted by the coastal states in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS and other rules of international law.² The IO is not an exception. At least the global treaties concerned apply to the IO. Nevertheless, the IO has its own characteristics and priorities.

¹ Caitlyn Antrim, International Law and Order: The Indian Ocean and South China Sea, in *Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security And Policy Challenges*, July 16, 2012, http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/indian_ocean_rising/

² Article 58 (3) of the UN Convention on the law of the Sea, 1982.

Maritime Delimitation

Although some of the maritime boundaries in the IO have not been delimited, the negotiations and litigation on maritime delimitation have been conducted in accordance with international law, especially UNCLOS. Compared with the SCS and some other disputed sea areas, disputes over maritime delimitation in the IO, at least in its north part, have not much affected international relations among the littoral states although jurisdictional conflicts occur from time to time.

Notably, Somalia, a war-torn and pirate infested nation, ratified UNCLOS on 24 July, 1989 and consequently amended its legislation on maritime zones and delimitation bringing its national law into coherence with UNCLOS. Somalia repealed its Territorial Sea and Ports Law (Law No. 37 of 10 September 1972) which claimed 200 nautical miles of territorial sea,³ and adopted the 12 nautical miles limit provided in UNCLOS. Somalia also claimed exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.⁴ It brought its maritime boundary dispute case against Kenya to the International Court of Justice on 28 August 2014.⁵

Peaceful settlement of maritime delimitation is one of the major factors conducive to good order at seas, including the IO.

Maritime Security

Maritime security threats, both conventional and unconventional, have long been a major concern in the IO. The existing problems mainly include: 1) maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait as the main shipping channel between the IO and the Pacific Ocean; 2) transnational maritime crimes such as drug and human trafficking, smuggling, and illegal fishing; 3) terrorism; 4) trafficking of weapons of mass destruction; 5) shipping of hazardous materials. Facts and statistics show that the IO has been seriously affected by these maritime crimes and threats. At least some drug officials agreed that the international anti-drug trafficking campaign

³ Articles 1 through 3, Law No. 37 on the Territorial Sea and Ports, of 10 September 1972, <http://www.somalitalk.com/2011/badda/law37.html>

⁴ http://www.somalilandlaw.com/territorial_sea_and_waters.htm

⁵ Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), ICJ Press Release, No. 2014/30, October 17, 2014,

<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/161/18380.pdf>

had failed.

Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden remains to be one of the major challenges of international legal order in the IO. However, long-term institutional mechanisms for countering maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the IO have not been in place. The current multi-national counter piracy mission off the coast of Somalia which started from 2009 was authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and at the consent of Somali authorities. The authorizations have been renewed by UNSC resolutions annually.⁶ This means that UN member states' anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are temporary and may be terminated without renewed authorizations of UNSC and the consent of Somalia. It is said that the US and some European countries are lobbying the UN to terminate the mission for financial and political reasons: 1) financial crisis in western countries and shortage of funding for the mission; 2) China uses the mission as an opportunity for military drills in the IO.⁷ The latter is obviously biased.

The US-led NATO authorized its member states to conduct counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The renewal term of each authorization is 2 years. On June 3, 2014, NATO Defence Ministers decided to extend NATO's counter-piracy operation Ocean Shield until the end of 2016.⁸ From a legal perspective, NATO and other countries have the right to conduct and the obligation to cooperate in counter piracy operations in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas. However, foreign countries' operations in counter armed robbery against ships in the territorial sea must be approved by the coastal states. In reality, Somalia has to permit and cooperate with foreign countries in international counter piracy operations off its coast under the current situation.

The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the

⁶ UN Security Council Resolutions: paragraph 10 of resolution 1846 (2008) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1851 (2008), as renewed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1897 (2009), paragraph 7 of resolution 1950 (2010), paragraph 9 of resolution 2020 (2011), paragraph 12 of resolution 2077 (2012), paragraph 12 of resolution 2125 (2013), and paragraph 13 of resolution 2184 (2014), <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11643.doc.htm>

⁷ The Escort Mission in the Gulf of Aden Should Be Continued, *Global Times* (in Chinese), October 24, 2014.

⁸ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_110867.htm?selectedLocale=en

Gulf of Aden,⁹ which was signed on January 29, 2009, is a regional mechanism for international cooperation in counter piracy and armed robbery against ships. Some of its measures are noticeable: the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania and the regional maritime training centre in Djibouti; the signatory States develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates. However, its effectiveness still remains to be seen due to at least the following deficiencies: 1) inadequate participation of the states in the region; 2) its non-legally binding nature; 3) weak capacity of implementation of the member states; 4) root causes of maritime piracy and other transnational maritime crimes have not been well addressed.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has also joined the international efforts to enhance counter-piracy cooperation, including through improved maritime information-sharing arrangements and stronger national legal capacity and laws, encouraging IORA to pursue efforts that are complementary to and coordinated with the on-going work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) which was created in 2009 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution¹⁰ and welcoming Somalia's application of membership for IORA as an important step towards building closer regional cooperation on maritime security issues.

Besides strengthening international cooperation, the synergy of existing multiple mechanisms for international counter piracy and other transnational maritime crimes is also important for their improvement. These include the UNSC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), IMO, the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP-ISC), IORA, mechanisms of Djibouti Code of Conduct, the maritime industry and so on.

The perceived challenges of maritime security in the IO include blockade and other military threats of the safety and security of the straits used for international navigation, particularly those in the Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the US and some other countries, mainly the US allies' have

⁹ <http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx>

¹⁰ www.thecgpcs.org/

concern about Iran's threaten to blockade the Strait. On the contrary, other countries do not consider Iran as a threat, but worry much more about the US' excessive counter measures against Iran, and even using Iran as an excuse to militarily control Hormuz. In this connection, some legal issues of blockade and counter blockade of straits used for international navigation are not very clear or concrete.

The international law on safeguarding international sea lanes of communication (SLOC) which applies to the IO has not been well implemented. Although UNCLOS and other treaties have set out an international legal regime for SLOC,¹¹ legislation and relevant mechanisms at regional and national levels are necessary for their implementation in specific seas and straits including those in the IO. However, regional institutional mechanisms for international cooperation in safeguarding straits used for international navigation are either lacking or not so effective in the IO. For instance, there is no regional agreement or other legal mechanism with full participation of all the littoral states for safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz. In other sea areas, some littoral states have not participated in the existing international agreements or mechanisms. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia, two of the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait, have not participated in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).¹²

On the other hand, the international law on safeguarding international sea lanes of communication, including the international regimes provided in

¹¹ Part III (STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

¹² ReCAAP is the first regional governmental agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. The 20 Contracting Parties to ReCAAP are Australia, the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,

<http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx>. For more information on ReCAAP, <http://www.recaap.org/>

existing multilateral treaties such as UNCLOS is quite general rather than concrete. This leads to ineffective implementation in some regional seas such as the IO which lack effective regional mechanisms for international cooperation concerned.

Natural disasters such as tsunami and massive marine pollution are also major maritime threats in the IO. The painful disaster of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 exposed not only the weakness of disaster relief capacity but also legal mechanisms, especially those concerning international cooperation mechanisms in the region.

In addition, the Malaysian airlines Flight 370 incident¹³ shows the deficiencies of the international cooperation mechanisms for maritime search and rescue.

The Marine Environment and Resources

The major concerns of the marine environment and resources in the IO include: 1) fisheries resources; 2) hydrocarbon resources; 3) deep seabed minerals and genetic resources; and 4) marine pollution and the conservation and management of the marine environment and resources.

The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) was established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission in 1993. It is an intergovernmental organization responsible for the management of tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean.¹⁴ Over 30 countries, including littoral states of the IO and some fishing states such as China, Japan, South Korea, the UK and France participated in the IOTC. IOTC is conducive to the management of tuna and tuna-like species in the IO, but many other fishery resources have not yet been covered by international institutional mechanisms. This means that there is no comprehensive regional institutional framework for the conservation and management of living resources in the IO.

¹³ Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 was a scheduled international passenger flight that disappeared on March 8, 2014, while flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. A multinational search effort, which became the largest of its kind in human history, began in the Gulf of Thai, apart of the South China Sea, where the flight's signal was lost on secondary surveillance radar, and was soon extended to the Strait of Malacca and Andaman Sea. The focus of the search finally shifted to the southern part of the Indian Ocean, west of Australia. However, the missing flight has not been found so far.

¹⁴ <http://www.iotc.org/>

The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks have not been ratified by many littoral states of the IO.¹⁵

International seabed mineral exploration and exploitation is governed by UNCLOS and the rules and regulations adopted by International Seabed Authority. However, international law on the exploration and exploitation of genetic resources in international seabed areas, including those in the IO is quite general rather than specific, and needs to be further developed.

In summary, there is no comprehensive, effective regional agreement on international cooperation in the conservation and management of the marine environment and resources in the Indian Ocean.

P.R. China's Practice in Marine-related International Law in IO

PRC's presence in the IO has been limited. PRC did not expand its activities from traditional shipping and fishing to marine scientific research, marine non-living resource exploration and anti-piracy operation in the IO until recent years.

1. The Chinese Navy participates in the international counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. As a permanent member of the UNSC, China supported the UN Resolutions authorizing UN member states to conduct counter piracy and armed robbery operations off Somalia coast and in the Gulf of Aden. China concluded bilateral agreements with some coastal states of the Gulf of Aden on logistic supports for this mission.
2. China exploits fishery resources in the IO by entering regional and bilateral agreements such as the Agreement on Indian Tuna fish.
3. China conducts and cooperates with other countries especially the littoral states in conducting marine scientific research in the IO.
4. As a pioneer investor in international seabed area, China explores and has been designated by the International Seabed Authority a zone of cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the IO on 18

¹⁵ The Agreement was adopted in 1995 and in force as from 11 December 2001. 82 countries ratified it as of 24 September 2014. Many littoral states of the Indian Ocean have not ratified it. <http://www.un.org/depts/los/>

November 2011.¹⁶

5. China advocates and strongly promotes the 21st century Maritime Silk Road which extends from the Chinese seas to the IO with a view to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and exchanges among the states concerned.

In summary, PRC's civil and military activities in IO have been constructive and complied with international law.

Lessons Learned from the South China Sea and their Implications for the Indian Ocean

The maritime disputes in the SCS are more complicated than those in the IO in some sense. Some lessons learned from the SCS may have some implications for the IO while the two sea areas have similar issues and problems in governance.

1. Disputes over sovereignty and maritime delimitation as well as jurisdictional conflicts in the SCS lead to difficulties in maritime cooperation and even adversely affect international relations. With a lower level of maritime disputes, the disputant states in the IO should continue to settle their maritime disputes peacefully with a view to maintaining peace and stability as well as international maritime cooperation in the region.
2. In addition to maritime disputes, lack of legally binding and effective regional mechanisms for the SCS and trust deficit among the littoral states concerned lead to insufficient implementation of international treaties and policy documents in the SCS. There has been no regional management agreement and organization for the SCS as a semi-enclosed sea except a bilateral agreement between China and Vietnam on fisheries management in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin). UNCLOS requires the littoral states in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas to cooperate in the conservation and management of the marine environment and resources. However, these provisions have not been well implemented in the SCS due to trust deficit mainly caused by maritime disputes among the littoral states. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South

¹⁶ <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/scientific/exploration/contractors>

China Sea¹⁷ which was signed by China and the ASEAN member states in 2002 has not been well implemented by some parties concerned.

Compared with the SCS, international cooperation in the conservation and management of marine living resources in the IO has been done in a broader area and better. At least the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission has been proved to be effective.

There is no international research and rescue cooperation agreement or mechanism for the southern part of the SCS. The search for the missing Malaysian airline unveiled the deficiency in this regard in both the SCS and IO regions.

3. Inadequate participation of the states concerned in international treaties and mechanisms for the region leads to deficiency of implementation of international law and cooperation. Some littoral states of the SCS have not ratified some international treaties which are applicable to the SCS. The IO faces the same problem. The non-parties concerned should be encouraged to participate in the relevant treaties and other international arrangements.
4. The US pivot to Asia has caused escalation of maritime disputes. On one hand, some claimant states of the SCS, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, take advantage of the US pivot to Asia to challenge China in the SCS. On the other hand, the US supports its military ally, the Philippines, in the SCS disputes regardless of merits. As mentioned above, the SCS and the IO have become major arenas for the US pivot to Asia. The relevant strategy and policy of the US have profound influence on the geopolitics as well as international order in the two regions.

Conclusion and Recommendations

1. Peaceful settlement of maritime disputes is essential for maintaining international legal order in regional seas.
2. Effective regional legal mechanisms are vital for the good order of regional seas such as those in the IO and the SCS. However, such mechanisms are lacking in these seas. Therefore, the littoral states should cooperate in building such mechanisms.

¹⁷ <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>

3. Full participation of all the states concerned in existing international and regional treaties and arrangements is important for the effective implementation of the international law which applies to the region.
4. International and regional cooperation in maritime law enforcement as well as combating transnational maritime crimes is necessary for good order at regional seas.
5. Social economic developments and common progress in all states are essential for peace and stability of the world as well as the IO and SCS as developing regions. In this connection, the building of the Maritime Silk Road is conducive to the peace and prosperity of the SCS and the IO regions.■

Chapter 6

Emerging Challenges in Indian Ocean Region-Role of Pakistan Navy

Muhammad Azam Khan

“The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn”

Alvin Toffler (American writer and futurist. B.1928)

The Gene Disposition and The Old World

In his internationally acclaimed treatise, *‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’*, author Paul Kennedy argues that the relative strength of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring greater advantage to one society than another¹. What factors determine which states or regions take a lead in history? Biologists suggest that more changes in physical variations in a species tend to occur with an increase in the size of the gene pool. The corollary states that the most change within a particular gene pool tends to occur toward the geographic centre of population, where the greatest contact occurs².

Applied to history, this principle indicates that change in general, other factors being constant, should centre in the Eastern Hemisphere, with its heavier population concentration. Within the Eastern Hemisphere, this change should be expected especially in the Middle East, where the old

¹ Kennedy, Paul, *‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,’* Random House New York, 1987, pp. xv

² Kearney, Milo, *‘The Indian Ocean in World History,’* Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.2

world's³ three main continents converge. This is exactly where human history received its initial impetus and long retained its primary focus⁴.

Another historically established truth is that culture always grows fastest along the main trade routes. And since ocean paths have provided the most cost effective means of transportation and connecting as well as discovering new worlds in the process, trade follows mainly those waterways that bring together the greatest variety of peoples and lands, along with their products. The greatest such favourable maritime trade route on earth is the water route in the very middle of the old world, stretching from the Indian Ocean through either the Persian Gulf or through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. This was and remains the world's major contact route between the West and East⁵.

The Correlation

Leaving aside vital factors like growth of innovative thinking, technological progress, preservation of human rights or strong and vibrant institutions necessary for progress, the land (or lands) that have been in the lead in world wealth and power at any particular time has been determined to a significant extent by, or been correlated with, control of or significant participation in the trade of the Indian Ocean and the lands at its periphery. The region represents the largest single chunk of exploitable wealth on earth. Its precious riches have inter-alia included nutmeg, diamonds, gold, emeralds, rubies and world's largest exploitable mass market for buying goods of any dominant state or region. Its geographic location in middle of the world's main trading belt has made it eminently accessible⁶. The Ocean has been described as a '*symbol of universal humanity*'⁷.

For centuries Arabs, Chinese, Persian and Indian trading arrangements here have created a grand network of cross-oceanic commercial ties. In case of Arabs and Muslims such a matrix was

³ The part of the world known before discovery of Americas, comprising of Europe, Asia and Africa- the Eastern Hemisphere

⁴ Kearney, Milo, 'The Indian Ocean in World History,' Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.2

⁵ Kearney, Milo, 'The Indian Ocean in World History,' Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.2

⁶ Kearney, Milo, 'The Indian Ocean in World History,' Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.2

⁷ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,' Random House New York, 2011, pp.6

underpinned by the Haj pilgrimage⁸. The region was so central to world trade, power and the march of progress that the very first civilizations on earth emerged in connection with it. Today nearly a million ships pass through the various Indian Ocean straits each year⁹ while merchandise of fossil fuels transported on its highways continue to define global economy and geo-politics. Nature dictated where trade would first spark the rise of important civilization, in the western Indian Ocean, also called the Arabian Sea¹⁰.

Continental vs. Maritime thinking — the Geopolitics

In a strange coincidence, Europe launched into its age of discovery just as Asia renounced the sea. Vasco da Gama dropped anchor in the Indian seaport of Calicut after the final cruise of the Chinese Ming treasure fleet. Unopposed by Asian battle fleets, European mariners-the Portuguese, Dutch, French, British-opened up new vistas for commerce, cultural interchange, and conquest among ancient societies populating the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins¹¹. Asian sea powers relinquished regional seaways to outsiders, ushering in an era of Western dominance that lasted well into the twentieth century¹².

The speed of change in maritime environment has accelerated dramatically, since the end of the Cold War. It has been even more pronounced over the past three decades. The gradual dissipation of known fossil fuel reserves, quest for new stocks, shrinking land resources amidst rising population and necessity of preserving economic vitality has led to a scramble for securing potential sea wealth. It has spawned claims and counter claims over sea based resources. There appears to be a universal perceptible shift in the mindset from one of 'apparent abundance' to 'growing scarcity' of oceanic resources, and due to increasing ocean uses, from 'accommodation' to 'conflict'. These changes in the basic condition of

⁸ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,' Random House New York, 2011, pp.6

⁹ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,' Random House New York, 2011, pp.127

¹⁰ Kearney, Milo, 'The Indian Ocean in World History,' Routledge, New York, 2004, pp.11

¹¹ Holmes, James R, Toshi Yoshihara et.al 'Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century,' Routledge 2009, pp.1

¹² Holmes, James R, Toshi Yoshihara et.al 'Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century,' Routledge 2009, pp.1

ocean use have raised questions on the legal status of oceans from one of 'freedom of the seas' to that of 'control and regulation'¹³.

Geopolitics has two basic competing views of geography and power. One view, held by British geographer, *Halford John Mackinder*, argues that control of Eurasia means the control of the world. As he put it: 'Who rules East Europe (Russian Europe) commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia). Who rules the World Island commands the world'¹⁴. This thinking dominated the British strategy and indeed, the US strategy during much of the Cold War, as it fought to contain and strangle European Russia. The opposing view is held by American, *Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan*, considered the greatest American geopolitical thinker. In his book '*The influence of Sea Power on History*', Mahan, makes the counterargument to Mackinder, maintaining that control of the sea equals command of the world¹⁵. His contention was that seapower must be considered in the broader context of national policy¹⁶.

A major reason for maritime strength not getting due recognition in national power construct rests in the fact that military power in most literature is a 'simple undifferentiated aggregate or, at best, distinguishes conventional and nuclear forces. While it does disaggregate military power into its components, it is often skeptical of the impact of navies. Nonetheless, despite the apparent neglect of sea power by many analysts of international politics, there remain essential insights into the utility of maritime forces'¹⁷.

Who Proved Right

History confirmed that both Mackinder and Mahan were right, in a sense. Mackinder was correct in emphasizing the significance of a powerful and united Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union elevated the United States to the level of sole global power. But it was Mahan, the American, who understood two crucial factors. The collapse of the Soviet Union originated in American sea power and also opened the door for US naval power to

¹³ Gupta, Manoj, 'Maritime Affairs-Integrated Management for India' 2005, pp. 28

¹⁴ Friedman, George 'The Next 100 Years,' Anchor Books New York, 2010, pp.24

¹⁵ Friedman, George 'The Next 100 Years,' Anchor Books New York, 2010, pp.24

¹⁶ Blagden, David, 'Seapower is benign power' RUSI Journal June/July 2014 vol. 159, no. 3 pp.55

¹⁷ Blagden, David, 'Seapower is benign power' RUSI Journal June/July 2014 vol. 159, no. 3 pp.55-56

dominate the world. Additionally, Mahan was correct when he argued that it is always cheaper to ship goods by sea than by any other means. As far back as the fifth century BC, the Athenians were wealthier than the Spartans because Athens had a port, a maritime fleet and a navy to protect it. Maritime powers are always wealthier than non-maritime neighbours, all other things being equal. With the advent of globalization, this truth became as near to absolute as one can get in geopolitics¹⁸.

Regardless, US control of the sea meant that the United States was able not only to engage in but to define global maritime trade. It could make the rules, or at least block anyone else's rules, by denying other nations entry to the world's trade routes. In general, the United States shaped the international trading system more subtly, by using access to the vast American market as a lever to shape the behaviour of other nations. It was not surprising, then, that in addition to its natural endowments, the United States became enormously prosperous from its sea power and that the Soviet Union couldn't possibly compete, being landlocked.

Having control of the sea gave the United States a huge political advantage as well. America could not be invaded, but it could invade other countries — whenever and however it chose. From 1945 onward, the United States could wage wars without fear of having its lines of supply cut. No outside power could wage war on the continent of North America. In fact, no other nation could mount amphibious operations without American acquiescence. When the British, French and Israelis invaded Egypt in 1956 against US wishes, they had to withdraw¹⁹. When the British went to war with Argentina over the Falklands in 1982, it was possible only because the United States didn't prevent it.

Trade Marks

The Indian Ocean covers 68.56 million sq kms, almost 27 per cent of the maritime space of the world and 14 per cent of the total globe²⁰. The Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca in the Indian Ocean are the world's most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil transit shipping roughly 17

¹⁸ Friedman, George 'The Next 100 Years,' Anchor Books New York, 2010, pp.25

¹⁹ Friedman, George, 'The Next 100 Years,' Anchor Books United States, 2010, pp.24,25&26

²⁰ Pearson, Michael, THE INDIAN OCEAN, Rutledge London, 2008, pp.4 & 14

and 15.2 million barrels of oil per day²¹ respectively. The region's landscape has the following distinctive features²²:

- Holds diverse economies and systems of governance. Is home to one third of the world's populace in a quarter of the world's land mass.
- Accounts for 65 per cent of strategic raw material reserves, 31 per cent gas and more than half of the world's oil exports.
- Is the largest producer of rubber, tea, spices and jute. Other minerals include manganese, cobalt, tungsten, coal and iron ore.
- Accounts for half the world's container traffic and 70 per cent of total traffic of petroleum trade.
- Has seen maximum number of post cold war conflicts.

Challenges

The evolving strategic environment in the Indian Ocean region is profoundly shaped by divergent perceptions about its unique regional, political and geographic circumstances. For many in this region, especially South Asians, the Indian Ocean has historically been one of the region's strongest unifying factors. For centuries, its waters carried religions, languages, traditions, and indeed people across thousands of miles and bound them together in a cultural bond. For others however, the region appears to be a largely disaggregated oceanic and littoral zone, more a collection of sub regions than a coherent, single region²³.

Come what may, while it may form a historical and cultural unit, in strategic terms, the Indian Ocean, like the larger world we are inheriting, does not have a single focal point, it has many. The Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and so on are all burdened by particular threats with different players in each arena. Then, there are the transnational threats of terrorism, natural disasters, nuclear proliferation and

²¹ These are 2009-2013 average estimates. See US Energy Information Administration, 'World oil transit choke points'

<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p.3>

²² Pavithran, K.S., 'Foreign Policy and Maritime Security of Indian,' New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2013, pp.16

²³ Lee Cordner, 'Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean', US Naval War College Review Autumn 2011, vol. 64 pp. 70

disorder²⁴. Some notable challenges in the Indian Ocean are discussed hereunder:

Piracy

Since its slow resurgence in 2005, eminent international maritime analysts have concluded that rather than a 'cause', modern day piracy is only a 'symptom' of the wider and troublesome problem of instability, poor governance and lawlessness on land. This fact has nowhere been more pronounced than in Somalia. It is maintained that *'Somali piracy is the single biggest maritime threat since the Second World War, with consequences resonating far beyond Somali shores that have political, geostrategic, naval, economic and human security aspects'*²⁵.

There is enough evidence to suggest that continuing instability and lawlessness on land has not only promoted piracy but emboldened militant groups in Somalia and elsewhere in the region. What adds to this predicament is the increasing availability and rapidly decreasing cost of lightweight guided weapons, small enough to be mounted on and fired from small craft, which can easily imperil shipping. The Somali pirates have amply demonstrated in the past how maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and across much of the western Indian Ocean remains at their mercy.

In late 2008 an increasing number of attacks sparked an international outcry while shipping industry leaders brought their concerns about maritime security in the region to the highest levels of the international political community. In its aftermath, it was interesting to see the manner in which navies and nations responded. Driven by France, EUNAVFOR's Operation Atlanta on 8 December 2008 just six days after the United Nations issued a mandate authorizing international response was first of its kind to be established and meant to deter, disrupt and destroy Somali piracy network. The institution of Coalition Task Force 151 under the Combined Maritime Force structure followed shortly afterwards. Many other navies too joined independently. The Chinese navy made an entry in 2009. The spectacular international response drawing in navies from so many countries was a resounding demonstration of the strategic significance that the world attached to the Indian Ocean region. It concurrently highlighted the desire

²⁴ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,' Random House New York, 2011, pp.15

²⁵ Murphy. Martin N. 'Somali Piracy-Why Should We Care,' *RUSI Journal*, December 2012 vol. 156, No.6, pp.4-11

by nation states to preserve balance by establishing political footprint through their navies²⁶.

Estimates of the loss to the global economy from Somali piracy have varied over the years. A 2010 report by a U.S. based foundation concluded that maritime piracy costs the world economy roughly between \$7 and \$12 billion annually²⁷. The figure however included the ransom payments, re-routing expenses, insurance premiums etc. In terms of human cost, 4,185 seafarers were subjected to varying types of armed attacks off Somalia the same year²⁸.

Maritime Terrorism

In 2008, an extensive definition on maritime terrorism was presented by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group. It reads:

*“the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities”*²⁹.

The flaw in the definition however, as argued by some, is that it does not include the use of the maritime domain by terror networks for strikes against targets ashore. Even so, with 90 per cent of the intercontinental cargo and roughly 63 per cent of the world's oil production³⁰ moving on maritime routes, it is little wonder that terrorists regard the sea an 'important pillar of their battle'. Al-Qaeda is believed to have previously

²⁶ Murphy. Martin N. 'Somali Piracy-Why Should We Care,' *RUSI Journal*, December 2012 vol. 156, no.6, pp 4-11.

²⁷ IISS London, ADELHI Papers 388. Also, Murphy. Martin N. 'Somali Piracy-Why Should We Care' *RUSI Journal*, December 2012 vol. 156, no. 6, pp.4-11

²⁸ Murphy. Martin N. 'Somali Piracy-Why Should We Care,' *RUSI Journal*, December 2012 vol. 156, no. 6, pp4-11.

²⁹ Graf, Andreas, Countering Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in South East Asia and off the Horn of Africa, Piracy-Working Papers on Maritime Security Nr. 5, April 2011, pp.14.

³⁰ US Energy Information Administration, 'World oil transit choke points,' <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wtoc&trk=p3>

undergone maritime terrorism training alongside Sri-Lanka's now defunct Tamil Tigers and not too distant past 'al Qaeda strategist Al-Suri had written about carrying out attacks in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb by scuttling ships at choke points³¹. The October 2000 attack on USS Cole while the warship was refuelling in Aden harbour, Yemen and almost two years later another attack on MV Limburg — a modern vessel with double safety walls-virtually around the same place in Gulf of Aden that resulted in spilling of some 90,000 barrels of oil in the Indian Ocean remains a sobering reminder of the domain's vulnerabilities and perils of terrorism at sea.

Fortunately no major incident has since been recorded. Maritime terrorism nonetheless remains a potent challenge in the Indian Ocean³². The choke points, particularly straits of Malacca and Hormuz are susceptible to asymmetric threats of terrorism. With the kind of inroads ISIS is currently making in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, a possible fall out in the maritime domain would not be too farfetched. While piracy is fundamentally motivated by economic considerations, maritime terrorism is driven by '*political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking or hijacking a maritime target*'³³.

Security of Sea Lanes

In 1980, as the US-Soviet duel was moving to its climax, transpacific trade rose to equal transatlantic trade for the first time in history. A mere 10 years later, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, transpacific trade had soared to a level 50 per cent greater than transatlantic trade. The entire geometry of international trade and therefore of the global system was undergoing an unparalleled shift³⁴.

Asia is now the global economic centre of gravity. Underpinning the phenomenal rise of countries in the region and beyond is the sea commerce, particularly flow of energy goods. Asia is projected to experience by far the

³¹ USNI Proceedings July 2010 pp 26-27. See, also, Kaplan, Robert D. 'MONSOON', pp.7

³² US State Dept., Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 2010), www.state.gov/.

³³ Graf, Andreas, Countering Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in South East Asia and off the Horn of Africa, Piracy-Working Papers on Maritime Security Nr. 5, April 2011, pp.14.

³⁴ Friedman, George, 'The Next 100 Years' Anchor Books United States, 2010, pp.26

world's greatest increase in energy demand in the medium term³⁵. The largest energy growth area is in the demand for coal, forecast to grow by 73 per cent between now and 2030, most of the increase coming from China and India. Australia is the world's largest exporter of coal, with South Africa close behind³⁶. Both countries ship much of their exports via the Indian Ocean. Under the existing geo-political situation, trade and energy security in the region assume a significant dimension.

Fragile law and order, particularly in some major urban centers along the shores of the Indian Ocean region poses significant risks to maritime trade as well as economic and energy security of both, the regional and extra regional countries. The proliferation of failed and failing states in the region compounds the security challenges that — along with competition and perhaps conflict between regional and extra regional powers — could impinge upon freedom of navigation and therefore the flow of maritime trade. Any upheaval in the region can also cause major setback to strategic interests of regional and outside powers with stakes in the region³⁷. The security of sealanes and disputes over maritime resources has prompted Asia to veer towards the sea. As a consequence, there has been colossal investment in the navies.

Nuclearization

The induction of nuclear submarines, SSBNs and SSNs over the past few years has added a new dimension to the security and stability in the Indian Ocean. The presence of *Arihant* and *Akula* class nuclear powered submarines armed with conventional land attack and other nuclear tipped missiles undercuts an already fragile balance of power in the region. In the words of defense analyst Thomas P.M Barnett, 'No ocean is in need of strategic stability more than the Indian Ocean, which is arguably the most nuclearized of the seven seas'³⁸.

³⁵ For the medium term, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 Paris, 2008, p. 39, www.worldenergyoutlook.org/.

³⁶ 'The Australian Coal Industry: Coal Exports,' Australian Coal Association, www.australiancoal.com.au/. In 2008-2009 Australia maintained its position as the world's largest coal exporter with exports of 261 million tons, or 28 per cent of the world total. South Africa was the world's fifth-largest exporter of coal

³⁷ Khan, Muhammad Azam, 'Power Struggle in Indian Ocean', *Dawn*, October 21, 2010.

³⁸ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power' Random House New York, 2011, pp.8

Competing Strategic Interests

The Indian Ocean has long been the hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics.³⁹ Given its crucial historical and geographical significance, major powers have long vied with each other for the control of the Indian Ocean, though it was only in the nineteenth century that Great Britain was able to enjoy an overwhelming dominance in the region. With the decline in Britain's relative power and the emergence of superpowers during the Cold War, the Indian Ocean region became another arena where the US and the former Soviet Union struggled to expand their footprints. The US, however, has remained the most significant player in the region⁴⁰ since the end of the Cold War.

The increasing maritime focus of the Asian states towards sea is a cause as well as an effect of the growing economic prosperity of these states.⁴¹ In this backdrop, it was not surprising that in early 2012, President Obama announced America's new defence policy. What has been codified as Defence and Strategic Guidance is more commonly known as the Asia pivot⁴². The policy is a radical departure from America's century old Eurocentric focus. It will see a profound repositioning of a dominant part of the US marine and naval forces from Atlantic to Pacific and South East Asia. The rationale offered, at least initially, was to counter the presumed challenge from a rising China.⁴³

The new US defence policy underscores the necessity to rebalance Asia Pacific region. It also reinforces the need for strategic backing of India: *'the United States is also investing in a long-term strategic*

³⁹ Pant, Harsh V. 'India in the Indian Ocean: growing mismatch between ambitions and capabilities', Pacific Affairs, June 22, 2009. www.business.highbeam.com.

⁴⁰ Pant, Harsh V. 'India in the Indian Ocean: growing mismatch between ambitions and capabilities', Pacific Affairs, June 22, 2009. www.business.highbeam.com

⁴¹ Pant, Harsh V. 'The Rise of the Indian Navy, Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges' Ashgate, 2012: 2.

⁴² The US Department of Defence (DoD) began long-range planning for military activity in the Asia-Pacific region in 2009, a process that culminated with the official unveiling in the 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review of a new overarching approach known as 'Air Sea Battle'. That concept does not identify China by name, but calls on the military services to integrate their capabilities across air, sea, land, space, and cyber-space to counter emerging challenges to US freedom of action. See, "*Jane's Defence Weekly*" vol. 49. Issue 44, 26.

⁴³ 'Shifting Asian Pivot' Daily Dawn April 28, 2013 www.dawn.com

partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region' declares the document.⁴⁴ The policy document cannot however conceal the US predicament. Drained financially on account of costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US cannot continue to maintain a navy large enough to fight simultaneous wars in two theatres i.e. Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Hence, it seems an outsourcing of naval tasks to the Indian Navy remains the only viable option. This is a straightforward and uncomplicated inference one can draw from phrase, '*regional economic anchor and provider of security*'. Conversely, it serves India and the Indian navy equally well.

As the Indian navy struggles to take on the mantle of an arbiter in the Indian Ocean, it can continue to expand its domestic military industrial base in the backdrop of USN-I.N strategic alliance and India-US nuclear agreement. And while shopping some of the latest naval hardware and technology, a fully developed Indian navy in due course would be able to unshackle itself from the clutches of USN to thus independently assume the role of a regional policeman. It could subsequently shore up its reach to bring areas beyond Persian Gulf and Malacca including Red Sea in the East and China Sea/Pacific in the West under gaze and influence.⁴⁵

According to renowned American geographer, Robert D. Kaplan 'the Indian Ocean is where the rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacific interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and India and also with America's fight against terrorism in the Middle East, which includes America's attempt to contain Iran'⁴⁶. But like China's Malacca dilemma, India remains wary of Hormuz dilemma. Whenever US Navy warships have bombed Iraq or Afghanistan, they have often done so from the Indian Ocean. The US Air Force guards Iraq and Afghanistan from bases in the Persian Gulf and from the island of Diego Garcia, right in the

⁴⁴ 'The US Defense and Strategic Guidance,' January, 2012: 2,
http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

⁴⁵ Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R., "India's Monroe Doctrine and Asia's Maritime Future" IDSA vol. 32, issue 6, November 2008: 997-1011
http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/IndiaMonroeDoctrineandAsiaMaritimeFuture_jrh_olmes_tyoshihara_1108

⁴⁶ Kaplan, Robert D., MONSOON-The Indian Ocean and Future of American Power, Random House New York, 2011, pp .178

centre of the Indian Ocean⁴⁷. The Indian Ocean region is important to the United States and allies since it could become a secondary arena for great power strategic competition in Asia, particularly between India and China or India and Pakistan⁴⁸.

Role of Pakistan Navy

*“Armies win wars, but in an age in which the theatre of conflict is global-owing to the shrinkage of distance caused by the advancement of technology-navies and air forces are more accurate indicators of national power”.*⁴⁹

Over the past decade or so, Pakistan Navy (PN) has been a torchbearer in several international coalitions conducting sustained operations in the western Indian Ocean region to ensure order at sea. Since 2004, it has busted several criminal cartels operating in the region and has been in the vanguard of anti-piracy operations off Somalia's troubled coast. Its key international and national initiatives have included AMAN series of biennial multinational exercises allied with International Maritime Conference (IMC), setting up of a Coastal Command as well as a Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (JMICC). PN has swiftly responded to several local and regional level natural calamities. Pakistan Navy has besides added a number of surface combatants, missile corvettes, locally constructed F-22 P frigates and force multipliers⁵⁰ including UAVs in its inventory. It has test fired various missiles inclusive of a land attack version. To reinforce strategic deterrence, PN has laid the foundation of a Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) and is maturing strategic capability at sea. A pioneering effort is underway to unveil the first of its kind Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan. The newly defined Vision of Pakistan Navy meanwhile reads:

⁴⁷ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power' Random House New York, 2011, pp.9

⁴⁸ J. Green, Michael & Shearer, Andrew: Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2012, pp.178

⁴⁹ Kaplan, Robert D. 'Monsoon-The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,' New York: Random House, 2011, pp. 326

⁵⁰ 'Top Brass Interview, Admiral Muhammad Asif Sandila, Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy', *Asian Defence Journal (ADJ)*, October 2012, pp. 22-26

“A modern potent force manned by motivated professionals that contributes effectively to deterrence and national security across the full conflict spectrum and capable of radiating influence region wide with global outlook”

In CTF 150

To deter and counter the threat of terrorism and other illicit activities in the domain, Pakistan Navy joined the US led multi-national Combined Task Force-150 in 2004. The Task Force named Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) was set up as the maritime component of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’. The mission of TF 150 is to work with regional navies and conduct theatre level Maritime Security Operations. Its area of responsibility (AOR) covers Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. Pakistan Navy has since been the most productive regional participant. During the period, PN has successfully completed six command tours.

Pakistan Navy’s proactive engagement with the international coalition has allowed retention of strategic space. It also made possible to effectively monitor and control drugs and arms trafficking in the North Arabian Sea. PN ships in conjunction with the coalition forces have been successful in deterring and denying the exploitation of the domain by potential terrorists. Pakistan considers the collaborative maritime security efforts to be of fundamental significance for maintaining peace and stability in its AOR⁵¹.

In CTF 151

In January 2009, with the spectre of piracy assuming menacing proportions, the Coalition Maritime Forces Headquarters in Bahrain assembled a dedicated Task Force (CTF 151) comprising ships and aircraft from over 20 countries. It aimed to assist international drive against the menace of piracy. Pakistan Navy joined this effort. It has since had five command tours with dozens of PN ships participating in these operations.

Pakistan Navy played a central role in the 2010 spectacular release and rescue of MV SUEZ from Somali pirates demanding a ransom of USD 2.1 million. The ship had a multinational crew and included Indians,

⁵¹ Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Interview *Asian Defence Journal (ADJ)* October 2012, pp. 25

Egyptians, Pakistanis as well as Sri-Lankans. PN has furthermore initiated number of measures to pre-empt any act of piracy around Pakistan's EEZ. In this regard, a counter Piracy Patrol is in place.

Multinational Exercise-AMAN

A significant initiative of Pakistan Navy in the field of maritime diplomacy⁵², aimed at reinforcing regional maritime security was the institution of multinational exercise AMAN in 2007. In the inaugural event ships, Special Operation Forces (SOF) and observers from over 28 countries participated. The biennial exercise preceded by International Maritime Conference (IMC) is a regular mega event in the PN calendar. The concept of AMAN centres around information sharing, identifying areas of common interest for participating navies and a shared understanding on maritime security operations, counter terrorism operations and operations related to humanitarian assistance. AMAN is a clear manifestation of Pakistan's deep commitment to promote peace and stability in the region through collaborative endeavour.

Maritime Diplomacy

Pakistan Navy is an essential appendage of state's foreign policy and this is one area, which has received unprecedented attention by its leadership. PN ships regularly undertake flag showing missions and have docked in ports as far and across as New York, Cape Town and Tokyo. Pakistan Navy enjoys long-standing and fraternal relations with navies of the region in particular and Asia-Pacific in general. PN greatly assisted navies of the Gulf in their formative years especially through provision of training facilities to the officers and men. Between 1960s till late 1980s, hundreds of PN officers and men were seconded to these countries. They played a key role in assisting and establishing local navies. Even today a sizeable number of naval officers and personnel from UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and several other friendly countries are receiving regular training in PN institutes including PN War College.

PN regularly conducts bilateral and multilateral exercises with navies of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Singapore and China. These exercises serve to increase interoperability, and expand

⁵² Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Interview *Asian Defence Journal (ADJ)* October 2012 pp. 26

regional maritime security. Exercises are also conducted with extra regional navies particularly the U.S. *Inspired Siren* and *Inspired Nautilus* are exercises that are held biennially between PN-USN in Pakistani waters. Exercises with the navies of France and the UK are also conducted as and when opportunity arises⁵³.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

Pakistan Navy has actively contributed in the disaster relief operations both, at the national as well as regional level whenever the situation so dictated. To mention a few, during the worst floods in the national history in 2010, PN extensively participated in rescue and relief operations evacuating scores of afflicted people at sea and in coastal regions to safety. Likewise PN ships and helicopters contributed significantly both, during and after the Tsunami in 2005. Pakistan Navy ships rendered immediate assistance to the government of Maldives for evacuation of stranded tourists/locals from islands via PN ships. This humanitarian assistance later continued by way of diplomatic and material support. Two PN ships with sizeable relief materials were dispatched to Indonesia and Sri Lanka. These vessels with three helicopters, a marine expeditionary force, military and civilian doctors and paramedics, also transported relief goods, medicines, medical equipment, food supplies, tents, and blankets in large quantities.

Reinforcing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Ancient military strategist Sun Tzu once wrote; 'what is called 'foreknowledge' cannot be elicited from spirit, or from gods, or by analogy with past events, nor from calculations'. Notwithstanding such a conclusion, warriors and statesmen pursue 'foreknowledge' in the interest of national safety and security.

Ocean space is unarguably vast and the maritime interests of nations are widely dispersed. It is virtually impossible for a nation to monitor large swathes of ocean expanse 24/7/365 days and respond to activities that endanger legitimate national or international maritime interests. These large unregulated spaces accordingly become fertile ground for pursuit of illicit activities by crime syndicates. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the

⁵³ Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy, Interview, *Asian Defence Journal (ADJ)* October 2012, pp. 25.

effective knowledge and understanding of anything on, above or below the maritime domain.

The US National plan to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) defines MDA as, '*the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the United States' security, safety, economy, or environment and describes it as a key component of an active, layered maritime defense in depth*'⁵⁴.

Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (JMICC)

'The watershed events of 9/11 led to the stark realization of the gaps in maritime domain awareness (MDA) policy and capacity that are inextricably tied to physical and economic security of a nation'⁵⁵. Leading maritime nations have developed integrated systems of inter-agency coordination through seamless information sharing with a view to achieving effective maritime security. The contemporary regional maritime security environment came under renewed focus following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Coastal security and maritime security are inseparable; in fact two sides of the same coin. But with tens of hundreds of fishing craft, commercial, recreational as well as other vessels and craft cluttering its landscape, identifying a potential threat in coastal environment is as good as looking for a needle in a haystack.

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) both, in its area of responsibility and wider Indian Ocean region has received significant attention by Pakistan Navy. But as efforts were made by PN to close those gaps, the threats and challenges have too continued to evolve. Given the import of Maritime Situational Awareness i.e. actionable intelligence, recognized maritime picture and common operating picture (COP) for effective conduct of operations against identified threats in the area, a Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (JMICC) was established by PN in 2008.

The Centre serves to coordinate and synergize the efforts of all national stakeholders including government Ministries as well as other agencies to protect national maritime interests in coastal waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Pakistan and beyond. JMICC allows constructing

⁵⁴ 'The Maritime Domain Awareness Conundrum', USNI Proceedings October 2011, pp.28, 31.

⁵⁵ 'The Maritime Domain Awareness Conundrum', USNI Proceedings October 2011, pp.28.

data bases on all water borne vessels and craft operating in the country's jurisdiction through information obtained from various sensors. The information is aggregated and correlated for decision support. The objectives of JMICC include:

- *Achieve enhanced MDA in AOR*
- *Timely sharing of information between all stakeholders involved in matters related to maritime security*
- *Coordinating response amongst concerned stakeholders to counter illicit activities*
- *Develop archive/data for analysis*
- *Avoid duplication of efforts by stakeholders*

NCMPR

To meet contemporary maritime needs and based on the request of Pakistan Navy, the government approved the establishment of a National Centre for Maritime Policy and Research -- short titled NCMPR in 2007. The mandate of the Centre includes:

- *Serve as Think-Tank for multidisciplinary study and maritime policy research*
- *Examine maritime issues to provide guidelines and solutions to the challenges in the maritime domain*

NCMPR engages eminent scholars and renowned researchers on regular basis to probe into maritime policy matters and elicit concrete policy indicators for myriad maritime security issues. In the short period of its existence, apart from holding four International Maritime Conferences, NCMPR has been instrumental in formulating a revised National Maritime Policy which is currently under process for government approval.

Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan-Preserving Freedom of Seas

The soon to be published 'Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan-Preserving Freedom of Seas' (MDP) will be a pioneering endeavour in Pakistan. Spread over 11 chapters and formulated with over three years of direct effort and extensive discussions at various tiers predating the process, MDP will provide an accurate national and PN perspective on variety of diverse maritime, maritime security and naval related issues. Its contemplated wide distribution in military and public sector as well as the country's academia

is forecast to be instructive for the present and the next generation of national decision makers. It will also hopefully go a long way in addressing the enduring 'national maritime blindness'-a term often used to describe a state in which large segments of a nation's population remain ignorant or detached from matters related to oceans. In due course and once formally placed on web, the doctrine will enhance Pakistan's maritime, maritime military image; spell out threat perception as well as peace and war time roles of PN for wider international readership.

Conclusion

The fate of the world in the 21st century is inextricably linked to the global maritime commons. The Indian Ocean is the kernel where the global and regional economic interests of internal and external powers coincide. It is also here that major rising powers compete for influence whilst enlarging and wielding their naval might. In a region swarming with challenges and competing narratives, Pakistan Navy continues to act as the principal balancing force. But the gap in conventional and strategic deterrence is growing fast. Amidst disparate challenges and evolving order in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan will have to retain strategic space through development of hard power. Alongside, the crucial requirement to prevail over 'national maritime blindness' and the role that the Pakistan Navy can play in reinforcing strategic deterrence in the region should be the cornerstone of any national policy making in Pakistan. ■

Chapter 7

Maritime Security Dynamics in Indian Ocean: Pak-China-India

Lt. Cdr. (R) Adil Rashid

ARCHITECTURE

WHAT THEY SAY

- MARITIME SECURITY DEFINITION
- INDIAN OCEAN REGION
- TRADE IN IOR
- MARITIME BALANCE OF POWER
 - CHINA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN

WHAT I SEE

- IT'S A PHASE OF WAR
- CONCLUSION

"Whatever may be said, whosoever may say it - to determine the truth of it, is wisdom" -
Thirukural


MARITIME SECURITY DEFINITION

- A reasonable working definition of maritime security might be "freedom from the risk of serious incursions against a nation's sovereignty launched from the maritime domain, and from the risk of successful attack against a nation's maritime interests."
- According to *The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) Berlin Germany* it is a task aiming for
 - preserving the freedom of the seas,
 - facilitating and defending commerce, and
 - maintaining good governance at sea.

MARITIME SECURITY DEFINITION


- That naval power, control of the seas, is the key to success in international politics: the nation that controlled the seas held the upper hand in modern warfare. For Mahan, a strong Navy was important to the conduct of commerce. But now Many things have changed since Mahan was teaching here. One is our definition of maritime security. It has broadened a lot. Today,
- The maritime domain is defined as all areas and things of, on under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea ocean or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure people, cargo, and vessel and conveyances

According to Tom Kelly Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs US Naval War College while quoting Mahan the famous American strategist of 19th century said that naval power, control of the seas, is the key to success in international politics: the nation that controlled the seas held the upper hand in modern warfare. For Mahan, a strong Navy was important to the conduct of commerce. But now many things have changed since Mahan. One is our definition of maritime security. It has broadened a lot. Today, The Indian Ocean is the third largest



ocean of the world encapsulated between the eastern shores of Africa and Middle East to the western shores of Australia and the Malay Peninsula framing the entire southern shoreline of Asia. Indian Ocean region has always been the heart of trade. The Indian Ocean trade routes connected Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and East Africa from at least the third

century BC, long distance sea trade moved across a web of routes linking all of those areas as well as East Asia (particularly China).



Long before Europeans "discovered" the Indian Ocean, traders from Arabia, Gujarat, and other coastal areas used triangle-sailed dhows to harness the seasonal monsoon winds. In the classical era, major empires involved in the Indian Ocean trade included the **Mauryan Empire in India**, the **Han Dynasty in China**, the **Achaemenid Empire in Persia**, and the **Roman Empire in the Mediterranean**. Silk from China graced Roman aristocrats, Roman coins mingled in Indian treasuries, and Persian jewels show up in Mauryan settings.

Another major export item along the classical Indian Ocean trade routes was religious thought. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism spread from India to Southeast Asia, brought by merchants rather than by missionaries. Islam would later spread the same way from the 700s CE on.


Between the Arabs and the Chinese, several major empires blossomed based largely on maritime trade. The Chola Empire in southern India dazzled travelers with its wealth and luxury; Chinese visitors record parades of elephants covered with gold cloth and jewels marching through the city streets. In what is now Indonesia, the Srivijaya Empire bloomed based almost entirely on taxing trading vessels.

For centuries, China had mostly allowed foreign traders to come to it. After all, everyone wanted Chinese goods, and foreigners were more than

willing to take the time and trouble of visiting coastal China to procure fine silks, porcelain, and other items.


In 1498, strange new mariners made their first appearance in the Indian Ocean. Portuguese sailors under Vasco da Gama rounded the southern point of Africa and ventured into new seas. The Portuguese were eager to join in the Indian Ocean trade, since European demand for Asian luxury goods was extremely high. However, Europe had nothing to trade. The peoples around the Indian Ocean basin had no need of wool or fur clothing, iron cooking pots, or the other meager products of Europe.

As a result, the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean trade as pirates rather than traders. The Portuguese began to rob and extort local producers and foreign merchant ships alike. Scarred by the Moorish conquest of Portugal and Spain, they viewed Muslims in particular as the enemy, and took every opportunity to plunder their ships.



Where this ocean is rich with the known and unknown submerged treasures today it is also serving as a highway to world major trade routes in between the continents in general and home of major SLOCs for energy in particular. According to a current estimate the annual value of two way trade through this ocean is almost 1 trillion US \$. This is expected to be further increasing in the coming decades. With this increase where the commercial value of the region is increasing the strategic value of the domain is also on the rise. Most of the great powers including both the established and emerging are in quest of establishing their strategic

footholds in this area. This establishment of naval bases, increase in naval power and support in coastal development by India, China and USA in developing countries around the ocean is a sign of the same. On the other hand the increasing strategic value of this region is also reflected by comparing the increased number of studies conducted mostly by the strategic thinkers of these nations. In a report published in 2010 by the Hague Centre of Strategic Studies, it was revealed that more of the foresights were published after 2008 than were published in the seven-year period prior to that. In fact, all publications from government and industry – parties that directly make and implement policy – were published after 2005, with the largest share after 2009. This suggests that the strategic importance of this topic is increasing. The figures produced in the report are interesting and I felt them worth sharing at this forum:



The bar graph of number of foresights sampled for the report from year 2000 till 2010 is as shown here. The height of bars clearly shows the increasing interest of researchers from year 2005 with maximum in 2008 and 2009, in this most of the publications from government and industry — parties that directly make and implement policy — were published after 2005, with the largest share after 2009. The pie chart of country perspective revealed through the number of publication by country shows a big share of USA followed by India.

MARITIME BALANCE OF POWER – CHINA

- Mao Zedong wrote in 1953 “we must build a strong navy for the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggression.”
- In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for “a strong navy with modern combat capability,”
- few yeXi Jinping’s enunciation of a “China Dream” has engendered articles calling for a strategy of “outward-oriented military power,” to include “limited global military power . . . capable of protecting distant sea lanes.”^x


The idea to have supremacy in naval power is not new for CHINA (PRC). Mao Zedong wrote in 1953 “we must build a strong navy for the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggression.” In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for “a strong navy with modern combat capability,”. Recently, Xi Jinping’s enunciation of a “China Dream” has engendered articles calling for a strategy of “outward-oriented military power,” to include “limited global military power capable of protecting distant sea lanes.”

Here is a question. If we consider the SLOCs only do china really require to have supremacy of naval power in Indian ocean to safeguard them. To answer it lets see what are the possibilities of disruption of Chinese SLOCs in Indian Ocean.



Nearly 80 per cent of China's fuel is imported from Middle East and North Africa. These shipments must travel through several strategic areas and "choke points" along the way. The first of it is the Strait of Hormuz. An area distant enough for China to safeguard their imports without the help of a Blue Water Navy or alliance. The second line is the route parallel to West Coast of India which is the home of two major Indian naval commands (i.e. the Western Command and Southern Command). In addition a well reached air power is also available in western and southern coastal cities of India which in case of any conflict can easily disrupt China's energy SLOC. After crossing the Strait of Palk and Sri Lanka the line passes through the particularly narrow Strait of Malacca which is being covered by the US naval forces in the area. This scenario somehow justifies the requirement of a well-established naval arm and strategies like the 'String of Pearls'.

STRING OF PEARLS



- The First Pearl is located at the Hainan Island in South China.
- The Second Pearl is the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Hambantota port will also include aviation fuel storage facility, LNG refinery and a bunkering facility to refuel ships.
- The Third Pearl is located at the Chittagong port in Bangladesh.
- Fourth is the Woody Island located 300 miles east of the Paracel Archipelago.
- And so does Port of Sittwe in Myanmar, Marao in the Maldives and Port of Gwadar in Pakistan.

Development of infrastructure along the SLOCs is a part of the four pillars of China's modernization drive which includes Education, Industry and Infrastructure, Military and agriculture. This modernization is dependent on energy which now China is importing in form of oil from Middle East crossing the Indian Ocean. This development is termed as

String of Pearls by the US. The concept of a 'pearl' is a sphere of influence seeded, secured and maintained through the use of economic, geopolitical, diplomatic or military means. The 'string of pearls' is about the rising dragon's sea power and its emerging maritime strategy.

The First Pearl is located at the Hainan Island in South China. The Second Pearl is the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka which will also include aviation fuel storage facility, LNG refinery and a bunkering facility to refuel ships. The Third Pearl is located at the Chittagong port in Bangladesh; the Fourth is the Woody Island located 300 miles east of the Paracel Archipelago. And so are the Ports of Sittwe in Myanmar, Marao in the Maldives and Port of Gwadar in Pakistan.

Some thinkers say that the emerging imbalance of military presence in IOR for one or another reason gave rise to the string of pearl strategy for China.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

CV-16, LIAONING (1601) AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Specifications:

- Length: 251.4 m
- Beam: 35.4 m
- Displacement: 65,000 tons (full load)
- Speed: 30 knots
- Complement: 4,000 crew, 4,000 military
- Range: 7,000 nautical miles
- Top speed: 30 knots
- Range: 7,000 nautical miles

Armament:

- 1 × 160mm gun
- 2 × 100mm guns
- 1 × 57mm gun
- 1 × 30mm gun
- 1 × 20mm gun
- 1 × 12.7mm gun
- 1 × 100mm gun
- 1 × 57mm gun
- 1 × 30mm gun
- 1 × 12.7mm gun

Other features:

- 1 × 100mm gun
- 1 × 57mm gun
- 1 × 30mm gun
- 1 × 12.7mm gun
- 1 × 100mm gun
- 1 × 57mm gun
- 1 × 30mm gun
- 1 × 12.7mm gun

Aircraft Carrier Complement:

- 1 × J-15
- 1 × J-16
- 1 × J-17
- 1 × J-18
- 1 × J-19
- 1 × J-20
- 1 × J-21
- 1 × J-22
- 1 × J-23
- 1 × J-24
- 1 × J-25
- 1 × J-26
- 1 × J-27
- 1 × J-28
- 1 × J-29
- 1 × J-30
- 1 × J-31
- 1 × J-32
- 1 × J-33
- 1 × J-34
- 1 × J-35
- 1 × J-36
- 1 × J-37
- 1 × J-38
- 1 × J-39
- 1 × J-40
- 1 × J-41
- 1 × J-42
- 1 × J-43
- 1 × J-44
- 1 × J-45
- 1 × J-46
- 1 × J-47
- 1 × J-48
- 1 × J-49
- 1 × J-50
- 1 × J-51
- 1 × J-52
- 1 × J-53
- 1 × J-54
- 1 × J-55
- 1 × J-56
- 1 × J-57
- 1 × J-58
- 1 × J-59
- 1 × J-60
- 1 × J-61
- 1 × J-62
- 1 × J-63
- 1 × J-64
- 1 × J-65
- 1 × J-66
- 1 × J-67
- 1 × J-68
- 1 × J-69
- 1 × J-70
- 1 × J-71
- 1 × J-72
- 1 × J-73
- 1 × J-74
- 1 × J-75
- 1 × J-76
- 1 × J-77
- 1 × J-78
- 1 × J-79
- 1 × J-80
- 1 × J-81
- 1 × J-82
- 1 × J-83
- 1 × J-84
- 1 × J-85
- 1 × J-86
- 1 × J-87
- 1 × J-88
- 1 × J-89
- 1 × J-90
- 1 × J-91
- 1 × J-92
- 1 × J-93
- 1 × J-94
- 1 × J-95
- 1 × J-96
- 1 × J-97
- 1 × J-98
- 1 × J-99
- 1 × J-100

- First phase from year 2000 to 2010 includes doubling of GDP and up gradation of its Navy from 'Green Water' to 'Blue Water' which has been successfully achieved.
- The second stage is from 2010-2020 aiming for double the GDP and development of 06 Aircraft Carrier groups. Which presently going as per target and marked with the recent commissioning of its first Aircraft Carrier, The Liaoning.
- The final stage will be starting from 2020 to 2050 which will end with propelling the china at the stage with world Advanced Nation and with a Naval Power capable of project itself in all oceans of the world.

China's Economic and military development is a three phased plan with a total span of 50 years. The first phase from year 2000 to 2010 includes doubling of GDP and up gradation of its Navy from 'Green Water' to 'Blue Water' which has been successfully achieved.

The second stage is from 2010-2020 aiming for doubling the GDP and development of 06 Aircraft Carrier groups, presently going as per target

and marked with the recent commissioning of its first Aircraft Carrier, The Liaoning.

The final stage will be starting from 2020 to 2050 which will end with propelling China to the stage of world advanced nations and with a naval power capable of projecting itself in all oceans of the world



According to Indian Maritime Military Strategy, independent India's maritime vision was expressed in the first Naval Plans Paper of 1948. The Indian Navy was to consist of cruisers and destroyers, structured around small aircraft carriers and would protect India's Sea Lines of Communications. Today India is among the first five super powers of the world. The race does not stop there and the development of military power of India is still on.

India nevertheless enjoys sizable advantages when competing in South Asia. Geography, for one. The subcontinent occupies a central position in the region. It juts out into the Indian Ocean, letting Indian mariners and airmen exert some control over maritime traffic crisscrossing the Indian Ocean. India, moreover, holds the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, athwart the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca. And Indian forces enjoy short distances to potential trouble spots. They're intimately familiar with the physical and cultural terrain in their home region. In all likelihood, furthermore, Indians place more importance on managing what transpires in

the Indian Ocean than any external power will. Wanting something more supplies an edge.

India's concern about China's attempt to change maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean and planned maritime Silk Route that will crisscross up to Europe, is sinking deep in the strategic planners' bone.

- "India's growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca...India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness".

Dr Manmohan Singh

- "We see the Indian Navy as a significant stabilizing force in the Indian Ocean region, which safeguards traffic bound not only for our own ports, but also the flow of hydrocarbons and strategically important cargo to and from the rest of the world across the strategic waterways close to our shores...And so, the safety of SLOCs will always remain a priority for India in the foreseeable future"

Admiral Sureesh Mehta

According to Cmde Ranjit B Rai, these statements have given grist to China to defend itself on what has been touted by a US researcher as 'China's String of Pearls' of bases in the Indian Ocean. Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India's Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a 'metal chain' to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an 'Iron Curtain' in the Indian Ocean,

STRING OF PEARLS VS IRON CURTAIN



Backed by a burgeoning economy, New Delhi too aspires to be hailed as a true blue water navy, and they will always deter the Chinese aspirations in the IOR. To live up to this very notion, India too is answering boldly by juxtaposing its presence alongside that of China in the IOR — a strategy that has been termed as Iron Curtain.

Backed by a burgeoning economy, New Delhi too aspires to be hailed as a true blue water navy, and they will always deter the Chinese aspirations in the IOR. To live up to this very notion, India too is answering boldly by juxtaposing its presence alongside that of China in the IOR — a strategy that has been termed as Iron Curtain.

India is presently exchanging dialogues with Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh to identify the areas of investments in these countries. In Myanmar, it is developing the Sittwe port. The Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore that administers the Malacca Straits has recently received substantial monetary aid from India. The group has involved India's naval expertise to survey shipwrecks in the area that has left China fuming for obvious reasons.

Militarily too India has expanded its presence in the IOR by setting up listening posts in Seychelles, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mauritius. Recently India has also gained berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam, which again is sure to give the mighty Chinese dragon cold vibes.

REGIONAL COOPERATION STRATEGY

- The Indian Ocean Rim-Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), rechristened as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is the only pan Indian Ocean economic grouping and brings together countries straddling three continents i.e. Africa, Asia and Australia. In recent times it has begun to address maritime security issues.
- The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a 35-member Indian Ocean security apparatus which facilitates exchange of views among the naval professionals to evolve common understanding of maritime security issues in the region.
- Likewise, Milan (confluence) is a gathering of navies from India's extended neighborhood of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand that aims to develop cooperative mechanisms. The 2014 Milan at Port Blair in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal was significant from the perspective that 17 navies participated including two from Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), three Indian Ocean island nations (Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles) and the navies of Philippines and Cambodia made their debut.

The Indian Ocean rim countries have established a number of multilateral maritime mechanisms to address non-traditional security threats and challenges confronting the region. The Indian Ocean Rim-Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), rechristened as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is the only pan Indian Ocean economic grouping and


brings together countries straddling three continents i.e. Africa, Asia and Australia. In recent times it has begun to address maritime security issues.

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a 35-member Indian Ocean security apparatus which facilitates exchange of views among the naval professionals to evolve common understanding of maritime security issues in the region.

Likewise, Milan (confluence) is a gathering of navies from India's extended neighbourhood of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand that aims to develop cooperative mechanisms. The 2014 Milan at Port Blair in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal was significant from the perspective that 17 navies participated including two from Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), three Indian Ocean island nations (Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles) and the navies of Philippines and Cambodia made their debut.

While IORA, IONS and Milan are successful models of maritime cooperation in their own right, they have shied from addressing hard security issues which appear in two forms; first, there is a gradual accretion of naval power by the Indian Ocean littorals; and second the continued presence of extra regional naval powers that are forward deployed in the Indian Ocean to support national strategic and economic interests. In essence, the Indian Ocean region emerges as an arena of cooperation and competition. ■

INDIA AS REGIONAL POWER



PAKISTAN'S MARITIME STRATEGY

- Pakistan's maritime strategy is defense-driven with no element of seeking parity with the neighboring countries that are reportedly opting for a full-fledged blue water navy. The imperatives of the strategy include protection of Pakistan's territorial waters, frustrating all efforts of exploiting its sea resources by others and to ensure free and smooth economic access for trade. It is a medium size navy with no offensive designs and it does not aim at sea access denial to its neighbor. Pakistan had always treated sea as a binding agent than as a divisive element in its relations with neighbors. Pakistan had always used its modest maritime forces to strengthen peace and security of the lanes in the Arabian Sea which is strategic for safety of energy corridor.
- It had also cooperated with the international community as part and sometimes as the command of 150, 151 Multiple Task Forces in collaboration with NATO to carry out anti-piracy campaign in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Eden and waters around it.



Chapter 8

Contemporary Geopolitics of Indian Ocean and Great Power Competition over Gwadar

A. Z. Hilali

Since the beginning of “blue water” politics, the Indian Ocean has become a key strategic arena and considered strategically vital for regional and global powers to secure export of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to industrialised countries and the rest of the world. It is a highway to conflict zones and critical routes for global trade and commercial activities because of its potentially volatile location for geopolitical strife. Robert Kaplan, US geo-strategist in his work observed that the greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the South Asian region, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one. It is an area which will be the true nexus of world powers confrontation in the coming years. It is also volatile and has a recognizable geography which already forms center stage for the challenges of the twenty-first century world’s ocean water politics.¹ The maritime security of the Indian Ocean region and the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has now become an issue of all concerned powers such as the United States, Europe, China, and India who need energy to maintain economic growth. In addition, the end of the Cold War has diminished the importance of the Atlantic Ocean and boosted the strategic value of Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean for all maritime powers.

¹ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: Indian Ocean and the Future of the American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. 7-23; and see also Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 2009), pp. 3-14.

Geostrategic Importance of Indian Ocean in the post-Cold War Era:

In the past the Indian Ocean had remained a highly neglected and isolated region but the Cold War intense has given strategic importance to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area. At that time, the dream of the Soviet Union was to advance to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Some political observers have termed the region the “New Silk Road Economic Belt” which will connect China across Central Asia and Russia to Europe and link to the 21st century “Maritime Silk Road” through the Malacca Strait to India, the Middle East and East Africa. It is perceived to work as a modern logistics bridge between China and the rest of the world.² Alfred Thayer Mahan underscores the importance of the Indian Ocean when he says in his famous work *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, that “control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.”³ *The Times* (London) proclaimed that Mahan was “the new Copernicus,”⁴ and Halford Mackinder called Mahan as the founder of modern geopolitics. Mahan’s most significant contribution to maritime thought was his finding that the success of the British maritime empire could be attributed to not only sea power but also the combined interplay and exploitation of all its naval, military, economic, and diplomatic powers in a comprehensive manner. He also insisted that the maritime and continental schools of strategy should not compete against, but complement each other.⁵ Mahan is most commonly remembered for emphasizing the significance of sea lanes and the shipping industry, the importance of naval stations, the concentration of naval forces, and the positive effects of naval blockades. His book was applauded by the leaders of the great powers and navy circles at the time for articulating the

² Yang Jiechi, “China Economic Diplomacy,” *Time* (London) November 10, 2014 and see also *News* (Rawalpindi), November 11, 2014, p. 11.

³ Philip A. Crawl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 450.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

⁵ Barry D. Hunt, “The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian S. Corbett,” in John B. Hattendorf, Rosert S. Jordan, and Robert O’Neill (ed.), *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1989), p. 115.

decisive battle doctrine, the “Big Gun Navy,”⁶ and the principle of the big navy, and he was called an expansionist and a propagandist.⁷ Thus, Mahan’s quotation appeared in official and academic discussions of the blue water navy as he mentioned over a century ago that “whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”⁸ So, the Indian Ocean is the only ocean which is for all the time and practical meaning of that great reality was not wholly understood until after the end of the Cold War when it appeared being grasped in its entirety.⁹

Strategically the Indian Ocean, the world’s third largest body of water, covers more than 28 million square miles and 30 nations that constitute its littoral region contain one-third of the world’s population. The region occupies a crucial importance, especially because of the presence of major powers in the region and potential of the regional powers to form the center stage for the challenges in the 21st century. In the contemporary time, the Indian Ocean is not only important because of the great powers’ economic and military interests but it is also vulnerable due to organized network of global terrorism, piracy, human smuggling, drug trafficking, drug smuggling and gun running, as well as proliferation of munitions between and among insurgent groups.¹⁰ According to Ashley Tellis, “the vast Indian Ocean is rapidly becoming more prominent in strategists’ thinking, amidst rapid changes affecting its dynamics. Unlike the Arctic region, the Indian Ocean’s importance does not derive from an intrinsic value, from the resources it contains; its value, for the US and other external

⁶ Kenichi Kitamura, “Comment by the translator: How Should We Comprehend Seapower- Today’s Significance,” *Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*, translated by Kenichi Kitamura, Commentary by Kazushige Todaka (Tokyo: Harashobo, 2008), p. 15.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸ American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his *magnum opus* “Influences of Sea Power upon History,” in the 18th century. There marking the Ocean as the springboard propelling or making Great Power. See also Government of Indian Press Information Bureau, “Guarding the Coastline of the Country,” 28 August 2002.

⁹ Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, translated by Yasunobu Somura (Tokyo: Harashobo, 2008), p. 39.

¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2009), pp. 18-19.

powers, is primarily as a highway.”¹¹ The ocean is rich in natural resources and its geographical space contains 62 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves, 35 per cent of its gas, 40 per cent of its gold, 60 per cent of its uranium, and 80 per cent of its diamonds.¹² Sizable deposits of other resources are also available in the littoral areas such as uranium, tin, iron, titanium, chromate, lithium, bauxite, cobalt, nickel, manganese, rubber, gold and diamonds and accentuate the factors beckoning the attention of out-side maritime powers to the region. In the present time the Indian Ocean is the world’s busiest trade routes connecting the Middle East, South Asia and the Asia-Pacific which has made it one vast “choke point.” The seaborne oil trade is around 40 per cent of the world which goes through the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and also cross other world commerce’s main chokepoints: Bab el Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Moreover, approximately 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil (equivalent to about one-fifth of global energy supply) - oil which fuels the economies of the United States, Japan, China and India, depends on transit shipments of Middle East oil, natural gas, and raw materials.¹³ Even today, around 90 per cent of world trade and commerce, measured by bulk, travels by sea and about 65 per cent of all oil travel from the Persian Gulf to reach consumers in Europe and Asia. Seventeen million barrels of oil a day (20 per cent of the world’s oil supply and 93 per cent of oil exported from the Gulf) transits by tanker through the Strait of Hormuz and into the western reaches of the Indian Ocean. Large amounts of oil reach Europe and the Americas via the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope, the more important route is eastward, as Gulf oil provides nearly 75 per cent of Asia’s import needs. Japan’s economy is almost totally dependent on Gulf oil, with 89 per cent of its imports shipped via the Indian Ocean, while Asia’s two rising powers, China and India, are also increasingly reliant on oil transiting the region. At present, more than 89 per cent of China’s

¹¹ Ashley Tellis, “The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC: 2012), p. 9.

¹² Andrew S. Erickson, Walter C. Ladwig, and Justin D. Mikolay, “Diego Garcia and the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 6, no. 3 (2010), p. 216.

¹³ Walter C. Ladwig, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East,” and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2009), pp. 87-92.

hydrocarbon imports come via the Indian Ocean, while Gulf oil will soon account for 90 per cent of India's imports.¹⁴

In terms of international trade, the Indian Ocean is a major conduit linking manufacturers in East Asia to markets in Europe, Africa, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to more than two-thirds of the world's oil shipments, half of the world's containerized cargo and one-third of its bulk cargo travels the ocean's busy sea lanes annually.¹⁵ The Asia-Europe shipping route, via the Indian Ocean, has recently displaced the transpacific route as the world's largest containerized trading lane.¹⁶ For these reasons, the region has assumed tremendous strategic significance. Indeed, Robert Kaplan argues that the Indian Ocean is a key geographic space which melds energy, commerce, and security.¹⁷ Moreover, economic and commercial growth in both the developed and developing world depends on uninterrupted access to the Indian Ocean littoral's oil and mineral resources and the goods that transit through it and particularly because 80 per cent of the trade conducted across the Indian Ocean is extra-regional.¹⁸ In the same way, 40 per cent of world trade passes through the Strait of Malacca and 40 per cent of all traded crude oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Globalization has been made possible by the cheap and easy shipping of containers on tankers, and the Indian Ocean accounts for fully half the world's container traffic. More than 70 per cent of petroleum products pass through the Indian Ocean, on its way from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific. An estimated \$200 billion worth of oil transits the Strait of Hormuz annually, while some \$60 billion transits the Strait of Malacca en route to China, Japan, and other East Asian countries reliant on energy imports.¹⁹ The dependence of industrialized economies on the Gulf region "has already invited the presence of extra-regional powers and the accompanying Command, Control, Surveillance and Intelligence network. According to

¹⁴ Andrew S. Erickson, "Diego Garcia and the United States' Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy," p. 216.

¹⁵ Integrated Headquarters (Navy), *Indian Maritime Doctrine* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defense, 2009), p. 57.

¹⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2008* (New York: United Nations, 2008), p. 23.

¹⁷ Robert Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century," p. 16.

¹⁸ Integrated Headquarters (Navy), *Indian Maritime Doctrine* (2009), p. 58.

¹⁹ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle?," *Naval War College Review*, col. XII, no. 1 (1999), p. 44.

Zhang Ming, “the South Asian region is akin to a massive triangle reaching into the heart of the Indian Ocean, benefiting any from there who seeks to control the Indian Ocean” and it is a link of communication and oil transportation between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the most important strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean.”²⁰ Robert Kaplan explains that the Indian Ocean is an area that has become witness to knock for power, and subsequent shifts in the dynamics of the region. It is a very ‘active’ ocean, perceived by many as the emerging center of gravity in the strategic world. Its ‘activities’ in the region are defined by extensive trade, energy transfers and a spectrum that ranges from political turbulence on one end, to threats from piracy, terrorism and transnational crime on the other.²¹

In addition, the geographical feature of the Indian Ocean is concerned with the centrality of global energy politics in the twenty-first century and the rise of China and India as economic powers as well as quest for energy security, have compelled both countries to redirect their gazes from land to the seas.²² In fact, sea power has always been less threatening than land power because navies make ports and armies invade. Ships take a long time to get to a war zone, allowing diplomacy to work its magic. Felipe Fernández-Armesto mentioned that throughout history, sea routes perceived to have mattered more than land routes, because they carry more goods more economically. According to him, in the late fifteenth century “whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice,” and Hormuz would be its yolk. Nonetheless, the post-Cold War political and military developments in the region have adverse effects and can disturb the flow of oil, raw materials, or trade goods in the extreme competitive world’s major economies. On the other hand, the particular geography of the ocean which is bounded on almost all sides by the narrow chokepoints of the Straits of Malacca to the east and the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, and Straits of Hormuz to the west imposes challenges to maritime security. As several maritime analysts have noted, “If there was ever a case to be made for the relevance of strategic chokepoints, it is here, at the aquatic juncture between the world’s largest sources of petroleum and the

²⁰ Zhang Ming, “The Malacca Dilemma and the Chinese Navy’s Strategic Choices,” *Modern Ships*, no. 274, (October 2006), p. 23.

²¹ Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century,” pp. 16-18.

²² James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the Indian Ocean,” p. 36.

world's most import and export-dependent economies."²³ All types of ships in these narrow sea lanes are vulnerable to attack, but control of these bottlenecks has been the key to dominating the ocean because any country which has a well-equipped blue water navy can play leading role in the northern Indian Ocean and that would have the ability to affect the oil and trade routes from the Middle East to Europe and Asia and can create negative influence over the industrialized world. As the world's strategic center of gravity shifts from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Indian Ocean as Kaplan argues that "the Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the 21st century,"²⁴ its adjacent waters will be a central theatre of global conflict and competition. It is not an exaggeration to mention that the Indian Ocean could be pivotal geopolitically because the region has the potential to be the scene for great power conflicts.

Influence and Confrontation in the Indian Ocean

Since the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean has emerged as an intense competitive zone between the US, China, Japan, India and other concerned countries and the region became important in the world of free market economy as the new economic silk route also passes through it. Although the security situation in the Indian Ocean region, long characterized by uncertain relations between its major power brokers, is prone to strategic miscalculation. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, the Indian Ocean is a dangerous flash point of global significance which has changed the character of international politics due to strategic, economic and commercial value of the world. More than ever before, the interests of the United States, India, and China all coincide and collide in the Indian Ocean littoral. The key actors, one predominant and the others ascendant, may find themselves at odds as they protect national interests.

It is argued that the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost in Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In essence, the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The countries of

²³ Stephen J. Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 66.

²⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean," p. 18.

Asia-Pacific region are certain to fear the Chinese rise and have awareness that they cannot prevent China from achieving regional hegemony without the support of the United States. Indeed militarily weak countries are worried about China's growing power and are looking for ways to contain it.²⁵ In the same way, India and the United States have become good friends over the past decade because both fear China. The problem with this argument is that the US administrations have made it clear that they are committed to maintaining American primacy. As Walter Russell sees that "China, Iran, and Russia are determined to undo the post-Cold War settlement and challenges the US-led global order." He argues that "these aggrieved states are bent on building spheres of influence to threaten the foundations of US leadership. So, the United States must rethink its optimism, including its post-Cold War belief that rising Non-western States can be persuaded to join the West and play by its rules." For Mead, "the time has come to confront the threats from these increasingly dangerous geopolitical foes."²⁶ In the same manner, the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright also mentioned that the US is 'indispensable nation' and therefore it has both the right and the responsibility to police the entire globe.²⁷ It means the US is likely to go to considerable lengths to prevent China from becoming an Asia-Pacific and South Asian power. Regarding capabilities, the United States spends nearly as much money on defense as all the other countries in the world combined.²⁸ Moreover, the US military is designed to fight all around the world which has abundant power projection assets. Much of that capability is either located in the Asia-Pacific region or can be moved there quickly should the need arise. Thus, the United States has formidable military forces in its neighborhood that are

²⁵ David Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership," *Asian Survey*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), p. 98.

²⁶ Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2014), pp. 23-46.

²⁷ Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright said on February 19, 1998 that, "if we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further than other countries into the future." See also John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," p. 386.

²⁸ The US accounted for 43% of worldwide spending on defence in 2009, according to the *SIPRI Year book 2010: Armament and Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 11.

designed in good part for offensive purposes.²⁹ Furthermore, many US strategists have the opinion that “Washington’s military capability is pre-emptive and Chinese military is a defensive instrument”³⁰ but Charles Glaser said that “that is not the way it looks when you are at the other end of the rifle barrel.”³¹ Thus, anyone in China seeking to gauge American intentions by assessing its military capabilities is likely to think it is a revisionist state, not a status quo power.

Nevertheless, Chinese are well aware that the United States can take advantage of a weak China and they don’t want that the US has to play in Asia-Pacific as a guardian of the region. On the other hand, the recent decision by Japan to allow the US Marines to remain on Okinawa was driven in part by Tokyo’s concerns about China’s growing assertiveness in the region and the related need to keep the American security umbrella firmly in place over Japan and the rest of Asia-Pacific.³² So, Pacific nations have no options to join the US-led balancing coalition designed to check and contain China’s power. However, the superpower competition is always intense because it is driven by sharp ideological differences between the two sides as well as by geopolitical considerations. In this context, there are certain ideological differences between China and the United States, but both don’t want to affect their relations in profound ways. In particular, China has embraced a market-based economy, and does not see its current version of state capitalism as an exportable model in the world. Moreover, China is deeply integrated into the world economy and actively engaged with the Western countries for economic benefits which is good for long-term peace rather war.³³ According to Kenneth Waltz, “in international politics ties are often a major source of friction between great powers”³⁴ but

²⁹ Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the US Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 63, no. 3 (2010), pp. 39-56.

³⁰ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214.

³¹ Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 1 (1997), pp. 171-201.

³² Blaine Harden, “Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Resigns,” *Washington Post*, June 2, 2007.

³³ Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantages* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 1912), pp. 32-45.

³⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison, 1979), pp. 91-107.

economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other.³⁵ So, it is the United States that shows a greater tendency to want to export its system to others, but that ambition is likely to be tempered by setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq and it seems that future rivalry between Beijing and Washington would be less intense than the ideological-laden competition between the superpowers.

In essence, the future stability of the Indian Ocean depends on the nature of US-China relationship because both have economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. For China, India, and the United States, an age-old strategic calculus prevails in the long-standing interplay between country's power, influence, and presence throughout the Indian Ocean littoral countries. To establish presence, and influence, it helps to have power. So, completing the cycle, a country's interests tend to expand as power does, further complicating the interactions of emerging powers. China is facing a major geographical problem in securing sea lanes which has significant implications for Asia-Pacific countries. Specifically, there are three major water passages that connect the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It means China must have access to at least one of those passages at all times to be able to control its sea lanes from the oil-rich Persian Gulf. This situation almost certainly and predictably means both the US and China will maintain a significant military presence in the waters of Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The US is concerned about China's growing military power and Beijing is also deeply concerned about the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region and their power projection capabilities. It will therefore work to establish counter power capabilities to protect China shipping in the Indian Ocean. In essence, the belief that the US as a dominant power in the world will continue to protect its own and allies' strategic and economic interests for the unforeseen future with the fact that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean horizon seems understandable.

³⁵ G. John Ikenberry, "The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2014), pp. 41-56.

United States' Interest in the Indian Ocean

US involvement in the Indian Ocean took place after the 1960s when the British practically withdrew from the region and the US entered to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and to protect the interests of Asia-Pacific region. It was the time when the regional countries and US allies enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stability underwritten by US strategic primacy.³⁶ US played its role to contain the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean through various covert or overt and secret activities. Its navy stabilized logistics bases in the region to facilitate local contingency operations. They developed communications stations for ships and aircraft in the area, an airfield capable of hosting long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and a supply depot that could sustain a US naval presence on a site that was relatively unpopulated and free from political restrictions on its use. Although many American naval strategists advocated securing basing rights on strategically located areas and to cover the vulnerabilities of shore-based facilities.³⁷

After the end of the Cold War, the global politics has changed the position of the Indian Ocean which has emerged as a major centre of geostrategic interests. It has been perceived that the US will no longer be the preponderant power in the Asia-Pacific region, as it has been since 1945. The argument, of course, is that the rise of China is having a significant effect on the global balance of power and the power gap between China and the US is shrinking and in all likelihood 'US strategic primacy' in the Asia-Pacific region will be no more.³⁸ It has been noticed that as other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change. Moreover, the shifting balance of power may not be good for the Asia-Pacific countries which are worried about China's rise because it is likely to lead to an intense security competition between China and the United States. To put it bluntly, most of

³⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, vol. 3, (2010), p. 381.

³⁷ "US Overseas Bases," Memorandum, Box 27, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OASD/ISA Files 680.1, RG 330, National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP); and see also David Vine, *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the US Military Base on Diego Garcia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 56–71.

³⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," p.382.

China's neighbours including India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Australia desire that China's rise happens peacefully.³⁹ It is a welcome fact that China has peaceful intentions but it has been assumed by the regional countries that the structure of China's military modernization has the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern against which they seek US support for the protection of Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has recommended "integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations" and asking the US planners to review the policy according to the modern needs and requirements.⁴¹ Some Pacific players have the perception that "the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality and to maintain maritime strategy and defence planning."⁴² The major players of Pacific Rim are willing to enhance cooperation with other important countries like India not only to encircle China but even to share common interests in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia."⁴³ The US future strategy already highlighted by Robert Kaplan's book *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* in which he spotlighted that the United States is the only power which realizes the growing dependence on the sea lanes of Indian Ocean for energy supplies and trade.⁴⁴ The US has appeared as a guardian of the Indian Ocean, of its growing share of global economic output and the security of littoral countries. The United States, India, and China are among those countries which have overlapping interests in this vital region. In this context, the United States seems to be determined to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean but in turn needs effective strategies

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Department of Defence, Australian Government, "Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2010," p. 49.

http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009

⁴¹ US Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," February 2010, pp. 60-61,

http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

⁴² Australian Department of Defence, "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030," 2009, p. 37.

⁴³ Japanese Ministry of Defense, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond," December 17, 2010, p. 9,

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.

⁴⁴ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, pp. 18-35.

from the Asia Pacific countries and India to protect the rights of all weak and small littoral countries and to contain the Chinese influence.

As per Kaplan's description, the Indian Ocean is "the world's preeminent energy and trade inter-state seaway," where the emergence of a geopolitical "great game" rivalry is inevitable. Other than the United States, China and India are growing economies and China surpassed the United States in recent years to become the world's largest net oil importer.⁴⁵ Thus, it is an area that has become a witness to the knock for power, and subsequent shifts in the dynamics of the region. It is a very 'active' ocean, perceived by many as the emerging center of gravity in the strategic world. Its 'activities' in the region are defined by extensive trade, energy transfers and a spectrum that ranges from political turbulence on one end, to threats from transnational to organized crimes. All the main countries of the Pacific and Indian Ocean region have shown the desire for closer bilateral security and political engagement with the US and have no reservation on the prospects of US pre-eminence in the area. They include India and key allies like Japan who look for US proactive engagement and military presence which will be indispensable to a stable balance of power. In the situation, the US as a unipolar power continues to see itself as the "Guarantor" of international commerce and maritime security.⁴⁶ In order to maintain balance in the Asia-Pacific region the US has a naval presence in Bahrain, Djibouti and Diego Garcia and engages in exercises with various African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries along the Indian Ocean coastline. Currently, United States, the world's mightiest naval power, is dominating the region which China is trying to balance in order to protect its interests with regard to its growing economy and energy needs. At this point, the Indian Ocean highway does not seem directly threatened by any hostile power except China to meet whose claims in the south China sea the US is encouraging regional states to obstruct China's expansion and limit Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and reduce regional countries dependence on China. The United States thinks that China wants to shift the economic centre from the west to the east through acquiring control over the key choke points in the Indian Ocean and thus change the direction and balance

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, "Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2012), pp. 21-47.

of trade further towards Asia.⁴⁷ The US wants that the region should not be dominated by any single state.

Geographically, the Indian Ocean provides China with potential asymmetrical advantages to keep New Delhi off guard in a way that India could not easily replicate in China's littoral in the East or South China seas. So, the US wants to achieve objectives in the region and continue to engage India and Asia Pacific countries with itself as part of its strategy of encircling China. As a part of its "Asia Pivot" or "rebalance to Asia"⁴⁸ strategy, the US encourages India to establish relations with South-Eastern and Central Asian states. To some extent, US policy seems to be complicated by India's "look east" policy but New Delhi compromises because the "Pivot" enables the US and India to work together to compete for influence with China.⁴⁹ The US is enhancing its naval presence in the region which is recognition of the fact that the region is gaining central position in the world politics. According to Japanese scholars Tomohiko Satake and Yusuke Ishihara, Indian Ocean is at the centre of the world affairs through which transit half of all containers and all Asian countries are dependent on crude oil and petroleum products transported through the Indian Ocean and its choke points.⁵⁰ For the protection of these strategic routes, the US navy remains present in the region to secure passage through both chokepoints, and also for the growing power-projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) in the not-too-distant future. Thus, while the Indian Ocean highway is not itself under any serious threat yet India perceives that US presence could provide an important defense-in-depth for countering threats to strategic chokepoints coming from outside the Indian Ocean region.

Christopher Layne outlined US strategic priorities, since 1945, which have been there to prevent the rival hegemon in Western Europe or

⁴⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean," p. 27.

⁴⁸ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. In the article Secretary of State Clinton refers to the "pivot" to Asia. The term was later changed to "rebalance."

⁴⁹ Stephen Burgess, "A Pivot towards the United States? Growing Power Politics in Asia and the India-US Strategic Partnership," *Journal of US Air War College*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (September 2014), p. 7.

⁵⁰ Tomohiko Satake and Yusuke Ishihara, "America's Rebalance to Asia and its Implications for Japan-US-Australia Security Cooperation," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 19, Issue 2, (November 2012), pp. 6-25.

Southwest and Asia Pacific region while guaranteeing order in key areas of the periphery particularly the Persian Gulf.⁵¹ In this regard, strategic developments in the Indian Ocean are of importance to the US as they affect the achievement of these broader goals. Among Washington's most significant concerns are the need to secure the sea lines of communication (SLOC) that transit the region, the desire to prevent a hostile power from dominating the littoral, and the imperative to disrupt the operations of al-Qaeda and other Non-State-Actors.⁵² So, it is evident that the US must address the critical issues of the region and also to create stable political order in the region with the consensus of all concerned countries. The United States, then, has a strong interest in developing influence in the region without engendering a backlash that would jeopardize that influence. As the world's largest economy, the United States is concerned with the security of the ships that transit the Indian Ocean to bring goods and energy to market. 22 per cent (22%) of America's oil imports and more than 50 strategic minerals on which the United States relies come from or transit the littoral region.⁵³ It is interesting to note that the United States directly does not significantly depend on the region for access to hydrocarbons, (oil & gas) which have a global market and disruption anywhere will affect the world price. However, all major US allies including Europe and Australia and key trading partners or allies in Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as important regional partners like India and Singapore, are heavily dependent on the energy flows transiting the Indian Ocean. This is also true of key trading partners such as China, Japan, and South Korea, which collectively account for more than 20 per cent of all US trade by value.⁵⁴ Thus, the requirements of trade and energy make the continued free passage of shipping through the Indian Ocean of supreme importance for Washington to enable it to quickly move its naval forces between the European, Central, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility.

⁵¹ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 27, 45.

⁵² White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 12.

⁵³ "Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet," Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Brief, June 2007, <http://www.marcon.com/marcon2c.cfm?SectionListsID=93&PageID=771>.

⁵⁴ Andrew S. Erickson, "Diego Garcia and the United States' Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy," p. 218.

As a result, the United States has an interest in preventing the emergence of a hostile regional power that could threaten the flow of commodities in the region.⁵⁵ The US has fear that increasingly belligerent Iran straddles the Strait of Hormuz, which is the world's most important maritime chokepoint. There is no doubt that Iran has an ability of sea mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and attack submarines to protect its own navigation interest in the Arabian Sea rather than to interrupt maritime activities. Tehran can adopt proactive policy in response to US retaliation against Iran's nuclear installations and Tehran can block the Straits of Hormuz.⁵⁶ At the same time, China has increased its extra-regional presence and political influence from Southeast Asia to the coast of East Africa in its quest for energy. Beijing is also cultivating an informal set of access rights to local ports which could increase the Chinese navy's ability to project power into the littoral areas.⁵⁷ In the situation, the key US interest in the region not only ranges from energy to trade to security but to secure the use of the world's oceans at will, free from restriction and interference."⁵⁸ So, the Indian Ocean littoral countries are an increasingly important part of the world and their political and economic developments certainly will affect US interests. In recognition of the importance of the region the US maritime strategy reorients the Navy and Marine Corps from their traditional two-ocean focus on the Atlantic and the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, thereby declaring the intent to maintain sufficient forces in these regions to deter or defeat any hostile power. Thus, the US as a moral and military guardian of the world would play its key role in managing stability in the region, and using multilateral efforts to respond to irregular security threats or to prevent the escalation of interstate conflicts. For this purpose, the United States does not like too much involvement in the Indian Ocean; rather, regular military deployments, coupled with the ability to surge forces into the area during a crisis, would provide the ability to deter most threats

⁵⁵ Ashley Tellis, "American and Indian Interests in India's Extended Neighborhood," *India in Transition*, June 27, 2007, <http://casi.sas.upenn.edu/node/64>.

⁵⁶ Caitlin Talmadge, "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 82–117.

⁵⁷ Sudha Ramachandran, "China Moves into India's Back Yard," *Asia Times*, March 13, 2007.

⁵⁸ James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford, England: Routledge, 2009), p. 120.

to US interests in the region. This is basically a reason that the US is more interested in stabilizing its centrally positioned island of Diego Garcia which is “one of the most strategic American bases in the world.”⁵⁹ There is a “major shift” in its regional strategy in significantly increasing the frequency of its naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, particularly upgrading Diego Garcia from a “limited communications facility” to an “active support facility of the US Navy,” complete with “an anchorage, airfield, and associated logistics support and supply and personnel accommodations.”⁶⁰ The further extension of the island’s airfield and upgrading of its communications suite allowed the temporary basing of long-range bombers. The improvement of Diego Garcia’s facilities and the prepositioning of military equipment also significantly enhanced America’s capability to project power into the Indian Ocean littoral and assume a more active role in the region’s affairs. According to Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US “strategy supports the development of a tailored posture in the broader Middle East and Central and South Asia, promotes a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region, and reaffirms our commitment to NATO and Europe.”⁶¹

In recent years, with the rise of the strategic position of the Indian Ocean, the US put forward the “Indo-Pacific” concept and strengthened its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. According to Kaplan, “it seems difficult to seize any option to incorporate China’s navy into international alliances because there is no such kind of understanding between US-China at sea for the stabilization of world politics in the twenty-first century.”⁶² There is no doubt that the Indian Ocean is a seaway for both energy and hashish and is in drastic need of policing. David Kang recommended the US military planners have to “deal effectively the Indian Ocean and have to invoke challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and smuggling to bring together India, China, and other states in joint sea patrols. The goal of the United States must be to forge a global maritime system that can minimize

⁵⁹ Andrew S. Erickson, “Diego Garcia and the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy,” pp. 219-221.

⁶⁰ US Department of State, “Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia, 24 October 1972,” in *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972).

⁶¹ See *Quadrennial Defense Review Report: 2010* (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing, 2011), p. 104.

⁶² Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” p. 28.

the risks of interstate conflict while lessening the burden of policing for the US Navy.”⁶³ The United States must frame a new US Indian Ocean strategy in broad and comprehensive terms, and address the comprehensive range of US interests in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. This strategy recommends support to India for strategic advantages in the region⁶⁴ through nurturing a strategic partnership with it. No doubt India's strategic culture is changing, but in directions that will underpin stability and US strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. Nevertheless, although there is no immediate security crisis in the Indian but to counter the forces who want to change the balance of power in the region.

Chinese Interests in the Indian Ocean

In the past, China's Indian Ocean strategy was based on 'moderation' and 'maintaining the status quo', but the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates that China play a more proactive role in the affairs of the region. After the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean's eastern border with the Pacific is increasingly irrelevant and the Indo-Pacific Region grows in geo-strategic significance. After the establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese had a small naval wing (PLA-Navy), which was very rudimentary and not well equipped to face the modern challenges. It was Admiral Li Huaqing who took radical initiatives to modernize the Peoples Liberation Army's (PLA) naval strength, fully backed by the Deng regime.⁶⁵ So, the US deployment of naval flotilla in the Taiwan Strait in the early 1990s made China to hasten the process on its imperative to build a modern Navy as a possible deterrent against any future US naval presence near Taiwan. In 2013, China for the first time came out with policy document "*Blue Book on Indian Ocean*" in which they have highlighted the geo-strategic importance of Indian Ocean for China and

⁶³ David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 57–85.

⁶⁴ Michael J. Green, "Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy," p. 186.

⁶⁵ Christina Lin, "China's Persian Gulf Strategy: Israel and a Nuclearizing Iran 2009," *China Brief*, Vol. 9, No. 21, October 22, 2009; and see Bernard D. Cole, "The PLA Navy and Active Defense," in Michael E. Marti and Stephen J. Flanagan (ed.), *The People's Liberation Army and China in transition* (Washington, DC: National Defence University, 2003), pp. 129-146.

shown determination to achieve maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific region.⁶⁶

Asian states, notably China and India are sharing a larger slice of global wealth. Robert Kaplan precisely argued that “the interests and influence of India, China and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here the 21st century’s global power dynamics will be revealed..... two key players in this region are India and China- India moving east and west while China to the South.”⁶⁷ According to Kaplan the new forces of Indian Ocean will naturally create aspirations for high-technology navies and air forces capable of projecting power and securing access to the global needs of their nations.⁶⁸ Energy security, potentially, is one of the most significant catalysts for conflict in this 21st century. Thus, the linkage between maritime power and energy supply naturally draws strategic planners to consider the importance of the Indian Ocean region. Lee Cordner argues that maritime security in the Indian Ocean is fundamental to energy security and, more broadly, the global trading system.⁶⁹ The dramatic economic growth of China is a modern day miracle but equally its military ramifications are also showing its great-power aspirations, as well as its quest for energy security has compelled the country “to redirect their gazes from land to the seas”⁷⁰ which is the hub of power politics in the twenty-first century. It is a fact that China is the main country from outside the Indian Ocean region which has a major maritime presence in the region and after the end of the Cold War the key element of China’s national strategic approach has been enmeshing the requirements of land, maritime, economy and energy security. China is one of the great consumers of oil in the world after the United States, Japan and Australia. China’s demand for crude oil will be double in the coming years or by 2020, China is expected to import 7.3 million barrels of crude per day.

⁶⁶ *Blue Book on Indian Ocean* (Beijing Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2010), pp. 7-45.

⁶⁷ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon- the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, pp.24-56.

⁶⁸ Robert Kaplan, ‘The 21stCentury’s Defining Battleground is Going to be on Water’, www.eyedrd.org/2011/09/the-21st-century-s-defining-battleground-is-going-to-be-water.html (19 January 2012).

⁶⁹ Lee Cordner, ‘Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Compelling and Convergent Agendas’, *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs*, Vol. 2, No 1, (2010), p. 20.

⁷⁰ James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the Indian Ocean,” pp. 42-49

More than 85 per cent of the oil and oil products bound for China cross the Indian Ocean and pass through the Strait of Malacca. Currently, China's imports run to around 5 million barrels per day and will reach about 13 million barrels per day by 2030. As part of its March West, China has completed a pipeline which begins on Burma's coast and runs into Yunnan province. At full capacity, this pipeline will move about 440,000 barrels per day. China also plans to construct a pipeline from Siberia designed to pump about 620,000 barrels per day into North China. Another pipeline linking the Caspian Sea oil fields of Kazakhstan to west China is planned to deliver of about 400,000 barrels per day.⁷¹

In the contemporary scenario, China is trying to secure its economic and commercial interests in the Indian Ocean littoral and has established a "soft power" economic diplomacy based on Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum of "biding time and lying low,"⁷² and for this purpose, they have strategy to build blue-water navy in asserting the nation's maritime territorial claims. The goal of this strategy is to maximize access to resource inputs and trade in peacetime. Beijing's Indian Ocean ambitions may grow with its national power and its current military development and significant presence in the Indian Ocean have challenged the region's status quo. In addition, China's current naval platforms and weaponry perceived to project substantial naval influence into the Western Pacific; rather, it may focus south and west along the strategic sea lanes through Southeast Asia and along the Indian Ocean. Persistent fears of oil supply interdiction, together with China's growing interests in maritime resource and commerce may gradually drive more long-ranging naval development westward.

Presently, China's seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world, particularly the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. China's priority will always be on protecting its energy security interests, by way of securing its trade and energy interests spreading from the Gulf to the South China Sea.⁷³ They have short and middle-terms interests with the realization of its existing inferior position compared to US maritime power and India's strategic advantage, China will continue its 'harmonious sea'

⁷¹ John Lee and Charles Horner, "China faces barriers in the Indian Ocean," *Asia Times* (January 10, 2014).

⁷² Zhiqun Zhu, "Chinese Foreign Policy: External and Internal Factors," *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2, (2011), pp. 185-195.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

approach. It will avoid offensive approach and push for 'constructive engagement' in the Indian Ocean region along with the US and India, and concentrate on achieving 'greater space' in the region by way of promoting maritime security cooperation with the Indian Ocean littorals. In the long-term, China, has no intention to challenge US-India's domination and strong presence in the Indian Ocean but certainly Beijing is actively working to create alternative energy supply routes, safe from US and Indian encounters. China's scholars argue that the US is trying to contain the Chinese influence through India and by roping in other Indian Ocean littorals within an 'Indo-Pacific' framework.⁷⁴ Its drive to build infrastructure in the Indian Ocean littorals as part of 'going global' and 'Look West' strategy accords primacy to rebalancing ties with India and expected to influence New Delhi's long-term strategy in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China tends to believe that India will always maintain its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis other nations and leave no option for China to build deep-water ports in the west and east which will help to reduce the influence of Indo-US alignment to encircle China. According to Zhao Nanqi, (Director of General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army), "China can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians."⁷⁵ Zhang Ming, a Chinese naval analyst, has warned that "the 244 islands that form India's Andaman and Nicobar archipelago could be used like a "metal chain" to block the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca, on which China so desperately depends."⁷⁶ India is perhaps China's most realistic strategic adversary, as Zhang has written that "once India commands the Indian Ocean, it will not be satisfied with its position and will continuously seek to extend its influence, and its eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China."⁷⁷ India launched first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant (August 12, 2013) which by the Chinese has been viewed as "showing India's ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean and heralding a greater Indian presence in the Pacific." The

⁷⁴ Kevin Whitelaw, "Obama: U.S.-India 'Natural Allies' in the 21st Century," *National Public Radio*, November 24, 2009.

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120712790>

⁷⁵ Adam B. Lowther, *The Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities* (Broken: Taylor and Francis, 2011), p. 136.

⁷⁶ Quoted by Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean," p. 32.

⁷⁷ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "China and the United States in the Indian Ocean," *Naval War College Review*, pp. 43-53.

experts allege that the US wants to push India to integrate into its system to contain China and encourages India to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs under the “Indo-Pacific” concept, but India prefers balancing China naturally by ensuring peaceful and fruitful competition and has no intention of becoming a regional test balloon by going against China.⁷⁸

It is not difficult to evaluate China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean which has more warships than the United States. China is producing and acquiring submarines five times as fast as compared to the United States. In addition the Chinese have wisely focused on buying naval mines, ballistic missiles that can hit moving targets at sea, and technology that blocks signals from GPS satellites, on which the US Navy depends. China also has plans to acquire at least one aircraft carrier and constructing a refueling station for their warships in the region or close to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The PLA Navy is upgrading its destroyers and frigates. Testing of 056 stealth frigate and the entry into service of China's first air craft carrier, need to be seen in China's future naval capabilities and its efforts to modernize navy with the development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ship cruise missiles, submarines, both conventional and nuclear, amphibious ships, land based aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, electro-magnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance. China's investment in a large fleet of Xian H-6 anti-shipping strike aircraft provides a robust capability to interdict shipping out to 2,000 nautical miles using the turbofan H-6K. The Su-30MKK Flanker G and J-16 Sino-Flanker provide a robust strike capability, expected to be supplemented by the stealthy J-20. China's expanding fleet of nuclear and diesel-electric submarines could be used to good effect. The principal weakness in the Chinese force structure is an inadequate long range ASW capability, and long lines of resupply to Indian Ocean forward basing, vulnerable to interdiction. It is believed that the establishment of Yalong naval base near Sanya may have strategic implications for military balance in Asia-Pacific region.⁷⁹ The modernization of Chinese navy and maritime security interests that dominate China's thinking on the Indian Ocean region came through a statement of Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, (Commander of the East China Sea

⁷⁸ Fu Xiaoqiang, (China Institute for Contemporary International Relations) CICIR, *China Daily*, 12 August 2013.

⁷⁹ Chen Iijun and Xu Juan, “Flexible Balance and Economic Strategies of China, the US and India in Indian Ocean,” *South Asia Studies*, vol. 4, no. 12, (July 15, 2013), pp. 46-76.

Fleet of the Chinese Navy), which laid stress on the 'freedom and safety of the navigation in the Indian Ocean' acting as a crucial factor in global economy and declared that the Chinese navy will actively maintain the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean through carrying out 'maritime security cooperation' with the navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime security 'code of conduct' between them under the 'premise of respect for each country's sovereignty and maritime interests.'⁸⁰ It also asserted that China will adopt a 'peaceful offensive naval strategy' with the objectives to ensure a 'harmonious sea' through capacity building and international cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle.⁸¹

However, Chinese analysts are looking at US military development in the Indian Ocean and more specifically at Diego Garcia as part of a larger strategy to maintain US control in East Asia in the form of an "unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean."⁸² There are more directly relevant military scenarios involving China's contested territorial claims that seek to deploy significant forces to the India Ocean. China might then regard the island as a long-term obstacle to military power projection.⁸³ Even Beijing's interests are not nearly as alarmist as those concerning US bases in Japan and Guam.. As mentioned by Kaplan, taking the case of China, it cannot be denied that the PRC's strategic focus till now continues to be on the Pacific and not on the Indian Ocean region. It would however be a folly to ignore the gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the Indian Ocean strategic importance; they are indeed pointers to the future. As for

⁸⁰ Vijay Sakhuja, *Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia* (New Delhi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), p 186; and see also Su Zhiqian, 'Deepen Common Recognition, Strengthen Cooperation and Safeguard Maritime Security Together', address by the Commander of China's East Sea Fleet at the 'Galle Dialogue, 2012', Lighthouse Hotel, Galle, December 13, 2012.

⁸¹ See Chun Hao Lou, "Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don't Exaggerate the China Threat", 24 October 2013, (Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations) CICIR, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/2014power-politics-in-the-indian-oce>

⁸² Jing Hai, "The US Navy Pacific Fleet's Five Great Naval Bases and Their Relevant Statistics," *People's Navy*, March 4, 2006, p. 4.

⁸³ Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, "100,000 US Troops in the Asia-Pacific Look for 'New Homes,'" *Guofang Bao*, June 10, 2003, p. 1.

now, Beijing's principal interest seems to lie in the need to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) along the Indian Ocean, vital for the country's energy imports.⁸⁴ Other than that China has huge maritime interests in the region and is gradually improving its blue water navy to envisage an effective counter maritime response or to become the number one power, at least in the Asia or Indo-Pacific region. This perception was revealed in 2009 by the former Chief of US Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, who while on his visit to India told the then Chief of Indian Navy, Admiral Nirmal Verma that a top brass of PLA-N told him to hand over the entire maritime operations of the eastern Pacific and the Indian Ocean to it [China], with the rest left for the US. This clearly shows that China actually wants to take overall control of the Indian Ocean region, completely isolating or ousting India in the coming 'Great Power Game' in this vast oceanic region.⁸⁵

China, however, is taking seriously the developments in the Indian Ocean region and has tremendous interests for fuelling the fast growing economy and energy needs of the country. Most of China's trade by sea passes through the narrow and volatile Straits of Malacca which are surrounded by India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, or they can go further south and traverse either the Lombok Strait or the Sunda Strait, both of which pass through Indonesia and both of which bring you out into the open waters of the Indian Ocean, close to the north-west of Australia. China might not be able to get through the Straits of Malacca in a conflict with the United States because all main countries of Asia-Pacific region are closely allied with Washington, sit astride that passageway. This is what Chinese strategists call "the Malacca dilemma."⁸⁶ Therefore, China does not want to become vulnerable if the country is blocked by India or other Asia-Pacific countries which can also use the Andaman Nicobar islands as 'metal chains' though this is highly improbable and merely speculative. In this regard, the security of its crucial sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) impinges heavily in China's mindset and certainly it will maintain a significant military presence in the Asia-Pacific region so that no power can threaten China's shipping in the waters of Asia-Pacific Oceans.

⁸⁴ Robert Kaplan, "China's Unfolding Indian Ocean Strategy-Analysis," Center for New American Security, Washington, DC, February 11, 2014.

⁸⁵ SourabhJyoti Sharma, "China's Maritime Interests In Indian Ocean Region And Strategic Implications For India," *Eurasia Review* (September 24, 2014), p. 1.

⁸⁶ Toshi Yoshihara, "Chinese Missile Strategy," p. 42.

According to the report of IISS (London), “China’s ability to project genuine naval power in the Indian Ocean and for at least the next decade should not be miscalculated. Most analysts argue that China’s rapidly modernizing navy continues to enjoy a significant lead over its Asia-Pacific counterpart.⁸⁷” They have warships to conduct counter piracy operations off Somalia beginning in late 2008 showed that Beijing had developed at least a limited capacity to project and sustain maritime power far from home, increased its familiarity with Indian Ocean operating conditions and multinational maritime interception operations, and no doubt bolstered China’s visibility and prestige. Moreover, China is engaged in a “String of Pearls”⁸⁸ (SoP) strategy and building naval ports as a network of naval bases within and across the Indian Ocean region to counter Indo-US alignment to ‘encircled containment’ of China and as part of which it has built the Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong port in Bangladesh, Sittwe port in Myanmar, apart from building an underground naval facility in Hainan island and other still ‘unknown’ facilities. It is important to note that the plan of “string of pearls” will provide China with intelligence and other advantages, including limited logistical support for naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean, prestige, and a degree of leverage with host governments.⁸⁹ Indian observers often perceive China’s efforts to bolster closer ties with Indian Ocean countries as directed against India, but many analysts agree that these concerns are exaggerated and that the facilities of ports are to serve predominantly commercial purposes.⁹⁰ Furthermore, in case if China will develop effective power-projection forces including an effective carrier-borne strike capability and military support facilities in some of the string of pearls those forces will operate in the Indian Ocean with significant advantages. But China’s present capability with reference to the United States is limited

⁸⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2011: The Annual Review of World Affairs* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), p. 339; and David Brewster, “An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?” *Security Challenges*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring 2010), p. 5.

⁸⁸ The phrase ‘String of Pearls’ was first used in 2005, in a report entitled “Energy Futures in Asia” provided to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.

⁸⁹ Ashley Townshend, “Unraveling China’s String of Pearls,” *Yale Global Online*, September 16, 2011, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publication.asp?pid>

⁹⁰ Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, “Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy,” *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2012), p. 180.

because long distances from ports in southern China would make for attenuated supply lines vulnerable to interdiction around the Strait of Malacca and other chokepoints or on the high seas by forces operating from Diego Garcia (located approximately 2,200 kilometers south of India) or other locations including India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands (located about 150 kilometers north of Aceh in Indonesia).⁹¹ However, India is far away from China's military capability and has no options to depend on the US military strength or to cooperate with Washington to counter China's power. In addition, Chinese strategists recognize that control over the strategically vital island would give the PLA-N unimpeded access to the Western Pacific.⁹² This might be relevant to the balance of power in the Indian Ocean because once China navy would be freed to redirect its attention elsewhere, including the Indian Ocean then the PLAN would be able to expand operations from its major submarine base on Hainan Island. Of course, Chinese strategists consider a longer-term possibility about the strong regional counter action to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea or in Asia-Pacific region and there is a distinct possibility that Beijing would face significant counter-balancing among maritime powers of the region.

So, China's large investment in the construction of deep water port facilities is basically motivated with the objectives of lower cost of shipping between the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean ports, but also by the ease with which the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok could be closed to shipping. Moreover, China's strategic need to have secured access to Indian Ocean ports has resulted in heavy Chinese involvement in Pakistan and in Burma. This amounts to, from an Indian geo-strategic perspective, a semi-circular geo-strategic envelopment by China, as any conflict between China and India could see India fighting concurrently on three fronts – Eastern, Northern and Western. On the other hand, China's port-development projects around the world can be described as Beijing's "growing empire of ports abroad which are mainly about trade, not aggression."⁹³ Indian strategists fret over the prospect of a Chinese "string of pearls," is for encircling the Indian Ocean region. Seaports can accommodate container

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "China and the United States in the Indian Ocean," pp. 52-54.

⁹³ James R. Holmes, "Don't Worry About China's String of Pearls...Yet," *The Diplomat*, July 09, 2013.

ships and the like can accommodate fighting ships for routine functions such as refuelling and re-provisioning. They can be further improved to serve as full-up naval stations but great powers coveted options to hedge against are always unknown.

In the meantime, pressure on the Indian Ocean's eastern gateway has increased and Beijing has upped the ante on the other claimants to the South China Sea through operations by the PLA-N and related maritime services which would be on track to become the dominant maritime power in the absence of the United States. However, China's larger strategic and economic interests with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) suffered during 2009-2010 when ASEAN states responded to Chinese assertiveness by embracing the United States: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and ASEAN members asserted the importance of "freedom of navigation."⁹⁴ The United States also offered more military assistance through increased defense cooperation, particularly with Vietnam and the Philippines as well as through forward basing of a US Littoral Combat Ship in Singapore. But the whole situation changed when Iran at the other end of the Indian Ocean, warmly welcomed Beijing to counter the influence of US in the region. Beijing in the meanwhile has not retreated from its territorial claims and is, in fact, expanding its ship-building programme for extending power into the South China Sea region. China's rising power therefore introduces the near-term possibility of a "new front" in the broader Sino-Indian rivalry scenario.

Up to now, China's strategy has been to avoid confrontation by building defensive rather than offensive military forces. In other words, Beijing neither signals that it is a status quo power nor denies that it is not improving its military capability to alter the balance of power. A country which has offensive capability would not want to declare that they are a revisionist state, because it does not have the means to act aggressively. However, as the *New York Times* said that the Chinese will maintain that it is 'purely a self-defense force.'⁹⁵ So, China is building military forces that have significant power position and its 'military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection

⁹⁴ Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, "Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy," p. 181.

⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, July 26, 2010.

capabilities'.⁹⁶ As Robert Kaplan pointed out, China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century and want sea powers for influence and for the decisive battle. So, they have formidable offensive force.⁹⁷ The western strategists argue that China is not a paper tiger and have a military capability with significant offensive potential which is enough to dominate the Asia-Pacific and they will increase their power to counter the US, India, Japan and Australia. They want to maintain their military superiority in the region as much as the United States which wants other states to believe it is the boss. The United States would no longer be allowed to interfere in the South China Sea, which China views as a 'core interest' and it seems that China feels the same way about the Yellow Sea.⁹⁸

Geopolitics of Balochistan and Great Power Politics

The post-Cold War era has changed the shape of world politics and the role of the small or weak countries has become critical in the international system. The country is still the main actor in the global system and retains prerogatives on its own territory. Hence, the country is not a passive element and national security objectives are to gain control over territory and expand its sphere of influence for which significant military strength is needed. In the modern time, the role of the country is more complex -- struggling for access to scarce resources (oil, gas, coal and etc.) and efforts to control geo-economic weapons.⁹⁹ A route is both a geographical and a strategic idea that means physical access in a particular region and in particular countries. Thus, routes or areas perform in both the crucial spheres of country activity, security, development and can use routes for the formation of domestic development or depending on their priorities. Moreover, routes are an ideal instrument by which to reveal the qualitative relationship between the countries and can open the door of economic

⁹⁶ Department of Defence, Australian Government, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century*, p. 34.

⁹⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean," p. 22.

⁹⁸ Edward Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power," *New York Times*, April 23, 2010.

⁹⁹ Edward N. Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce," *The National Interest*, (June 1990), pp. 17-24.

productivity, security, expand rural development, and increase access to urban or foreign markets.

The access of routes is important because without appropriate access no country can maintain its economic and commercial activities. This kind of strategy can facilitate mountains, deserts, boundaries and oceans or sea.¹⁰⁰ So, routes can cross land, sea or ocean and air and can be natural geographical features which are associated with the physical capabilities of the country and are integral to the achievement of political, economic and strategic objectives. It is a fact that routes are means for the development of country, distribution of resources and can create sense of competition between the actors. According to Mahnaz Ispahani, routes are the means for the movement of ideas which can be called the “iconography” of the country and it can carry a dominant culture and ideology of the political centres to the peripheries.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the primacy and vitality of routes have undisputed characteristics; they remain relevant and essential to the country’s policy and work for shifting balance of power and stand at the nexus of security and development. Certainly, without valuable routes, it is difficult to forge a country or to assert and maintain a national identity. For security, development and for the administration of country policies, routes are an important factor and serve, consequently, as a reward to the people and the concerned land. In the building of trade routes security concerns cannot be ignored, particularly when considerations of economic and commercial development will be dominant and the result can be the loss of territorial and national integrity. The modern theorists have established the idea that internally, national integration proceeds by routes and countries cannot come into existence without the ability to deny access, they cannot be physically consolidated and politically sustained without the ability to expand access or without the extension of power and the legitimacy of the center to the peripheries.¹⁰² Strategically, routes provide the country with means for internal control and for the expansion of its external security interests. In developing countries like Pakistan, the concept of security incorporates both the need for internal consolidation and the need for defence against the perceived external threats. For the long-term routes not

¹⁰⁰ Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: the Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: the Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, p. --

only permit peaceful means of integration but coercive ones as well to effectively manage external security threats.

In this regard, Pakistan's peripheries and its borderland areas particularly Baluchistan province have been central to the acquisition of power, the pursuit of progress and have potentials to bring international attention. In addition, its land and sea have a strategic significance useful for rising economic powers including China, India and the United States. In the contemporary geopolitics, new sea routes and faster ships are the guarantee to secure economic and strategic interests that themselves derive from the ability to advance towards oceans, mountains, deserts and seas. So, the politics on the oceans and land for the purpose of economic and commercial interests is an old one and the post-Cold War era has not altered the parameters of modern politics.¹⁰³ It is an irony of history that former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also observed that "geography continues to remain the most important single factor in the formation of a country's foreign policy and the politics of oceans particularly the importance of Indian Ocean is beyond change and the country cannot (remain aloof) from the influence of geographical neighbours."¹⁰⁴ Bhutto's words predicted the future scenario and indicated that all great military and economic powers including US, China and India have deep and abiding interest in the affairs of the region. According to Edward Luttwak, the importance of routes is more obvious in warfare than in peace time and vital in terms of tactical aspects to gain strategic aims and equally pivotal for the country's economic development.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the lack of access to the sea or availability of suitable areas always creates a high degree of insecurity and competition among the rival powers. In the situation, great powers normally build routes "for strategic and political reasons" to take economic advantages. However, small countries can benefit from the great power interests and the character of trade can change the balance of military

¹⁰³ Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46 (January 1968), pp. 242-248.

¹⁰⁴ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's statement in *Government of Pakistan, Special Development Plan for Baluchistan* (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1980), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 67.

power.¹⁰⁶ In reality, the economic growth and survival of the country is integral and its neglect can result in the collapse of the system. So, the areas create access and serve as a bridge and make it available for the purpose of linking with other parts of the world.¹⁰⁷

Historically, Baluchistan has been ruled by Afghans, Arabs, Persians, Mughals and Egyptians and Greeks have crossed its inhospitable territory. The land's most famous victim was Alexander the Great because his armies passed through Las Bela, Makran and crossed the Mula Pass. Alexander lost around three-quarters of his forces while trying to leave India through Baluch area.¹⁰⁸ In the 19th century under the British rule, Baluchistan got some valuable position because of the British and Russian confrontation in their Great Game of routes. As a result, the British assumed ever-expanding interests along India's frontiers. It was an important region in the mental map of the British empire because it bordered upon sites of pressing danger — Afghanistan, Russia, Iran and Persian Gulf region and these were the lands contested in the Great Game.¹⁰⁹ The basic aim of British empire was to prevent other powers, especially Russia, from gaining access to Indian territory. So, British guarded control of all sea and land routes toward India and blocked all outside powers not to enter in their imperial peripheries'. British sensitivity can be realized by the assessment of Lord Curzon in the late 1800 that "India, without which "the British could not exist," was threatened. British always feel bad about Russia's advance across Central Asia to Afghanistan and its growing influence over Iran. British concerns, which mirrored Russia's, were precisely claimed by Lord Curzon who viewed that Russia being a land power has long been on the search for a new seaboard and has directed covetous eyes upon the Persian Gulf. Curzon called Sistan¹¹⁰ a terra media "through which any power desirous of moving southwards from Meshed, particularly any power that is covetous of an

¹⁰⁶ Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 32 (February 1938), pp. 34-40; and see also Hans J. Morgenthau,

¹⁰⁷ Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory* (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1973), p. 27.

¹⁰⁸ Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 110-118.

¹⁰⁹ Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: the Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, p. 38.

¹¹⁰ The term Sistan encompassing large parts of southwestern Afghanistan and southeastern Iran, one of the driest regions in the world and an area subjected to prolonged droughts.

outlet upon the Indian Ocean, must pass.” Not only would possession of Sistan place the Russians at the doorway of Baluchistan, it would also provide the shortest possible rail route linking the Transcaspian railroad with the Indian Ocean and would present fewer difficulties to Russians for the access of Persian Gulf.¹¹¹ Curzon suggested to the British that Russia wanted commercial and political influence in southeastern Persia via Afghan territory which would give Sistan's contiguity to Baluchistan for railroad and land route connection. Curzon further explained that Russian rail link might even be linked by a southerly branch to Gwadar on the Makran Coast of Baluchistan or to Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf.¹¹²

Apart from Curzon's awareness of the geopolitical connections between the Gulf and Baluchistan which remained a cornerstone of British policy in the 20th century when Sir Olaf Caroe argued in support for the protection of valuable routes including Gulf and Baluchistan in his influential book *Wells of Power* and suggested that “Persian Gulf and Baluchistan were a single sea channel,” and the “political assessor must reckon them as one right down to Karachi.” He warned that “the area from long coastline of Baluchistan to Karachi which stands at the mouth of the larger Gulf is vital to the reckoning.” He mentioned that Baluchistan was “an empty porch to the Pakistan mansion, but porches, “though empty, must be held by Pakistan.”¹¹³ The actual dilemma of the area remained unknown as to why the external forces including the British did not give appropriate attention to the area except the British who used the land as a protection of Indian frontiers. They developed small communication infrastructure for military movement and governance purposes and took no interest to integrate the land through economic and political control. According to Olaf Caroe, Baluchistan seventy years after Sandeman was “scarcely distinguishable” from its earlier state because of the “static” nature of British system. Unlike British ventures in main areas of India, the administration did not give devotion to the remote periphery. They did not develop modern population centres apart from some urban areas including Quetta but no major ports were developed as an economic strategy. No expenditures were made to improve the socio-cultural structure of society

¹¹¹ Lord Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), p. 377.

¹¹² Ibid., and see Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, p. 40.

¹¹³ Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South-Western Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp. xvi, xvii and 32.

and illiteracy remained prevalent.¹¹⁴ The reason might be the rigid character of the people and their Sardars (chieftain) who opposed any type of socio-economic development for their vested interests and used the masses to maintain status quo. So, the British used the Bolan Pass and Quetta as one of the two gates of India or used the land as a launching-pad for invasion of India through the Bolan Pass which existed as a leading artery of trade between Central Asia and the British India.

Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan with an area of about 347,190 km (134,051 square miles) which is approximately 44 per cent of the total land area of Pakistan whereas population is only 10 million. It is interesting to note that quite a substantial proportion of Baluch population lives in Punjab and Sindh. Thinly populated, demographically it is a complex society composed of different communities including Brahui tribes, Jats, Gujars, Tajik, Turkomen, Hazaras, Jamotes, Kurds, Makranis and Pashtuns. The Baluch also inhabit northeastern Iran, around Herat in Afghanistan and near Mari (Merv) in Turkmenistan.¹¹⁵ Many Baluch are settled in Oman, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Middle Eastern oil boom lured Baluchis, especially from the Makran Coast to settle in the Gulf States and some have gone to East Africa. In economic and commercial term, Baluchistan is an isolated and neglected area and this character pushes the province into extreme poverty. otherwise highly rich in natural resources including gas, oil, coal, gold and copper. It has never been a part of the national socio-economic and political mainstream.

Strategically, Baluchistan lies at the heart of South, Central and West Asia. It gains importance due to coastal sites such as Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Jewani and Somniani on the Makran Coast. On the other hand, the region encompasses the eastern part of the Iranian Plateau and situated at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Arabian Sea. The Bolan Pass is a natural route into Afghanistan towards Kandahar. Over time it has become a hub of world energy politics.¹¹⁶

However, after the dismemberment of Pakistan and the end of the Cold War, Baluchistan is no more a “backwater” and on its development

¹¹⁴ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, 550 B.C-A.D (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 378; and see more details Jason Heeg, *Insurgency in Balochistan* (Kansas: Kansas State University, 2012), pp. 15-65.

¹¹⁵ An estimated 100,000 Baluch live in Turkmenistan. See also Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: the Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

and progress depends the country's integration. The problems of the province cannot be managed in the security paradigm or through colonial tactics. Constitutional reforms and political developments give hope of big change in all this. The development of the Gwadar port and its important role as the gateway to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor is going to be a game changer.

Gwadar and Geopolitics of Great Powers

Gwadar's location is strategically alluring to regional and global powers which have interest in Central, South and West Asia. Its lies at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and its northern areas lie close to the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Indeed, Gwadar has become a strategic periphery in the modern world. Moreover, Gwadar seaport is close to the Strait of Hormuz from where more than 17 million barrels of oil passes every day. It's ideal location among three key regions, South Asia, the oil-rich Persian Gulf, and oil and gas-resourced Central Asia has further increased its strategic significance. Its development has shifted the Great Game of Central Asia to Pakistan because Gwadar would be the junction to connect the landlocked Central Asia and rest of the world. It will not only uplift the impoverished people of Balochistan by providing thousands of employment opportunities but go along way in redressing the grievances of the people.

Pakistan purchased Gwadar from Oman in 1958 but did not begin work on the port project there until 2002. Pakistan lacks ports for shipping and maritime security. Gwadar, a deep warm-water harbour is an ideal location in the Indian Ocean. It is being developed with Chinese help as part of the projective 'trade and energy corridor'. We recall what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said after 1971: "The severance of the country's eastern limb by force has significantly altered its geographic focus. This will naturally affect Pakistan's geopolitical perspective." In the new geopolitical prospect, "the country's interests are within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie." Bhutto proposed a revised geopolitical perspective that placed "Baluchistan along the Middle East and Persian Gulf."¹¹⁷

In the early 1970s, the Soviets were prepared to construct a strategic highway through Afghanistan to Quetta and to Karachi with the sole

¹¹⁷ Lawrence Ziring, "Bhutto's Foreign Policy 1972-1973," in J. Henry Korson, (ed.), *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 63.

objective to use the road link for naval stores or fuel for Soviet units cruising the Indian Ocean or possibly for the discreet replacement of submarine crews or marine commandos.¹¹⁸ The Soviets further suggested that Moscow would be happy to financially assist Pakistan in a five-year project for the expansion and improvement of Gwadar.¹¹⁹ Pakistan turned down the Soviet offers for fear of jeopardizing its relations with the United States. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Baluchistan gained strategic prominence. The Soviet attack reawakened the United States interest in Southwest Asia and US circles came to perceive Pakistan's western borderlands as the best option to check the Soviets.

In the early 1948, Harry Hodson, had described the Gulf region as a borderland where great interests meet and clash. The area of overlap, he mentioned, stretched in a rough arc from Baluchistan to North West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Afghanistan and Iran. This curve embraced the Gulf region "as closely and as neatly as the Turkish crescent embraces the star." For Hodson, this was the Arc of Danger.¹²⁰ The geopolitics of Olaf Caroe and Harry Hodson influenced Pakistan's security establishment. General Rahim Khan is reported to have said, "For the first time in the life of Pakistan, we have to look at our western defences." US undersecretary of state James Buckley referred to Pakistan in a Senate testimony as "an essential anchor of the entire Southwest Asian region."¹²¹ The US analysts considered the denial of Baluchistan to the Soviets and mulled over the province's potential usefulness for US strategic interests. In 1980 US Admiral Thomas Moore called for "the establishment of a naval base at Gwadar and referred to Gwadar as an excellent and potential naval facility." Another American Admiral Alvin J. Cottrell also argued that the "Gwadar harbor will be much better suited topographically and financially to be a naval base than other possibilities in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman."¹²²

¹¹⁸ Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: the Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, p. 59.

¹¹⁹ T. B. Miller, *Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), pp. 172-173.

¹²⁰ Harry V. Hodson, *Twentieth Century Empire* (London: Faber & Faber, 1948), p.158.

¹²¹ "Defending the Gulf: A Survey," *Economist* (June 6, 1981), p. 10.

¹²² "The Search for US Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance," *Strategic Review*, No. 8 (Spring 1980), p. 36.

Francis Fukuyama warning against Soviet designs advised the US to review its relations with Pakistan since its “geopolitical position” will provide good advantages to the US because its territory could serve as an important “entrepot for an RDF moving into the Persian Gulf from the east or from Diego Garcia or the Philippines. Pakistan owes its geopolitical importance largely due to the routes of Baluchistan. .¹²³

Reagan administration provided significant financial assistance for Baluchistan to reduce its vulnerability concerning the security of the Persian Gulf. In 1985 USAID spent around \$40 million on a road project linking Bela to Turbat and also linked to Gwadar. During 1986-87, the US provided substantial aid to Pakistan in which the largest amount was given for the economic and communication development of Baluchistan. It is undeniable that the US-Soviet competition in Baluchistan has brought the old Makrani fishing town of Gwadar to prominence.

So, the politics of routes has raised Gwadar to a prominent position on the mental map of Pakistan's policy makers and to other concerned with the military prospects of the region. Gwadar might be remote from the centres of strategic and political discourse but its fate became their intimate concern. In addition to Gwadar's strategic importance in relation to the defence of the Persian Gulf, the area is in a commanding position in the contemporary world politics. The growing Chinese stake in the province has created anxiety among various players of geopolitics in the region.¹²⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic planners in Washington have their eyes on Baluchistan to advance their regional and global agenda. United States, China, Iran and India are currently the major players in the global energy game.

The deep-sea port at Gwadar and future plans for important cross-national oil pipelines further enhance the region's strategic value. Certainly, Gwadar's location provides China an alternate to Strait of Malacca. The use of Gwadar and Makran Coast has many strategic advantages for all concerned powers because the access to the coast can serve purposes beyond the exercise of influence in the area. It could give access to any power to sea routes, expanding their reach across the sea lanes of the Strait of Hormuz and the northern Indian Ocean. It could allow regional and global powers to operate at long distances from their shores for extended

¹²³ Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, p. 72.

¹²⁴ Robert F. Dernberger, *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 86-89.

periods of time, service for more ships, which in turn would allow an increase in Indian Ocean patrols and raise the level of presence along the shipping routes which are vital to the industrialized nations. In this context, the Indo-US combine perceive Chinese presence at Gwadar to have obvious strategic implications for events in the Persian Gulf and Iran. Although China claims that its interest in Gwadar is mainly economic and not potentially strategic other actors believe that China's extension to Gwadar may quite plausibly have been motivated by commercial goals but routes can serve dual purposes and it can be military objectives also. The US administration which does not feel comfortable with Sino-Pakistan close ties shares Indian anxieties about Gwadar. Chinese involvement in Gwadar is perceived as a threat to the US influence in the region. India watches Gwadar obliquely as it hinders its influence in Iran and Afghanistan.

The quest for energy security has made India and China competitors in the global energy game. India is rated as the world's number six energy consumer. As a competitor of China, India is engaged in developing Chahbahar port in Iran that also provides it access to the landlocked countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan, by passing the Pakistani territory. As a matter of fact, India is seeing Chahbahar as its main entrepot for energy and commercial trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caspian region. So, with Beijing involvement in Gwadar and New Delhi in Chahbahar, the two ports are likely to emerge as 'strategic competitors' in the region with reference to Indo-US nexus in Afghanistan.

Many US lawmakers have highlighted the geo-strategic and geopolitical significance of Baluchistan and in different times they have presented the idea of "Independent Baluchistan" that can serve US' geopolitical and geostrategic interests. For instance, Selig Harrison, urged the US administration in 2011 to create an independent Baluchistan.¹²⁵ He also recommended a comprehensive plan of action and suggested that "the idea of "independent Baluchistan" would not only settle the regional repercussions, but prevent further anarchy and regional instability. It would turn out to be a 'safe playground' for US covert and overt activities. On the lines US military analyst Lt. Col. Ralph Peter's has presented the idea of revision of boundaries between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan as per 'demand of locals', in his article "Blood Borders" and marked that these

¹²⁵ Umm-e-Habiba, "Global Geopolitics Behind Turbulence in Baluchistan: Regional Repercussions and Policy Options for Pakistan-Analysis," *Eurasian Review*, November 26, 2013.

countries are unnatural and demarcation would be better for US long-term interests.¹²⁶ The meddling of foreign agencies including RAW and Mosad in Baluchistan looks 'justified' to them as Selig Harrison stated that "to counter what China is doing in Pakistan, the United States should play hardball by supporting the movement for an independent Baluchistan along the Arabian Sea and working with Baloch insurgents to oust the Chinese from their budding naval base at Gwadar."¹²⁷ In this regard, India is also directly involved in attempts to destabilize Baluchistan region. According to hardliner Indian security analyst Amarjit Singh, "a weak Pakistan would enable India to pay full attention on the China front because it is difficult for us to come out from the tragedy of 1962 Sino-India war."¹²⁸ On the other hand Washington might support the creation of an "Independent Baluchistan" to weaken Islamabad-Tehran relationship. According to Harrison, "an independent Baluchistan, under the influence of the US would significantly enable them to counterbalance Iranian domination in the Persian Gulf. This will also enable the US to have continuous energy supply via the Persian Gulf beside helping it monitor the coastal areas of Iran.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a major centre of geostrategic interest in the modern world. The United States, European countries, China and India have become the world's largest energy consumer. In this regard, the region of Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean represents a complex blending of power and paradox in the direction of economic growth and strategic development. The US is the dominant feature of contemporary geopolitics and has perceived that its strategic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific

¹²⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peter, "Blood borders How a better Middle East would look," *Armed Forces Journal*, 2006, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899> (Accessed April 20, 2013)

¹²⁷ Selig Harrison, "The Chinese Cozy Up to the Pakistanis," *The National Interest*, (March 2011), pp. 17-54; and see also Maitra, Ramtanu "Balochistan: Is US backing London's plan to dismember Pakistan?" <http://www.vijayvaani.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?aid=2144> (Accessed April 20, 2013).

¹²⁸ Amarjit Singh, "Why the existence of Pakistan is not in India's interest," *Indian Defence Review*, October 30, 2014; and see also Umm-e-Habiba, "Global Geopolitics behind Turbulence in Balochistan: Regional Repercussions and Policy Options for Pakistan – Analysis," *Eurasia Review* (November 26, 2013).

and the Indian Ocean is vital and inevitable. On the other hand, China is the growing economic and military power and the country has asymmetrical advantages in keeping the US, India, and Asia-Pacific countries off guard in a way that no country could easily replace China's influence. However, the major contenders of Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions need strategic and geopolitical adjustment to transform global conditions because of contending and interdependent global economic and strategic interests.

It is in the interest of players to maintain a favourable and stable strategic equilibrium in the region. The US strategic partnership with India will disturb the equilibrium in the region. In this context, China's interests in Gwadar will counteract US-India alignment in the region. Nevertheless, Pakistan has strong geopolitical reasons to challenge the Indian dominance in the region and the country's policy makers rightly think that the centrality and security of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean can only be maintained through the philosophy of 'coexistence'. ■

Chapter 9

Strengthening Cooperation: Collective Security of Sea Lanes

Dr. Muhammad Khan

Abstract

As the third largest water body, Indian Ocean occupies 20 per cent of world's oceanic surface. It has a number of sea bodies, important islands and international ports. Like highways on land, Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) or Sea Lanes are trade routes in the seas, which ships and vessels follow, keeping in view the oceanic geography, islands, shallow waters and other obstacles, which may hinder the vessels' course. Since over 80 per cent of global trade is taking place through seas, therefore, there is a need for the freedom of navigation in seas, accomplished through sea-lanes. Threats to supply can take two forms: physical constraints that restrict passage and actions by states or non-state actors that threaten or restrict free passage through the chokepoint. The security and access to the sea lanes warrants increased cooperation and enhanced understanding and support of regional states and major powers. Owing to heavy trade volume, sea lanes need to be kept open and secure too. Along the wide sea lanes, there are places where the traffic converges to pass through chokepoints; also known as narrow channels. The huge Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has three critical sea lanes used for global commerce and trade, particularly for energy transportation. In case of any disruption of these critical sea lanes, there would be energy crisis at the global level. The Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and the Pacific Oceans are two of the world's most strategic chokepoints. Bab-el-Mandab, is yet another critical chokepoint, which connects the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea that leads to the Suez Canal. Beside regional states, the international community has been concerned about the security of IOR sea lanes. There are three international Task

Forces, already performing the role of protecting the sea lanes along IOR. Major security challenges that confront these sea lanes are terrorism and piracy. Despite the current security arrangements, regional states need to develop a strong collective security mechanism for the security of these sea lanes. This depends on enhanced cooperation among the regional states and global actors. This paper aims at exploring the possibilities of strengthening cooperation for the collective security of sea lanes in IOR.

Introduction

Whereas, about 70 per cent of global population lives within 150 kms of coastlines, the oceans and seas cover 70 per cent of earth surface. 51 countries are located on the shores of Indian Ocean, the third largest water body, after Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Major water bodies forming part of Indian Ocean include: “Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Flores Sea, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Java Sea, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Savu Sea, Strait of Malacca, and Timor Sea.” A portion of the Indian Ocean 60-degree south latitude was included in Southern Oceans in 2000. This Ocean has many islands, including many island countries like Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Indian Ocean Sea Lanes

Sea lanes are also known as shipping lanes, as they are routes through the oceans of the world that vessels use to move cargo and facilitate trade. Each sea lane is typically designed to take advantage of a current or a prevailing wind to decrease travel time. In certain cases, a sea lane may deviate from favorable currents or winds in order to service important trade cities.

The first sea lanes were established during the age of sailing, when vessels depended on prevailing winds to circumnavigate the globe. These sea lanes were not official, though ships did tend to take similar paths to take advantage of the winds. Ocean voyages could be long and dangerous, so sticking to an established sea lane with known trade or westerly winds could contribute to the ultimate survival of a vessel. Many ships would take southern courses when travelling from Europe to North America, and then assume northern routes when returning in order to make use of known wind currents on each leg of the journey.

Like highways on land, Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) or sea lanes are trade routes in the seas, which ships and vessels follow, keeping in view the oceanic geography, islands, shallow waters and other obstacles, which may hinder the vessels' course. Since over 80 per cent of global trade is taking place through seas, therefore, there is a need for the freedom of navigation in seas. For the protection of their sea lanes, the trading nations use their naval forces.

While tracing history, one learns that during the Roman Empire, the Silk Road was mainly across the Indian Ocean sea lanes. This means that the Silk Road was not just a land route but the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean were very much part of this. However, with the fall of the Mongols, the use of the land route declined which gave rise to sea trade in the Indian Ocean. The sea lanes or Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean connect various parts of Asia and Africa namely East Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East, southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, India, Africa and southern China. From the economic point of view, most of the trade activities are taking place between China-ASEAN, Middle East, India and Africa. Currently China and India present themselves as the biggest markets, industrial production houses as well as energy imports centers. In its past history, Indian emphasis on trade and merchant activity was far greater than in China, and definitely greater than in the classical Mediterranean world.

Historically, the Indian Ocean sea lanes were also used during the trade of slaves, particularly from Africa. Indeed, due to this trade, the "The whole coast of East Africa was depopulated" and slaves were sailed and traded up to China. Very interestingly, the Ming dynasty of China had an enhanced focus on Indian Ocean for trade, with the 'voyagers of Zheng He'. Despite being short lived, by 13th Century, the Chinese "Bantu people arrived on the east coast where their language merged with Arabic languages from Muslim traders. This formed the Swahili languages. Because of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, trade added to social and economic complexity and created the basis for most formal intellectual life."

Choke Points and Critical Sea Lanes

Chokepoints are the narrow channels along the widely used sea routes. In the Indian Ocean there are three critical sea lanes extensively used for trade and commerce, particularly for the transportation of energy. Any disruption or blockade even temporary can cause an international energy and trade crisis. These chokepoints are; "the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the

Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The third critical point is the Bab-el-Mandab that connects the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal. The first two are the global strategic chokepoints, their blockade can lead to conflicts at the international level.

Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between the Gulf of Oman in the southeast and the Persian Gulf. At its narrowest point, it is 22 nautical miles wide and located between Iranian and Omani territorial waters.





Iran is on its northern coast and United Arab Emirates and Oman on its southern coast. It is the most significant and busiest chokepoint in the Indian Ocean. Estimatedly, over 17 million barrels of crude oil passes through it daily and overall 40 per cent of the world's total seaborne trade passes through it. The Strait has two shipping lanes; "one in each direction. Every shipping lane is two miles wide and a two-mile buffer separates them."¹

Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Connecting Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean and South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca too has strategic location. It is bordering four ASEAN namely; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 2 countries,

¹ Kenneth Katzman, Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, January 2012.

² Frederick Situmorang, The need for cooperation in the Malacca Strait, *Maritime Security Review*, July 19, 2012. Accessed on November 13, 2014, <http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/07/malacca-strait-cooperation/>



The Straits provide a corridor from Indian Ocean to South China Sea. As a major sea lane, used for oil tankers from Middle East and Africa, approximately 15 million barrels of crude oil passes through the Strait of Malacca. It houses over 60,000 transiting ships each year. Being the longest navigational strait, its length is 600 nautical miles with width varying from 11 nautical miles at the narrowest point and 200 nautical miles at the widest.

The twin threats to shipping in the straits include piracy and maritime terrorism. The peculiarity of the Malacca Strait is that it has two sea lanes. "One is the Sea Line of Communication (SLOCs) and the other is Sea Line of Commerce, both are very significant. One, from the point of view of military uses and the other purely for the purposes of commerce and trade. In the past, both China and South Korea wanted to play their part in the security of the Strait, as both have major stakes in its safety from maritime crimes and terrorism.

Security of the Strait of Malacca

The Malacca Strait is conducive to pirate attacks due to the narrowness of the strait and its proximity to numerous channels and islets where attacks can be launched. Maritime terrorism also continues to be a threat. The regional countries have instituted two initiatives to counter the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism. The first is the conduct of air and sea patrols by the littoral countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand and the second is the setting up of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre in Singapore which collates and analyses piracy incidents in the Asian region.

The huge utilization of the strait, therefore, relates closely to many fundamental global factors, such as economics, energy security and militarization. Rising energy demand from large industrial states like the US and Japan, and new industrial powers, China and India, place more energy-security dependence on the Strait. This Strait is a shortcut in reaching any trouble spot throughout the world, which enhances its strategic significance.³

There is a global dependence upon the Malacca Strait, which creates yet another dilemma. An intervention from the major powers may be

³ Frederick Situmorang, The need for cooperation in the Malacca Strait, The Jakarta Post July 19 2012.

opposed by the littoral states, since the Strait mostly encloses their territorial seas. Other UNCLOS provisions concerning piracy are also ambiguous. In Article 101, piracy is defined as “any illegal act”, containing “violence, depredation or detention with private ends” that takes place on the high seas, meaning outside the jurisdiction of any particular state.

Among the Malacca Strait's gray areas, international and littoral states' interests traverse. Then there are crimes committed by non-state actors, such as terrorism, drug, and human trafficking, or with a criminal nexus like Narco-terrorism, which usually has a mixed goal, be it political or economic. Once more, the Straits' complexities have created “a zero-sum game” situation. On the one hand, the littoral states want to be responsible for security within their own jurisdictions. On the other hand, other states, especially the major powers, do not want to take any chance by leaving their vital interests to the littoral states' discretion.⁴ It is therefore, mandatory to alter this negative sum game into “a positive-sum game”, which is only possible through the cooperation of all stakeholders.

The cooperative and collaborative mechanism in place in this regard includes the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).⁵ These partnerships are politically sensitive and their achievements are constrained by their initiators. If just one littoral participant is unsupportive, cooperation comes to a dead end.

Take the RMSI for example. It was proposed by the US in 2004 with the famous vision of “a one-thousand ship Navy” securing the sea, especially the Malacca Strait. Although Singapore was a supporter of the initiative, it was unsuccessful since the other two littoral states, Malaysia and Indonesia, rejected it. Similarly, the CSI and PSI have been less than successful in their respective applications in the Strait, as they were given a lukewarm reception by Indonesia. These examples show that solid commitment by all littoral states is imperative for cooperation to be successful.

Perhaps the most successful example of cooperation has been the Malacca Strait Security Initiative (MSSI). It was established by the three main littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) in 2004. Cooperation between these states brought them to agree upon combining

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

their naval and air patrols (the Eye in the Sky or EiS) on the Strait. But unfortunately, it is not a collective security framework.

Adopting the "ASEAN way" of non-interference, cooperation is merely a mechanism of "taking care of oneself" in a collective way. This appears in the absence of "hot pursuit" agreements and the very limited maneuvering space for operations (three nautical miles from EiS states' coastlines). Hence, although it has been in operation for almost eight years, it is still criticized as being merely "an exchange of scheduling activities".

In conclusion, the Malacca Strait is a global strategic dilemma that needs a cooperative solution. The littoral states are the decisive stakeholders in achieving cooperation for the sake of the Strait.

This cannot be achieved, however, if the major standing body in the region, ASEAN, does not move toward a collective security phase. In fact, what does exist is the Five Powers' Defense Arrangements (FPDA), in which Malaysia and Singapore are members. Yet again, this is ironic since the initial FPDA aimed to contain another fellow ASEAN state, namely Indonesia.

Strait of Bab el-Mandab

Located between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandab is a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Persian Gulf exports pass through Bab el-Mandab, before entering the Suez Canal. Approximately, 3.3 million barrels of oil per day flow through this waterway to United States, Europe and Asia.



Maritime terrorism as witnessed in 2000 against USS Cole and Limburg, the French oil tanker in 2002 is a major challenge for foreign firms. Currently, piracy has become a problem in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean. Whereas, maritime terrorism remains the major concern, there have been global efforts against piracy. To combat the threat of piracy, the international community has sent ships to patrol the area to deter the pirates. The regional response to piracy incidents is in the form of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Modelled after the ReCAAP, three information-sharing centers were planned to be established in Yemen, Djibouti and Kenya.

Major Security Threats along the Sea lanes in Indian Ocean

The threats faced by the critical sea lanes in the Indian Ocean region range from the traditional, state-closure of the Straits of Hormuz, to the non-traditional, like piracy and maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The measures taken to address the threats in the three sea-lanes are also different and have an impact on the long-term sustainability and efficacy of the measures.

In the past, there have been a few minor confrontations between US Navy and the Iranian Navy in the Straits of Hormuz. In particular, senior Iranian officials have threatened to seal off the Strait of Hormuz to wreak havoc in oil markets. In response, the United States has deployed its 5th Fleet in Bahrain across the Persian Gulf to forestall such a possibility.

The littoral states have primarily driven the efforts in the Straits of Malacca and this has yielded most success as the piracy rate has dropped in the Straits since 2005. In contrast, the international community has been driving most of the measures taken in the Gulf of Aden with a nascent regional effort underway in the form of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Yet, the piracy rates have continued to increase, despite the presence of the international forces.

Hence, it can be surmised that for most of the Indian Ocean region, a strong external presence, either in the form of the US Navy or a coalition of international forces, is still required to guarantee the security of its sea lanes and the safe passage of global energy trade. The necessity for this strong external presence will only diminish with increasing regional involvement in sea lane security and with a strong regional power taking the lead in security operations. However, as this is not likely to happen in the near future, the continued US presence in the region is critical.

In the past more than once, Iran threatened to utilize its geopolitical influence in the region to hold or close the Strait of Hormuz should it be provoked. Iranian leadership may well view continuous sanctions and blocking of its exports through sanctions as such a provocation. In the absence of alternative routes, there would be serious impact on the global trade of oil from this region. Mining of the Strait could be an effective deterrent for the Iranians against US and international pressures. Depending on the method, Iran could set thousands of mines in the narrow strait in a very short period. United States, however has taken the responsibility to defend the sea lanes along the Strait. In the US strategy, there are counter measures against mining and large-scale military actions. In the event of its closure, its opening would not be easy or without cost. It would need months and then restoration of oil supplies may take even more time.

Most experts of the Indian Ocean believe that pirates (mostly Somali origin) plant themselves along the known shipping lanes. There may be other possibilities like selling of sailing plans by shipping industry men or else, pirates may be using Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals for tracking the ships. There are possibilities that pirates may use intercepted radio signals. It is said about pirates that, they “mostly attack shipping in the heavily trafficked shipping lanes.” Some sea lanes like the Straits of Malacca off Indonesia and Malaysia along the Somalian water have been frequented by attacks by pirates through ages.

Collective Security Measures

In the last few years, political instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has raised security risks for the global shipping industry. As regional governments struggle to provide physical and economic security to impoverished populations, pirates and terrorist groups have taken advantage of these power vacuums, placing commercial vessels and trade infrastructure at risk. The report (???? Which report sir?) identifies the most salient threats to maritime security in the region as being the proliferation of terrorism in Egypt and its implications on Suez Canal security, the risks posed by Iranian naval forces to shipping in the Gulf, and the evolving threat posed by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the broader Indian Ocean. The report discusses the naval and coast guard capabilities of stakeholder states as well as international efforts to assist regional governments in countering these threats. The analysis concludes that maritime security efforts can be strengthened through the reorientation

of foreign assistance to regional states. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on developing naval assistance programmes with the Gulf Arab states. By focusing on naval capabilities and developing the human capital, an integrated effort can be made by local states to play a larger role in countering any blockage or action against piracy. There is a need for the institutionalized use of Best Management Practices (BMP) recommended by the shipping industry, as well as the use of armed security contractors aboard vessels transiting the High Risk Area (HRA).

These measures have proven to be the most effective means of preventing and deterring pirate attacks. However, much could still be done to promote and safely regulate the use of such forces.⁶ As per the IISS report, Iran has the military capability to disrupt the vessels while passing through the Strait. The report says: "Such tactics would resemble the latter years of the 'Tanker War'. Lasting throughout the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88, but with a significant escalation in 1984, this primarily involved the targeting of vessels carrying Iranian or Iraqi/Iraq-allied Arab oil and offshore platforms. According to a comprehensive CSIS study, 259 tankers and carriers were attacked between 1984 and 1988."⁷

Along the sea-lanes, the sea traffic at times converges to pass through narrow areas, commonly known as, chokepoints. These are in fact, narrow channels along widely used global sea routes.

Strengthening Collective Security through Combined Maritime Forces Along the sea-lanes, the sea traffic at times converges to pass through narrow areas, commonly known as, chokepoints. These are in fact, narrow channels along widely used global sea routes.

⁶ Robert M. Shelala II, Maritime Security in the Middle East and North Africa: A Strategic Assessment, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Feb 6, 2014. Accessed on November 15, 2014 at; <http://csis.org/publication/maritime-security-middle-east-and-north-africa-strategic-assessment>.

⁷ Andrew Holland, More Threats in the Straits of Hormuz, ASP, American Security Project, Feb 10, 2012. Accessed on November 14, 2014 at; <http://www.americansecurityproject.org/more-threats-in-the-straits-of-hormuz/>.

Strengthening Collective Security through Combined Maritime Forces

Maritime forces are the first line of defense with ability to deploy quickly, reach difficult locations. Maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in the international waters.

Established in 2002, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is a multi-national naval partnership, which exists to promote security, stability and prosperity across approximately 2.5 million square miles of international waters, which encompass some of the world's most important shipping lanes. It comprises three principle task forces:

CTF-150 (maritime security and counter-terrorism),
CTF-151 (counter piracy) and
CTF-152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation).⁸

and 30 member nations: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen.

CTF 150

Task Force 150 was a US Navy formation under the control of the US Naval Forces Central Command (CENTCOM). After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, it was re-established as a multi-national coalition in order to undertake counter-terrorism operations at sea as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). CTF-150 is a multinational task force. Participatory nations have included: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Participation is purely voluntary. No nation is asked to carry out any duty that it is unwilling to conduct.⁹

⁸ Combined Maritime Forces, accessed <http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/>

⁹ Ibid.

CTF-151

The main aim of the CF-151 is to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation. CMF supports Best Management Practice (BMP), as promoted by the industrial shipping community. BMP offers advice and guidance on avoiding piracy and is targeted at seafarers who intend to travel through the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and the Indian Ocean.¹⁰

CTF152

CTF-152 largely operates in the Arabian Gulf where it coordinates Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with regional partners, conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO), and remains prepared to respond to any crisis that may develop. Today the Gulf is one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world oil transportation. It contains in the region some 700 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, representing over half of the world's oil reserves, and over 2,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves (45% of the world total). Arabian Gulf countries maintain about one-third of the world's productive oil capacity. The majority of the oil exported from the Arabian Gulf is transported by sea.¹¹

CTF-152 was established in March 2004. It operates in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf and took part in Operation Enduring Freedom. CTF-152 is a multinational task force which has included participation from Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Main Features

- The CMF is largely a collaborative effort to tackle challenges of maritime security that include no rigid responsibilities on member states. Instead, the member states take upon themselves the responsibilities voluntarily in accordance with their operational capacities and specific needs.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

- The three major initiatives of the CMF i.e. CF-1, CF-2, CF-3 indicate the possibility of a large number of states working together to meet the common interests against counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.
- The development of the initiative speaks of an expanding set of security needs from traditional security aspects to non-traditional ones and from singular efforts to joining forces against common enemies for a common cause.
- A number of regional and extra-regional powers have forward-deployed their navies in the Indian Ocean. These operate either independently (such as those of China, India, Iran, and Russia) or as part of various task forces such as the TF 150, TF 151, EUNAVFOR and the NATO in support of counter piracy operations, 'war on terror', treaty agreements, and other national strategic agendas.¹² Hence, while collective efforts are underway, individual states are also active in establishing their presence and consolidating positions in the IOR.
- Pakistan has offered its services for the CF-150 and CF-151 initiatives. PN was the first Navy of the region to join Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan in 2004 and TF 151 in 2009. Since April 2004, PN units have cumulatively clocked close to 78,000 hours at sea; having investigated over 8073 ships and undertaken over 100 boarding operations along with flag verification of many vessels.¹³

Conclusion

In his inaugural address, US President Eisenhower had said, "We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose."¹⁴

¹² Vijay Sakhuja, Indian Ocean Navies: Lessons from the Pacific, IPCS, June 2, 2014, accessed <http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/maritime-matters-indian-ocean-navies-lessons-from-the-pacific-4485.html>

¹³ Pakistani Delegation in Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 2014, accessed <http://www.sadaewatansydney.com/admiralasifvisit.htm>.

¹⁴ Two SLOCs: Strait of Malacca security issues, March 22, 2006 (Accessed November 12, 2014), <http://www.eaglespeak.us/2006/03/two-slocs-strait-of-malacca-security.html>.

Unlike the Atlantic and Pacific, most of the Indian Ocean lies south of the Equator. The Indian Ocean forms two large indentations in the Southern coast of Asia, the Arabian Sea in the West and the Bay of Bengal in the East. Many rivers empty into the Indian Ocean. It was Admiral Mahan who emphasized this point very well when he said, 'It must however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying influence upon the growth of Sea Power in the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests'. ■

Chapter 10

Integration of Indian Ocean Community: Challenges and Dividends: Deterring and Suppressing Transnational Organised Crime


Capt. (R) Martin A. Sebastian RMN (R)

Abstract

Maritime Security concerns among the Indian Ocean community is as diverse and complex as the community itself. Maritime security threats which involve major powers, or State actors have little to do with the Indian Ocean community as a whole. It is the non-state actors, or transnational organized crime syndicates, who are the real major powers, thriving from the gaps within the disorganized system of States. Almost all of the maritime security threats today have their locus on land, the fuelling of the crime and the feeding of the proceeds from crimes at sea. The direct and indirect costs of these crimes to States, whether within the Indian Ocean community or other parts of the world are substantial according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime¹ and Oceans Beyond Piracy². It is therefore vital to cast political differences and come together to break the logistics chain of syndicated crime. In doing so, the Whole of Nation (WoN) approach will be vital, to be organised, in targeting those who fuel and feed from the crimes that uses the sea as a medium in the logistics chain of crime. Once WoN is in place, security complexes can be built among regional community networks to deter and suppress transnational organised crime syndicates by disrupting the source that fuels and feeds the crime. The purpose of this paper is to offer a concise appraisal of the current state of the primary maritime security challenges in the IOR, explore in greater detail the evolution of some key trends, and offer some pointers for policymakers and stakeholders as to what solutions and strategy adaptations might be worth considering going forward.

¹ UNODC, *A Threat Assessment*, April 2013.

² Oceans Beyond Piracy, *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012*, One World Future Foundation



Introduction

The Indian Ocean community comprises of 51 States, coastal and land locked excluding Central Asia. Characterised by diversity and complexity, the community is estimated to be 2.6 billion or 39 per cent of the world population. It is important to emphasize that the Indian Ocean's strategic economic value is linked primarily to global trade; less than one-quarter of its trade is among the littoral states, and the economic value of coastal subsistence activities is a modest portion of national income. This global dimension has impeded a deep sense of comity and shared interests among the littoral states, which often perceive themselves as small players in the transactions of global powers that ply the Indian Ocean³. The sea itself is an economic resource, from fisheries to deep sea minerals to the tourism that depends on tropical islands and coral reefs.

³ S. Bateman, "The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium—Will the Navies of the Indian Ocean Region Unite?," RSIS Commentaries (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), as cited in Chew, op. cit., p. 15.

Figure-1
International Transit Routes Through the Indian Ocean



Maritime Security concerns vary from illegal cross border movements of people, goods and wildlife; illegal exploitation of living marine resource which comprise of edible fish, endemic and protected species, and non living resource like priceless artifacts; piracy and armed robbery; dumping of pollutants at sea and; maritime fraud including insurance and bunkering fraud.

The ocean that plays a vital part in the global supply chain through shipping routes and network fuels the legitimate economy as well as the shadow economy. Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) that thrives in the gap between the two economies is essentially a well organised “business”. When reflecting on the maritime security concerns, it is a wonder how the many have romanticised maritime security concerns with the fact that these threats are to be addressed at sea. Whilst maritime security agencies have blamed the less initiated for “sea blindness”, it is worth mentioning here that maritime security agencies themselves are guilty of “land blindness”. This is due to the fact that two thirds of the logistics chain in maritime crime are on land. The fuelling of the crime and the locus of the proceeds.

It is therefore vital to bridge the land-sea nexus to deter and suppress TOC through fusing Maritime Domain Awareness and National Domain Awareness.

TOC and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

Illegal Cross Border Movements. The sustained trafficking of people, illicit narcotics and weapons within, and via, the Indian Ocean will persist for the medium- to long- term for several key reasons. There are numerous sources of high-volume supply for all three commodities; there are a sufficiently large number of points of export located in key countries that suffer from chronic insecurity and/or corrupt officials; there is a massive array of sea transportation available (liner and tramp) servicing all of the necessary sites of demand and consumption; and, the environment within which this activity occurs is vast. The many States within the IOR, for all intents and purposes are largely insecure, including lengthy tracts of unpatrolled coastline. The nature of the crime and its relationship with smuggling of migrants by land and by air means that it is a successful crime type that yields high profits for smugglers with all the risks being borne by migrants. Indeed, migrant smuggling by sea can be understood as a criminal business, which is competitively run as such⁴.

The movements of people come in two categories. The ones that are trafficked and those that are smuggled. Trafficking of migrants is done against the will of victims whilst smuggling of people is conducted through a collaborative effort of smugglers and people that are smuggled to beat the regulatory immigration regime, mostly for economic reasons. The primary difference between the two crimes is *consent*. Human trafficking, over the past decade, has become one of the major concerns of the international community and one of the most profitable activities of TOC worldwide. It is dynamic, adaptable and opportunistic and, like many other forms of criminal activity, it takes advantage of conflicts, humanitarian disasters and the vulnerability of people in situations of crises. Men, women and children are abducted and sold for sexual and labour exploitation and in some cases, as spare parts for human organs. There are numerous source countries for illicitly trafficked people in the IOR with the associated dangers of loss of life at sea and abuses of trafficked persons by syndicated organisations. The

⁴ UNODC, *Issue Paper - Smuggling of Migrants by Sea*, 2011

Stimson Centre⁵ reports there are two main maritime flows for this activity which are from the southern Red Sea and Horn of Africa to the southern Arabian Peninsula and from the Asian subcontinent to the eastern Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. The sea area of greatest concern remains the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea, where high-volume trafficking persists between Bosaso and Berbera in Somalia and Yemen. Currently, the largest number of refugees in Yemen are Somali nationals. This is ironic given that Yemen is in a state of virtual civil war, and indicative that the situation in Somalia is so bad that thousands of people each year are compelled to travel to another conflict torn country to escape their own. Trafficked persons also cross to Yemen from Eritrea and Sudan, and to a lesser extent from Djibouti. For those persons that survive the transit, many are trafficked onwards to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and sold into sexual and/or domestic servitude. There are as well the more famous routes from Sri Lanka to Australia through Indonesia and Malaysia. Migrant smuggling by sea generally occurs as part of a wider smuggling process often involving land and/or air movements. Furthermore, the complex nature of criminal migrant smuggling networks and their modus operandi means that smugglers who use sea routes cannot be identified purely by looking to the sea; the transnational criminal network itself must be traced from a smuggling vessel, back to the coast of embarkation, and from there back to countries of transit and origin⁶

The trafficking of narcotics and weapons continue to be of greatest concern, the smuggling of oil, cigarettes, charcoal, khat, endangered species, and other contraband is also commonplace in the IOR. The world's two main illicit opium-producing areas — the Golden Triangle, mainly in Myanmar and northern Thailand, and the Golden Crescent in Afghanistan and Pakistan — are in the IOR⁷. Much of the trafficking of drugs in the region is carried out by sea. Myanmar is a major source country for opiates (mainly heroin), but there's an increasing problem generally with the manufacture and trafficking in methamphetamines ('ice') and other amphetamine-type stimulants. Three types of illicit narcotics dominate trafficking in the Indian Ocean — heroin/opiates, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), and cannabis. In terms of volume, the majority of


⁵ Rupert Herbert Burns, *Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean*, Stimson Centre 2012.

⁶ UNODC, *Issue Paper - Smuggling of Migrants by Sea*, 2011

⁷ Sam Bateman, *The Second Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean*, September 2014

narcotics are trafficked by land, most notably Afghani heroin bound for Russia and Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey, and the Balkans. Over the past four years, drug trafficking from Afghanistan has increasingly used a southern route, traveling through Pakistan and Iran by land and then by sea for delivery into Africa, Europe and Asia. Dhows sail from the Makran Coast of either country with heroin and drop the consignment off on smaller vessels destined for the East African coast.⁸

Figure-2
Drug Trafficking Routes through the Indian Ocean




Source: UNODC

Nevertheless, sea conveyance of narcotics remains substantial. In early 2014, the HMCS Toronto, a frigate serving in the Royal Canadian Navy, headed for home after a 12-month tour with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in the Arabian sea. In one year, the HMCS Toronto had logged some 80,000 nautical miles, completed 150 operations and boarded 60 boats. It had also intercepted nine narcotics shipments, and by doing so, seized around 8.5 metric tons of drugs, including heroin and hashish. During the past 20 months, the CMF has seized some 4,200 kilograms of

⁸ Yuri Fedotov, *A free pass for drug traffickers at sea*, The Wall Street Journal, Sept 17, 2014

heroin. These seizures have disrupted the flow of heroin, but they do not seem to be a deterrent. Indeed, the seizures merely indicate the enormous amounts of heroin being transported across the high seas. A more detailed breakdown of producing countries, key ports, routes, and destinations is given in the diagram below.

Figure-3
Syndicated Crime Routes in the IOR



Source: Stimson Centre

The flows of greatest concern are the Afghan heroin/opiate trafficking to Europe via Iran/Pakistan/United Arab Emirates (UAE), and via the Arabian Sea/Red Sea/Suez Canal shipping route. Flows of illicit weapons and ammunition in this region follow the familiar logic of supply and demand, moving from source (or surplus) to areas of conflict, where they can fuel insurgency or, to a lesser extent, terrorist activity. Details are provided in the figure above. The linkages of greatest concern are flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Iran to Yemen and onwards to the Eastern

Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, and between the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia).

Across the IOR, the most common types of weapons trafficked fall into the SALW category. Trafficked weapons in this category include anti-aircraft guns (e.g., ZU-23-2); anti-personnel mines; anti-tank guided missiles (e.g., Malyutka AT-3 Sagger); anti-tank mines (e.g., TMA-5, YM-III); assault rifles (e.g., AK-47, AK-74, G-3s, FN FAL, M-16); C-4 plastic explosives; hand grenades; handguns/side arms; heavy machine guns (e.g., DShK); man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) (e.g., SA-7, & Strela-2); man-portable machine guns (e.g., PKM, RPK); mortars (e.g., 60mm, 80mm, and 120mm variants); rocket-propelled grenades (e.g., RPG-7, RPG-18); sniper rifles (e.g., 7.62mm SVD); surface-to-surface rockets (e.g., 122mm and 107mm Katyusha and Grad); TNT; and, ammunition for all of the above⁹.

⁹ Rupert Herbert Burns, *Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean*, Stimson Centre 2012.

Figure-4
Maritime Trafficking in the IOR

	Narcotics			Small arms & light weapons	Human
	Opiates	ATS	Cannabis		
Key source countries	Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam	Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Africa, Thailand	Afghanistan, India, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka	Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Yemen	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Yemen
Potential points of sea export/ departure	Pakistan (Karachi, Gwadar, Port MBQ); Iran (Bandar Abbas, Charbahar, Jask)	Bangladesh (Chittagong); India (Mumbai, Chennai); Indonesia (Jakarta); Iran (Bandar Abbas, Charbahar, Jask); South Africa (Durban)	Pakistan (Karachi, Gwadar, Port MBQ); Iran (Bandar Abbas, Charbahar, Jask)	Iran (Bandar Abbas, Charbahar, Jask); Yemen (Hodeidah, Aden)	Djibouti, Somalia (Bosaso, Berbera); Eritrea (Massawa, Aseb); and Sudan (Port Sudan)
Transshipment points	India (Mumbai, Chennai, Calcutta, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa), Mozambique (Nacala Porto, Pemba, Maputo), Oman (Salalah, Muscat); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), UAE (Jebel Ali)	India (Mumbai, Chennai, Calcutta, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa), Mozambique (Nacala Porto, Pemba, Maputo), Oman (Salalah, Muscat); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), UAE (Jebel Ali)	India (Mumbai, Chennai), Kenya (Mombassa); South Africa (Durban); Sri Lanka (Colombo), UAE (Jebel Ali)	India (Mumbai, Chennai, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa), Mozambique (Maputo); Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bosaso), South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), UAE (Jebel Ali); Eritrea (Massawa, Aseb); and Sudan (Port Sudan)	India (Mumbai, Chennai, Calcutta), Kenya (Mombassa), Oman (Salalah, Muscat), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), UAE, Yemen (Hodeidah, Mocha, Red Sea coast, Hanish Island group)
Primary sea transportation routes	Malacca → Bab el Mandeb, Suez; Malacca → Durban, Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Sri Lanka/Malacca; Persian Gulf → Suez	Malacca → Bab el Mandeb, Suez; Malacca → Durban, Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Sri Lanka/Malacca; Persian Gulf → Suez; Singapore → SE China/Taiwan/Japan; Western Australia → Sunda Strait	Malacca → Bab el Mandeb, Suez; Malacca → Durban, Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Sri Lanka/Malacca; Persian Gulf → Suez; Singapore → SE China/Taiwan/Japan; Western Australia → Sunda Strait	Malacca → Bab el Mandeb, Suez; Malacca → Durban, Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Sri Lanka/Malacca; Persian Gulf → Suez; Singapore → SE China/Taiwan/Japan; Western Australia → Sunda Strait	Malacca → Bab el Mandeb, Suez; Malacca → Durban, Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Cape Agulhas; Persian Gulf → Sri Lanka/Malacca; Persian Gulf → Suez; Singapore → SE China/Taiwan/Japan; Western Australia → Sunda Strait
Destination regions/ countries/ ports	Major European ports		Major European ports	Somalia (Kismayo, Mogadishu, Haradhere, Bossaso); Yemen (Hodeidah, Aden); Eritrea (Massawa, Aseb); Sudan (Port Sudan), Gaza, Lebanon and Syria (via Suez)	Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen
Means of transportation	Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats	Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats	Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats	Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats	Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats

Source: Stimson Centre

Piracy and Armed Robbery. Re-emergence of maritime piracy, one of the world's oldest crimes, in the past decade has grown into a serious global security concern. Rising number of attacks in recent years on merchant vessels to seize goods and hostages in exchange for ransoms running in millions of dollars prompted urgent concerted international naval campaign to protect arterial sea routes and shipping lanes. Earlier maritime robbery was mostly confined to hotspots around Malacca Strait, South China Sea, coastal areas off Peru and Brazil, and waters between India and Bangladesh

but an explosive growth in pirate activities in Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea has turned the waters of the IOR into the world's piracy haven.

The depth of concern for the problem internationally is amply demonstrated by the levels of co-operation and coordination among naval and other forces from several countries that have assembled in the west Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden to escort ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia and to protect vulnerable shipping. Notwithstanding this unprecedented effort, the vast sea area in which the pirates now operate makes it difficult to patrol and monitor effectively, particularly with the limited resources available. More resources, in the form of naval vessels and aircraft, are needed and at every opportunity the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) encourages Member governments to make greater efforts to provide the additional naval, aerial surveillance and other resources needed through every means possible. Using sophisticated techniques they have raided shipping vessels as far east as the Maldives including Seychelles and as far south as the Mozambique Channel including Kenya and Madagascar. In 2010 – the year with the highest number of kidnappings at sea – Somali pirates had seized 86 per cent of all hostages. According to a Chatham house expert, average ransom payments to Somali pirates in 2011 were above \$5 million almost making piracy the second largest generator of money in the country bringing in over \$200 million every year¹⁰.

¹⁰ Nishta Churgh, *Global Piracy: Just a Seaborne Scourge or a Bigger Malady?* Fair Observer, April 7, 2013 2013


Figure-5
Piracy Activity in the High Risk Area



Source: NATO Shipping Centre

According to the report, *Pirate Trails*, by the United Nations crime unit, Interpol and the World Bank, pirate financiers, considered the "money kingpins," earned the most loot -- about 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the total ransom paid. Low level pirates, mostly foot soldiers sent to the high seas to do the dirty work, earn between \$30,000 and \$75,000 a vessel. Pirates who board the vessel first or use their own weapons in an operation get a bonus of \$10,000. Rewards aside, there is also punishment. Those who refuse to follow orders, mistreat the crew or fall asleep on the job get fined, according to the study, and each step of the operation is tracked, with a lot of beneficiaries along the way. "When a ship is caught, the pirates call at the city. Everybody celebrates," the study says. "When the ship

Figure-6
The Money Trail



Source: UNODC, World Bank, Interpol

comes at the port, a crew comes to secure it. Everything is written down, every food, drink, any kind of transaction. The final amount will be deducted from the ransom at the end. The investor pays." Pimps, cooks and militia benefit too. Cooks, pimps, lawyers and the militia controlling ports also get a piece of the pie. The pirates' money is "typically spent on alcohol, khat, and prostitutes," the report said. "Proceeds from piracy are also reinvested into the financing of future pirate operations and may support the purchase of real estate, investment in the khat trade, and other business investments and ventures." Pirates in Somali areas controlled by the al Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab also pay a development tax to access the ports, according to the study. Although the piracy trade is controlled from Somalia, its effects spill into surrounding areas. Proceeds are moved by the kingpins across borders through smuggling, money

laundering and wire transfers, the study shows. And the funds are widely distributed among various industries. "Pirate financiers invest into a range of sectors ... some of these proceeds are recycled into financing criminal activities, including further piracy acts, human trafficking and investing in militias and military capacities on land in Somalia," the study says¹¹.

It is therefore apparent that maritime security issues in the IOR like trafficking and piracy are syndicated operations by TOC which will require a much more concerted and organised approach.

Measures to address TOC in the IOR

Though the purpose of this paper is not to analyse responses to maritime security problems in the Indian Ocean, a few incomplete remarks pertaining to the measures taken by nations, coupled with the existing initiatives by security communities in the IOR, and the potential contribution of regional cooperation in enhancing security in the Indian Ocean are perhaps relevant.

UNODC. The United Nations understands the nexus between maritime security and TOC. It is for this reason, several initiatives are underway in the East Africa region focused in combating TOC. These initiatives are not only on active measures to counter the activity, initiatives are also underway to provide Governments with the necessary governance architectures to support the overall initiatives. The Indian Ocean team within the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme assists states in the Indian Ocean region to enhance and coordinate their efforts to combat maritime crime, with a focus on criminal justice capacity building.


The Maritime Crime Programme (MPC) works with States in the Indian Ocean region as part of its counter-piracy activities and continues to work with those States to combat a range of maritime crime threats.

REFLECS3. Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea (REFLECS3) is the new incarnation of Seychelles-based Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC), which played an integral role in anti-piracy and countering drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean Region. REFLECS3 is in the exciting process of transition from a purely piracy focused theme to a broader mission which focuses on enhanced maritime security in the region and building on a successful programme for counter-

¹¹ Faith Karimi, *African pirates use millions of dollars in ransom on drugs, real estate, prostitutes*, CNN, Nov 2013

piracy, commencing a wider engagement with regional partners to help support the fight against transnational organised crime (TNOc). This new mandate which was authorised by the multi-nation Steering Group, the independent body which provides strategic direction to the Centre, takes the form of three interlinked missions; Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU), Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) and Local Capacity Building Coordination Group (LCBCG).

Figure-7
REFLECS3 New Mandates



Piracy and Armed Robbery: In response to this threat, several resolutions in the United Nations Security Council after 2008 enabled international action to counter piracy. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created in 2009 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851. Its members include those stakeholders affected by Somali piracy: countries from the region, Western Europe, Middle East and Asia, industry, seafarer's organisations and NGOs. The EU chairs the CGPCS in 2014. The EU and the entire CGPCS are keen to mobilise international support to eradicate Somali piracy once and for all, not only

by addressing the symptoms at sea but also by addressing the root causes of piracy ashore with five working groups that have been set up¹². Counter piracy coalition forces including the EU Naval Force, NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Groups, and the Combined Task Force have also been working coherently to counter the menace. Regional powers increased naval operations. Despite the presence of these forces, however, incidence of piracy continued to increase between 2008 and 2012, until declining somewhat in the last two years. One of the primary causes for this recent decline has been the increasing presence of armed private security teams on-board merchant vessels. Ship owners as well as insurance underwriters have started to demand the presence of private security teams on board ships crossing the piracy-affected areas of the Indian Ocean. This has led to a change in the policies of many nations with regard to the presence of armed personnel aboard vessels in international waters, and has subsequently enabled a rise in the presence of on board private security teams¹³. According to some estimates, as many as 35 per cent of ships traversing the Gulf of Aden may be employing armed guards. Since naval deployments to the region have been cut and governments such as the US see armed guards as the solution, there is concern in the shipping industry that what was seen as a temporary solution is becoming permanent.

Maritime Security — the Whole of Nations (WoN) Approach to Deter and Suppress TOC


It is evident by now that maritime security has much of its locus on land. It is also apparent that no single agency nor nation can combat TOC and that combating TOC per se will mean setting aside political differences whether between agencies or between nations. If the general consensus is to address the root of the crime, then measures to deter and suppress should begin on land. If crime has an impact on socio economic well-being, then it is everyone's responsibility to carry out concerted efforts to break the logistics chain of crime through national, regional and international efforts. This is to mean, an organised capability to deter and suppress organised crime. To do

¹² <http://www.thecgps.org/>

¹³ Excerpts from speech delivered by Sec Defence at the 2013 GALLE DIALOGUE, *Emerging Maritime Trends in the Indian Ocean*, 25 November 2013.

that, political will be important to understand the risks posed by TOC. Governance mechanisms to deter and suppress must be put in place to harness the WoN approach to win over TOC.

Figure-8
The Whole of Nation (WoN) Approach



The main effort for WoN will be to target the logistics chain of TOC. Money laundering activities to finance and garner proceeds from crime must be disrupted. Agencies must set their differences and come together to form a Joint Inter agency intelligence cell to fuse information jigsaws to better understand the threat and harness Joint Inter agency countermeasures. Land and sea enforcement agencies need to come together and see the “big picture”. Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act (AMLATFA) including unlawful activities could be enhanced to freeze assets of kingpins and colluding government staff. Attorney General, Multimedia and Financial regulators should be roped in to follow the money trail by targeting communications and information leads provided by regional and international sources. Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) with a common cause should be part of the anti-graft network to “weed the lawn”

and identify those supporting the shadow economy. Reporters from the media also have a part to play with the common public in being responsible citizens. As crime affects socio-economic well-being, community policing may yield valuable information for agencies to react. The industry, too, have a role to play. Risk assessment could be provided to agencies to enhance their understanding on the situation. Together, the nation will work coherently to collaborate and coordinate initiatives to break the logistics chain of crime, thus creating a viable entity to deter and suppress TOC.

The national approach will complement regional and international approach in building security complexes and be organised against TOC.

Conclusion

Maritime security threats have become syndicated operations often with far reaching national, regional and international networks. Their locus on land provides the supply chain to fuel and feed from the crime. Crime lords and kingpins capitalise on the socio economic disparity and the weak governance system to recruit manpower and finance crime. The lucrative shadow economy finds its way into enforcement agencies by financing graft making 'big fishes swim in cold waters while small ones feel the heat'. A new paradigm is needed to change the mindset of agencies in working together and address the menace coherently. The effort must yield in successful indictment and not successful arrests. A good example is when countering narcotics. Police know the gangs, coastguards know the routes and customs know the entry points. Working together would break the logistics chain for narcotics. Other national entities should also come forward and work together to fight crime. Gone is the era when countering crime was left to the whims of government agencies. Communities must come together for the prevention of crime with the overall effort to deter and suppress.

National initiatives must complement regional and international initiatives to create an international organized network to fight TOC. With these architectures, TOC will not find the gap between legitimate and shadow economy to thrive. ■

Chapter 11

Maritime Economic Cooperation: Hydrocarbons, Fisheries and Minerals

Shahid Amjad

Abstract:

Unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans that are open from North to South Pole, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea in particular are only partially open with very little water exchange taking place from the north. This coupled with reversed flows during the monsoons make the North Arabian Sea a unique region, making it one of the world's highest productive areas. A third of the world's population lives around the rim of the Indian Ocean which is dependent on the living and non-living resources. The North Arabian Sea offers products and services essential for development of coastal states. Coastal and offshore zones are capable of producing rich fisheries, mineral, and oil and gas resources. Marine resources have an immense potential in contributing towards national economic growth and development. The importance of developing marine resources in the coastal and offshore maritime areas of Pakistan has not been fully recognized. Due attention of policy and decision makers is essential to fully benefit from the development and sustainable exploitation of these marine resources. A firm policy needs to be in place for badly required investment in oceanic research which would soon pay back handsomely to the economy.

Introduction

The economic wealth of Pakistan's coastal zone is derived from living and non-living resources and products of direct market value (e.g. fish and fishery products, coastal dependent activities, maritime trade, port and shipping activities, beach recreation and tourism etc.), which earn millions of US dollars in foreign exchange. Then there are products of

natural systems that are intangible and are not accounted for by the market economy, they are the output of economic functions performed and services provided by those systems. Cooperation between maritime states has become increasingly important for Pakistan in recent years. Pakistan has become more aware of the benefits that are derived by other regional coastal countries engaged in sustainable exploitation and development of maritime resources. The fascination with the marine sciences continues to grow as we find new resources such as economically important minerals embedded in the seafloor and offshore gas hydrates (Von Rad *et. al.*, 2000) as potential new energy sources and food from the ocean to supplement the depleting land sources. Oceans have a vast wealth of resources that could contribute towards national economic growth and progress through cooperation between maritime states and the creation of innovative technology for sustainable development of these resources.

Minerals from marine sources provide raw materials for manufacturing and construction sectors, energy for industrial and domestic use, and fertilizer for agriculture sector. Economically important minerals such as poly metallic sulphide deposits are known to contain high concentrations of zinc, lead, copper, barium, silver and gold, while the cobalt-rich crust, commonly found on the flanks of seamounts, contain nickel, copper, zinc, iron and manganese as well as cobalt. Other resources such as gas hydrate oil and gas, phosphorites and precious metals have also aroused the interest of research institutions and mining companies worldwide. While the current contribution of marine mineral resources to the global economy is significant, more recent scientific discoveries suggest that the potential contribution of these resources to the global economy could be even greater. The coastal and offshore areas of Pakistan are bestowed with large natural resources that need to be explored. Pakistan has an active continental margin having distinctive oceanic phenomena and features that are capable of producing rich fisheries, minerals, oil and gas resources. Pakistan is fortunate to have a long coast line of 990 kms, with an Exclusive Economic Zone of approximately 240,000 km².

Non-living Resources on the Seafloor

The principal geomorphic features of the Balochistan/Makran coast are cliffs, headland, and mud volcanoes. Rocks exposed along the coast are the assemblages of sandstone, shale and mudstone. The mountains are composed of bare rocky limestone or conglomerate, with the exception of

some upper highlands, there is little or no vegetation. The coastline faces considerable erosion. Owing to shortage of promontories and sheltered areas, most of the littoral material is lost to the sea. Spectacular mud volcanoes are found in several locations along the Makran coast where gas-charged water escapes to the surface.

Continental Shelf and Ocean Floor Characteristics

An outstanding feature of the seafloor is northeast-southwest trending Owen Fracture Zone and the Murray Ridge. This asymmetric ridge system divides the northern Arabian Sea into two main depositional basins: The Oman basin in the west and the Arabian basin towards the east (Figure 1). The Murray ridge separates the Indus basin from the Oman basin, which starts from south of Karachi and has maximum relief range from 1500-2000 meter depth.

Geologically, the offshore Balochistan coast has a subduction plate as a result; the coast is rising at 1.5 to 2-mm/ year (Page et al, 1979; Vita-Finzi, 1979). The Arabian plate moves at a rate of 50 mm/year northward under continental crust. The subduction zone is about 900 km long, stretching from near the Straits of Hormuz in the west to Karachi in the east.(Leggett and Platt 1984). The continental shelf is narrow and steep. Along the Makran margin the shelf width suddenly narrows to about 40 km and further decreases gradually towards the west.

resources. For example, offshore oil and gas reserves now constitute a major portion of overall energy sources (International Energy Agency, 1996). As other non-living resources become scarce on land, the offshore exploitation becomes more feasible through technological advances; more minerals can be expected to be mined from nearshore and offshore areas. Exploration or mining in the international seabed area can only be carried out under a contract issued by the Seabed Authority. (ISA).

Marine Hydrocarbon

Hydrocarbons are formed as a result of biochemical process of unoxidized organic matter in the sub soil seabed over millions of years. This process occurs in marine sedimentary basins in sequences. The unoxidised organic matter in the subsoil is subjected to high pressure and temperature during burial and it forms liquid (oil) and gaseous hydrocarbons (natural gas). Oil may comprise between 50 to 90 per cent hydrocarbons, with oxygen, nitrogen and sulphur in minor quantities. The formation of exploitable reservoirs of hydrocarbons requires migration (from their source rocks), to geological traps comprising a porous reservoir of rocks overlain by an impermeable horizon. The common geological traps for hydrocarbons include: shale, salt domes (evaporites), and anticlinal folds of permeable and non-permeable rock layers. (Bramleyet,al 2000).

The estimated proven oil resources world-wide at the beginning of the 21st Century were estimated at one trillion barrels. Of this amount, about 252 billion barrels (25 per cent) are estimated to lie in sub-sea environments. Similarly, the total world-wide proven resources of natural gas are estimated to be 4,000 trillion cubic feet, of which about 26 per cent are estimated to be in the sub-sea environment. However, these offshore resources may be as much as ten times larger, in which case they will provide the majority of future hydrocarbon production (IEA, 1996). Offshore Indus Basin, South of Pakistan may have a high hydrocarbon resource potential, based on sediment thickness, crustal age and basement type, small sub-sea basins having thick sedimentary (2-6 km) sequences that generally have large petroleum deposits.

Marine Gas Hydrate Deposits

Gas hydrates are a crystalline compound that are composed of gas molecules, normally methane (Kvenvolden, 1993), en-caged within

water molecules to form a solid similar to ice. Gas hydrate — “the ice that burns”— is by far the most exotic of energy deposits. It forms when methane from organic decomposition comes together with water at low enough temperatures and high enough pressures to trap individual gas molecules within atomic scale crystalline cages of water ice. It forms within the sediment spaces cementing the grains together. This dramatically changes the physical properties of the sediment. One volume of hydrate also stores 164 volumes of un-pressurized methane - a measure of the value of the resource. Worldwide estimate of gas hydrates range from 10,500 to 42,000 trillion cubic meters (tcm), (Kerr, 2004). If only 1 per cent of hydrates could be made to give up its gas, the world would be awash in a clean-burning fuel that yields the least greenhouse gas of any fossil fuel. Such best guesses by geologists have been enough to excite growing interest in gas hydrates as an energy source.

The German Research Vessel “R/V SONNE” (1998) investigated the methane concentration in the water column of the Arabian Sea, offshore Pakistan. They have reported high concentration of methane plumes, suggesting large deposits of gas hydrates (rough estimates 200 km long by 100 km wide and 600 meters thick) off the Balochistan coast. The gas hydrates are often associated with bivalves (pelecypod) *Calymene sp.* and *Pogonophora* worms. These bivalves are known to be biological indicators associated with active gas seeps. On shore mud volcanoes are also found on Balochistan coast, the largest active mud volcano is known as Chandra Gup, the source of methane gas bubbles being emitting from the Chandra Gup crater is predominately sulphide oxidizing bacteria. (Faber, 1997). More recently, (September 2013) an island associated with soft sediments and methane gas erupted off Hingol which is part of the accretionary ridge and the Balochistan subduction zone. Eventually, the soft sediment Island eroded with the passage of time by high energy waves during the south west monsoon. However, methane gas bubbles continued to flow from the origin of the Island towards the surface. Scientists and engineering geologists are still a long way off, to commercially exploit the gas hydrates. Currently, advances in developing a viable technology for sustainable extraction of methane from the hydrates are being made by Japan.

Living Resources

Pakistan is a net exporter of shrimps, lobsters, crabs, molluscs, fish and fishing products. The exports fetch US\$ 220 million (2012). The total landing for small pelagics, large pelagics, demersal fish and shellfish in 2012 accounted for 474,665 metric tons.

Table-1

Fishery Resources	Biomass (tons)	MSY (tons)	Average 6 yrs Landing (tons)	Increase in Potential Catch (tons)
Small Pelagic Species	700,000	300,000	86,800	213,000
Large Pelagic Species	80,000	60,000	39,500	20,500
Demersal Fish	500,000	300,000	267,800	32,000
Shrimps	88,000	35,000	25,700	9,300
Cephalopods	30,000	15,000	6,500	5,500
Mollusk	8,000	4,000	500	3,500
Crabs	25,000	10,000	5,700	300
Lobster	1300	600	800	0
Mesopelagics	10,000,000	5,000,000	0	5,000,000
Total	11,432,300	5,724,600	433,300	5,284,100

Source: Table-1 Fish Resources, Total Marine Fisheries Landing Averages and Biomass Estimates Ranged from 400,500 – 474,665 tons (MFD statistics)

The commercially important marine fisheries resources of Pakistan are composed of about 350 different species. Some 240 are demersal fish, 50 are small pelagics, 10 are medium sized pelagics and 18 are large pelagics fish; in addition, there are 21 species of shrimp. 12 of

squid/cuttlefish/octopus and five species of lobsters. The commercial landings, constitute large pelagics (tuna, mackerel, shark, Barracuda, dolphin fish etc). Demersal or benthic varieties include the marine jewfish, croakers, grunters, snappers, groupers, ribbonfish, pomfret, sole etc. Small pelagics (sardines, anchovies) and medium sized pelagics. Crustaceans include shrimps, lobsters crabs etc. A sizeable stock of *Symplectoteuthisoualaniensis* has been recorded from offshore waters from past fishery resource surveys. Similarly oceanic squid *Discodissp* has also been observed in good quantities. It is estimated that their stocks are about 10,000 metric tons with a maximum sustainable yield of about 5,000 metric tons. Present production of cephalopods is based on the by-catch of shrimp trawling and estimated to be about 200 metric tons annually. Cephalopod jig fisheries should be established either using artisanal boats in shallow coastal waters or in form of joint venture operation in offshore waters. In addition to squids, shrimps, pelagic and demersal fish, there is a high biomass of mesopelagic fish (myctophids) in Pakistan offshore waters. This biomass is estimated to be about 10 million metric tons which is an untapped resource and can be exploited from the EEZ of Pakistan. However, technology for its harvesting and utilization has not yet been developed.

Conclusion

Our Interest in cooperation in developing technologies in marine sciences and interrelated disciplines continues to grow as we find new resources such as economically important minerals embedded in the seafloor and offshore gas hydrates as potential new energy sources. Minerals from marine sources provide raw materials for manufacturing and construction sectors, energy for industrial and domestic use, and fertilizer for agriculture sector. Economically important minerals such as poly-metallic-sulphide deposits are known to contain high concentrations of zinc, lead, copper, barium, silver and gold, other resource such as gas hydrates oil and gas, phosphorites and precious metals have also aroused the interest of research institutions and mining companies worldwide. While the current contribution of marine mineral resources to the global economy is significant, more recent scientific discoveries suggest that the potential contribution of these resources to the global economy could be even greater. Pakistan has a wealth of living and non living marine resources that could contribute towards national economic growth and progress through the creation of innovative technology for sustainable development of these

resources; concerted efforts are needed for prospecting sea bottom minerals within and beyond Pakistan's EEZ. It is recommended that an "Ocean Business Forum" be established with members drawn from Indian Ocean coastal states and beyond to take advantage and share the technology for sustainable development of living and non- living marine resources, to contribute to national economic development and progress. ■

References.

- Amjad S, 2007. Sustainable Exploration of Seabed Mineral Resources. Paper presented in the 1st. International Conference on Maritime Threats and Opportunities in the 21st Century. Bahria University Karachi.
- Amjad,S., 2010.State of Fisheries in Balochistan.in Development of Fisheries Sector-Analysis of Issues and Formulation of Strategies National Centre for Maritime Policy Research. Bahria University. pp 98-105
- Bramley, J Murton, Lindsay M Parsons, Peter Hunter and Peter Miles 2000.Global non-living resources on the extended continental Shelf: Prospects at the year 2000. ISBA, Jm. 65 pp.
- Faber, E., Gerling, P., Berner, U and Sohns, E. 1994. Methane in Ocean waters: Concentrations and carbon isotope variability at East Pacific Rise and in the Arabian Sea. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 31, 139-144,
- Kerr, A. Richard. 2004, Kilometer beneath the white infilling. Science Vol. 303,
- Kvenvolden, K. A. 1993. Gas hydrates as a potential energy resource -a review of their methane content. *In: Howell, D.G., ed. The future of energy gases: U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1570, 555-561,*
- Leggett, J.K., and J. Platt. 1984. Structural Features of the Makran Fore-arc on Landsat Imagery Marine Geology and Oceanography of Arabian Sea and Coastal Pakistan. editors B.U Haq and J.D Milliman. pp 33-44.
- Marine Fisheries Statistics Handbook. Directorate of Marine Fisheries. Government of Pakistan
- Von Rad, U., Bernev,U., Delosle, G., Doose-Rolinski. H., Fechner, N., Linke, P., Luckage, A., Poeser, H.A., Schmaljohann., R., and Wiedicke, M., 2000. Gas and fluid venting at the Makran Accretionary Wedge off Pakistan, Geo-Marine Letters, 20: 10-19.

Contributors

Mr. Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury is Head of Operations at BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), BRAC University Dhaka, Bangladesh.

He studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK. Before joining BIGD, he was an Associate Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS). At BIGD, in addition to his responsibilities as Head of Operations, he is also a member of a Research Cluster.

Rear Admiral (R) Pervaiz Asghar is a retired officer of the Pakistan Navy. During the course of his naval career he has served at Fleet Headquarters as Fleet Operations Officer and at Naval Headquarters as Director Naval Warfare & Operational Plans and Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans). He has also served as the Flag Officer Sea Training.

He did his Principal Warfare Officers course from HMS Dryad in UK, his staff course from the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich, UK and his war course from the National Defence College, Islamabad. He has written extensively on naval and maritime subjects.

Dr. David R. Jones is currently a visiting Faculty at School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He has also served as Research and Editorial Consultant at the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad. He did his PhD from Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.

He has a long and distinguished teaching career having taught at universities in Canada, England and at the Naval War College, Newport. His research has been published in reputed journals and he has edited several books and contributed to encyclopaedias.

Dr. Nasser Hadian is professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran. He has also been a Visiting Professor and Research Scholar at the Middle East Institute of Asian Languages and Cultures at the Columbia University, US. Dr. Nasser is a Ph.D from University of Tennessee, Knoxville. His scholarship embraces

Iranian Contemporary Politics, Iran's Nuclear Programme and Political Islam.

Dr. Wang Hanling is Professor of International Law and Marine Affairs; Director, Centre for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Institute for International Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is adjunct professor of China Ocean University, Shanghai Ocean University, and Xiamen University; research fellow of the Center for Ocean Development of China; and senior research fellow of International Center for Emergency Studies, Cape Breton University, Canada.

He received the degree of Doctor of Law from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, studied at the World Maritime University in Sweden, and worked as a researcher at University of Lapland in Finland.

Dr. Wang has published widely in Chinese and English. He was nominated by China as an expert for Special Arbitration under Article 2, Annex VIII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and served as a consultant to the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) of the Office for Legal Affairs of the United Nations. He won the highest research award of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for his outstanding policy advice to the Chinese central government in 2007 and 2008.

Mr. Mohammad Azam Khan is a retired naval officer currently serving as a research fellow at the Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore. His experience in naval and maritime security issues spans over 38 years. He has extensively written for reputed national and international journals and leading magazines. He has presented papers at International Maritime Conferences. He is currently engaged in formulating the Maritime Doctrine of He is a graduate of National Defence University, Islamabad and Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.

Lt. Cdr. (R) Adil Rashid is a retired officer of Pakistan Navy. He is M. Sc. in Maritime Affairs from World Maritime University, Malmo Sweden.

After retirement from PN, he joined the National Centre for Maritime Policy Research (NCMPR) at Bahria University, Karachi as Director and Senior Research Officer. At present, he is Director Training Center at Port Qasim Authority.

Dr. A. Z. Hilali is a Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Peshawar, Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. Earlier Dr. Hilali also served as Head of Department, Peace and Conflict Studies in the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS) at the National Defense University, Islamabad. From Dr. Hilali did his Ph.D from the University of Hull (UK) and M.Phil from King's College, London.

Dr. Hilali has written extensively and published research articles in renowned international and national research journals. He is author of a book titled "US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", published by — Ashgate UK and USA. His contribution also appears in the "Encyclopedia of the Developing World"..

Brig. Dr. Muhammad Khan is the Head of International Relations Department, Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University, Islamabad which he helped found Dr. Khan has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Karachi.

Dr. Khan is a prolific writer and author of some 800 research articles published in Journals of National and International repute. He was awarded "The Best University Teacher Award" for year 2011-2012 by the Higher Education Commission (HEC). Dr Khan was awarded the Tamghai-a-Imtiaz in 2014.

Captain Martin A. Sebastian is a Fellow and Head of the Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Prior to joining MIMA, Capt. Martin served with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations, New York. Capt. Martin led a team in drafting a UN policy document on Maritime and Riverine Operations in Peacekeeping.

Capt. Martin holds an MBA from Charles Sturt University, Australia and is a Member of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, United Kingdom.

He is country representative at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Maritime Security Study Group.

Index

A

Afghanistan, 2, 3, 4, 6, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 48, 49, 51, 54, 59, 61,
65, 66, 67, 70, 74, 77, 103,
133, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160,
184

Af-Pak, 38, 45, 52, 54

Anti-piracy, 6, 8, 20, 33, 42, 58,
72, 76, 78, 84, 88, 104, 192

ASEAN, i, ii, 59, 90, 150, 165,
167, 171

Asia Pivot, 2, 26, 137

C

Central Asia, 21, 38, 45, 49, 125,
154, 155, 156, 157, 160, 181,
185

China, iii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12,
13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 29, 33,
35, 38, 42, 61, 67, 71, 72, 73,
75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84,
86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 101, 102,
103, 106, 111, 113, 115, 116,
117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124,
125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138,
139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150,
153, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162,
165, 167, 169, 178, 188

G

Great game, 136

Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), 80

Gulf of Aden, 5, 7, 8, 9, 22, 26,
41, 42, 83, 84, 85, 88, 98, 100,
105, 164, 173, 174, 177, 184,
189, 194

H

Hormuz, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 37,
40, 85, 86, 96, 100, 103, 117,
127, 128, 129, 139, 157, 159,
163, 165, 166, 167, 173, 174,
175, 199

I

Indian Ocean, i, ii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28,
30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47,
48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 79, 80,
82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90,
92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 110,
111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117,
119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125,
126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133,
134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,
146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161,
162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169,
171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179,
180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185,
187, 189, 192, 194, 197, 205

Iran, 1, 5, 13, 20, 26, 29, 48, 64,
65, 66, 75, 77, 80, 81, 86, 103,
131, 139, 141, 150, 154, 156,
158, 159, 160, 167, 174, 175,
178, 185, 186

L

Labour migration, 52

Littoral states, 1, 5, 7, 13, 32, 33,
34, 37, 40, 41, 68, 69, 83, 86,
87, 88, 89, 90, 143, 170, 171,
173, 181

M

Malacca Strait, 5, 34, 83, 85, 86,
125, 167, 169, 170, 171, 188
Maritime, ii, iii, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 22,
23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40,
42, 61, 67, 69, 76, 82, 83, 84,
89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99,
100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 111, 119, 125, 128,
142, 146, 147, 167, 169, 170,
173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180,
182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188,
189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197,
206
Middle East, iii, 1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 16,
36, 37, 38, 45, 47, 48, 52, 72,
77, 79, 80, 92, 103, 112, 117,
125, 127, 130, 135, 140, 157,
161, 165, 169, 171, 174, 175,
193

N

Naval Power, 4, 61, 127, 151

P

Pacific Ocean, 61, 83, 135, 167
Pak Navy, 6
Persian Gulf, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 37,
66, 80, 85, 93, 97, 103, 124,
125, 127, 128, 133, 138, 141,
149, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159,
160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166,
171, 173, 184
Piracy, ii, iii, 3, 5, 22, 26, 32, 36,
37, 38, 39, 42, 53, 84, 85, 86,
98, 99, 100, 106, 170, 180,
184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192,
193

R

Regional Cooperation, ii, iii, 17,
68, 86, 121, 170

S

Sea lanes, 86, 116, 125, 128, 130,
133, 135, 143, 147, 159, 163,
164, 165, 169, 173, 174
Somalia, ii, 6, 16, 17, 20, 23, 26,
34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 51, 58, 59,
65, 66, 72, 78, 83, 84, 85, 88,
98, 99, 104, 148, 184, 187,
189, 191, 193
South Asia, 5, 23, 36, 38, 39, 45,
47, 49, 52, 119, 127, 140, 145,
157
South China Sea, iii, 2, 5, 33, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 87, 89, 90,
133, 143, 149, 150, 151, 167,
169, 188
Strait of Hormuz, 8, 127, 128,
173
Strait of Malacca, 7, 8, 34, 74, 87,
96, 117, 119, 128, 143, 144,
149, 159, 163, 164, 166, 167,
169, 178
String of Pearls, 71, 117, 118,
120, 148, 149

T

Trafficking, 3, 6, 9, 21, 23, 32,
33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 69, 83,
105, 126, 170, 183, 184, 186,
192

U

US pivot to Asia, 90