

**8th & 9th Annual
International
Conference**

**The Dynamics of Change
in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
Region: Politics, (Dis)integration
and Reformation in the
Borderland 2019 & 2020**

Edited by
Dr. Noreen Naseer
Dr. Aamer Raza

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Edited by
Noreen Naseer and Aamer Raza

8th & 9th International Conferences

**THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN REGION:
POLITICS, (DIS)INTEGRATION AND REFORMATION IN THE
BORDERLAND 2019 & 2020**

Organized by

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR**



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at
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Disclaimer

This publication is based on the papers presented by the authors in the 8th and 9th International conferences on “The Dynamics of Change in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region: Politics, (Dis)integration and Reformation in the Borderland” organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar in collaboration with the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) Pakistan in 2019 and 2020. The opinions expressed in these publications are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar and HSF Pakistan.

Introduction

Like many great ideas, the foundational concept “The Dynamics of Change in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region: Politics, (Dis)integration and Reformation in the Borderland” Conference organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar in collaboration with the HSF Pakistan in 2019 and 2020 was the product of frustration. The frustration, in this case, was with the manner in which the Pashtun region in the Pak-Afghan borderland has been covered by international media and academia. The conference that resulted from this foundational idea has been indisputably impressive in its academic and intellectual contribution not only regarding the academic discourse on the region but regarding the study of borderlands in general. We found willing and supporting partners in the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) Pakistan. The HSF has not only been instrumental in providing material and logistical assistance but have helped academically in every possible way. And with the active assistance of the HSF, the annual conference is one of the longest sustained conferences focusing on borderlands, not only in Pakistan but internationally too.

The current proceedings are from the Annual Conferences held in 2019 and 2020. The 2020 conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the travel restrictions that had been imposed on account of the same. Initially, like many other academic events, it was felt that the conference should be delayed for a year. However, eventually, it was decided to use the available technologies and conduct the conference virtually; however, it was made possible with the technical support of HSF Pakistan.

Borderland studies have emerged as a subfield of Political Science and International Relations. Fixed clear borders are a relatively recent phenomenon and are human constructs, results of politics, geography and power plays. The borderland has historically served as a route for armies, wars and more recently non-state interventions and terrorism. Although, people living on borderlands have always shared a longer history of social interactions, economic and political relations as the population belong to the same ethnicity, culture and in some cases same religion.

Like the past years, the papers that have been presented by scholars from across the globe in these two conferences cover the familiar areas of the past editions. Over the years,

we have, by design, encouraged papers with themes and areas that are generally covered to a lesser degree by academia.

In the 2019 Conference, the papers predominantly reflected the ongoing developments in the region: The change in the American policy towards Afghanistan, and by extension towards the region as a whole, and the closer economic integration of Pakistan and China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and what that would mean for the region. Other papers during the same conference focused on the Pakistan-Afghan relations, the issues in border management and the influence of global public perception on the developments in the region.

In the Conference held in 2020, participating scholars focused on more disparate themes. Dr Sehrish Qayyum in her paper “Coordinated Border Management (CBM); A Sentinel Approach to Contain Asymmetric Warfare After Fencing at Pakistan - Afghanistan Border” discusses Pak-Afghan Border Management that has become a nightmare due to two decades of long war and conflict. The article explains Max Diff analysis (mathematical theory with specific assumptions) and gives solutions by supporting Coordinated Border Management (CBM) to curb the menace of asymmetric warfare as sentry approach to be practiced form on both sides of the borderline.

Dr. Irfan Mahsud’s work is on “Militant Demobilization and Reintegration in the Pashtun Belt of Pakistan”. He argues that demobilisation and reintegration of convicted/captured militants/terrorists is a sensitive and complex process. Demobilization is a formal and controlled discharge of militants from active militancy or militant groups, while reintegration is a process through which a militant acquires civilian status, employment, and sustainable income.

Abdul Basit in his paper “Implications of Possible US Withdrawal from Afghanistan on the South Asian Militant Landscape” discusses the ongoing Afghan peace process and the expected US exit from Afghanistan. He is of the opinion that the local and regional militant trends in South Asia are likely to be reinvigorated, while global Jihadism will be weakened. Consequently, it is less likely that despite the expected chaos and volatility, a post-US Afghanistan would once again become the epicentre of global Jihadism.

Mujtaba Ali Isani's work on "The Afghan Endgame: Prospects and Challenges for US-Pakistan Relations", discusses that the Afghan endgame seems yet so close but yet so far. After almost two decades of war, all sides concerned hope that some settlement can be reached. Afghanistan has defined US-Pakistan relations even pre-9/11. He argued that for the past three decades US-Pakistan relations have been primarily shaped by the situation in Afghanistan.

Bakht Noor, discusses "The State Building in Balochistan: Legitimacy and State Society Relations". His paper addressed that many, if not most, post-colonial states are still in the process of state-building. The state is relatively a modern idea to Muslim societies. This unfamiliarity with the idea of the state has given birth to ideological debates as well as political confrontations, between the state and society. Importantly, state has sought help from a wide range of concepts – divine and worldly – to 'legitimize its legitimacy'. In countries like Pakistan, its monopoly over tools and use of violence is a dominant theme of state-crafting.

Dr. Noreen Naseer

Dr. Aamer Raza

Development Conundrum: Horizontal Inequalities and Unending Conflict on the Pashtun Borderland.

Asif Iqbal Dawar¹

Abstract

In the past two decades, several studies have highlighted the ideological and political causes of the conflict in Pakistan tribal areas; however, none of the academic studies investigates the socio-economic origins of the conflict in the region. The purpose of this paper is to highlight: how has the persistent inequalities and insecurities made the local community susceptible to the conflict in the region? The study finds that non-state actors instrumentalized the persistent inequalities in mobilizing poor strata for conflict, which in turn caused further insecurities and vulnerabilities to the local communities. Improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the people is inevitable. New development initiatives in the post-merger scenario are a good omen. However, a conscious pursuit focusing on ‘human security’ (freedom from want) through ‘People perception and experience’ is needed for capacity building of the local communities to become strong enough to be influenced by violent or extremist ideologies or exploited by violent elements. Social inclusion through state interventions at the grass-root level is equally imperative for peacebuilding and sustainable socio-economic equality and stability in the region.

Keywords: Horizontal inequalities, Conflict, Militants, Marginalization, Human security, Development.

Introduction

Historically, tribal areas of Pakistan (after merger it is referred as Newly Merged Tribal Districts) have been, and they continue to be, both an enigma and a dilemma (Wazir, 2011). The region remained a gate-way for invaders rather than an integrated part of the sultanate or kingdom of India, Persia, or Afghanistan (A. Khan, 2005). For centuries, the area has been used as a crossroad for dynasties such as the Aryans, Mughals, Persians, Turks, and Durranis. The invaders temporarily enlisted their support or neutrality for heading to the

¹ Asif Iqbal Dawar is currently a Ph.D. research scholar in development studies at the Lisbon school of economics and management, University of Lisbon, Portugal.

estimated achievement: occupying the jewels of mainland India. The inhabitants were in return paid for providing safe-passage through their areas and in case of rendering military support to the invaders for achieving the goals. The area remained a swinging pendulum between the subsequent power - wielders in the broader context of the sub-continent (Ullah, 2014).

Owing to its unique geographical location, its inhabitants have often witnessed militancy. The region served as a hub for jihadis activities during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979) and has become an epicentre of the global War on Terror. Post 9/11, the US attacks on Afghanistan pushed hard-core militants into Pakistan's tribal areas though the long porous border called Durand Line. Militants established base camps in the rugged mountainous region and operationalized these bases for recruitment as well as an armed resistance against the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. To destroy the network of militants and expel them from the region, Pakistan's security forces launched full-scale military operations which flared up an intense conflict in the region. The post 9/11 conflict has severely damaged local infrastructure, businesses, income generation sources, agricultural land, and other opportunities of livelihood.

Various conflicts related perspectives are competing to explain the reasons of the prolonged and un-ending conflict in the tribal areas. The most academic studies conducted so far, explain the conflict as a religious struggle of the Afghan Taliban against the US occupation by linking it with Primordialists or clash of civilization theory (Cheema, 2008; Qazi, 2011; Rana, 2009). Others see religion through instrumentalist lenses as a mobilizing tool for gaining political objectives (Rashid, 2009). On the other hand, the local perspective competes to explain the conflict in the region as a geopolitical history and strategic depth policy of Pakistan in the region (Ghufran, 2009; Siddique, 2014; Taj, 2011). These arguments have valid reasons in explaining the causes of the conflict in the region, but none of the academic studies answered: how persistent horizontal insecurities made the locals susceptible to militants' indoctrination? What does security means to tribal areas? And what is the 'rights-based approach' to address the insecurities and vulnerabilities of the local community? The paper begins by highlighting the theoretical paradigm followed by the

historical context of tribal areas. In the end, the paper addresses the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict in tribal areas and the way forward in the post-merger scenario.

Horizontal inequalities and conflict

Human inequalities and insecurities as a cause of conflict have been debated a lot in a conflict and development discourse. Stewart forwarded a theory of ‘horizontal inequalities’ linking conflict with inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions between culturally defined groups (Stewart, 2005, 2008). Drawing his experiences based on empirical evidences from Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland among others, Stewart argues that less horizontal inequalities reduce the chances of conflict, while pervasive horizontal inequalities locked the societies into an un-ending conflict (Stewart, Brown, & Mancini, 2005). Cramer maintains that inequality is correlated with a greater incidence of political instability which makes the ground favourable for full-blown organized violence (Cramer, 2003). Similarly, a quantitative research work carried out by Murshed and Gates in 75 districts of Nepal concludes that persistent horizontal inequalities based on ethnic and cast dimension is a driving force and is highly relevant in explaining the Nepalese civil war (Murshed & Gates, 2005).

Sen defines conflict in terms of ‘under-development’ where he elucidated several examples from history victim countries like Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia where inequalities and insecurities provoked “bloody rebellion” or violence in the societies (Sen, 2008: 7). According to him, these “factors provide an adequate understanding of the causation of widespread violence and the absence of societal peace” (Sen, 2008: 15). Ban Ki-Moon has expressed a similar opinion, Countries that have poor socio- and economic conditions with no sufficient job opportunities for youth are at high risk of conflict (Moon, 2011). Paris argues “inequality between the impoverished majority and the affluent minority has been the most important cause of conflict” (Paris, 2004: 113). However, on the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (1999; 1998) define greed as a key driver of conflict for gaining economic opportunities that motivate the armed rebellion to adopt a path of violence. They argue that combatants perform a cost-benefit analysis and take up arms when fighting will better their situations (ibid).

Several research studies have also highlighted the connection between horizontal inequalities and conflict. According to the World Bank (2011: 73) report, “high unemployment youth can all exacerbate the risk of conflict in a country”. The report further writes that countries that are affected by conflict face a two-way relationship between poverty and underdevelopment – pervasive inequalities make societies more vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict creates more poverty (ibid). According to a Department For International Development report, inequalities in society create fertile conditions for conflict and the people are more vulnerable to the appeal of a violent group or to become part of the violence (DFID, 2005). According to the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) findings reviewed by Stewart, “empirical analysis across countries, for 1986–2003, reveals a significant rise in the probability of conflict in countries with severe economic and socio-horizontal inequalities” (Stewart, 2010: 9).

Cederman took the debate a step further by answering how inequalities, insecurities, under-development turned into grievances that led into violence? He explains four steps with the identification of in-group and out-group which led to the evaluation of injustices and finally to framing and blaming (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). In-group substantiates the inequalities into blame games which result in mobilization against other group or state repression, in a certain situation, there are more possibilities of conflict and justification of violence. Inequalities conundrum of in-group and out-group not only result in violence but also led to the construction of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) for achieving certain motives. The stereotype of the outgroup makes it easy in mobilizing in-group support for war and construct political identities against the adversaries. The inequalities are then turned into insecurities which lead to ethnic/group mobilization. This new construction of differences produces ample opportunities for rebel leaders to exploit the people in the name of ideology or ethnicity (Stewart, 2010: 9).

Why tribal area is the way it is (Historical context)

Political inequalities

The system that governed tribal areas, till recent past originates in the British ‘Forward policy’ based on persuasion and pressure. The British promulgated a separate set of

laws for the acephalous self-governing Pashtuns tribes popularly known as Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) (Dawar, 2020). Unique and separate laws were first implemented as “Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation” in 1887, which was further modified in 1899 and finally on 24th April 1901 renamed to ‘Frontier Crimes Regulation’(Nichols, 2014). The British formulated restrained, discretionary, and localized law through which “British norms and institutions could find their place in the remote corners of the empire” (White, 2008: 221). It essentially attempted to codify local customs of the area which would allow the local Jirga and Khasaadars to enforce government writ in the area (Caroe, 1958). The local culture and tradition was incorporated in FCR to make the law acceptable for the people. The area served as a buffer zone and FCR was developed to counter the Pashtun aggression and opposition to British rule. Under FCR, a British appointed political agent who held both judicial and executive powers.

The FCR which was a complex body of Laws comprised seven chapters, sixty-four sections, and three schedules. FCR is alleged to be harsh and notorious for its repressive features against the people of the tribal areas. Maria Hayat argues that “FCR was tailor-made to tame the tribesmen: it did away with the need for measures such as habeas corpus, allowed arrests on mere suspicion, authorized collective punishment and mass arrests, and restricted the movements and activities of the tribes” (Hayat, 2009: 187). FCR gave enormous power to political agents. Under FCR, a political agent could put anyone in jail for up to three years and this sentence could be extended if his majesty deemed it so. Moreover, it permitted collective punishment of a family or tribe for crimes of individuals. Under the clause of “collective responsibility,” “an entire tribe or sub-tribe could be held accountable for the actions of a single wrong doer” (S. Khan, 2011: 36).

Under section (21, 22), a political agent could stop the people of the tribal areas entering into settled districts. It articulates: “debar all or any member of the tribe from all access into British India...” The political agent could seize the property of an individual or a tribe and send the person to jail for three years by using his discretionary powers. In addition, he could demolish buildings and houses of even distant relatives or people belonging to the sub-tribe of the criminal and could impose a heavy fine on them. In case of failure of the tribe to present the suspect, the political agent could stop all the incentives and salaries of all

government officials belonging to that tribe. The decision of the political agent could not be challenged before any court of law. Neither the criminal procedure code (Cr.P.C) nor the civil procedure code (C.P.C) or the law of evidence was applicable. There is a famous local axiom that “It is a law of no Wakeel (Lawyer), no Dalil (justification) and no Appeal”. Owing to its strict punishment and the violation of human rights, Frontier Crime Regulation was known as Black or Draconian law.

After the British departure in 1947, Pakistan endorsed all the old treaties and pacts signed between the British Government of India and tribesmen (Shah, 2012). Quid-e-Azam, the founder of Pakistan, assured the leaders of the tribal belt that the government will continue all grants and allowances provided to them by the British government and that their status will remain unchanged. Upon confirmation of the continuance of the status quo in November 1947, through an open Jirga organized by Sir George Cunningham, the tribal leaders affirmed their loyalty to Pakistan (Shah, 2012). On 17th April 1948, Quid-e- Azam, in his speech to tribal Jirga said: “... Pakistan has no desire to interfere and temper unduly with your internal freedom, your allowances and Khasadari that you had in the past and presently you are receiving should continue. Neither any government nor I have any desire to modify the existing arrangement except in consultation with you so long as you remain loyal and faithful to Pakistan...” (Shah, 2012).

Socio-economic inequalities

In the past 67 years, the Pakistani government paid little attention to the development of tribal areas. The region remains the poorest and least developed part of Pakistan with per capita income of approximately \$250 (Demkiv, 2009; PCNA, 2010) and about 60% of households are living below the poverty line (ICG, 2006). The government’s development allocation was a mere \$11.30 per capita, compared to the national annual average of \$25.55 (P&DD, 2009a). Due to the lack of livelihood opportunities, most of the youth are working in the Gulf States. According to a Post Crises Need Annual Report, “24.4 percent of the employed population is employed outside the country, 29.5 percent in another province and 10.3 percent in another district or agency” (PCNA, 2010: 23). The rural economy is chiefly pastoral, with agriculture practiced in a few fertile valleys. Less than 10 percent of the land is

arable. Out of approximately 450,790 arable hectares, only 184,825 hectares are irrigated. “44 percent is irrigated and the rest of land is dependent upon rainwater. Water for irrigation is provided through community-built canals and irrigation networks. In some areas, the irrigation systems no longer function” (P&DD, 2006: 9).

Medical care is also limited: The population per doctor ratio is six times that of the rest of the country and the population per hospital bed is 50 percent higher (Sammon, 2008). According to the ex-FATA Secretariat there is only one doctor for every 7,670 persons in the ex-FATA, compared to 1,226 persons for every doctor in Pakistan (P&DD, 2009a). According to survey results, 58.7 percent of the population do not have access to clean drinking water, including 16.2 percent who use surface water. The highest number of households using surface water for consumption is observed in FR DI Khan (62.8 percent), followed by FR Bannu (49 percent) and South Waziristan (34.8 percent). The people of agencies/FRs are, therefore, greatly exposed to the risk of infectious intestinal diseases (P&DD, 2009b: 21).

The literacy indicators are the lowest in Pakistan. Overall literacy is as low as 17.42 percent compared to 35.41 percent in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 43.92 percent at the national level (P&DD, 2006). According to a report prepared by Shaor Foundation for Education and Awareness (SFEA) referred in (Dawn, 2014) “Literacy rate among females in the tribal areas is alarmingly low and stagnant at a mere 3 percent compared to 29.95 percent of the male. It is said that 14.7 percent of girls between 3 and 13 years of age had never been enrolled in any school. The overall enrolment stood at 27 percent for girls as compared to 73 percent for boys. A subsequent decrease was observed in the transition of female students from primary to higher secondary levels from 27 percent to 13 percent – the lowest in the country. Factors hampering the process of education are: inaccessibility to schools, poor quality of education, ghost schools, lack of proper funds, and conservative traditions prevalent in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Horizontal inequalities and conflict in tribal areas

A long period of pervasive inequalities and underdevelopment makes societies vulnerable to violent conflict (Sen, 2008; Stewart, 2000, 2010). It creates fertile conditions

for conflict and local communities are more vulnerable to the slogans and appeal of a violent group or to become part of the violence (DFID, 2005). Pakistan's tribal areas are faced with the same situation, circumstances, and consequences. Tribal areas are one of the poorest and disfranchised parts of Pakistan. The strife that keeps the tribal belt underdeveloped has various dimensions but the root cause can be found in the persistent negligence on the part of the government with regard to development in the tribal areas. Ab-initio, the region was left as a 'no man's land' where the people were left unattended and ungoverned. The unequal distribution of economic resources, weak social sector development, and unique political status has, over the years, fuelled a sense of alienation in tribal Pashtuns. The most unjust and discriminatory treatment meted out to the tribal people was that the government of Pakistan deprived the tribal area of its share in the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award since its commencement. This award is being distributed among the federating units, i.e. the four provinces minus tribal area. The share of each province is fixed on the basis of its population. This sense of alienation is being instrumentalized by non-state actors to promote their specific agendas in the tribal areas in particular and the rest of Pakistan in general.

Consequently, in post 9/11, the propaganda of non-state actors against Pakistan and across border in Afghanistan made the poor and un-employed youth susceptible to the indoctrination of militant ideologies. Foreign militants both during the Afghan Jihad and thereafter found a great potential of recruitment among the unemployed youth (Rashid, 2009; Siddique, 2014; Taj, 2011). These unemployed youth were exploited in the name of Jihad by non-state actors for their hidden agendas. The non-availability of jobs and better economic opportunities and conducive social environment, youths with poor and vulnerable backgrounds fell victim to the surging waves of militancy both across the border and inside the country (ICG, 2006). These innocent and immature youth were used as suicide bombers for indiscriminate killings in tribal region, Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The militants justified their brutalities such as beheadings of security forces, local population, suicide bombings, and sectarianism in the name of Islam. Ahmad Rashid argues that militants are not keen on the imposition of Sharia, rather their primary purpose was to use the slogan of jihad to attract youth for new recruitments and collect funds (Rashid, 2009).

The preaching of the local Mullahs (religious clerics) through pro-militant sermons influenced the people of the ex-FATA. The weak and powerless, with low social and economic status in the society joined the militancy because these individuals had no other opportunity to gain power, money and to influence the formerly powerful individuals in the local communities, for example, the Maliks and other notable tribal elders (Shakirullah, Nawab, Nyborg, & Elahi, 2020). The poor having no opportunity of livelihoods resulted in a large army of radicalized youth without any employment skills except to involve in unlawful activities when the opportunity arose. Moreover, the power of the village Mullah grew where the local, traditional leaders lost their power in the tribal society. Over the years, the mullah took on an enhanced political role in the tribal community and gradually became more powerful than the Malik. With new resources and status, the local religious figures were able to emerge as prominent leaders of the tribal society. They assumed all powers the Maliks previously held and solidified their financial roles in each agency.

Moreover, economic stress not only boosts militancy but also engagement in illicit livelihoods, including drug, arms trafficking, and other criminal activities. With few opportunities, most families have to work in the informal sector and sometimes their young male souls get trapped by the local criminal networks. Poppy cultivation is though effectively discouraged in the tribal areas on religious grounds; the same is the only promising mean of survival in the border regions of Afghanistan. Due to the overflow of arms in the wake of the US-backed Afghan Jihad against USSR, new arms markets were set up in tribal areas. The arms were sold openly in these markets. Arms-selling became a lucrative and profitable business. Security analyst Khalid Aziz argues that around \$ 66 billion worth of weapons were introduced into Afghanistan and tribal areas during the period of 1978 -1992 (Aziz, 2006).

In the past government formulated several development plans for the uplift of tribal areas, but failed to achieve the desired outcome. For example in 2003-04 economic reforms were introduced. The industries of ex-FATA are exempted from tax to promote industrial development in the region. With the assistance of the US, FATA Reconstruction Opportunities Zone (ROZ) was announced. But up till now, no concrete measures have been taken for the establishment of ROZ in tribal areas. In 2006, a sustainable development plan

2006-2015 of \$ 2.46 billion was introduced with five years' actual development followed by four years consolidating development to improve the socio-economic conditions of ex-FATA region with a specific focus on education (Planning & Development Division: 2009). In 2010, the US pledged \$750 million to support infrastructure, health, education, job creation, and other economic projects in tribal areas. All these plans remained on paper with no actual implementation at the ground level.

In the post 9/11 era, militant violence, US drone attacks, military operations, frequent curfews, indiscriminate suicide bombings, and heavy shelling by the security forces has further aggravated the living conditions of its inhabitants. The outcome of the conflict has created huge repercussions on local households and their livelihood. The decade's long conflict has severely damaged the infrastructure, income sources, agricultural land, and other opportunities for sustainability. Livestock ownership has extensively reduced due to the loss of cattle during the military operations and displacement of the local population. Agriculture production has also suffered huge damages and losses. All these new developments have inflicted more pressure on the local communities. As a result due to the non-availability of livelihoods, the conflict has limited the access of households to employment and income generation thus increasing the level of instability. Consequently, the loss of livelihood activities in the region has added to the long-standing inequalities, vulnerabilities entailing future insecurities.

Human security in the post-merger scenario

The government of Pakistan has acknowledged the importance of socio-economic development in the post-Zarb-e Azb (Pakistan military's operation in the tribal areas against the extremists) period to overcome the sense of alienation of the people of tribal areas. Recently, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed an amendment, which abolished the Frontier Crime Regulations and merged the tribal areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa known as "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Merged Merged Tribal Districts". Now the people of tribal areas would be able to have access to the formal judicial system of the country. They would be no more deprived of '*wakeel, dalil and appeal*'. The Amendment has also proposed construction of major infrastructure, irrigation system, mineral development, integrated health, education,

and vocational training and special incentives, intending to bring the tribal areas at par with the rest of the country based on all major economic and social indicators. The government allocated 3 percent of NFC shares approximately Rs100 billion of the divisible pool for the implementation of the 10-year plan. Indeed, these are positive steps to eradicate the deprivation of tribal areas but the question arises: what does security means to tribal people? And what is the 'rights-based approach' to address the insecurities and vulnerabilities of the local community? These questions of security prospects need to be recognized and address as a conflict resolution process for sustainable peace and development in the region.

The task of development should first eliminate the distrust between the state and society in tribal areas. Sincere and meaningful interaction, association, and coordination will help in promoting mutual understanding, cooperation, and trust between the state and tribal people. This, in turn, will offer an environment conducive for development, peace, and stability in the region. The traditional conception of peace, focusing on military power merely promotes negative security, which is neither acceptable nor sustainable in the long term. Examples from history show that this approach did not materialize in bringing a self-sustaining peace in places like Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Liberia. The state-centered peace-building projects are often characterized and backed by external actors and lack indigenous legitimacy. The external led development and peace initiatives lack the inter-subjective understandings, produce more tensions, and in certain conditions generate more grievances on the top of the older grievances. In contrast, the community-led development and peace-building initiatives, the top-down approach of development has raised concerns about the sustainability of development and peace-building projects.

A conscious pursuit requires focusing on 'human security' (freedom from want) through 'quotidian practice of everyday security' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2015: 1185) focusing on 'People perception and experience' to build the capacities and capabilities of the local communities to become non-violent in character'. Importantly, human security addresses the prospects of a sustainable livelihood, access to resources, and participation of the local communities in the decision-making process. Stability in tribal areas requires 'material wellbeing' to address the grievances of individuals and provide space in identifying their vulnerabilities in a specific context to build trust by winning 'hearts and minds' of non-

dominant conflict-ridden local communities (De Coning, 2013; Hoogensen, 2012; Schirch, 2013). The end of the conflict should not be understood in the negative sense of eliminating threats but in the positive sense of creating material conditions, which provide people with basic economic security and vital capabilities to all persons equally. In tribal areas, ‘true security’ requires more than an absence of threat but survival plus to provide more space to the individuals to make their choices freely without physical constraints.

The new development interventions in the post-merger scenario need to be context-sensitive. Context determines the parameters or boundaries of what is, or is not a part of the security dynamics at the time and place (Hoogensen, 2012; Ware, 2011). Human security stresses on context-specific approach prioritizing local needs and promoting participatory multi-sectorial comprehensive development within the local dynamics of the region. The local community within a given context are most capable of arguing for or against a perception of security or insecurity within that context. It helps the external donors as well as the national governments in prioritizing the exact need, decision making, and implementation of development interventions. Identification of local communities’ priorities in volatile situations gives them a sense of ownership, which in turn provides a solid foundation for development and peace-building (De Coning, 2013; Schirch, 2013).

The discussion takes us to ask some elementary questions about how to make people safe and secure in their daily lives, in their homes and streets, within their communities, and in their regions. Therefore, it is crucial to know how practices of security implemented by the state are experienced by different people and groups ‘on the ground’ so to speak, and how they are implicated in, forged through and find expression via quotidian aspects of social life (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2015). People's perceptions and experiences, thereby, provide a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of security, which demands more attention to the marginalized groups and considers ordinary routines and practices that people engage to manage their security (ibid). The community is, therefore, deemed not to be the source of agency in terms of diagnosis and critical action, but rather a circumscribed locus within which lie both the source and solution to violence. Participation of indigenous conflict affected tribal peoples in all levels of interventions is essential for restoring peace, dignity and developing trust in transformation.

Conclusion

In the colonialist discourse, the tribal region was used as a buffer zone for testing colonial rivalries. To ensure the security of settled districts and contain Russia's expansion towards the east, the British government of India devised a strategy for the tribal areas based on coercion and rewards. The region came under the control of British India followed by the cacophony and vacillation either to permanently retain it or abandon it. Keeping in view the broader political discourse in terms of space & time, things like rent and fare, skirmishes for repelling and subduing frequently took place. What the enigmatic question is that the region and its people could not become an active part of two separate political systems: in the east of India and to west Afghanistan. Thus the region remained as a 'no man's land' where people lived in total isolation on a self-sustainable basis. And that sense of alienation can be felt in the present-day conflict in the region.

After independence from the British Raj, Pakistan retained the same status of the tribal areas with no changes. The region was left politically orphaned, physically isolated and financially deprived of socio-economic development. This region has remained neglected for about two centuries and remains the most oppressed and deserted part of the country. The British Raj and Pakistan did not bother to take into account the integration of the tribal belt into their respective political systems. Moreover, different states in the past frequently utilized them in the violent ventures against the other for their grand strategic designs which left an indelible impact on the psyche of generations of the tribes. The persistent marginalization and deprivation of its inhabitants with extreme poverty, poor health facilities, and lack of education made the population vulnerable to extremist tendencies.

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The Borders that Cross People: Differentiating Between The Pashtuns of Afghanistan and The Pashtuns of Pakistan

Prof. Dr. Mujtaba Ali Isani²

Introduction

“Between Pakistan and Afghanistan the borders cross people rather than the people crossing borders.” Asfandyar Wali Khan (Interview by myself conducted in 2011). If this statement made by the leader of one of Pakistan’s largest Pashtun party is true then, why do Pashtuns in Pakistan display significantly democratic satisfaction than Pashtuns in Afghanistan? Although there is a general dearth of data on attitudes towards democracy in the region, a recent survey by the Asia Foundation in 2018 and data from the Brookings Institution show that that indeed Pashtuns in both countries significantly differ in their political behavior. This paper treats the drawing of post-colonial borders as a natural experiment which randomly assigns a different national context. Hence reasons that the differing national context which includes different foreign influences and different population sizes with respect to the majority causes this different political behaviour.

Theory and Literature Review

The Pashtuns are an ethnic group residing on both sides of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, they form a majority in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and they are present in significant minorities in the province of Baluchistan, Sindh and the Punjab. Overall, they account for 15% of the population of the country (Yousaf, 2019).

In the country of Afghanistan, Pashtuns form at least a plurality with estimates suggesting that they are 40 to 60 percent of the population. Stereotyped by the British as warrior-like and violent, the Pashtun were known as people following a tribal lifestyle with a code of living called the Pashtunwali which allows them to maintain affairs between and within the different tribes without the need for state government. This need for ferocious independency and governing law without state authority has been part of the Pashtun since centuries and recent examples can be found in the failed attempts of the British to colonize the area inhabited by the Pashtuns (Benson & Siddiqui, 2014).

Thus, when it comes to resisting anyone that tries to claim control over the Pashtun, of today, is the same as that of a millennium ago. When the British saw that

² He is serving in the King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals

their attempts to control Pashtuns were proving futile (the tribes went as far as uniting with each other, keeping any enmity, aside to crush any attempts of subjugation by any outsider), they introduced the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) in which a political agent known as the Malik communicated with the elders of the tribes help the government conduct external relations and presumably, exercise some extent of control over the Pashtun whilst leaving the daily internal issues to be solved through Pashtunwali. This system of the FCR was followed by the subsequent governments of Pakistan in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area i.e. the area inhabited by the Pashtun tribes) now communicated through by the governor of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Benson & Siddiqui, 2014; Siddique 2014).

According to the US Institute of Peace (2006), some urban-dwelling Afghani Pashtuns are literate while most reside in rural areas and are illiterate. They are identified by their tribal lineage and cohere to their tribal and religious laws. But as they went through the anti-Soviet jihad war in the 1980s, civil disturbance in the 1990s and challenges to power by smaller ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Pashtun political mindset took a turn to restore their supremacy in the central government establishing the base of an ethnic state. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the government chose a different pathway. In a bid to keep influence over the Pashtuns in Pakistan, Pakistan's carved out personal networking with the leaders of the Pashtun tribes. It subsidizes some regional Pashtun political figures of which some are opposed to the central government and endorses the Pashtun claims that they are at a disadvantage when it comes to their part of distribution in government offices and development funds.

Pashtuns in Afghanistan have a sense of dominancy. They believe it is their right to be ruling Afghanistan (Riphenburg, 2005). Other than the Pashtuns there are three other major ethnic groups: Hazaras, the Panjshiri Tajiks, and the Uzbeks. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Pashtun tribe Durrani rose to power and their strengthening control over the society, as well as the state, often proved detrimental to the other ethnic groups. But to every rise, there is a fall. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1979 and then the succeeding civil war, state-society relations were in turmoil and presented the ethnic groups with an opportunity to cause resistance against Pashtun dominance and this gave them the liberty to establish economic and political independence from the, as well as the state government. As a result, the central government came under command of the mostly Tajik Jami'at-I Islami party between 1992 to 1996. This proved to be unacceptable and almost illegitimate for the Pashtuns who sought help from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which led to

the rise and rule of the Taliban between 1996 and 2001 and were primarily Pashtun fundamentalists. Post-2001, things started going more towards a democratic approach albeit not without shortcomings. King Zahir Shah inaugurated the Emergency Loya Jirga system in hopes of establishing a fair and legitimate government. It placed Hamid Karzai as interim president until 2004 when general elections were expected to take place. Hamid Karzai belonged to the ethnic Pashtun tribe of Popalzai and was a tribal leader. But taking the seat as president he realized that he found it difficult to handle problems relating to the Cabinet. Not only did the Shura-i Nazar-I Shamali (Supervisory Council of the North) comprising mainly of the Tajiks predominate the Cabinet but they also controlled the power ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and defense. The implementation of the Emergency Loya Jirga made the Shura-i Nazar more powerful and they won a monopoly over the institutions of security that is the army, police and intelligence services. This created resentment amongst the Pashtuns as they bristled against the rising political power of non-Pashtun tribes in the government. On top of that, Karzai came under pressure from the Shura-i Nazar during the Loya Jirga and did not take consultation of his fellow Pashtuns and went on to impose it through the legitimacy given to him by a landslide vote. This led the Pashtun to infer that Karzai had betrayed his ethnicity and fellow Pashtuns especially when they were looking to find favor and regain lost influence in return of their support of the King Zahir who they expected to head the Transitional Administration. King Zahir's unceremonious removal from the candidacy under the influence of the US special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad widened the gap between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns who perceived this notion as an attempt to establish an Interim Authority dominated by the Panjshiri Tajiks even though the Finance Ministry was under the control of the Pashtuns, which balanced out the control of power for both the Tajiks and Pashtuns (Riphenburg, 2005).

A jirga is an indigenous mechanism that resolves any conflict among the Pashtun be it family feuds or a matter of local or national security. This is a system that they are more comfortable with and rely on it for their welfare rather than that of the democratic state system. It is not only widely accepted but is now a legitimate way of solving conflicts among the Pashtuns at both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistani and Afghani governments have taken initiatives to recognize the Jirga system to a state level. Pakistan released the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

bill in 2016 while the CEO of the Afghan Unity Government, Abdullah Abdullah, set for a Grand Jirga or otherwise known as the Loya Jirga to seek proposals for amendments to the constitution to decentralize power.

This proves the point of the presence of ethnic bias in Afghanistan. As Riphenburg (2005) pointed out, the representation and presence of the Pashtun is a necessity in the political process or the country will face instability. An example of this would be the fragility of the government under the rule of President Hamid Karzai. The Pashtun contribute to the majority of the population and they are based on the more strategic part of the country namely the south and east of Afghanistan. If their rational ethnic and political representation issues will not be addressed, then it's unlikely that Afghanistan will get to see a legitimate and stable government. According to the International Crisis Group, Afghani Pashtuns started losing interest in the political process set up by the US government to re-establish Afghanistan as a state (Bonn Agreement) when they saw unfavourable political circumstances in the form of loss of power from the centre. Moreover, Pashtun commanders were fragmented in the south and east with limited support bases which made them feel leaderless and lost. This ethnic bias is also found in Afghan history during the monarchy period and before the Soviet invasion. The army consisted of a majority of Pashtuns, a small number of Tajiks and other minorities. To reduce the predominance of the Pashtun officers in the army, a reform was created in 1963 to recruit army officers on a quota in proportion to their share in the population. This caused the problem of insecurity and fragmentation of the Pashtuns as many of them were powerful local figures who held the authority to interfere in commerce by controlling the trade routes from their areas and using them according to their business interests. Sometimes some of them would put up a façade of abiding by state law for example by allowing police officials and a judicial court to be set up but in reality, they hold the reins of these institutions and practice extortion as needed.

Connecting social effects with politics, warlords seem to have a huge hand in running the Afghan society and government (Riphenburg, 2005). To be precise, prolonged war conditions have benefitted commanders/warlords to control power and practice politics through economic means. Inducing perpetual low-level conflicts aids warlords in maintaining power at the cost of instability. The idea was further promoted when the country was forced to subordinate into becoming a contemporary state system. Power from warlords is currently spread over regional or sub-regional areas. Their conformity to law lies in their tribal affiliations where an ethnic commander is supported on the basis of their contribution to the tribe. They can also send aid to other areas where ethnic tribesmen reside by securing a place in the local government. Thus we see the impact on the Pashtun warlords and their actions on the collapse of the government which had left a security and political vacuum which the Pashtun warlords used as an opportunity to gather tribal support and in doing so, they worsened the divisions and conditions over the most vulnerable groups that are the sub-ethnic minorities. For example, people from the Ghilzai tribe who live in areas dominated primarily by the Durrani tribe find themselves being targets of discrimination by local warlords who exercise harassment on them for example seizure of property or the permission to only employ workers from the Durrani tribe if the farmers are from Ghilzai tribe (to support employment for their own tribesmen) (Riphenburg, 2005).

According to Bezhan (2017), Afghani politics did not and does not always rally behind religion. Some individuals were also in support of democracy after the world war and their reason was nationalism and constitutionalism. For this reason, a party called the Awaken Youth Party (AYP) was established earning support and approval from the educated intellectuals at that time that is in the 1940s. Of course, they faced resentment from the religious institutions because they believed that the ideology that should be followed must be from Islam only and the constitution from the Islamic holy book of Quran. The AYP believed that factions within Islam such as Sunni and Shi'i divided the people and the superstitious clergymen prevented advanced growth in sociopolitical as well as modern scientific and technological development. It inspired and attracted young intellectuals, the ruling elite, young members of the Musahiban royal family as well as Pashtun nationalists. To attract the Pashtun nationalists, the AYP formed one of its ideologies to be to promote the Pashto language. And they were believed in by the Pashtun nationalists because many of the party members were educated and held top positions in the government's cultural institutions and all of this seemed less severe than the dynamics of politics since it was something most

people were comfortable with. The AYP aimed to reform the Pashtun tribal ways through social and cultural practices so they do not keep clinging to political forces. In the process of putting kings on the throne, the Pashtuns were creating internal conflicts by forming rivalries and religious differences for their own privileges where the leaders reaped the benefits and the common civilian did not. This unknowingly prevented society from uniting and working together for the betterment of the country. Soon people from the elite class, mid-ranking business owners, landlords, urban traders, Pashtun nationalists and personnel from the military and government began joining in. The first step to AYP's journey was to promote constitutional advocacy and draw secular laws. Their other demands were to spread modern education and end all privileges coming through tribal, religious and family names as that was what prevented equal rights to common citizens while the power lay in the hands of the tribal/religious chiefs and leaders. The AYP promoted Pashtun nationalism because they were from Pashtun roots themselves and they planned to keep Pashtunwali as their code of law but reforming it with a new set of ethics and believed that it would help in nation-building. Their aims proved to be alarming for the non-Pashtuns who thought that with the government supporting Pashtun nationalism (in a bid to find political means to an end) would not end their discriminatory policies towards the minorities. Through the later years, the AYP earned in successfully spreading their ideologies through different platforms such as newspapers, public demonstrations and ceremonies and became socially prominent despite facing active competition from traditional and/or religious leaders. Through this matter, the religious and traditional leaders also learned to organize themselves and open a new gateway to the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan.

When it comes to political attitudes of Pashtuns residing in Pakistan, scholars have conflicting views. But one view is established that since the tribes on both sides have lived and interacted with one another for centuries, they follow the same law of Pashtunwali. It is the circumstances their respective countries put them through which measures the nature of their reaction. Marten (2008) criticizes Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason on their article "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier where she accuses them of "cultural reductionism (Marten, 2008, p. 180)" and pointing out errors, she believes they made in their study. Marten says that the study made by Johnson and Mason (2008) believed Pashtunwali to be the only form of running politics and there was no flexibility allowed in it, that they misapprehended the role of the Maliks in the governance of FATA and did not take it into consideration that today the sources of support for Islamic

religious leaders (mullahs) are different than those in the British Empire. She believes that Pashtun reactions and thoughts to circumstances are an effect from socioeconomic reasons as well as under pressure from political parties seeking monetary gains as well as popularity. Apart from the contribution to the economy for example in the trucking and construction businesses, they incorporate well into and dominate politics at provincial and national levels in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan where they are concentrated than even from the FATA regions. Not only that, they believe and support universal suffrage. Marten expresses her disapproval over the Pashtun portrayal of looking at things in a different way. For example, they see the corrupting influence of Mullahs to misguide Lashkars (temporary militias) into uprisings. Previously, the mullahs were not financially strong surviving on alms and patronage from the tribal leaders so it would have served them no purpose to meddle with political matters. In fact, Maliks and mullahs supported each other's decisions. But today's mullahs were funded by outsiders to assassinate Maliks, reinforce terrorism and an unpopular form of Sharia law in the tribal areas. To remove these radicals, the Pashtuns turned to the democratic state institution and voted out Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal party alliance, which consisted of several more of the radical mullahs, however in 2008 as they were unable to provide physical security and economic development to the public.

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason published their reply in the same article of "Misunderstanding Pakistan's FATA? They replied that the economics of the Pashtuns was not the concern of their study but rather their political behaviour still present in the tribal areas. They acknowledge the idea that real politics is demonstrated at the local level where civilians are loyal to a unanimous group for reasons of protection, patronage, economic benefits, and various other purposes and will support their political causes. For the Pashtun, maintenance of honour and justice is essential for their identities and is the basis on which they interact with the environment. Johnson and Mason reject Marten's accusation of the implication of cultural reductionism, as well as Pashtunwali, being inflexible. But they admit to the fact that tribal dynamics and politics are not the only reasons of insurgent behaviour associated with the Pashtuns but they believe that Pashtuns have shown a recurring need to do jihad (a fight against enemies of the religion of Islam) as compared to other tribes on the Pakistan and Afghanistan border.

Despite the almost entire control of the Taliban and these corrupted mullahs, Johnson and Mason are hopeful of the re-establishment of the old tribal system to run their own affairs which will keep the Taliban away from controlling borderland. They find that any other readymade model of a political system including that of democracy will not work on the Pashtun and it is vital to let them resume through the power of Pashtunwali as well as forming policies more sensible and compatible with the Pashtun culture which they might actually agree on following (Marten, Johnson & Mason, 2008). To conclude this review, scholars find it difficult to reach any conclusion as it seems to them that the peace of the Pashtun homelands is uncertain. Terrorist attacks whether by the Taliban, the military or the US drones have made the Pashtun civilians the primary victims. When North Atlantic Treaty Organisation pulled out, Afghans were disappointed that they left without caring to establish some peace and stability in the region

Derivation of Main Hypothesis Scholars have long noted that in democracy, a sense of people-hood, a common denominator of “we” is required, to whom the state would properly belong. Although, there are contentions about whether such an identity must emerge before democracy or whether it can come after (Beissinger, 2008, p. 93). For such an identity to emerge, and to form a mutual solidarity, all sections of the population ought to have faith in the electoral process of democracy. Hence, a high level of political participation, including voicing opinions and concerns, higher turnout in elections etc., indicate a high level of satisfaction with democracy.

In this paper, I attempt to unpack the relationship between an ethnic majority population and their satisfaction with democracy (SWD). Whether as a consequence of colonialism, or for more recent years, international migration, ethnic diversity is now a prominent feature of many contemporary democracies. Given the importance of ethnicity in structuring people’s identities, scholars have sought to incorporate ethnicity in their models of people’s political behaviour (Just, 2017). It should be noted that the majority of academic writing on democratization mostly explores the ways in which ethnic feelings spawn radicalism and instability (hence denoting that ethnic identities weaken democracy), and hence, favour civic over ethnic nationalism as the basis for stable democracy. Yet however, as many scholars now recognize, there is no such thing as a state that is perfectly neutral when it comes to culture, and liberal democracies—even when based on civic rather than ethnic principles—are also unavoidably rooted in a dominant cultural idiom (Beissinger, 2008, p. 93).

There are different arguments amongst scholars of political science about factors that determine satisfaction with democracy. Some argue that it is dependent on the representative function of governments (Aarts & Thomassen, 2012) or on the institutional framework of a state (Lijphart, 2012). Others, as Rood (2008) mentions, argue that certain social changes, like a higher educated society or a more politically disillusioned youth, have influenced the levels of democratic satisfaction. Most of these mentioned studies take certain individual factors into consideration, like age, social class or education (Rood, 2008, p. 3). Before I get into the discussion about theories that relate ethnicity with aforementioned parameters of trust in democracy, it is important to understand the very construct and application of the term “ethnicity”, and hence what “majority ethnicity” may actually mean. Although it cannot be embodied in a general theory, ethnicity generally refers to one’s descent and culture (Bessinger, 2008).

The idea that ethnic identity structures people’s political attitudes and behaviour has roots in the social identity theory, which stipulates that, any group is defined in relation to other groups (Just, 2017). For this reason, the Oxford dictionary defines it as “a group within a community which has different national or cultural traditions from the main population” (Rood, 2018, p. 6). In addition, the basic human need to assign order and meaning to the social environment encourages people to differentiate themselves into social groups. These features of individual identity then play a considerable role in shaping people’s political attitudes and behaviours. The majority is not seen as ‘ethnic’. Ethnicity seems to be a label that is either given to a minority group by the majority or used by a minority group to distinguish itself from the majority (Rood, 2018, p. 6). Henceforth, the question of the role of ethnicity in political systems of a homogenous society would not be a fruitful one.

Therefore, most theories on democratic satisfaction and ethnicity are formed in regard to the minorities. However, in contemporary times, in the backdrop of mass immigration to Europe, rise in ethnic right-wing nationalism across different nations in the world (also in part a colonial legacy), many scholars in political science have theorized strong ethnic passions (also manifested by the majority ethnicity) with extreme right-wing ideologies that share, in their view, an instinctive anti-democratic animus and tendency for militarism, intolerance, and violence (Beissinger, 2002, p. 86). It thus becomes a very relevant question to ask what has been theorized about majority ethnicity’s level of satisfaction with the system of democracy. Ethno-nationalism is an important aspect to look at to properly understand this. Research suggests that in general, people tend to vote for people belonging to their same

ethnic group. Ethnicity, in a multi-ethnic state gives a reason for politicians to help mobilize people in their support, and as Jack Snyder argues, democratization exacerbates ethnic violence by tempting politicians to “play the ethnic card” in order to avoid challenges and consolidate their rule (Beissenger, 2008, p. 90). It is also seen that in early stages of democratization, nationalism typically becomes politicized, as elites from ethnic groups make nationalist appeals in their competition for popular support (Brood, 2018, p. 8).

But there is a strong reason for both majority and minority ethnicities to show satisfaction with a democratic system. For example, in an authoritarian system which practices an exclusionary nationalism that favours a minority ethnicity, ethnic mobilization from below by the subordinate majority group (often) becomes a key driver of transition to democratization (Beissenger, 2008, p. 91). Now, there is also evidence to support that ethnic nationalism as practiced by the minority against a “tyranny of the majority”, strengthens the cause for democracy. A strong ethno-nationalist movement can lay the basis for the resurgence of civic life and help to fuel the revival of a civil society that can stand apart from and contain the power of the state, foster knowledge of public issues, and so on (Beissenger, 2008, p. 94).

Tying back these arguments with the paper’s main exploration, research has shown that, in general (i.e. including both majority and minority groups), people who live in a country with proportional electoral representation (for example, a consensus democracy) are more satisfied with democracy than people who live in majoritarian systems (Rood, 2018, p. 8). Nevertheless, for the majority ethnicity, there is little to lose in either of the two democratic systems. And reasons seem obvious: the introduction of elections brings the numerically largest ethnic group to power, creating permanent winners and losers (Horowitz and Long, 2006, p. 2). And naturally, democratization in culturally or ethnically plural societies typically faces a “minority problem” and ethnic minorities are potentially amongst the biggest losers in any democratization. Beissinger (2002) also notes, “To be blunt, democracy as such is a numbers game. Majorities rule. Minorities are potentially threatened” (Beissenger, 2008, p. 91).

Following this chain of thought, the majority ethnicity naturally (and potentially) has no threat to their voice, and to their political agency. Democratization hence is a process that empowers ethnic majorities. The record also shows that the more followers a movement mobilizes, the less likely it is to face repression (the primary reason that “oppression” triggers political participation of ethnic minorities towards democracy). Moreover, where a

regime has traditionally favoured a majority ethnic group, democratization is unlikely to pose a threat to the existing order of ethnic stratification (Beissenger, 2008, p. 91). Therefore, in light of the aforementioned theories and argument, it is likely that ethnic majorities in a multi-ethnic democratic system have a high level of satisfaction with democracy. This leads to the following hypothesis:

"Belonging to the Pashtun ethnicity in Pakistan causes more democratic satisfaction than belonging to the Pashtun ethnicity in Afghanistan because in Pakistan, Pashtuns are a minority, while in Afghanistan, Pashtuns are a majority".

Data and Results

For the purpose of analysis and to test the hypothesis, the paper uses a large dataset based on the Asia Foundation's Survey of 2018. Accordingly, the paper studies the relationship of democratic satisfaction (DV) with respondents belonging to the Pashtun identity in Pakistan compared to Afghanistan, using a list of independent variables (IV).

Independent Variables

- Pakistani Pashtun [Pak-Pashtun]: The variable Pak-Pashtun is coded as a dichotomous variable having the value 1 if the person is Pashtun from Pakistan and 0 if the person is a Pashtun from Afghanistan.
- Education [Education]: The level of education of the data's sample population ranges over from no formal schooling [1], primary schooling [2], secondary school [3], high school [4] to university education [5], including those which have had any form of informal education [6]. The data was cleaned and empirically tested to understand the importance of education in promoting democratic values (Development Studies, 2010, p. 1) amongst the Pashtuns. As education plays a vital role in "civic instruction and socialization" (Baviskar & Fran, 2004, p. 9) so most likely, more educated respondents with say, a university level education, should display a greater appreciation for democratic norms.
- Income [income_cont]: In several researches, the relationship between a stabilized democracy and egalitarian income distribution has been demonstrated with reported higher levels of democratic satisfaction in groups with higher incomes (Schafer, p. 2). However, in a case otherwise, the poor income groups too may favour democracy as a means to an end

(Baviskar & Fran, 2004, p. 9). To map out the effect of varying incomes within the Afghan Pashtuns, our study uses income as a list variable [income_cont] over using income responses in ranges to capture data sensitivity.

- Gender [gender]: The data set consists of 45,542 Pashtuns, which composes of 19,334 females [coded as 1] and 26, 208 males [coded as 0]. We have chosen to study and isolate the impact of the ethnicity's gender composition on their support for democracy to account for the probable effect of gendered cultural norms (Inglehart, 2004, p.9) on the DV.
- Access to the internet [info]: In general, access to information is held to be the prime most requisite to democratic satisfaction, enabling active public participation and awareness of human rights (Carter Center, 2004, p. 11). However, those individuals who are unable to access and process relevant information, they seek information shortcuts or heuristics to infer how choices they make satisfy their self-interests.
- Age [Age]: Age is known to potentially influence democracy-related conceptualizations, where the older population, having witnessed first-hand, human rights abuse of democratic regimes, tend to incline towards democracy and its inherent advocacy for human rights (Baviskar & Fran, 2004, p. 10. To this end, the paper analyzes the effect of the age in the chosen data sample, which ranges over 18 to 97 years old.
- Free and fair elections [ffelec]: The binary-coded variable [0= No, 1=Yes] informs our analysis by scaling whether given the definition of what entails 'free and fair elections' and the respondent's vote, does this perception of the electorate system correlate significantly with their democratic satisfaction?

The paper estimates an ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regression test to study the correlations between democratic satisfaction and Pakistan Pashtun identity. This design offers a vital strength whereby the study can analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and how this may change by adding covariates which makes the overall analysis more nuance by taking into account demographic factors and those that the authors consider important to an understanding on democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, the paper estimates ordinary least square regression using interaction terms between the main independent variable and other covariates to expand our analysis by incorporating an understanding of how an interaction of two independent variables correlate with democratic satisfaction. This model also provides more robustness to our analysis and strengthens the study's ability to prove or disprove the hypothesis.

Results and Analysis

An overview of the responses received from Pashtun respondents for the dependent variable question and other independent variable questions show a broad picture of where they stand with regards to the democratic system in the country. For democratic satisfaction, 17.41% of Pashtuns responded very satisfied, 46.8% were somewhat satisfied, 23.0% were somewhat dissatisfied and 12.7% were very dissatisfied. Despite being the largest ethnic group, 57% of Pashtun respondents had received no formal education and only a mere 14.9% had attended high school. Out of the Pashtuns surveyed 57.5% were males and 42.45% females. On the question of whether the respondents believe that the next election will be free and fair, 61.13% of Pashtuns surveyed responded with a Yes, while 38.86% said that they do not believe in the credibility of the next elections being free and fair. With regards to access to the internet, either through cable connection, WiFi or cellular data, 60.75% of Pashtuns surveyed answered No, while 39.2% said that they did have access to the internet. These basic statistics will assist in interpreting the regression analysis as they provide the details that the regression model may not be able to cover. As mentioned earlier, the paper estimated an ordinary least squares regression to discern the correlation between Pak-Pashtun identity and democratic satisfaction. At first only the dependent and main independent variable (Pak-Pashtun) were included in the model and showed a positive coefficient and a p-value of 0.000 thus indicating a significant relationship at the 95% confidence interval. The model below (Table 1) shows that adding covariates of gender, education and age do not alter the correlation between Pak-Pashtun and demsat (democratic stratification), although individually gender and education have negative coefficients for demsat, although this correlation is significant at the 95% confidence interval. Pashtun females have a lower democratic satisfaction and so it could be that male satisfaction in democracy is causing a positive correlation between the IV and DV.

Table: Democratic Satisfaction among the Pashtun Population

Democratic Satisfaction			
Pak-Pashtun	0.05***	(0.01)	
Controls	Gender	-	0.10*** (0.01)
Education	-0.01***	(0.00)	
Age	0.00***	(0.00)	
R-squared	1%		
N	94544		

Source: Asia Foundation (2014), Own calculations, OLS Model.

Standard errors in parentheses = significant at the 0.05 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; *** = significant at the 0.001 level.

However, when covariates of info and income_cont are added to the model they result in a change in the significance level for Pashtun correlation with democratic satisfaction, although the coefficient remains positive. This may be because of the increase in the missing values in the dataset. Variables for access to the internet and free and fair elections also result in many missing values in the dataset. Hence, the paper cannot assess the relationship of these covariates with respect to the dependent variable. The interaction terms between Pak-Pashtun and other variables produce certain substantive results in assessing democratic satisfaction amongst Pashtuns. Out of the six other independent variables, four (income, info, fair & free elections and Education) are negatively correlated with democratic satisfaction and this relationship is significant at the 95% confidence interval. The case for ffelec is unique because although 61.13% of Pakistan Pashtuns surveyed believed that the next election will be free and fair, the regression results of the interaction term between Pak-Pashtun and ffelec shows a negative coefficient for demsat and is significant at the 95% confidence interval as shown below. Interestingly, all of the interaction terms (Figure 4) except Pashtun Age show a negative correlation between them and democratic satisfaction which is also significant at the 95% confidence interval. For example, the interaction term Pashtun info signifies that as access to internet amongst Pashtuns will increase their democratic satisfaction will reduce by .1425. The same is true for income; because a rise in incomes for Pak-Pashtuns will result in a reduction in their democratic satisfaction which is strange considering that rise in incomes is usually positively correlated with satisfaction in the government or system of governance. Lastly, considering the fact that 57% of Pashtuns surveyed had received no formal education, the interaction term Pashtun-Edu shows that increased education will lower democratic satisfaction for this ethnic group. More awareness about governance, rights and socio-economic positioning of the country may provide clarity to the Pashtuns on the degree of democratic implementation in the country. The same holds true for access to internet which will provide Pak-Pashtuns to engage in public discourse and give them various channels of communication.

Conclusion

This article began with the empirical finding that Pakistani Pashtuns exhibit different political behaviour – in this case democratic satisfaction – from Afghan Pashtuns although they are of the same ethnicity. This was perhaps because of a differing national context provided by the drawing of colonial borders. The Pashtuns in Pakistan form a minority with respect to the national population while the opposite is the case with Afghan Pashtuns. Afghanistan and Pakistan also have had different foreign influences over the years. The paper then provided a literature review on the differing aspects of the two Pashtun populations as well as deriving the main hypothesis of the paper through the literature on democratic satisfaction. To test whether the expectation held true in a multivariate setting, data from the Asia Foundation survey of 2018 was used. It was indeed found that democratic satisfaction of Pakistan Pashtuns significantly differed from Afghani Pashtuns controlling for demographic variables. However, the exact reason for why this is case or the mechanism that causes such as a difference could not be traced with the available data. Although this is a weakness of the paper, I am confident providing the first attempt to empirically depict the difference in the two Pashtun populations. Prospective research could use other data to trace the exact mechanisms of this broad finding. This is maybe a fascinating endeavour and I hope to take part in such efforts in the future.

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The Geopolitics of Afghanistan and Its Impact on the Peace Processes

Dr. Mujahid Hussain Sargana³

Dr. Tauqeer Hussain Sargan⁴

Dr. Adam Saud⁵

Abstract

Afghanistan being the conflict prone state has been struggling for peace since decades. The state of immense strategic importance with unique geography had been a battlefield of great powers that inevitably shaped the contemporary system and behaviour of its society. The pace of turmoil and anarchy got impetus immediately in the aftermath of 9/11 incident when United States attacked Afghanistan and started another era of conflict. After almost eighteen years of continuous war at last a sigh of relief emerged when in January 2019 Taliban appointed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as chief negotiator, who along with United States peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad agreed on a peace deal involving intra-Afghan negotiations, ceasefire, troop withdrawal, and counter terrorism. In this backdrop, this study makes the point that the ongoing peace dialogue between United States and Afghanistan is key to achieve peace in the region. This is not the first time that efforts to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan have been initiated. Over the last eighteen years many regional, multi-lateral and international efforts have been made, which one way or the other fell prey to geopolitical dynamics of Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus of this study has been associated with the role of geopolitical actors including United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India and how their interests define the overall situation of Afghanistan. Today, it is not the United States neither the Taliban who would decisively put halt to chaos in Afghanistan rather there are many other factors and actors that need to be considered. This study has followed deductive method of research and relied on descriptive analysis with that of qualitative data.

Key Words: Geopolitics, Afghanistan, Peace, Conflict, Pakistan, China, India, Russia, United States, Taliban.

³ Assistant Professor- Cluster Head Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Bahria University, Islamabad.

⁴ Assistant Professor Dept. of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad.

⁵ Associate Professor Dept. of International Relations, Bahria University, Islamabad.

Introduction

The military campaign launched in the aftermath of 9/11 incident had gone through from almost four different phases. The first phase of the campaign was to topple the Taliban regime of Afghanistan with that of ousting the so-called Al-Qaeda safe heavens (Bajoria & Laub, 2011). This phase has limited objective and was achieved in a short span of time, whereas the second phase of the military campaign lasted from 2002 to 2008. This phase has focused more on the state building of Afghanistan along with defeating the sanctuaries of insurgents. During this phase United States faced lot of criticism as its promise to build institutions and counter insurgency in Afghanistan was not achieved rather the situation day by day became hostile to anarchy and chaos (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). The third phase came in 2008 and lasted until 2014. This phase is basically aligned to the so-called Obama doctrine of counterinsurgency, which accelerated the number of US troops on Afghanistan soil (Celso, 2010). The idea of enhancing the troop's numbers was to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, which in turn became nightmare for the soldiers themselves. Neither any Talib was integrated into society nor did the phenomenon of terrorism come under control. Keeping the pace of innovation and declarations, the fourth phase of US engagement in Afghanistan convened the post-withdrawal security environment, which exposed a new era of reintegration and negotiation. The new US President Donald J. Trump initiated a new discourse of blame game in the beginning, (Yusuf, 2017), which later on ended into marriage of convenience which wanted Pakistan to play its role in the Afghan peace process (Yousaf, 2018).

With all ups and downs of the US military campaign, Afghanistan had experienced three Presidential and two Parliamentarian Elections along with 2001 Afghan Interim Administration, which was established as a result of Bonn Agreement (Chesterman, 2002). During all this process one of the biggest hurdles or the so-called de facto stakeholders of Afghanistan known as Taliban, was set-aside. Though, one way or the other, efforts have been made to convince them to surrender their violent resistance against the US installed regime of Kabul and foreign troops operating in Afghanistan. This was done through various efforts of peace negotiations which were done by Afghan government, regional states and

international stakeholders. For example, so far there have been almost seven major attempts to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, which include:

- High Peace Council (HPC) of 2010
- Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process of 2011
- Murree Peace Dialogue of 2015
- Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of January 2016
- Trilateral Talks of December 2016
- Six Nations Talks of 2016
- Peace Treaty with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbadin (HIG) of 2017

All the above peace efforts one by one collapsed and the reasons were domestic, regional and international. For example, the High Peace Council (HPC) was established by the Afghan government on September 5, 2010 to engage one of the factions of Taliban under Burhan Uddin Rabbani. The HPC activities halted when Burhan Uddin Rabbani was assassinated (The Telegraph, 2011). Contrary to HPC, the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process was inaugurated in November 2011 which mandated political, economic, counterterrorism, peace and stability as key variables of cooperation between Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Along with United States, there were twenty more states who supported the spirit of Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (Rutting, 2011).

The third major peace dialogue was initiated by Pakistan under Murree Peace Dialogue in July 2015 (Zulfiqar, 2015). On July 29, 2015, the efforts were sabotaged, when the Afghan government announced the death of Mullah Omer (BBC News 2015). Pakistan on the auspices of Heart of Asia Conference announced the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) in January 2016, which included Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and United States. Absence of Taliban in the group and later on death of Mullah Mansur in US drone attack also put full stop to this peace effort of Pakistan (Boone & Rasmussen, 2016). The track of Mullah Mansur as claimed was from Iran but his assassination in Pakistani territory gave many messages in one strike (Dawn, 2016).

Due to lingering situation of war-torn Afghanistan; Pakistan, China and Russia were concerned about increasing influence of Daesh/ISIS on their security and formed a Trilateral Talks forum on December 27, 2016 (Khattak, 2017). The objective was to help bring peace in Afghanistan, but the initiative did not receive due weightage from the US and other European countries. Also, Afghanistan was not happy on its exclusion in the meetings in Moscow.

All these failures did not undermine the importance of peace dialogue to achieve stability in Afghanistan. That is why once again an arrangement of Six Nations Talks was convened in 2016, which included Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and India (Tolo News, 2017). The purpose was to encourage Taliban to honour the peace process with Afghan regime. Though, in this arrangement, India was not willing to directly engage with Taliban, and believed that Russia, China and Pakistan wanted to use Taliban to fight with ISIS in Afghanistan and their direct engagement with Taliban would give militants legitimacy. There were also other complications.

Last but not the least, the Ashraf Ghani regime in Afghanistan inked a peace deal with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbadin (HIG) in September 2016 believing that this would continue and other groups would end up just like HIG (Johnson 2018). This allowed Gulbadin to return to Kabul after twenty years of exile. He also received many concessions from the government in Kabul, which included lifting of UN and US sanctions on his faction (Alizada, 2017). Contrary to the objective of Ashraf Ghani, not other insurgent group surrendered and joined the political league.

The current phase of US and Taliban peace talks are in fact continuation of the previous efforts when in October 2017 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson invited the 'Moderate Taliban' for peace dialogue (Gramer, 2017). The continuation of positivity prevailed when in February 2018; Afghan President Ashraf Ghani showed his commitment to engage Taliban without any 'preconditions' (BBC, 2018). As a result of trust and peace building initiative by the Afghan government, the Taliban were offered to be recognized as political party and permission to contest for the elections. In return, they were expected to accept the government, peace initiative and the constitution of Afghanistan (Popalzai & Berlinger, 2018).

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan has been always extending its political and diplomatic support to peace processes meant to bring stability in Afghanistan. It has from the very beginning reiterated that peace in Afghanistan compliments peace in Pakistan. At certain occasions due to cross border infiltration and firing, Pakistan did show its inconvenience with Kabul but even under such circumstances remained firm to its commitment towards peace and stability of Afghanistan. This has been also reflected from the highest military ranks of Pakistan Army. For example, in April 2018 during his visit to Moscow, General Qamar Javed Bajwa emphasized the importance of peace and security of Afghanistan. (Tolo News, 2018). The same was reiterated in June 2018, when General Bajwa travelled to Kabul (Dawn, 2018).

Due to backdoor diplomacy between US and Pakistani counterparts and the encouraging letter of US President Donal J. Trump requesting Pakistani Prime Minister to play role in facilitating the peace dialogue in Afghanistan is an encouraging sign (Dawn, 2018). As of today, a peace deal is enunciated on a plea to bring peace in Afghanistan, which is under process of being inked between Taliban's Chief negotiator Mullah Baradar and US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (Mashal, 2019). Though, the momentum of the ongoing peace talks is smooth and tangibly stable but one has look at the baggage of history which under no circumstances can be ruled out. Furthermore, as we know that the Afghan government is skeptical of ongoing peace talks between Taliban and Afghanistan as Kabul is nowhere in the driving position. That is why on the one side in Qatar, Taliban and US are about to ink the deal but on the other side the President of Afghanistan in a televised speech to the nation claims that "the Taliban should enter serious talks" (The News, 2018). This in fact reflects that the 'serious talks' means when Kabul is part of it. Does this mean that the Kabul regime is now under enormous pressure with an anxiety that the Taliban's are being installed by the Washington establishment just the way they were installed immediately after 9/11? If this situation erupts then this time not the Taliban but the Afghan regime in Kabul will become the biggest hurdle in installing peace in Afghanistan.

This brings us to geopolitics of Afghanistan and its impact on the peace processes. Interference by foreign forces and proxy war against each other by countries such as US, Russia, China, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, had been the main cause of conflict in

Afghanistan and thus a major hurdle in peace and stability in the region. Taliban and the so-called Afghan regime are nothing else other than 'false flag political operations'. The prolonged geopolitics in Afghanistan which had been continuously hosting the great game particularly since the last four decades had clutched the progress, prosperity, peace, politics, people, and economic portfolio of the region. Regardless of having great and unique exposure, the fate of Afghanistan is trapped into volatile ventures of terror (Ahmed, 2016).

Not only the available literature on the subject matter categorically highlights the politics between great powers as one of the variable of turmoil in Afghanistan but also the geographical location of the country makes it vulnerable to regional and international politics. Therefore, this section of the paper has analyzed in detail the stated and perceived interests of the major players involved in Afghanistan and how it had shaped the regional political landscape. Below are mentioned some of the important actors and their interests in Afghanistan particularly and in the region in general.

US Role in Afghanistan

The most important of the foreign forces is the US. The American role has always been there in Afghanistan. In the decades of Cold War when USSR occupied Afghanistan, it was the US who managed to rally support for its response to the Soviets. The Soviets were defeated with the help of United States active participation in the insurgency. Pakistan also played role being the neighbor of Afghanistan and facilitated the continuity of the conflict. Above all the human fuel was provided mainly by Pakistan and helped the Americans win the war. Siding with America at that time was considered in Pakistan's best national interest.

The current crises in Afghanistan erupted in the aftermath of 9/11 incident in the US. It was believed that the attacks were carried out by Al-Qaida. The attack on US changed the global perspective on terrorism (Mitchell, 2011). The US demanded the Taliban Government to hand over Osama to the US, and Taliban agreed to, but to hand over to a neutral country. This was not acceptable to US and became the flash point for the war. The US managed to rally the support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and also a stamp of United Nation was also affixed to it to legitimize the global war on terror.

The stated aim of US was to destroy the Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and to bring to justice to Osama bin Laden who was the mastermind of the 9/11 attack on US. Almost, eighteen years had passed and the war is still posing challenges to peace and security. From 'daisy cutters' to the 'mother of all bombs (MOAB)' nothing has been achieved nor the claims of decisive victory against Taliban got endorsement from the independent and neutral observers.

Then, what were the actual aims of US in Afghanistan? While following the lead of Pakistan, the Osama Bin Laden has been killed and the Al-Qaida network is completely taken out through tremendous sacrifices of Pakistani armed forces. Both high priority threats are today made almost ineffective. The stated aim at some time was to wean the foot soldiers from the Taliban and integrate them in Afghanistan. From integration then came the policy of reconciliation. Then there was the policy of 'good Taliban are dead Taliban' and then 'Taliban are not our enemy (Ahmed, 2012). Wasn't it the pickle of everything with absence of peace?

What does all this show, confusion or some hidden agenda? The previous administration of President Obama had though increased the number of troops there on the demand of military commanders in Afghanistan yet he also had set a timeline for withdrawal till 2014. This time line was considered by some to be a wrong strategy, which was interpreted by the Taliban as victory. That's why the new President, Donald J. Trump, in his new policy on South Asia enhanced the number of troops by eight thousand and made it condition-based and not time specific. The number of troops from some over one hundred thousand have now been reduced to some eleven thousand including the new increase. But the question remains as to what are their real aims?

On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban's are staunchly against the presence of all foreign forces. So in this scenario, when the presence of foreign forces is not acceptable to the Taliban, peace will not be possible in Afghanistan. The US and other countries presence in Afghanistan will always deter peace as the Taliban have a strong abhorrence for them.

Russian Role in Afghanistan

The new geopolitical reality has compelled the Russians not to stay neutral in the face of protracted US presence in Afghanistan and re-enter the Afghan arena with a purpose. The December 2016 tripartite meeting in Moscow which was attended by China, Pakistan and Russia to discuss security situation in Afghanistan is just one example. Tahir Khan, “Kabul slams tripartite meeting in Moscow,” (Tribune, 2016). Russia has realized that the US policy in Afghanistan has failed and that is why have contacted the Taliban on many occasions to discuss the Afghan situation with them. Washington also discussed the drugs issue and emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan, which Russia perceives as a big threat to Central Asian Republics (CARs) and ultimately to Russia itself (Rubin & Rashid, 2008).

Washington based expert, Michael Kugelman commented on the Russian influence and said that, “Russia may have been chased out of Afghanistan several decades ago, but now it appears keen to re-enter the scene in a big way” (Kugelman, 2019). The Russians are skeptical about the prolonged stay of US in Afghanistan. They are also fearful of the Islamic State presence in Afghanistan, which is commonly referred as IS Khorasan Province (ISK-P) and deem it as a threat. In this scenario the Russians are taking the risk of siding with the Taliban. There have been numerous clashes between Taliban and ISK militants. This changing of sides by Russia has definitely angered US and also weakened the Afghan National Government and strengthens the Taliban position, against whom the Americans have been fighting since 9/11. This possible alliance of the Russia with the non-state actors will further exacerbate the situation in Afghanistan. Again, one is not sure of the Russians actual intention as “there can be a 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' dynamics at play” (Kugelman, 2019).

The Russians may be looking for an opportunity to take revenge from US. There may be something deeper in its planning as siding with Taliban to fight the ISIS may not be a very convincing story, because the presence of ISK is limited to a few areas and it may not pose a serious threat to Russia’s interests. Again, it may be that the two i.e. Taliban and ISK find a common ground in future and start fighting against the US and their allies in the name of Islam. But in any case the battleground will be Afghanistan. The reported supply of arm to Taliban by Russia has been seen by the US very seriously. Although the Russians denied providing arms to the Taliban, Americans have viewed this as something that will weaken

the US efforts in Afghanistan and strengthen the Taliban, which Paulo Casaca explains in his words that, “Russia's realignment in Afghanistan, forging a strategic partnership with Pakistan and China and engaging with the Taliban, seems to be geared by a single objective: to confront the US wherever it is possible” (Casaca, 2016).

Indian Role in Afghanistan

Traditionally India has enjoyed cordial relations with Afghanistan, always at the cost of Pakistan. India though not being in close proximity of Afghanistan as Pakistan is, yet it has managed contacts with Afghanistan to disturb peace and destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan has always complained to New Delhi regarding its negative activities, yet India has given little heed to Pakistan's assertions. Recent capture of an Indian serving military official on spying and planning sabotage activities have proven Pakistan's stance. Kalboshan Yadav, a serving naval commander has confessed in planning many sabotage activities in Pakistan. He has now been tried for his offences under the law of the land, and awarded death penalty. Whether he will be executed or not, is yet to be seen as the matter has been taken by India in the International Court of Justice. However, his sabotage activities are now fully established. In this chain of terror networking by the Indian agent, some condemnable part has also been played by Iran, as he was found to be travelling inside Pakistan with Iranian passport (Ahmed, 2017).

There are other linkages also which shows close links between India and Iran. The Chabahar Port is one such important factor, at a time when Pakistan and China are developing Gawadar Port, the effects and collusion of both the countries can be easily comprehended. It may not make a big difference to Gawadar Port due to its strategic location but the intents of negativity are obvious. Seen in the larger context of the New Great Game, the importance given by the US President in his August 2017 policy speech, India will play a major role in Afghanistan in future (Roche, 2017). The new suspected role to be played by India with the strong support and behest of US will not augur well for Afghanistan, as it will make Afghanistan a battle ground for the big powers to fight their war on its soil. The new US strategy in Afghanistan is believed to be a prolonged affair, which will try to contain China, keep a closer eye on Pakistan's nukes and also guard closely the Iranian nuclear issue,

which the US has always looked with suspicious intentions. This will bring home the basic point regarding the effects of existence of foreign forces on peace in Afghanistan. In this scenario China, Pakistan and even Iran, will not sit idle. These proxies will further deteriorate the situation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan

Pakistan, a neighbouring country of Afghanistan, has always looked to Afghanistan with the prism of its own national interest. There has been lot of criticism regarding its interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The allegations are not very untrue. From the very start, Afghanistan was the only country which did not recognize Pakistan in 1947.

Pakistan has always thought that Afghanistan is tilting towards India. This tilt towards India made Pakistan sceptical of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's geo strategic location has made her a playground for great powers. Starting from the British Empire, to Russia, and now US, all these powers have played and are still playing the game to foster their hegemonic designs. All these eras of great powers struggle have left Afghanistan in backward straits. Afghanistan has suffered a lot for no fault of its own. Pakistan has also contributed to the agonies of Afghanistan in no lesser ways. Pakistan always adopted policies based on its own national interests without caring for Afghanistan. It is this long and hostile attitude which is now the main reason for distrust of Afghanistan, although, after the Russian invasion, Pakistan helped Afghanistan and accommodated a huge number of refugees (Rubin, Barnett, & Rashid, 2008).

About 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees are still residing in Pakistan mostly in its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, 2018). But it is also to be noted, that United States organized the warriors in the name of jihad from these very Afghans and thus with the help of Washington and other allied powers defeated the Soviet forces. By siding with the US, Pakistan also protected itself, as at that time it was like writing on the wall, that the real aim for Russia was to reach the warm waters. Some of the actions taken by Pakistan were sheer out of compulsion as dictated by the circumstances. The fact remains, these current woes of Afghanistan are due to mainly of foreign states interference in Afghanistan (Rubin & Rashid, 2008).

The Taliban phenomena, who considered being terrorists, are the creation of unplanned and untimely withdrawal of US and other western powers after the defeat of USSR. It was that vacuum which left unattended and was exploited by foreign elements. Inevitably, the phenomenon of Taliban was created. Pakistan at one time considered Afghanistan as its strategic depth. India is today using the land of Afghanistan to initiate proxies inside Pakistan, which convincingly approves Pakistan's apprehensions regarding inability of Kabul to control its territory. Furthermore, the old-fashioned concept of strategic depth becomes 21st century allowance for Pakistan's security if sought properly. Pakistan had done all its best to seek alternative discourse of peace dialogue and facilitated all of the initiated to the best of its ability but remained unsuccessful due to the very geopolitical gambling in the region. Therefore, unless and until, all these foreign interferences and proxies are put a complete end, Afghanistan will not find peace.

China's Role in Afghanistan

China's interest in Afghanistan is manifold. China and Pakistan are now implementing the grand economic project in the shape of China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which involves some close to \$60 Billion investment from Chinese side, some from Government side and some from private investors. The resources rich Central Asian Republics' is also in the scheme of things of Chinese One Road One Belt (OBOR). In this way, peace in Afghanistan will be China's top priority as any conflict or instability in Afghanistan directly affects peace and stability in Pakistan. But this is not the whole thing. There is something deeper to it (Roy, 2017).

China and India are historical rivals, due to some territorial disputes between the two countries. China will always try to minimize Indian role in Afghanistan. India on the other hand has the patronage of US, and the major role, which the US has now demanding from India to play in Afghanistan is a source of major concern for China. China is well aware of the US designs to curtail her growth and influence through India. Thus, the role of India and that of US in Afghanistan will be looked upon with great concern and suspicions by China. Then there is another emerging proximity of interest or an undeclared alliance between Russia, China and Pakistan. All have their own interests in it. Pakistan wants a space for

itself in Afghanistan, which the Americans are not ready to grant as the Washington is tilted toward India. China wants minimum role both for US and India in Afghanistan. Russia wants to hit the American in a big way to avenge its previous defeat (Deutsche Welle News, 2018). The only factor that has brought these three countries closer together is the aim to keep the US and India out of Afghanistan.

Keeping in mind the centrality of Taliban in Afghan settlement, there has been reports that Russia and China have contacts with Taliban (Ryan & Rotman, 2018). Pakistan also has influence over Taliban. This closeness of Taliban with these major regional powers, are something not liked by the US. These interests of China and Russia in Afghanistan vis-à-vis, Indo-US nexus of instability will keep the war theatre alive, and peace will be denied to the soil.

So we can easily identify two blocks pursuing separate interests in Afghanistan. US, India and Iran may be placed in one block and China, Russia and Pakistan in another block. Both the blocks are driven by the mutuality and commonality of interests. Taliban and the so-called Afghan regime in Kabul are not other than the 'false flag political actors'. Unfortunately, the battleground is Afghanistan. Whosoever wins this battle of interests, the ultimate sufferer will be Afghanistan and its people. The battle seems to be a prolonged affair and therefore it can be predicted that there will be no peace in Afghanistan any time sooner.

The above-mentioned players are involved in a serious and big way ultimately proving their justification to prolong their stay in Afghanistan. They play a zero-sum game and the casualty will be the prospects of peace in Afghanistan. The alliance between US and India will no doubt enhance Pakistan and Chinese concerns. Similarly, the economic bond between China and Pakistan in CPEC will be a cause of concern for both India and US. So, in a way it is a conflict between geo-politics and geo-economics in the region and the game is played on the soil of Afghanistan. This will no doubt keep Afghanistan and the region in constant and prolonged turmoil and instability. Similarly, Russia will try to get the US out of Afghanistan. This may lead to another Cold War between the two former adversaries. Similarly, there is a strong interest of Iran, which wants a say in the future set up of Afghanistan. It not only wants safety and security for its Shia population but also has huge economic interests there (Prakash, 2017).

Impact of the Afghan Conflict on the Region

The internal dynamics of Afghanistan that are other than politics belongs to its ethnic identity. The largest ethnic group is Pashtun followed by Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch and others. Most of ethnic groups have transnational affinity with neighbouring countries. Afghan population is predominately Muslim with about 84.7% Sunnis and 15% Shias. Pashto and Dari are both designated as official languages of Afghanistan. Dari (Afghan Persian) serves as the lingua franca in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and other cities in northern and north Western Afghanistan. Pashto is widely spoken in Pashtun dominated southern and eastern areas of the country. Internal factors that contribute towards conflict include different factions of Taliban, Islamic State, and Al-Qaida (Dinstein, 2017).

The surfacing of groups like the Fidayi Mahaz, the Turkistan Islamic Movement (TIM) and lately Daesh has further made the security scene more complex. Although these elements control a small area compared to the main Taliban group, their existence and actions have cast a shadow of gloom over the prospects for peace and stability. The Fidayi Mahaz has its presence in central Afghanistan; the TIM operates from time to time on the northern fringes of the country, mainly in Kunduz and Balkh provinces, while Daesh has been confined to Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. Of course, these groups have created a space for themselves not at the expense of the government but the Taliban. That is why there have been clashes between their followers from time to time (Jalali, 2006).

This situation has given rise to fear and insecurity amongst the masses and that's why large number of people has started leaving the country. In the coming days, more fights between these groups is feared. Currently the picture is not clear, whether Taliban will still be their enemy or they may unite in the name of Islam and against the foreign forces. The enormous wealth generated as narco-money is fuelling this war. Almost all the warring factions/parties are having their share in the money. A very negligible portion of the drugs is being smuggled through Pakistan, the rest find its way to European and other markets through other routes mainly Iran and Central Asian Republics (Collins, 2014).

There is a strong pro-status-quo group in the country—people who have gained wealth, power and clout courtesy the boon delivered by the generosity of the international community. These elites, with their wealth abroad, would like foreign forces to stay in the country for an indefinite period so that they can continue to enjoy the fruits of their

‘enterprise’. To the degree to which the outlook of reconciliation endangers their position or their survival, they would rather want the current conflict continued.

Ineffective border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan which is stretched over about 2611 kilometres is contributing in lawlessness and disturbances on both sides (Tribune, 2017). According to Director General ISPR, Pakistan will complete the border fencing until the end of 2019. He further mentioned that “802km out of 1,200km has been covered and work on 233 out of 843 forts has been completed in priority-1 areas” (Tribune, 2018). Pakistan in fact had done a marvellous job to secure the border on its side. Since the British days, as per an agreement, the easement rights were given to the tribal people living on both sides of the border. However, in the current circumstances, proper border management was imperative to stop the miscreants from crossing border on each side. People with proper entry and exit documents must be facilitated and no entry without proper documents shall be allowed as is required for entry into any sovereign state. This would stop the miscreants from coming and going without any check and scrutiny.

The Turmoil in Afghanistan and Its Impact on Pakistan

The turmoil in Afghanistan has affected the whole region and Pakistan in particular. Due to instability in Afghanistan an uncertainty has taken place regarding many economic projects that pass-through Afghanistan. The landlocked CARs have tremendous natural resources like Afghanistan itself but for that to be exploited, peace is the first prerequisite. The renewed interests shown by the major powers like Russia and China in Afghanistan, seems to be part of a response to ongoing great game by the western states which will have prolonged repercussions for the whole region.

Pakistan has been seriously affected by the conflict in Afghanistan. The effects have been social, economic and political. For many decades now, Pakistan is having negative effects from its western border. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the extremism, the Kalashnikov and drugs culture and those deep effects are still grappling Pakistan. The effects of talibanisation on whole society and specially FATA have damaged the country extensively (Abbas, 2015). The current long, continuous and unending conflict in Afghanistan has put Pakistan in uncertain situation. Despite bearing so much loss in the war on terror, due to the double standards of the West, Pakistan is still looked down upon with

suspicion and its sacrifices are not recognized at-all. Pakistan is being dubbed as part of the problem. The US-India nexus in the light of new policy of Donald J. Trump has serious implications for Pakistan. Pakistan cannot sustain in the long run between two hostile governments, one on the Eastern and the other on the Western side. Similarly, the most important project of CPEC will be affected due to the instability in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is stable, the dividends of CPEC can be extended to the whole region including CARs (Schaffer, 2017).

The 2017 Afghan policy announced by President Trump has surprised many people as the announcement was a complete departure of what he used to say during his election campaigns (Mitchell, 2018). That shows that there is a strong establishment and the new entrants have to toe the line. The new policy spells out an indefinite stay for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Their number is to be increased, though not much. Unlike his predecessor, Donald Trump's Afghanistan policy is 'conditions based' and not 'time based'. The policy asks for a greater Indian role in Afghanistan reconstruction. Keeping aside the recent Trump letter to Prime Minister Imran Khan, the sacrifices rendered by Pakistan in war on terror have not been appreciated; rather Pakistan has been declared part of the problem and not part of the solution (Mitchell, 2018).

With this prolonged stay of US and other allied forces in Afghanistan, many analysts have started doubting US intentions in Afghanistan. Among many interests, the key US objectives that surface out of extensive literature review include, containment of China in the context of CPEC, keeping a close eye on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and also guarding the Iranian issue by placing itself close to its borders. The US will not get out of Afghanistan and will keep a permanent presence in that country. The instability in this region also suits the objectives of the US-India nexus to thwart rising Chinese influence in the region and to sabotage CPEC. The portents are not very encouraging for Pakistan (Khan, 2018).

The main effects of the Afghan conflict on Pakistan include:

- i. Economic burden
- ii. Law and order problem
- iii. Aggravated drug and Kalashnikov culture
- iv. Disturbed demography of KPK and Baluchistan
- v. Burdened civic amenities
- vi. Increased unemployment

vii. Partial control over small businesses particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan by the Afghan refugees

As most of the Afghan refugees were settled in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, it disturbed the economic situation. Most of the small businesses like hotels, transport were predominantly occupied by the Afghans. Being very hard working, they created a space for themselves but took the economic leverage from the locals. This exacerbated the unemployment problem in the two provinces. Socially and culturally the Afghans were closely connected to Pakhtuns on this side of the Durand line. Their merger with the local population was not a challenge at all. Afghan refugees unlike in Iran were settled near the urban centers of Pakistan and were not confined to tents. The huge number of refugees overburdened the already insufficient infrastructure, like roads, markets and hospitals etc (Hilali, 2002).

Conclusion

From the perusal of these factors, it is evident that Afghanistan is not likely to have peace and stability in the near future. Like in the past it is once again a battlefield for the great game of the global powers. The most important factor responsible for the instability and conflict is the presence of foreign forces. All the involved powers are in one way or the other, pursuing their own agenda, mostly at the cost of the others. The presence of these forces will keep Afghanistan and the region in constant turmoil and instability. It is the strategic location of Afghanistan which has made it the centre of attraction for the global powers. Be that the British empire of the yesteryears, or the Communist Russian Empire or now the hegemonic US; the aim and purpose of all was and is to promote their national agenda.

History is witness to the fact that the Afghan national character abhors the presence of foreign forces on their soil. All the imperial powers with their huge military and national wealth were defeated by the Afghans. If the Americans did not get its politico-military aims and objectives with more than one hundred thousand troops, the highest surge in President Obama tenure, how can they win with as little as twenty-two thousand troops now? Although huge amount of foreign aid has been given to Afghanistan, yet it has brought little difference to the lives of ordinary Afghans. Corruption, incompetence and lack of any organized delivery system, prevented the foreign aid to reach the countryside, where 70 percent of the

population lives. Under the Taliban rule, there was virtually no poppy cultivation. After the US -led invasion, now Afghanistan is producing 80 percent of the world opium and generates around \$3 billion incomes a year. It seems that the Americans have not learnt any lesson from its past experience of Vietnam War. The highly seasoned and experienced ex secretary of State, Henry Kissinger has written about the Vietnam War failure in these words, "We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The (North Vietnamese) used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance" (Kissinger, 1969).

It is their inability to fight the insurgents in a convincing way or some other hidden agenda, the fact remains that their withdrawal is not going to happen anytime soon. This will keep Afghanistan and the region in a state of uncertainty and security limbo. Fight against Taliban is still going on and the phenomenon of Daesh is emerging. Afghanistan, regardless of becoming a territory of peace and prosperity has ended up launching pad for proxies of all types. Let's assume that the Afghan government, the US and allied forces, and the Indian intelligence network altogether are working for peace in Afghanistan then how new terrorist organizations like Daesh are able to get their strong hold in Afghanistan. Knowing the very fact that Taliban who control more than 70% territory of Afghanistan are also in negation of Daesh and fighting with them on daily basis. The close analysis gives alternative discourse to the whole situation, which indicates some kind of hidden agenda. Parallel to this in November 2017, the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also pointed fingers on US for strengthening Daesh/ISIS in Afghanistan (Aljazeera, 2018). The prolonged stay of United States and now open invitation to India in Afghanistan on one pretext or the other will make Afghanistan a launching pad for achieving its hidden agenda. If there is no US then there will be no India in Afghanistan (Fair, 2011). The amalgamation of interests between both the actors has drastic implications for the region. Hence, keep the region and Afghanistan in a state of turmoil. There will be no peace unless and until the game of the foreign forces is over.

Trump's 2017 policy on Afghanistan is therefore more complex and dangerous for the region especially for Pakistan. The US India nexus is more alarming for Pakistan, keeping

the Afghan pot boiling suits India, as it will be used to destabilize Pakistan. There are six airbases established by US, and now the US has also shown interest in the natural resources of Afghanistan for its own benefit. This way the Afghan soil will benefit the US interest in a big way. The US military industrial complex will flourish. The maximum casualties will now be that of the Afghan forces as the Americans will not be in the combat mode thus with little human casualties and huge strategic benefits, there will be no backlash at home.

Peace is imperative for the whole region, and that can only be achieved when there is peace in Afghanistan. This also brings stability for Pakistan, whose future depends on China Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India and the Central Asia & South Asia 1000 energy project. Unless and until there is peace in Afghanistan, the realization of these grand schemes would remain elusive. To achieve peace, the great game of the global powers has to end and the Afghan led and Afghan owned political construction of the country shall be installed as soon as possible which is the key for regional stability. The idea becomes fragile if settlements on divergences among key players are not addressed amicably. Therefore, the contemporary pace of political process that has brought the importance of peace dialogue at forefront must continue to evolve a consented fabric of political elites in Afghanistan. It is important for Pakistan to recheck the recent glimpse of hope and must carefully evaluate the US intensions before becoming prey to another 'false flag peace process' (Tribune, 2019).

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Coordinated Border Management (CBM): A Sentinel Approach to Contain Asymmetric Warfare after Fencing at Pakistan-Afghanistan Border

Dr. Sehrish Qayyum⁶

Abstract

In many conflict-ridden regions, border management is a nightmare. The 1640 miles long Pak-Afghan border has been a point of illicit transnational trade, cross border infiltrations by the terrorists, and sanctuary for guerrilla warriors. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and un-attended Taliban creation by CIA made this region hell, particularly for the adjacent stumbling economies. In 2016, Pakistan Army initiated border fencing, which is an extraordinary step towards regional peace. Hence, shifting from Integrated Border Management to Coordinated Border Management at Pak-Afghan Border will be Sentinel Approach to contain asymmetric warfare in the region. This research inscription offers a prototype as a strategic practice of containment towards unrecorded illicit entries along both sides of the border to curb terrorism and asymmetric warfare. It is quantitative research with a causal-comparative research approach using Max Diff analysis.

Keywords: Asymmetric Warfare, Coordinated Border Management Containment, Fencing, Max Diff Analysis, Sentinel Approach

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan share more than 2,560 kilometres of the porous frontier. Border management especially security crisis affects both sides of the dividing line. The contentions can likewise be seen in the more extensive setting of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and the refusal of progressive Afghan legislatures of different political and ideological influences to acknowledge the Durand Line as the international boundary line between the two nations (Khan, 2019). No Afghan government since the intersection of British India in 1947, into the independent countries of India and Pakistan has acknowledged the Durand Line as the international fringes (Bilal, 2016). Factually, the geo-politically noteworthy territory of Afghanistan has generally remained a front line and a "zone of contention" as a result of the competition of extraordinary forces and mediations by major regional and extra-regional players (Saikal, 2014). Throughout the Cold War, in 1979 the

⁶ Lecturer Political Science Department, University of Punjab

Soviet intrusion of Afghanistan influenced Pakistan's policymakers to fundamentally remove their Afghan methodology, which resulted in the years-long war at its patio (Shafqat, 2017). Generally, the post-9/11 conditions, in the fallout of the United States' intrusion of Afghanistan, have been changing South Asian geopolitical elements and security designs.

Under the circumstances, Afghanistan lingers on to view attempts by Pakistan to erect barriers as endeavouring to legitimize the Durand Line and, thus wane Kabul's claims to the territory. An unmanaged and neglected border line for any state creates a question mark on their sovereignty and solidarity. As disputed borderline creates a hell of lacunae in managing cross border movement due to the reason illegal personnel-crossing, illicit trafficking, and progression in terrorism are seen (Jayshree, 2009). In regard to formerly mentioned issues, continuous blame game ranging over two decades is going on and both sides are not able to manage the porous border effectively. This uncertain condition may lead to having unexpected consequences of the serial happening in the international scenario of the South Asian region. World major powers are playing a role in dragging the region back into the great game again.

Pakistan and Afghanistan's history can be partitioned in six inescapable stages. The preeminent stage from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, it is depicted by the undertakings of the Afghan pros to make use of, how Pakistan was a totally new political substance that appeared in 1947 after the simultaneous purposeful and compelled withdrawal of the colonialists from Indian sub-mainland. The difficulties of the fundamental period of the arranging of the outskirts and the local structure of the Pakistani state empowered Kabul to look after an antagonistic methodology towards their neighbour, attempting to confirm access to the Arabian Sea with assistance for the radicals in Pakistan (Bezhan, 2014). They were connected at the time with the uprising in the Baluchi domain of Kalat, and with the assertion of the "Free Pashtunistan" in the Pashtun tribes in Waziristan Mountains (Bezhan, 2014).

The subsequent stage suffered from the mid-1950s and enduring to the 1970s. Pakistan in these years basically vanquished the hidden "improvement slack" and through and through reinforced its money-related and military capacities. It concentrated on relations with India, which used its connections with Afghanistan to misuse it to "pressure" on its regional neighbour and enemy. In the wake of vanquishing the extreme crisis in separate relations, during the mid-1960s, a period of relative synchronization began, which was not

hurt even by the wars of Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 with its eastern neighbour, India (Iqbal, 2018).

The third stage covers the 1970s. Pakistan, losing in view of the events of 1971 its eastern area, changed into a self-sufficient domain of Bangladesh. Afghanistan winds up in a widely appealing geopolitical space among the Arab states, Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. Thusly, in the mid-1970s, the hero part of the Islamic factor in neighbourhood authoritative issues has extended, and Pakistan has ended up being one of the foci of Islamization from above (*The U.S. War in Afghanistan / Council on Foreign Relations*, 2020). In Afghanistan used Islamists as a power repudiating Kabul. Afghanistan tried to play a guide of ethno-national resistance that cleared the western and Pashtun dominant part north-western locales of Pakistan, yet toward the end goal of the period, identifying with the solicitations of Iran and the US, endeavoured to develop a talk with Pakistan, consenting to counsel with her on the fringe issues.

The fourth time frame begins with the turn of the 1970s-80s, during which in 1979 Afghan Jihad was for all intents and purposes started after Soviet Union's interruption and completions with the beginning of the 1990s (Jayshree bajoria, 2009). This period was the period of the most extraordinary threatening vibe between the two neighboring states. The protection position of Afghanistan was replaced by its full association with the socialist coalition headed by the Soviet Union. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which came to control in Kabul, completed an approach course of action that was ideologically backward of Islamabad. Political and ideological missions, for example, the socialist (Soviet) and the Islamist ones (Iqbal, 2018), smashed on the Afghan-Pakistani limits, which during various wartime were engaged with assistance from the West. Meanwhile, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan endeavoured to viably use the factor of Pashtun energy in Pakistan and maintained the likelihood of advancing Pashtun statehood toward the south up to the Arabian Sea (Bezhan, 2014). Pakistan transformed into the site for the sending of political affiliations that fled from Afghanistan, drawing in against the left-democrats of the Kabul government. Official relations between the countries after the introduction of Soviet troops were meddled with, indirect contacts assisted to have table talks and arrangements for settling the issues. Pakistan has mind-boggling accomplices as the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) (Iqbal, 2018).

The fifth retro in Pakistani-Afghan relations took 10 years from the mid-1990s to the

mid-2000s. Within this period, Pakistan generally assumed the job of the arbitrator in Afghan undertakings by taking situational assistance of exploiting differences in the positions of Afghan *Mujahideen* to those who launched education in the social sector (Bilal, 2016). Pakistan's multiplied impacted effect on Afghanistan, in any case, did not enable Islamabad to tackle the issue of the fringe along the "Durand Line" in a reasonable way for her lastly to conceal the plan of a free Pashtunistan. In the meantime, Pakistan neither before nor after this period launched its influence on Afghanistan so straightforwardly and successfully (Iqbal, 2018).

Retaining confidence in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan accomplished solely effect on Afghanistan's regional and extra-regional policy under the standard of the Taliban rule. The 6th phase started with the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and proceeded until mid-2010 (*The U.S. War in Afghanistan | Council on Foreign Relations*, 2020). This phase is noticed as a debilitating influence of Pakistan on the neighbouring nation. The prime impact was exploited by the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces during this stage of draining Pakistan's influence on its neighbouring countries. Pakistan faced severe setback of illogical retreat from backing Afghan Taliban which resulted in the outbreak of terrorists' activities in its north-west region under the shelter of militant groups. Pakistan faced a crisis due to the emergence of Taliban outfits in its own region and lost its imperative capacity to apply the direct political effect on Afghanistan (*The U.S. War in Afghanistan | Council on Foreign Relations*, 2020). On the other hand, Pakistan performed indirectly by the provision of safe heavens and assistance to the Afghan Taliban and their allies. Pakistan's situation took a twisted turn after 2001 when Allied forces need support for their organization and logistics of large military troops in the region. In the same way, Pakistan kept its status as transit territory and serving Afghanistan with imported products.

Pakistan and Afghanistan in their best interest need to settle their issues on table talks and decide the plan of action for the future. As Afghanistan is a war-stricken area for the last 40 years, and Pakistan has been facing its consequences continuously. Rather than raising confrontation on settled issues of Pashtun tribe's division alongside the border, unacceptability towards the border, illicit cross border drive affecting the economy of both states, both neighbours need a peaceful environment to live and let live. Few issues have a history of centuries, which cannot be resolved but a better and medieval path can be chosen to manage peace in the region with regional actors' hegemony rather than foreign hegemonic

ruling the region.

Reasons of Failure of US/NATO - International Security Assistance Force in Border Management

A lot many reasons may contribute to the hurdles for improved and systematic border management by the present and governing forces in Afghanistan. US/NATO ISAF has been long present in the region but many administrative to political issues were creating issues in management of border particularly with Pakistan i.e. Durand line- porous border. The extreme military weight has eased back the Taliban's regional extension and numerous Taliban warriors have been executed over the previous year (Dwivedi, 2018). In any case, the gathering has figured out how to hold its region and hold its operational ability to do fatal assaults the nation over. Then again, the serious aeronautical strikes have been condemned for causing non-military personnel setbacks. In spite of the bombarding of medication labs, the Taliban don't have all the earmarks of being confronting a monetary emergency. Truth be told proof on the ground proposes their riches has developed. Islamic researchers have held different gatherings, incorporating into Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, during which the brutality in Afghanistan was denounced and the Taliban were approached to go into harmonious converses with the Afghan government. In any case, the Taliban essentially decried these as being a piece of an "American procedure" to legitimize Washington's war (BBC, 2018). The Trump organization has adopted an intense strategy with Pakistan and suspended security help and help. Islamabad, which denies helping the Taliban, has said it is prepared to help begin an Afghan harmony process. Be that as it may, there are not many indications of a change in outlook in Pakistan's Afghanistan methodology.

There are five main considerations in charge of the increase of the Afghanistan strife. The two sides are attempting to break the stalemate to support them. Each side needs to expand its impact and hold onto more regions. There are inquiries concerning the viability of the US technique and the absence of arrangement clearness since 2001 (Clinton, 2014). A huge number of Taliban contenders have been executed, harmed, or caught since 2001, however, their uprising isn't giving any indications of shortcoming. 10 years back, the US and Afghan governments assessed that there were around 15,000 agitators in Afghanistan. Today, the evaluated number of activists surpasses 60,000. The development of the Islamic State's Khorasan branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan has taken the degree of viciousness and

fierceness higher than ever (BBC, 2018). The new gathering has guaranteed probably the deadliest assaults, for the most part on non-military personnel focuses on urban focuses. As the possibility of harmony talks has picked up force, the Taliban need to boost their influence and talk from a place of solidarity at the arranging table. The expanding pressure between the US and provincial players - particularly Pakistan, Russia, and Iran - is additionally having a negative effect. American and Afghan authorities have blamed these three nations for supporting the Taliban, which they deny (BBC, 2018).

Given the high recurrence and spread of Taliban viciousness, the Afghan security powers are overstretched and, now and again, overpowered. Afghan powers have been contending energetically to stop the Taliban's development. However, their loss rate remains alarmingly high and seems, by all accounts, to be expanding. Questions have been raised about the absence of strong and rousing administration, the opportune supply of coordination, and defilement. The quarreling among political and government pioneers in Kabul is likewise negatively affecting the smooth running of the legislature and the security circumstance. The two groups who shaped the National Unity Government (NUG) after the 2014 presidential decision have not yet really joined together. Regardless of being in power for a long time, the legislature in Kabul remains divided on queries such as the new 'Great Game' in Afghanistan, and who are the Taliban? And is Russia supporting the Afghan Taliban? (BBC, 2018).

Such issues are creating problems for US/NATO ISAF to manage border in coordination with Pakistan side, military and border management agencies/forces. The other real test is the co-activity of local players. Harmony in Afghanistan and the more extensive area must be accomplished through a multilateral system including the US and local players, including Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China, India and Saudi Arabia. Be that as it may, at last, it will be simply the discourse among Afghans that will decide the political fate of their war-torn Afghanistan.

Border Management by Pakistan Army

Pakistan has taken certain steps to control the terrorized situation of the region and relationship status among the states. In this regard, border fencing is an appreciable effort of Pakistan government and army in this difficult mountainous zone of 2611km, which has been initiated in 2010 (Ghafoor, 2019). According to ISPR, this fence is two way with 12 feet in

height. Surveillance will be performed at three levels with the installation of forts, towers, and tanks along the fenced border (Zakaria, 2019). According to ISPR briefs surveillance range and fencing has been maximally achieved by the end of 2018 while ignoring on and off skirmishes. In view of the available data of current situation, the first priority phase of 1200 km along Pakistan-Afghanistan almost 900 km has been fenced in Bajaur, Khyber, and Mohmand agency while rest 300 km will be done by mid of 2019. Thus, 80% border fencing has been done so far while rest is expected to be completed by the end of 2020 according to estimated plan (Ghafoor, 2019).

Border Fencing: Pakistan Army's Peace Creation Approach

Pak-Afghan outskirt seems manageable, yet there are sure debates about controlling Pakistan's endeavours to deal with its fringe. Keeping in view the actual highlights of the Afghanistan-Pakistan fringe, it is too hard to even consider monitoring the exercises of unlawful explorers. Thus, the development of psychological oppressors, illicit medication dealing and illegal exploitation has been practically difficult to control. Military activities figured out how to wipe out a large portion of the fear-based oppressors from the inherited areas of Pakistan. Accordingly, terrorists and radical outfits repositioned their focuses and discovered places of refuge in Afghanistan from where psychological oppressor assaults are being dispatched inside Pakistan. Solid confirmations assert that the psychological oppressors who assaulted Army Public School in 2014, were prepared in Afghanistan (Qayyum, 2016). Likewise, Bacha Khan University in January 2016 turned into the objective of Afghanistan-based terrorists. In 2019, the psychological militants who focused on Pearl Continental in Gawadar got their preparation in Afghanistan (DAWN, 2019).

To ensure its inclinations, Pakistan has at long last begun to fence its outskirt as all sovereign countries are permitted to do. Since outskirt the board is for the security and advancement of countries, it must not be made as a hostile stride. The design is simply to direct the appearance and takeoff of individuals and products for which different techniques have been presented. Ordinary police observing, migration divisions and delineated outskirts have decreased psychological oppressor exercises. So, in-ground facts, border management and fencing are called upon as a peace creation approaches neither its hurting tribal identity nor decades-long public relations.

Shifting from the Integrated Border Management (IBM) to Coordinated Border Management (CBM) System: A Sentinel Approach

Coordinated Border Management is an operational concept to manage the borders. This term is coined by the major trade stakeholder of the World Custom Organization (WCO) 2008 convention of defining strategies and Standard Operating Procedures. Following two are major concerning areas in terms of trade management at Border Crossing Points:

- a) Recognition of lead customs agency of the country dealing with all cross-border drives i.e. trade and transportation. It is supported by the UNTFC (UN Trade Facilitation Network) for integrated procedure of trading at borders.
- b) One window operation to gather all necessary information regarding travellers and then the distribution of information to all border agencies (WCO, 2009).

The SAFE framework highlights the practice of integrated border management, which gives institutional ground for coordinated border management. Feasibility for Confidence Building Measures was developed under the WCO thinking in a 2009 Background Paper – WCO Inter-Agency Forum on Coordinated Border Management. CBM is a technique used for the management of the border at which agencies for public service work in coordination to attain common goals by both the governments involved at borders. It is an efficient way of using rules and regulations for border management by the border management agencies who are maintaining security, legal cross border drive, documents checking for easy way go out and moving in of travelers and goods (WCO, 2009). Major concern of the CBM technique is facilitation of travelers and trade process with secured and managed borders as in present era due to unmanaged borders trade have been severely affected along with travellers move. CBM is going to be a rule book for border managing agencies to deal with all cases at border with a singular Action Plan.

The idea of shifting integrated border management system to coordinated border management system entails the coordination and collaboration strategy. Integrated border management system at cores doesn't employ essential integration of border management agencies from both sides. While current situation and former discussion in lieu of understanding cross border drive and necessity of managing porous and unfenced border

paves way for IBM to CBM approach. CBM will cover all those aspects which are considered as loopholes in the IBM system as discussed under Max Diff analysis.

Max Diff Analysis: Loopholes and Challenges to Integrated Border Management (IBM) System

- a) The Max Diff is a scholastic numerical hypothesis with unmistakable suppositions about how individuals make choices. It accepts that respondents assess all potential sets of things inside the showed set and pick the pair that mirrors the most extreme contrast in inclination or significance (Daily Times, 2020). It might be considered as a variety of the technique for Paired Comparisons. A Max Diff overview might be planned and investigated in two different ways: a. a. Through manual plan and specialist drove investigation utilizing standard factual programming methods or
- b) By using a business study organization, which bolsters this sort of discrete decision model (Daily Times, 2020).

Investigation of a Max Diff review contains information that shows how frequently each quality was shown, notwithstanding the quantities of times, the characteristic was picked as best and most noticeably worst. With these three information, the focuses measure the overall significance of subject under research and observation (Daily Times, 2020).

Max Diff analysis is applied on the categorical and axial coded data collected after survey of measuring impact range of both border management systems. For the purpose systematic random sampling was chosen i.e. practitioners from law enforcement agencies, ministry foreign affairs and interior is approached. According to collected data and Max Diff analysis, it is observed that current loopholes extracted from the survey data collected, via systematic random sampling, reveals operational problems emerging from policy lapse. These operational issues can be rectified under CBM approach by employing coordination and collaboration among the concerned agencies. Issue rectification via coordination will serve the purpose of both sides of the borders for peace creation and keeping for long term. Following figure-1 summarizes the comparative results among IBM and CBM approach through survey research conducted for the purpose. Max Diff Analysis IBM V/s CBM Approach prepared by the author




Summarizing results of the research, archival study of IBM system reveals aspects, which are creating problems for managing the cross-border drive. It includes undue beneficiaries as under individual influence or joining hands with extremist factions for a cash influx. Secondly, rapid skirmishes at borders while controlling illegal trade and drive results in border closure and halts dialogue process among the neighbouring states. Thirdly, deterrence under IBM system of managing borders is not always a solution towards handling issues, which require a policy review according to changing scenarios. Fourthly, skirmishes happen due to misunderstandings and behavioural rigidness in ongoing border management system. These mishaps can be contained by sharing data among border management and law enforcement agencies from either side of the borders. Lastly, the status quo under IBM system for decades can be broken down by the development of a joint action plan under joint discussions among the concerned agencies from both sides of the borders.

Coordinated Border Management (CBM): An Asymmetric Warfare Containment Approach

Adopting CBM system for border management and operation will help curb many issues between two states in a systematic manner. CBM has three basic constructive features i.e. coordination, collaboration and cooperation. It may pave possibilities of teamwork and

joint ventures beside trade activities among the neighbouring countries with conjoined future. Asymmetric warfare appears to be most holistic combat type, for world powers too, and in barren lands of Afghanistan. Paraplegic dimension of warfare paralyzes the socio-economic and political life of the nation-state, thus ruining possibilities of safe survival. Hence, containment of the deadliest approach is possible not by force but by systematic and deliberate cooperation. The figure displaying paraplegic resilience policy plan shows a containment and resilience approach towards asymmetric warfare. Residents and concerned agencies could assume a significant part in deciding the result of an asymmetric war. In such clashes, it is easier for extremists to absorb into the populace after an assault, tips on timing or area of radical action can sabotage any opposition. In a data-driven system, regular folks are seen as a source of vital data as opposed to resources to fight the irregular war. It further gives a worldview to comprehend the elements of such clashes where non-military personnel data of outfits are exercising in terrain and cross border drive, sharing is significant for containing such hidden powers. For instance, security situation of region may be under control after prospect of US withdrawal in near future from Afghanistan terrain. Continuous blame game since decades regarding asymmetric warfare from both sides of border due to extremist outfits i.e. TTP, Al-Qaeda factions in Afghanistan and now emerging ISIS etc will be curbed (A.S. Linstead, 2010). This security chaos leading to diplomatic rift will end too. Loss of innocent lives and burying defenders of state under tons of soil needs to be stopped for prosperous future of generations. CBM would be a sentinel approach than merely an operational approach to contain asymmetric warfare not only in the region but in all similar scenarios.



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Militant Demobilization and Reintegration in the Pashtun Belt of Pakistan

Dr. Muhammad Irfan Mahsud⁷

Abstract

Demobilization and reintegration of convicted/captured militants/terrorists is a sensitive and complex process. Demobilization is a formal and controlled discharge of militants from active militancy or militant groups. Reintegration is a process through which a militant acquires civilian status, employment and sustainable income. In 2009, Pakistan's militant demobilization and reintegration program started in Swat. The capture of huge number of militants created problems ranging from special confinement facilities, financial resources to human rights issues and demand of the families of reintegration of the convicts. The paper has analyzed existing infrastructure and policies of militant demobilization and reintegration process in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan by taking into account the Western models. The analysis drew support both from theoretical and empirical literature, thus explored the existing models of militant demobilization and reintegration apparatus in Pakistan. It also has compared the demobilization and reintegration programs/policies of Pakistan with other/developed countries. It has also examined the impact of such policies on the convicts, their families and society. The study has employed ethnographic based data collection tools, such as semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and personal observations to reach its findings. The respondents included families of the convicts, members of the concerned communities, professionals and government personnel (both serving and retired).

Keywords: Militants, Demobilization, Reintegration, Pashtun-Belt, Policies.

Introduction

Militant activities started on a large scale in the post 2003-2004 periods in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Mahsud, 2019). The emergence of militant groups invited chain of military operations. Resultantly, huge numbers of militants were captured after the successful dismantle of the militant groups. The confinement of huge number of militants created

⁷ Assistant Professor at National Defense University, Islamabad

problems on the state level. It means establishment of special confinement facilities, enormous financial expenditures. The issue was highlighted by civil society and humanitarian organization and by the families of the captured militants for reintegration. Many of the captured militants were under 18 years when they were captured (Basit, 2015). So, they needed second chance in life. Many of the adults involved in terrorist activities in the name of Islam were unaware of the basic tenants of their ideology/religion (N. Khan, Personal Communication, District Peshawar, February 2020). In numerous cases, the convicted were poverty stricken, illiterate and unemployed.

Demobilization and reintegration of convicted/captured militants/terrorists is a sensitive and complex process. Demobilization is a formal and controlled discharge of militants from active militancy or militant groups (Ball & Hendrickson, 2005). Reintegration is a process through which a militant acquires civilian status, employment and sustainable income (Ball, 2006). In 2009, Pakistan's militant demobilization and reintegration program started in Swat. The militant rehabilitation program as mentioned by various scholars (Basit, 2015) is comprised of militant who have disassociated themselves from the militant organizations and the youth who have little knowledge of extremist ideologies but they were driven by socio-economic factors.

Militant Demobilization and Reintegration Centers

There are several militants' demobilization and reintegration centers in Pakistan that are administered by Pakistan army with the support of different NGOs and local civil society bodies (Basit, 2015). These militants demobilization and reintegration centers are hosting different types of persons in the Pashtun areas. *Saboon* (Dawn) and *Rastoon* (right path) are two militant demobilization centers, which are located in Malaknad district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and these centers are dealing with the young militants of age between 16 to 19 years. *Mashal* (light torch) is another militant demobilization and reintegration center that deals with the militants of age 20 to 28 years and is located in Mingora, Swat District of KP province. There are three other centers in district Khyber on similar patterns and one in Bajour district known as *Navay Sahar* (new beginning). Some of these centers deals only with females. There is one most important center, which plays central role for the program of

militant demobilization and reintegration and is known as Sparlay. The *Sparlay* (spring season) center is located in district Tank and is located in close proximity to the district South Waziristan. The headquarters of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan was in South Waziristan District. It hosted largest number of militants in the Pashtun tribal belt in the post 9/11 period. Majority of the militants released were from South Waziristan, therefore, the center was established near this tribal district to assist the families of the militants swiftly. The training of the families of the captured militants takes place in this facility.

The deadliest/dangerous terrorists were not included in the program until recently. The militants who have surrendered and are living in confinement facilities have received little or no attention from academia and writers. The idea of Pakistan's demobilization and rehabilitation program is taken from the model which was introduced by Saudi Arabia and it has 80 percent success ratio. In Pakistan, the same model is achieving 100 percent success rate ratio (K. Khurram, Islamabad, February 2020). More than 1500 individuals are reintegrated in the respective communities with 100 percent result (M. Altimash, Khyber District, February 2020).

The Saudi Arabian Model

The militant demobilization and reintegration model of Saudi Arabia is very unique and quite interesting. This was established to uphold cultural norms/conventions, customs and traditions to influence a cognitive and behavioural shift away from violence to non-violence (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). The family relations and ties are of prime importance in the reintegration stage of the prisoners to be released. According to Holmer and Shtuni, (2017) the Saudi program relies heavily on familial obligations, notions of honor, and other cultural mores. The Saudi Arabian model used three approaches. One of which tends to breakdown ties/commitment of an individual-militant with the militant organization based on social obligation, emotional dimensions and other factors defined by the social institutions. The second one is to bolster the financial suitability of the individual-militant by providing facilities such as education, vocational training and skilled based learning. The third and the most important one is a tripod approach based on ideological affiliation, which systematically breakdown the previous affiliation. The efficiency of this model is subject to

the efforts of the professionals such as doctors, professors, psychologists, psychiatrists, clerks, law enforcement personnel and other skilled personnel. This model is costly in terms of time and money. Therefore, this approach is hard to adopt by the developing and poor states as it's costly and very expensive.

Aftercare Programs for the Militants

The aftercare of the militants is very important as it plays a vital role in the process of reintegration of the militants in their respective communities. Aftercare programs are crucial too for the prisoners, after their release, they are less vulnerable to be recruited into militant/extremist outfits but on other hand, nobody is willing to support or give them jobs. In Pakistan, due to scarce resources, government cannot spend efficiently on the aftercare programs of the militants. Thus, militants are integrated back into the society without formal institutions, which can monitor the activities of the returnees at least in the initial period of release. The role of civil government and its departments is crucial in this context too. In developed countries, the same task is given to probation officers who are affiliated with probationary departments (Neumann, 2010). But in the case of Pakistanis' terrorists/militants prisoners, there are no formalized programs in the aftercare, which has created problems for the individuals to adjust in the civil life. Probationary institutions have a checklist of certain conditions such as prohibition to see certain people or communicate with them, not to move far from home station and to enroll in fulltime education or training institutions (Neumann, 2010). There are conditions such as compulsory meetings with probation officer on regular intervals. However, in many countries probationary institutions are run by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The lack of direct involvement of the government in the aftercare can also be problematic because of the sensitivity of the issue of extremism. Moreover, the NGOs are mostly in this for business, the business first approach can compromise the entire model of aftercare of the militants.

In many Western countries such as US, France and Spain many militants are going to be released soon but the aftercare programs are not high on the list (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). In some European states such as Spain and France the sentences of the captured Islamist militants are considerably less as compared to the US. These prisoners will be released soon;

most of them will be deported to their home countries in the Middle East and there are no special arrangements for them to integrate them in their respective communities. This can get problematic too and make the released prisoners/militants vulnerable to join militant organizations with more vigor again.

Security First Approach

The security first approach upholds the idea of security as their top priority. Whereas, militant/prisoner care/demobilization/reintegration as second or third priority. Most of the Western developed countries including the US, UK and France is following security first approach in dealing with militants (Neumann, 2010). This approach has increased and intensified militancy/extremism/violence. Even most secure and restrict apparatuses have failed to provide a complete security. An example of Blind Sheikh who managed to communicate with militants outside the prison is a picture-perfect example in this regard. Sheikh served as the inspiration behind the 1993 World Trade Center attacks and he managed to send inflammatory messages from his prison cell in the US maximum security to his followers in Egypt (Lefkowitz, 2008). There are several other case studies too in which militant leaders have organized attacks from prison cells, even the maximum-security prisons failed to stop such episodes. In Britain, an imprisoned supporter of Al Qaeda used a mobile phone to direct the construction of an extremist website (Neumann, 2010). Neumann further noted that in Spain, Algerian terrorists planned a terrorist attack on the first anniversary of the 2004 Madrid train bombings from the prison cells.

There is a dire need of reformation of the prison system in general and militant confinement facilities in particular. Many countries dealing with militancy including Pakistan lack vigour and ambition when it comes to spending on the prison system. The political elite consider it unpopular and futile. Most of the militant/terrorist in the US and other Western countries will be sent back to home countries after the release. Therefore, the security first approach is supposed to continue in such states. In the case of Pakistan and many other countries, it is very important to understand that militant prisoners are not going anywhere after their sentences. Therefore, the security first approach will not suit these states where the militants will be integrated back into the societies in the same country. Spending

on rehabilitation program can be a real opportunity in the context of de-radicalization and reintegration in general.

Conclusion

The participation, assistance and support of the family and community is of prime importance for effective re-integrative program for returnees. In the Pashtun tribal belt, cultural values are given priority, and structures of the communities are family based. The concept of tribal elders and traditional way of dealing things are still intact. The government can take an opportunity of such environment to integrate the prisoners who have completed their sentences. The model in practice in Pakistan is predominantly the replica of Saudi model. In that case, well integrated communities can play crucial role in the aftercare of the inmates. Many militants have been released and integrated back into their respective communities in Waziristan, Khyber, Swat, Malakand, and Mohmand districts. Several of them were released and integrated with their families in urban areas such as Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, and Abbottabad too. Surprisingly the result of such case is 100 percent.

In the aftercare programs, the released prisoners must be facilitated in the context of Islamic de-radicalization. The help of professionals, experts and researchers are crucial to devise such programs, which can facilitate the ex-militants to give up on the extremist ideologies. For this, training and educational programs can be established to break the mental and psychological aspects of the militancy/violence. In Pakistan, whenever religion is in question, an ordinary man upholds extremist values/agendas/designs. Pakistan's demobilization programs are in the early stages. To strengthen its feasibility and efficiency, expert academic approach and cutting-edge research is needed. To understand the processes of demobilization and rehabilitation, it is imperative to dig deeper and develop deep understanding of the affected individuals and even societies. The current rehabilitation programs in Pakistan are temporary and local based with limited confinement facilities and financial resources. The policy makers in Pakistan are supposed to be innovative and dynamic to handle the constantly evolving and changing modes of militancy. Therefore, a broad national strategy and centralization of this program is needed because terrorism in Pakistan has spread all over. Terrorism in the modern world has transformed into more

complex phenomenon as it's a war of ideas too. In the world of ideas and innovation, demobilization and reintegration of the personnel associated with militancy is a positive step taken by the government.

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Impact of Expected US Exit from Afghanistan on South Asian Militant Landscape

Abdul Basit⁸

Abstract

The 1979 Russian invasion and the 2001 United States (US)' intervention in Afghanistan strengthened global Jihadism in South Asia, as a plethora of local and regional jihadists lent their support to Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Taliban. In the wake of the ongoing Afghan peace process and the expected US exit from Afghanistan, the local and regional militant trends in South Asia are likely to be reinvigorated, while global Jihadism will be weakened. Consequently, it is less likely that despite the expected chaos and volatility, a post-US Afghanistan would once again become the epicentre of global Jihadism. Arguably, the absence of a big enemy like Russia and the US will keep global jihadists away from the Afghan theatre, barring a handful of AQ remnants and a few supporters and fighters of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK).

Introduction

The US-Taliban peace deal signed in late February 2020 to bring the 19-year old war to a negotiated settlement seems to be floundering as violence has returned to the Afghan battles space (Detsch, Gramer & Haverty, 2020). Following the unclaimed brutal attack on Kabul's Dasht-e-Barchi hospital, a Médecins Sans Frontières run maternity clinic, and a funeral in eastern Nangarhar province (Aljazeera, 2020), President Ashraf Ghani ordered the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to switch from defensive to offensive mode (Reuters, 2020).

To initiate the intra-Afghan negotiations, the Afghan government is sticking to its demand of a ceasefire (Tolo News, 2020), while the Taliban are not budging from their pre-condition of releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners (Aljazeera, 2020). Following the three-day Eid truce announced by the Taliban (Tolo News, 2020) and the subsequent release of 900 Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government (Gannon & Akhgar, 2020) as well as the

⁸ Research fellow S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

political accord between Ghani and his rival Dr Abdullah Abdullah, which mandates the latter to spearhead the negotiations, has revived hopes of kick-starting the peace process (Aljazeera, 2020). At any rate, any outcome of the Afghan peace process (positive or negative), will have far reaching consequences on the South Asian militant landscape (International Crises Group, 2020).

Against this backdrop, this article will explore some implications of the US-Taliban deal and the expected US withdrawal on South Asia's militant landscape (New York Times, 2020). The anticipated US exit is creating a triumphant jihadist narrative that another superpower has been defeated in Afghanistan, and has emboldened disparate jihadist movements in the region. The article will argue that the possible US withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to reinvigorate the local and regional jihadist movements in South Asia, but it would weaken global jihadism. A plethora of local and regional militant groups, which redirected their activities from Kashmir or anti-Shia militancy to help the Taliban oust the US from Afghanistan, are likely to refocus their attention to their old agendas. Hence, Afghanistan might turn into a hub of local and regional militancy in South Asia, but in the absence of a big enemy like Russia and the US, it is unlikely to become an epicentre of global jihadism.

This article, in the context of the US-Taliban deal, only includes South Asian jihadist groups in the discussion. Non-jihadist groups engaged in insurgencies, political violence and other forms of religious extremism in South Asia are beyond the scope of this article. It is equally important to point out that though jihadist groups can be differentiated, on the basis of their declared operational and ideological interests, as local, regional and global groups, on the ground, these lines are quite blurred. Finally, it is important to highlight that the arguments laid out in this article will be reversed, if the US (for any reason) revisits its decision to exit Afghanistan. Likewise, if the Taliban movement splinters as a result of differences between the pro-talk and pro-fight elements, it can boost global jihadism, and more specifically the Islamic State (IS). The demotion and replacement of hard-line Taliban commander Sardar Ibrahim with Mullah Yaqoob, the son of Taliban's founding leader Mullah Omar, as head of the military wing points to existing division within the Taliban leader ahead of expected peace talks (Arab News, 2020).

This article has relied on interviews of terrorism experts in South Asia and consulted IS' weekly newsletter *Al-Naba* and *Voice of Jihad*, AQ's three-page statement congratulating the Taliban on their victory in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS)' monthly magazine *Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad*. The paper has also utilized published primary and secondary sources such as media reporting, policy reports and expert commentary on the subject. Divided in three sections, it first looks at the nature and composition of the South Asian militant landscape. Then, the article examines how the US-Taliban deal is creating a triumphant jihadist narrative in South Asia and why it is likely to reinvigorate local and regional jihadism in the region. Finally, the article explores why the deal is likely to weaken global jihadism in South Asia.

Nature and Composition of South Asian Militant Landscape

The South Asian militant landscape is chaotic, divisive and complicated with a highly competitive operational environment (Basit, 2019). It is an overcrowded space where militant groups of various persuasions operate. The region has the second highest concentration of militant groups in the world after the Middle East (Zahid, 2019). In the last four decades, these groups have cooperated and competed against each other. Generally, four types of militant groups operate in South Asia. First, country-focused jihadist outfits such as the Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Second, sectarian extremist outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jandullah and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). These are hybrid groups because they not only fall in the local and regional categories, but they have also coalesced with AQ and IS. Third, regional militant organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) et al. Fourth, global entities like AQ and its regional affiliate AQIS as well as IS' official branches in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Historically, AQ has dominated the South Asian jihadist landscape (Sternersen, 2016). The region is AQ's birthplace. Most of the groups operating in the region respect AQ as the vanguard of the jihadist movement in the region and the world (Zahid, 2014). In the 1990s, these groups trained in Afghanistan in AQ-operated camps and signed Osama bin Laden's Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.

However, the advent of IS challenged AQ's ideological supremacy in the region as some groups gravitated towards the former (Hourelid, 2015).

Taliban's Perceived Victory in Afghanistan is creating a Triumphant Jihadist Narrative in South Asia

In South Asia's diverse jihadist community, the Taliban's perceived victory over the US has created a triumphant jihadist narrative that after Russia, another superpower has been defeated by Afghanistan (Rana, 2020). This narrative is likely to fuel jihadist recruitment across the region, along with reinvigorating local and regional groups which joined hands with the Taliban to push out the US from Afghanistan (Zahid, 2020). Now that this mission, at least in the jihadists' view, seems accomplished, they will turn their man and fire power towards their pre-9/11 areas of focus i.e. Kashmir, anti-Shia militancy and country-focused violent activities to overthrow democracy and enact Shariah rule. Hence, there will be a regionalization and localization of the South Asia jihadist landscape (Pantucci, 2020).

Following the US-Taliban deal, AQ's general command issued a three-page statement in March lauding the Taliban's "great victory" (Joscelyn, 2020). The statement also mentions founder and supreme leader of the Taliban Mullah Omar's message, who said, "Allah has promised us victory, and Bush has promised us defeat. The world will see which of these promises will be fulfilled." (Joscelyn, 2020). Similarly, AQIS has published a special issue of its monthly Urdu language magazine *Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad* in March, congratulating the Taliban for "defeating" the US (Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad, 2020). More importantly, AQIS has changed the name of its magazine from *Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad* (Voice of Afghan Jihad) to *Nawa-e-Ghazwa Hind* (Voice of the Great Indian Battle) which indicates that with the expected US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the future focus of the group will be India and Kashmir (Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad, 2020). Likewise, an Uzbek militant group, Katibat Imam al Bukhari (KIB), which operates both in Syria and Afghanistan, has also felicitated the Taliban on their apparent victory in Afghanistan (Weiss, 2020). Also, internal discussions of various Kashmiri militant groups seem to be inspired by the perceived Taliban victory. Such groups have argued that if the Taliban can defeat the US in Afghanistan, they can do the same against India in Kashmir (Ramchandran, 2020).

Adjacent to the above-mentioned congratulatory messaging, some organizational realignment and shift in geographical focus is already underway. For instance, in a recent interview with Al-Jazeera, the former TTP spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan hinted at the possibility of cooperation between TTP and ISK (Hashim, 2020). Likewise, in Indian Kashmir, various local militant groups have formed an umbrella organization, the Resistance Front (TRF), to combine their manpower and resources against the Indian security forces (Pandey, 2020). This group has claimed several attacks in Kashmir in recent months (Pandey, 2020). In April, ANDSFs discovered six training camps of JeM between Khost and Jalalabad where over 400 militants have been trained and currently they are fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan (Gupta, 2020). Following the Indian government's decision to abrogate Article 370 of the country's Constitution, which has stripped the significant autonomy enjoyed by Kashmir for several decades, resentment and anger in the area has heightened. If militant groups channel this anger and grievances effectively, militancy is likely to increase (Pantucci, 2020).

Contrary to this congratulatory messaging, IS in its weekly newsletter, *Al-Naba*, mentions that the US has been defeated in Wilayah Khorasan but "Islam has not yet won (Al-Naba Newsletter, 2020)." IS upholds that this victory is not because of the Taliban who are termed as "mushrik" (hypocrites), but due to America's inability to conclude the war in Afghanistan (Voice of Hind, 2020). In late May, a similar message was echoed by the IS spokesperson Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in an audio message published by group's media arm, Al-Furqan media (Green Bird, 2020; Seldin, 2020). The editorial further notes, "Taliban's control of Afghanistan will not bring Islamic rule until they repent to Allah". In another publication aimed at a South Asian audience, Voice of Hind, IS has questioned the very notion of victory maintaining that winning or losing a piece of land from "kuffar" (infidels) is not victory. Rather, victory is to steadfastly follow "Deen" (Islam) while facing difficulties and challenges (Voice of Hind, 2020).

Localization and Regionalization of South Asian Jihadism

In the current scenario, the lines between regional and global militants in South Asia have become quite blurred with the emergence of AQIS and ISK (Acharya, 2020). Both

these entities are branches of AQ and IS but other than (global) branding, their leaders and membership are local. Furthermore, the ideological narratives of AQIS and ISK (Ghazwa-e-Hind) focus on South Asian local and regional conflicts (Acharya, 2020). Besides, over the last few years, AQ has glocalised its jihadist strategy by embedding its fighters within local militant movements (Turner, 2014). Also, AQ in South Asia is following a policy of strategic patience and de-emphasises violence to avoid attention. This globalization in and of itself has also strengthened regional and local trends of militancy (Rassler, 2020).

Most often, the AQIS-ISK fighting, tit-for-tat propaganda warfare and ideological blame games have overshadowed local and regional struggles as well as drained their manpower and financial resources (Zahid, 2020). To avoid this intra-jihadist fighting, local and regional groups are likely to tread an independent path and stay away from getting sucked into this AQIS-ISK enmity (Zahid, 2020). Two cases in point are TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). When IMU defected from AQ to IS (Mehl, 2015), its then leader Usman Ghazi was assassinated by the Taliban and later the group split between pro-AQ and pro-IS factions (Pannier, 2015). A similar thing happened to TTP, which has splintered into several factions after a few factions within the group gravitated towards ISK (AP News, 2017). In an overall sense, local groups, which joined ISK and AQIS in South Asia, have weakened.

Moreover, one lesson that can be gleaned from the Taliban's claimed victory in Afghanistan against the US for local and regional South Asian militant groups is that if a group's goals are limited and realistic, the enemy is clearly defined, and there is a coherent organizational structure and strategy, the chances of victory are greater (Feyyaz, 2020). Unlike AQ and IS, which have been decimated by the US, the Taliban's Afghan-centric approach proved effective (Taneja, 2020). Keeping this in view, local and regional South Asian militant movements, are likely to stay away from AQ and IS because not only would it dilute their local causes, but it will also provide a convenient pretext to state authorities to crackdown on indigenous movements, framing them as transnational terrorists (Syed Abdullah, 2020). So, the local groups are likely to follow the successful local model rather than global jihadism, which seems to be failing in the South Asian context (Sinan, 2020).

Global Jihadism is Likely to Be Weakened

Prior to the emergence of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2014, Afghanistan was the main trendsetter of global jihadism in the world. Since the 1980s, aspiring jihadists from around the world travelled to Afghanistan for training and participation in jihadism. Moreover, most of the jihadist movements around the world emanated from the Afghan Jihad. However, with the pending US departure from Afghanistan, the above-mentioned trends are unlikely to be replicated. In the absence of the US, global jihadists are unlikely to return to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is unlikely to become the epicenter of global jihadism for the following four reasons.

First, as mentioned above, a Russia or US like big enemy would be missing from the equation in a post-US Afghanistan. So, jihadists from the Middle East, Africa and the rest of the world will not return to Afghanistan barring a handful of hardened supporters and fighters of IS. Already the unrest in the Middle East and Africa provides enough organizational platforms and conflicts for the jihadists from these regions, such that they are less likely to travel to Afghanistan. The emotive appeal of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa for jihadists from these regions will be greater than the attraction of local and regional South Asian conflicts. A Yemeni is more likely to fight in Yemen compared to wanting to travel and fight in Kashmir and vice versa.

Second, the Afghan Taliban, notwithstanding their claimed victory, and in-line with their Afghan-centric approach, could discourage foreign jihadists from returning to Afghanistan. This is because a return of foreign jihadists will potentially weaken the Taliban's territorial control and dent their image. Not allowing Afghanistan's soil to be used for attacks against the US and its allies is one of the key conditions of the US-Taliban deal. So, to keep their territorial control and enhance their chances of forming the government in Afghanistan in collusion with other Afghan political groups, the Taliban may try to keep foreign jihadists out of Afghanistan (Feyyaz, 2020).

Third, AQ has been reduced to a shadow of its former self and is incapable of attracting foreign jihadists to Afghanistan. Moreover, AQIS since its formation has exclusively focused on local and regional issues in South Asia employing local leaders and fighters (Zahid, 2020). At the same time, ISK would remain involved in anti-Shia militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Almost all anti-Shia Sunni extremist groups such as Jandullah,

LeJ and LJA have pledged allegiance to IS. These outfits will continue their anti-Shia militancy from ISK's platform (Farooq, 2020). ISK may continue to operate in Balochistan's areas close to Iran's border. This positioning would also allow ISK to target Chinese nationals involved in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, the flagship infrastructure project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (Ahmed, 2020). Finally, the leadership crisis within AQ and ISK will also bar them from creating space for their agendas in the South Asian militant landscape. In recent years, AQIS Asim Umar and AQ's heir apparent Hamza Bin Laden have been killed in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2020). Likewise, ISK's emir Abdullah Orakzai aka Sheikh Aslam Farouqi and Zai-ul-Haq aka Sheikh Omar Khorasani who was the group's leader for South Asia and Far East have been arrested by ANDSFs (BBC News, 2020).

Conclusion

Afghanistan's peace process is floundering sooner than expected. Yet, the US remains committed to the troop withdrawal timeline agreed with the Taliban in the Doha agreement. This alleviates any pressure on the Taliban to de-escalate violence as demanded by the Afghan government and continuously shapes the Taliban's victory narrative. This continuing violence and victory narrative entails far-reaching security implications for South Asia. Alongside the intra-Afghan peace process, a regional dialogue among Afghanistan's regional stakeholders (India, Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, among others) is also needed to come to some kind of consensus on a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan as well as how to join forces to deny any space or opportunities to non-state violent actors. Notwithstanding India-Pakistan adversarial relations, South Asian countries will have to form a regional counter-terrorism mechanism to address different forms of terrorism and political violence in the region which at times cuts across the states.

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STATE-BUILDING IN BALOCHISTAN: LEGITIMACY AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

Bakht Noor Khan⁹

ABSTRACT

Many, if not most, post-colonial states are still in the process of state-building. The state is relatively a modern idea to the Muslim societies. This unfamiliarity with the idea of state has given birth to ideological debates as well as political confrontations, between the state and society. Importantly, state has sought help from a wide range of concepts – divine and worldly – to ‘legitimize its legitimacy’. In countries like Pakistan, its monopoly over tools and use of violence is a dominant theme of state-crafting. To investigate, how post-colonial Muslim state define their sovereignty, legitimacy, and in that process encapsulate the peripheries through various means is the question of the paper.

Key Words: State Building, Muslim Societies, Post- Colonial Muslim State, Legitimacy

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is a post-colonial state. It has lived for 70 years, yet it has to decide how it wants to be known to the world. The ostensible ‘identity crisis’ may describe this situation. In the process of state-building it has dwelled on different positions. This paper seeks to investigate the questions of state legitimacy, its monopoly over use and forces of violence, encapsulation and state-crafting in the context of Balochistan. It investigates how the state has sought legitimacy on the wake of different challenges it has faced over the time, and how they have resulted eventually. In Balochistan, for example, “State of Exception” is in full display. The concept is discussed in detail and it focuses on the theory of Giorgio Agamben in the context of Balochistan.

The lens through which the state is seen as a divine force or the start and end of everything has the least used in the academic circles, specifically in the light of State of Exception and Carl Schmitt’s political theology. After 9/11, many scholars have used religion as a policy tool and cohesive force. Hussain Haqqani’s in his book “Pakistan

⁹ Development Research Fellow at SPRC, Government of Balochistan

between Mosque and Military”, has provided a substantial evidence and work in this regard, which again confines itself to the larger political landscape.

This research is inter-disciplinary, qualitative and descriptive in nature, which has roots in the classical theoretical work of Aristotle, Hobbes, de Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Mill and Weber. Many qualitative political instability researchers attribute a great deal of descriptive importance to the nature of the collective action that a nation is experiencing. The qualitative explanatory school is extremely well grounded in the history and sociology. A factor that I have profoundly given weight in this research is the recognition of ethnic group as a significant actor, beside other social classes..

Historical Background and Understanding Baloch Nationalism

According to Baloch nationalists, the Baloch nationalism has deep roots in the Baloch history, dating back to as far as 1500 years ago (Qaisarani, 1994). Some experts of the area are of the opinion that Baloch nationalism started in the colonial British era (Noraiee, 2015). The resistance of Kalat state to the Colonial British Empire is described as the emergence of Baloch nationalism. The contention between the British-Empire and Tsarist empire resulted in the British attack on Afghanistan convinced the British power-corridors to capture Balochistan, aiming to control the logistic supply-lines to Kandahar (Harrison, 1981). It was also during this period, that the British Raj understood the strategic and military significance of Balochistan, and subsequently diverted its focus from the green fields of Ganges and Indus. This was also the first encounter of the Baloch to the modernity (Gazdar, 1947). However, they didn't capture it absolutely, and kept a thin line bordering Afghanistan under their control (Dashti, 2012).

For different scholars, Baloch nationalism technically emerged near the time of establishment of Pakistan. We can say that, perhaps, the Baloch motivated by the Red revolution in Russia and the freedom movement in India, nationalist leaders started raising voice for an independent Balochistan. On 15 August, 1947, a day after the partition of sub-continent, the ruler of Kalat announced his state free, bidding to arrange an uncommon association with the newly established Pakistan in the areas of defense and external relations. Pakistan expressed displeasure over the announcement and Kalat was acceded with Pakistan

after 9 months. The accession was followed by insurgency in 1948, 1958, and 1962 (Khan, 1975). The latest insurgency took birth after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Baloch Honour as the Trigger

Neither the Baloch grievances died in the brief periods of relative calm in the province, nor the efforts by the state compensated for the past misdeeds. Therefore, Balochistan witnessed waves of violence after every decade or two. There are multiple reasons to argue that the problem hasn't been understood well, hence the efforts to solve the issue of Baloch have been proved to be unfruitful. One of many reasons due to which there is a lack of trust between Islamabad and Baloch leadership is that little attention has been paid to the deep-rooted Baloch sense of honour, which is breached knowingly or unknowingly. Balochistan was relatively calm in end of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century. There wasn't any active insurgent groups operating widely, neither there was a political movement. The veteran Baloch leaders either adopted isolation in Karachi or Gulf, or made arrangements with the government. The uprising was activated by the sexual assault of a female physician, Shazia Khalid in the little Baloch town of Sui. A military man supposedly executed the assault.

The military foundation's supposed exertion to conceal the episode set off a progression of assaults against the security forces and the Frontier Constabulary by individuals from the Bugti clan. Islamabad's strategy towards the Baloch spins around three subjects. These are political manoeuvring, military activities, and development. As far as legislative issues are concerned, majority of investigators believe that the government has not entertained the demand for democratic rights. Some, be that as it may, interface this political technique with integration of the general population. One remarkable exemption is Tariq Niazi, who connects the refusal of civil and democratic rights to violence. In particular, Niazi notes, "since Pakistan's freedom, extremist brutality in Baluchistan broke out in light of the state's endeavor at stifling the democratic will of the general population" (Niazi, 2015). Another special case is Selig Harrison's work on the Baloch individuals. He additionally takes note of

this association between disavowals of vote based system and violence (Harrison, 1981). Frederic Graré examines how decisions in the most recent decade held this example of denying full majority rule rights to the Baloch (Graré, 2006). The theme of proper utilization of military power nets alternate points of view (Awan, 1985).

Political alienation

The political part to the Islamabad perspective says that the centre has routinely denied popular government to the Baloch people. Therefore, the administration has decreased their capacity to incorporate this society. For the Baloch, democratic and popular system denial shows up in the constrained history of Baloch joining into Pakistan, the One Unit System, and the 2002 elections, which they believe were rigged. The post-colonial states' struggle to integrate the peripheral territories, especially when they are disgruntled, thus ends up in refusing popularly elected parties rule. In return, that makes the integration more difficult and processes a bitter one. This argument can be illustrated well if we look back at the history of the previous waves of unrest. The violent phase was followed whenever there is election rigging, or dismissal of an elected government. An examination of these events shows that Islamabad was, all things considered, out of endeavor with democratic principles when executing approaches in case of Baloch people.

The One Unit system introduced in early years after independence is an additional instance of government denial of political rights to the Baloch, and other smaller provinces. It is associated with the 1958 uprising. In 1970, Ayub Khan's successor General Yahya Khan terminated One Unit, and formed the province of Balochistan, and announced election, which helped in eliminating revolts. It is worth mentioning that whenever a popular government was installed in the province, there was dramatic decline in insurgency (Graré, 2006). The last instance of the lawmaking body of Pakistan's renouncing of dominant part rule government to the Baloch was in 2002. At the time, President General Pervez Musharraf was endeavouring to legitimize his office. To do all things considered, he needed politicians whom he could control, especially in Balochistan. He searched for a union with the religious parties gathered under the name of MMA (Mutahidda Majlis- Amal), an Islamic ideological

party/movement, made up of a couple of Islamic parties befriended the establishment in an attempt to get a share in the government.

Economic Grievances

Another reason that has kept the flame hot for the Baloch nationalists is the persistent extraction of the resources from their lands with no relief for ordinary Baloch families. Being the most fortunate in the country in the natural resources yet the most unfortunate in the life quality gives much strength to the idea that economic exploitation has been severe in the region. To evaluate this aspect, this section looks at how resource exploitation, biased economic policies, and uneven distribution of the state's resources made the path of integration into mainstream political life of the state difficult. The central government made policies, which profoundly paved the way for use of the natural assets present in the areas to support the government in the centre. The Sui gas field situated in Balochistan was the biggest flammable gas field in Pakistan until late 90s. Up until 1984, Sui Gas field supplied more than 50% gas to the overall need of Pakistan. Altogether, the territory of Balochistan produces somewhere in the range of 36% and 45% of the national petroleum and gas. Notwithstanding this, numerous regions in Balochistan are still without gas connection, even in the same district where the gas is produced. It is worth noting that Sui Gas was discovered in 1950s while its connection in Balochistan was installed in 1984. Only four towns of Balochistan have gas supply out of twenty-six locales. The seizure of natural assets is the most constant complaint of the Baloch.

Poverty

One may argue that conflict in Pakistan is between those who are rich and those who are poor. The difference between Baloch and the mainland Punjab isn't only symbolic. A human development study conducted by UNDP in 2003 showed a very surprising data. It positioned Dera Bugti- district where Sui is located as the least developed area. Whereas, Jhelum located in Punjab was declared the developed one, an area that has top brass military personals. The unequal development and variation in human development index was striking too. Half of the last 30 districts in HDI were located in Balochistan. Whereas, more than 60%

of 31 best locale in HDI were located in Punjab. The financial variations in Pakistan are very apparent from the UNDP report, which uncovered that notwithstanding being just 8.0 million in number; practically 50% of the last 30 districts in human advancement were situated in Balochistan. In correlation, 60% of the best 31 locale in human advancement were situated in Punjab. These incongruities are very alarming.

The disregard of decades has brought about a vast inequality in human development in Balochistan and the other parts of Pakistan. In 2002 report by Planning and Development division of the Government of Balochistan (GoB), the education rate in the region is at a dreary 26.6% contrasted with 47% in the remaining parts of Pakistan. Since its beginning, the University of Balochistan has granted less than 50 doctoral degrees. Colleges of Punjab and Karachi, in correlation, have granted more than 1500 doctoral degrees each.

Lowest Human Development Index of the Richest Region

Two prevailing speculations endeavour to contextualize the decades-long emergency in Balochistan. The Islamabad hypothesis proposes that the state and its offices are in charge of the absence of advancement, rebel developments and the subsequent militancy in Balochistan. The Baloch hypothesis holds the Baloch Sardars and outside components in charge of Balochistan's troubles. The Baloch perspective, which blames Baloch Sardars for Balochistan's inconveniences, does appreciate the state's endowments as well as favored by numerous individuals in print and news media in Pakistan. However, it is observed that Nasirabad is only a little superior to Dera Bugti in access to channelled water and education rate. In the meantime, Dera Bugti reports altogether higher number of therapeutic offices, for example emergency clinics, fundamental wellbeing units than Nasirabad. These close insights outline that all zones of Balochistan are altogether poor; irrespective of the fact what the dominant Sardar is doing vis-a-vis the state. The urbanized white collar class and land magnates in Pakistan may keep on considering the Baloch Sardars responsible for Balochistan's problems. In any case, given a chance, Pakistani urbanites may not dither in hurting Baloch interests. Consider, for example, the incredible land snatch in advancement in Gwadar where the indigenous people have been left helpless before the enormous land designers from Lahore and Karachi. GDA has granted development rights for 12,533 acres of

housing schemes. Once built and populated, the housing schemes will likely shift the demographic makeup of Gwadar, whose current populace is somewhat short of 200,000. Indeed, even at a low placement of 50 people for every section of land per acre, when assembled the 12,533 sections of land of new lodging improvement will pull in approximately 600,000 new occupants to Gwadar, along these lines in a general sense, changing its ethnic composition fundamentally. This has been a long-held fear of the Baloch that once such developments have reached their peak, they will practically become minority in their own land.

Ongoing Insurgency

All the more as of late, General Pervez Musharraf defended using coercive strategies in Balochistan as a characteristic of a battle to end the territory's miseries due to a minority of tribal leaders, who were the reason behind the underdevelopment. They made a simple substitute for the government, which, curiously, expressed at the time that just 7 percent of the area was engaged with the revolt yet could not explain why the rest of the 93 percent that was under its control was not developed as well (Ahmed, 1999). Among 28 noteworthy sardars, only 3 had rebelled against the national government. In addition, as per Baloch columnist Malik Siraj Akbar, "the BLA isn't possessed by any one of the sardars" (Akbar, 2011). No tribal chief, including Bugti and Mari, admitted that they are not supporting the Baloch Liberation Army, despite the fact that every one of them confess to sponsor the fighters. Baloch tribal structure and kinship is still very much relevant but it has lost its influence as compared to previous insurgencies. Nowadays, the Baloch national movement is commanded by the middle class who is educated and more flexible with respect to tribal hierarchies. Apart from Mari and Bugti, most of the today's leaders arose from middle class.

The geographical scope of the violence has also changed with the changing Baloch society. The earlier insurgencies were concentrated in Kohlu and Dera Bugti, and also around Kalat and Khuzdar but today it has moved from rural to urban areas. In some cases, it has overflowed to even Karachi. These developments have changed the texture of the movement in a sense that the role of Sardars is decreasing, and the political workers from an area like Turbat, Kech or Kharan could have more influence on the nationalist cadres (Grare,

2006). The rise of Baloch insurgency as today is known has been the result of a complex procedure of liberation of the Baloch ordinary men, regularly educated in institution which was outside Balochistan. This class rose in parallel and as possible in exchange with the developing nationalism of Balochi clans (Adeel, 2009). The inborn character of nationalism in Baloch people is as much an issue of politics as of human studies. The tribal question is as yet a basic segment of any discourse on Baloch insurgent movement and has for some time been the principle contention of the individuals who discredited the presence of a Baloch nation (Adeel, 2009). For instance, alluding to the NAP, Feroz Ahmad wrote in 1999 that "the Awami League, which drove a Bengali movement across all the factions of the society, the NAP in Balochistan is a minor alliance of Balochi and Brahwi tribal chiefs. In the linguistic premise, Brahwis share as much for all intents and purpose with the Baloch as Tamils would have with Pashtuns." As a self-evident reality, Balochi language speakers are larger part in only four of 30 regions, such as Makran coastal area, Kharan/Rakhshan, Chaghi and Sibbi. Indeed, even in the place of birth of Baloch nationalism, Khalat, and Brahwi are the dominant languages. This interesting fact adds to the long-held questions that various scholars' ask about the presence of a Baloch nation. Nevertheless, there has been a unique process in Balochistan, in which the two majority lingual groups have spectacularly emerged as a single nation; Baloch. In fact, the current leadership of the mainstream Baloch politics is Brahvi-speaking Mengal family.

Balouchistan - State of Exception

Overseeing differences has been a noteworthy worry for most states, and different systems have been utilized, going from wiping out contrast to acknowledgment of social distinctions. McGarry and O'Leary (1993) distinguished eight unmistakable ways to deal with ethnic clash guideline that are not really connected in discrete and particular design but rather are generally found in blends. These strategies are secession, ethnic cleansing, genocide and political homogenization – the exercise carried by Soviet Union in the form of 'Russofication' (extending from integration to assimilation). Whereas, the other systems include the administration of distinction via domineering control, arbitration and self-rule

(Fair, 2010). Pakistan is politically and culturally a heterogeneous state. The country has more than four distinct cultures, languages and ethnic groups. Although, there have been efforts by the state to homogenize the country politically and culturally. Efforts have been made to promote Islamic identity in place of ethnic identity and so on. The journey of homogenization or integration is not always smooth. It is specifically difficult in the post-colonial states, which are not developed. The nation-state needs a long time to develop a national identity, which encompasses all other identities too. In Pakistan, this journey has been short yet full of troubles. The country saw the first in the shape of Bangladesh, which ceded in 1971. After this tragedy, the state attempted to mould the social and political fabric more vigorously. Authoritative control, in any case, has been the most widely recognized strategy by which truly divided social orders are balanced out. Dictator or imperialistic regimes oversee social contrast through co-optation of elite class, tribal chiefs, religious leaders and other notables. Ethnic difference, both dormant and dynamic, especially in times of quick modernization, is quickly stifled. Authorities topple ethnic distinction in an incomplete way in the interest of the dominant nationality. This process is named by O'Leary as the *Staatsvolk* (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993). To do this, the overwhelming majority should be organized, which in a liberal vote-based system implies the dominance of that group over state structure and the marginality of minorities. Control on coercive machine did not really rely upon the consent of the biggest ethnic group but, it is controlled by the dominant ethnic group or the group which is in majority. Unsurprisingly, there also are numerous instances of ethnic minorities' control of the security powers and their use of this apparatus to enhance and boost support authoritative control (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993).

Constitutionally, the mechanism for regulating and managing inter-provincial ethnic divisions is federalism. In Pakistan, constitution was amended several times, and lately it didn't resemble a federating constitution. However, the Eighteenth Amendment has moved it back to federalism to a great extent. Yet, the fruits of a federation have not been tasted because the amendment has been on paper only so far (Centre for Research & Security Studies, 2016). In spite of the fact that Pakistan is a federation, hegemonic control has been fundamental arrangement of ethnic differences. Dictatorships are always inclined to control various groups through coercive mastery and enfranchising the elite. The key stake-holders

in case of Balochistan have been the military, which is increasingly imperative under military principle. Notwithstanding that the military also has been the main decision-maker body of Pakistan for greater part of its history. Obviously, Pakistan's capability to endure secessionist movement has increased. With that, it has also increased the coercive measure and one can argue that it has radicalized the most moderate components of the nationalist quarters. Understandably, nationalist parties are compelled to make their stances radical; or else they will lose the support of their followers. For instance, in 2006, previous National Awami Party pioneer and Balochistan National Party senior statesman Ataullah Mengal needed to pronounce that "the days to take on political conflicts are over" (Zafar, 2012). For whatever length of time that the Pakistani focus acknowledged patriot portrayal, the patriot initiative stayed open to settle. This plausibility vanished—or if nothing else incredibly decreased—when it turned out to be evident that the military routine was looking for the disposal of the patriot administration.

Encapsulation the Periphery

There are a few subjects in the argument that should be considered. Firstly, how the state has dealt with the sardari and tribal framework, moreover how the framework is changing with changing political and cultural landscape. Lastly, the way competition and rivalry between the tribes map into pro-state stances in some cases and anti-state stances in other. Since the colonial times Balochistan is divided into two distinct 'A' and 'B' areas. Urban areas and towns are classified as 'A' areas and are directed by the regular forces such as Army, Police etc. The country territories are named 'B' regions and these areas are policed by Levies called '*Khassadar*' in local language. These troops are enrolled from the local population and work under the patronage of local tribal chief or sardar. The duty of this force is policing and working inside the boundaries of the local traditions and conventions/customs of the clans. Their quality is that the local community helps them in the counteractive action and wrongdoing. In any case, they can likewise turn into a core, around which sardars apply their control over the region.

The inability of the regular forces to operate inside 'B' areas has convinced government to propose for endeavors to dispose status of the 'B' areas and push the direct

state control, and decreasing the role of local tribal chiefs. Zulfikhar Bhutto's government passed an ordinance to abolish the Sardari system. In 2006, former President of Pakistan General Musharraf convened a tribal Jirga of Bugti, which was aimed implicitly to annul Sardari system of the Bugti clan. Moreover, the 'Balochistan Package' of Pakistan People's Party government headed by Asif Ali Zardari also proposed to terminate 'B' areas once and for all. The establishment's position has been loaded with political compulsions and irregularity. In the process it has co-opted some, while coerced others. This has been repeated several times. In 1970s insurgency, Baloch leader Akbar Bugti agreed/adjusted with the government and remained governor of the province. While at the same time, other Baloch nationalist leaders Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bux Marri, were imprisoned (Swindler, 2000). The motive behind the abrogation of the sardari system was the conflict with the government. President Musharraf's reform plan was just intended to rebuff Bugti tribesmen who were the main component of the revolt, and was not applied on the pro-government Bugti tribesmen or different territories where sardars stayed faithful to the government. It should be mentioned here that almost all the insurgent groups, and political parties in the Baloch society are headed by the tribal chiefs. So, a mistreatment on a Baloch leader is seen as mistreatment of the whole tribe, group and party. Akbar Bugti, who was chief of Bugti tribe and head of Jamhoori Watan Party, when revolted he was immediately followed by his tribesmen. His death unleashed a wave of unrest in the province.

On attacks of Baloch insurgent groups during 2003-2009, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) gives a detailed data (South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2010). The SATP recorded the brutalities in the Baloch territory. During the period 2003 to 2009, the portal recorded 1633 assaults in the region of Balochistan. Notwithstanding, savagery in Balochistan isn't obliged to Baloch radicals alone. Besides, the Baloch clans have a long history of inter-tribal rivalries too. As it has been reported lately, the Taliban and other militant groups are also active in Northern Pashtun belt of Balochistan. It is difficult to classify the attacks on security forces on the basis that whether it is carried out by Baloch separatist or other religious extremist groups. But it can't be overlooked that the overall situation is the product of contention between the insurgent groups and government forces. Luckily, the militant organization of the Baloch separatists in Balochistan have contrasting

expectations and, subsequently, varying strategies for utilizing their savagery. For instance, an assault on a NATO escort, Hazara Shia genocide, or attack on young girls school is probably the work of a Sunni Islamist organization. In any case, this investigation regards assaults on policemen, Frontier Constabulary, gas and electricity lines or anything in Gwadar, for instance, as likely the attack of Baloch separatist groups. According to SATP, attacks on security forces and government installations increased many folds after the death of Akbar Bugti.

It can be argued that denying democratic rule to Baloch has been a major component of bitterness between Baloch populace and government. Misuse of Balochistan's assets and military operations are instances of activities, which turned Baloch against the federation over time. The state activities in reality directly affect law and order situation in Balochistan. If there is a reconciliatory move by the state it results in decline of guerrilla assaults, and an oppressive move against Baloch associates with a spike in insurrection. Based on the information from 1,277 guerrilla assaults carried out in Balochistan amid 2003 and 2009 it becomes clear that on numerous occasions, the Baloch political leaders and workers have responded soundly to the carrot and stick approaches of the state. To verify this statement it is evident according to that there was a 216 percent rise in extremist assaults when a military cantonment was being established in Sui area of Dera Bugti. Thus, assaults by extremists expanded by 855 percent in response to the military activity in December 2005. In the meantime, a critical decrease in radical assaults was seen in light of Balochistan Package announced by the central government and monetary benefits declared for Balochistan in 2008 and 2009.

The Perpetual Cycle of Security and Violence

It is clear that the central government and establishment don't trust the politicians to manage Balochistan. They see them too fragile to manage a tough region of Balochistan. In the absence of powerful civilian administration, the boundary between the military and civilian administration has become blurred. Government in Balochistan, it is said, is made in Islamabad. The centre fills the void then by co-opting elite who have no base in the public. Thus, the public feel alienated from the administration. The co-opted leadership can't

complain, nor can they complain about their limited powers. The involvement of security institutions in civil matter makes room for security-centered policies. These policies eventually proved to be counter-productive. The Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the General Elections in 2008 against the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (Haider, 2012). In any case, the subsequent provincial government has been generally insufficient in declaring its writ in the region. Balochistan's former Chief Minister Aslam Raisani has on record blamed the Frontier Constabulary that is deployed in large number in the province and running a parallel government in the Balochistan (Dawn, 2012).

Political Engineering

In 1990s, ethnic strains were enormously decreased, and nationalist parties developed noteworthy powers. In the 1988 elections, the people voted in favor of regional-cum-nationalist parties and totalled around 47.8%. The percentage reached at 51.74 in the 1990 general elections. Hence, Baloch nationalist parties got majority in 1997. The condition however changed after 2002 elections. In 2002 general elections, Musharraf revived military's long-standing relation with religious political parties. In fact, the conditions were ripe for religious politics due to the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. With the central government support, the religious alliance MMA swayed the elections in religiously conservative Balochistan (Brown, 2012). The EU mission for election observation revealed irregularities, before and after the polling, and also in vote counts. Election Commission of Pakistan was also blamed for mismanagement in some areas, and favouring certain candidates. The qualification criteria for competitors were changed to 14 years bachelor's degree, however madrassa certificates were declared as equivalent to graduation. Some prominent leaders, even the individuals who had recently held high administrative office in the province, were kept from running, giving huge favourable position to the MMA. Thus, both Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties ended up cornered and felt betrayed. An aristocrat Jam Yusaf was elected as Chief Minister. He had little command over his cabinet. The cabinet was dominated by Jammiat Ullema Islam – a conservative Islamic party having strong bank vote in religious and conservative circles. The Baloch felt that they had no voice in their assembly, occupied either by clerics or aristocrats. Baloch nationalist circles

dismissed the Islamabad's constituent, political, and protected control. This manipulated apparatus of the 2002 elections established the initial move toward the contention (Ahmed, 2012). Resolved to pacify Baloch nationalist, Musharraf quickened the capture of its leaders before the clashes. A parliamentary committee, which also included members from the Baloch nationalist parties gathered on September 2004 and composed suggestions intended to frame the premise of an arrangement, however the circumstance continued breaking down. Notwithstanding when a deal with Akbar Bugti appeared to be up and coming, Musharraf intentionally decided on encounter (Akbar, 2006). General Musharraf tried to handle the Baloch issue at administrative and cultural front too. He introduced a local government order that made local governments totally under the control of the central government. In spite of the fact that it gave an impression of decentralization, all regions with the exception of Punjab saw the plan an invalidation of provincial autonomy—obviously an aggravation for Baloch nationalists (Dunne, 2006).

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The Afghan Endgame: Prospects and Challenges for US-Pakistan Relations

Prof. Dr. Mujtaba Ali Isani¹⁰

Abstract

The Afghan endgame seems yet so close but yet so far. After almost two decades of war, all sides concerned hope that some settlement can be reached. Afghanistan has defined US-Pakistan relations even pre-9/11. In this paper I shall argue that for the past three decades US-Pakistan relations have been primarily shaped by the situation in Afghanistan. As evidence for my argument, I shall conduct a content analysis of prominent media sources. In the future, as well, I shall argue that the Afghan endgame will continue to define US-Pakistan relations. Hence, coming to solution in Afghanistan that preserves cordial relations between Pakistan and the US, will be crucial to achieve for the Pakistani side. Pakistan would not like a government that further cause instability in the region nor would not like a government in Afghanistan that would be against its interests. I make the claim that Pakistan would ideally like a future government that would maintain good relations with the US as well have brotherly relations with Pakistan. In this sense, Pakistan would not have to compromise with either having cordial relations with Afghanistan or decent relations with the US.

Key words: Afghan End Game, Pak-US Relations, Instability and Conflict

Introduction

In January 2017, the meeting in Moscow, the third in a series of meetings between Russia, China and Pakistan, underlined increasing anxiety about the spillover impact of the region's Afghan crisis (Deutsche Welle, 2010). In the midst of increasing anger over the US inability to offer stability in Afghanistan, the proposal was the latest indication of Russia's demonstration of its diplomatic strength. An underlying cause of anxiety had been the growing threat of the militant Islamic State (IS) group spreading its tentacles in the war-torn country. But it remained questionable whether the new alliance could help reach a negotiated

¹⁰ GESIS Cologne/King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals

political solution to the Afghan conflict. Although the Kabul government was invited for the next round of talks, its exclusion from the earlier meetings cast a shadow over the process. With the US not invited to the Moscow-initiated process, it could not be anticipated that the current nexus would replace the US-included quadrilateral forum along with Pakistan, China and Afghanistan. Almost one year after the failure of the negotiations to carry the Taleban to the negotiation table, quadrilateral consultations were postponed. A new reduction of the aspirations of negotiations was the assassination of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Taliban leader, in the process of a CIA drone attack on a vehicle from Iran to Pakistan on 21 May 2016 (Guardian, 2016).

The democratic change in Washington made matters more difficult. In the Donald Trump presidency, like other external problems, there has been total uncertainty about Afghan affairs. That would have pushed the three countries to pursue a regional solution to the crisis in Afghanistan, which would have a direct effect on their own stability. At the Moscow trilateral conference, one of the key demands of the Taliban as the prerequisite for talks with the Kabul Government called for the lifting of the ban on travel for the insurgent leaders. Obviously, the Taliban were satisfied with the demand of the Moscow conference. However, the US had to vote to lift the ban (Diplomat, 2016).

The Presence of Islamic State Militants and Regional Powers

China, a major investor in mining and infrastructure construction programs, had been deeply involved for quite some time in the peace effort in Afghanistan. Beijing also managed to initiate a few rounds of indirect talks between all the warring parties with strong relations with both the Kabul government and the Taliban. The rise in uncertainty in Afghanistan and recent news on the country's growing IS operation were also of great concern for Beijing. While Russia is not a new entrant into Afghanistan, it has pressed for a new alignment of powers into an evolving geopolitical environment through its efforts to create a regional coalition to fight IS there. Interestingly, the Afghanistan conference preceded another round of trilateral talks in Moscow, including Turkish and Iranian negotiations on resolving the Syrian crisis. It also emerged that Moscow took the lead in addressing the crises of Syria and Afghanistan and dramatically altered regional power balance (Diplomat, 2016). The silence

of the Obama administration and the expectation of anticipated improvements in US foreign policy under the coming Trump administration seemed driving the Russian assertiveness. While Trump had publicly punished the Obama administration's approach to Syria and Afghanistan, the future US policy, in particular Afghanistan was not made explicit. Moscow has had a chance to change the existing negotiation process to attempt to crack the permanent impasse of diplomatic attempts towards seeking a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict. The worsening condition near the borders had also been deeply worried by the three nations. The Taliban escalated their attacks tremendously in 2016 as the bloodiest year in Afghanistan. However, the increasing footprint of the IS, evident in a series of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, was more disturbing and had tremendous implications for the civil population (Deutsche Welle, 2016).

Russia was especially disturbing at the intensified presence of the IS in northern Afghanistan, near the borders of the Central Asian countries. In Moscow also there has been an increased concern that the IS could lead to inroads in the Muslim community in these countries especially as it is one of the largest foreign contingents in Iraq and Syria in the IS war. This was also the reason why Russia made contacts with and supplied arms and financial assistance to the Afghan Taliban to fight against the IS. The fears of Moscow were echoed by both China and Pakistan. In particular, Islamabad saw some hope of a stronger place to force the Afghan Taliban to attend the negotiation table for the current regional format. However, considering the complexity of the problem, it was not easy to make a breakthrough. Most notably, it took a great deal of concentrated work to remove the Kabul administration's concerns about Pakistan's current format. The Taliban decided to officially sit across the table without any preconditions, especially as the Taliban became successful in the battlefield. There were still concerns. Representatives of the Taliban office in Qatar met informally by Afghan authorities. Yet structured agreements on peace were entirely different.

Pakistan's Political Instability

Meanwhile during these development in the region, the escalating political situation in Pakistan following the leak of the Panama Papers in February 2016 involving the family members of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the conflict between the civil and

military leadership there, has also thrown its shadow over Islamabad's dealings with the US and Afghanistan. In April 2016, Nawaz Sharif addressed the country twice. Most people recalled his struggling days at the turn of his first term in 1993. The analogy might not be entirely important here but the common aspect was that the Prime Minister had once again come to terms with the dire situation. Sharif was never a good communicator. But now as he tried to protect himself and his family against the accusation of graft, his speeches betrayed a perceptible sense of urgency. It was not just a matter of being embroiled in a controversy. When he still had enough challenges on his mind, each one more difficult to address than the other, the allegations against the prime minister arrived. In the face of rising political resistance, he was facing desperate war (The News, 2016).

In the middle of the crisis, the dispute was brought to a head by a leaked account of the contents of a secret meeting of the National Security Committee (NSC), exposing disagreements between civil and military leadership over intervention against rebel groups. The article published in the Dawn newspaper on October 7, 2016, revealed a measure of cooperation between the two sides as civilian officials warned against the increasing international isolation of the country due to the inability of security agencies to remove terrorist groups (Dawn Leaks, 2016).

Trump Administration and Afghan Policy

President Donald Trump, meanwhile, declared in June 2017 his intention to reinforce the involvement of US forces in Afghanistan, prompting concerns regarding the US joining the third phase of its Afghan campaign. The number of US troops has risen to 13,000, with 8,800 soldiers now participating in the war in Afghanistan. There had not been any formal Afghan policy statement by the US president; instead, he only authorised the Pentagon to take a decision on the surge number. The decision to send additional troops underscored a reversal of the strategy of the Obama administration envisaging the full removal from Afghanistan of US combat forces; it was also a deviation from Trump's own election promise not to participate militarily in international conflicts. The spreading Afghan Taliban rebellion, triggering a growing amount of military and civilian casualties in the war-torn region, necessitated the troop surge for the new government.

The string of terrorist attacks in Kabul has been the deadliest since the 2001 invasion of the United States. The killing of more than 160 soldiers of the Afghan National Army in an assault on a military garrison in Herat, perceived to be a safer city, underscored the country's deteriorating security situation. After the drawdown of US forces in December 2014, thousands of Afghan soldiers have been killed in militant attacks. The Taliban had increased their area of jurisdiction. The 'stopgap' deal with Trump was not going to succeed. The problems faced by the US in Afghanistan were very similar to those faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, with a declining security situation and a weak and fragmented government in Kabul, unable to retain its authority over territories.

Finally, on 21 August 2017, President Trump set out his Afghan agenda, which he declared would bring the longest war in the US to an end. The US president announced in a televised speech to the troops at Fort Myer in Virginia that the current policy would concentrate more on counter-terrorism and raise pressure on Pakistan to deny militants and insurgent groups a safe haven. The fresh US deployment to Afghanistan had already started, even though Trump would not specify how long, or what their end aim was, the new troops would remain.

Although Trump announced that US troops would not remain for a long time in Afghanistan, there was still no concrete plan for an exit. Before running for the election, and privately after joining the Oval Office, Trump had called for a military withdrawal, but in his speech he made a remarkable concession that he had changed his mind. 'My initial impulse was to pull out and historically, I like to obey my impulses, but I've learned all my life that when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office, choices are very different,' the president said. The priority was, as in the past, on the military option. The troop surge marked a complete turning point in Trump's election pledge to expel US troops from Afghanistan. He got the US more profoundly involved in what he described earlier as a senseless battle.'

Pakistan and US Relations

For Pakistan, Trump reserved his toughest critique. Though recognizing the sacrifices of Pakistan and its efforts to tackle terrorism, he announced that it was also part of the issue. Probably for the first time, the US president officially warned Pakistan of drastic

repercussions if the country did not take decisive measures along its borders against suspected militant sanctuaries. The Trump administration itself, like the previous ones, believed in unquestioned solidarity, totally ignoring the interests of Islamabad.

It was clear, though that the Trump administration was also unaware of the severity of the Afghan crisis. For the US forces, containing the Taliban's advance and preserving the status quo for a longer period of time was not straightforward. What was most troubling was the expansion of the insurgency to areas traditionally thought stable in northern Afghanistan. It was also clear that the surge of US troops would not change the balance of the war substantially. It was more of a patchwork initiative to send extra forces than a realistic attempt to discuss the possibilities of a diplomatic solution to the Afghan crisis. Diplomacy and diplomatic choices were obviously not a concern for the Trump administration, while the ability of the administration to launch talks with the Taliban insurgency was fleetingly stated.

The roadmap for peace was not there. Like his predecessor, Barack Obama, Trump made it known that the United States in Afghanistan will not be interested in nation-building. Sadly, there was no strong thought in Washington that the prospect of a diplomatic solution to the Afghan problem could be discussed. The use of the "mother of all bombs" will not bring this bloody battle to an end. Regional tensions were deepened by the much awaited strategy that linked Afghanistan with the US South Asia policy. With a closer emphasis on counter-terrorism, Trump consistently described his ideas for South Asia as a radical departure from the policies of the Obama administration, describing his policy as 'principled realism' (Robbie, 2017).

There was no plan to include other neighbouring and surrounding countries in the effort to settle the Afghan crisis, while assigning India a greater role. The situation in Pakistan has been made more complex by Trump's strategy of making India more closely involved in Afghanistan. Islamabad may have inflated its worries about India's economic and strategic partnership with Kabul, but previous US administrations were cautious not to allow Delhi to extend its position in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, by making India part of its Afghan policy, the Trump administration had crossed the red line. The centrality of this regional dynamic has long been overlooked by US policies towards Pakistan. A couple of hours before Trump's address, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called Prime Minister Shahid

Khaqan Abbasi (who took over from Nawaz Sharif after his ouster) to relay a more subtle message to ease Pakistan's concerns. But there were also many concerns about the current US strategy of lumping Afghanistan with South Asia. There was an overt threat from the US to apply action against the Afghan Taliban insurgency to the frontier regions of Pakistan (Roche, 2017).

The lack of a diplomatic matrix was the root of friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which had made the chances for stability in Afghanistan dimmer. Since 2001, relations between the two countries have never been cordial, but they have reached a new low with the outbreak of terrorist attacks that Kabul blamed on the Haqqani network operating from the border regions of Pakistan. With the steps taken by Pakistan to tighten border control, there was a further breakdown in ties between the two countries. No matter how strong the pressure from the US administration was it did not push Pakistan to change its stance (Ibid).

The questionable policy of Pakistan itself led to the widening of the divide. No significant effort was made to get Islamabad's issues heard in Washington. With the Trump administration, Pakistan has struggled to develop substantive ties. It also revealed a leadership crisis in both the civil and military realms that a consistent Afghan strategy could never be developed. In Kabul, Pakistan's Afghan strategy was largely reactive and focused on duplicity.

In his first tweet of 2018, Trump started the New Year by launching an attack on Islamabad: "Over the last 15 years the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than \$33 billion in aid, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools," he posted. "They give safe haven, to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan with help. No more!" A few weeks ago, US Vice-President Mike Pence said Pakistan had been placed on alert by the U.S. administration to end its support for the Taliban. Meanwhile, over Islamabad's supposed inability to confront militancy in the region, the Trump administration revoked all financial assistance to Pakistan. Washington's frustration was exacerbated by Pakistan's reluctance to give the US access to a detained Haqqani militant. Pakistani troops detained the insurgent in October 2017 when they rescued a Canadian-American couple who had been held hostage for five years.

It was not the first time Pakistan's relations with the US had reached a low, but there was no precedent for such an overt showing of animosity by the US administration. After the air attack on the Salala border post that killed more than a dozen military soldiers and officials, Pakistan-U.S. relations reached their lowest ebb in 2011. Yet Pakistan, without weakening its national security interests, then addressed the situation more deftly. The Salala event resulted in a recalibration of the two allies' alliances, morphing from a military partnership to a transactional agreement. During the false end of the second Obama term, both civil and military assistance from the US was still drying up. After Trump's punitive shift, the residual transactional partnership had also come under pressure (Rubin & Rashid, 2008).

Nearly all U.S. military assistance was discontinued, and there was just a trickle of humanitarian aid going to Pakistan. Although military-to-military communications have survived, the relationship between the two countries has been limited to a low official degree. While there had been a long absence of the illusion of any competitive integration, even a transactional partnership was becoming difficult to sustain. The way the Pakistani leadership expected to deal with the new threats emerging from the toughening of the US stance was uncertain. Pakistan's foreign policy and national security problems have been compounded by political uncertainty in the region.

This was not just about straining relations between Washington and Islamabad on the Afghan issue. The Trump administration has also voiced concern about the increasing strategic and economic relations between Pakistan and China. The geopolitical stakes of Beijing in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have been frequently challenged by Washington. The CPEC has introduced a new layer to Pakistan's 'all-weather' relationship with China. Over more than five decades of strictly political and security cooperation, the alliance has also developed into a complex economic and commercial collaboration.

In terms of both the country's economic growth and defense, Pakistani leaders identify the CPEC as a game-changer. The CPEC represents an international expansion of China's commitment by economic growth to deliver stability. Eventually, an overland connection to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan could help ease the exposure of China to the fact that approximately 85% of its oil imports pass via the Malacca Strait's single chokepoint.

At a time of increasing Chinese geopolitical assertiveness and rising questions regarding Pakistan's stability and growth, the CPEC is a realistic expression of strengthened and extended bilateral cooperation. The all-weather mates have been taken together by the shifting international geopolitics and consequent realignment of powers. The cooling of its ties with the US and the increasing friction with archival India gave Pakistan, leaning towards China, more impetus.

Concluding Thoughts

A big cause of concern for India is the increasing geopolitical assertiveness of China and its investment in Pakistan. One of the Indian fears was that China could use Gwadar for its enlarged blue water fleet and operations around the Indian Ocean as a naval base. The fear now is that CPEC might become another point of contention between the two South Asian nuclear powers. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told China in June 2015, just two months after Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed plans to spend \$46bn in CPEC, that it was 'unacceptable' (Panneerselvam, 2017).

Washington is worried that CPEC would help China achieve its goal of extending its access to and possibly influence, within Eurasia. Also worried about Pakistan's increasing closeness to China was the US administration. Washington, which did not want to lose control over its long-term South Asian partner, perceived the current strategic axis between Pakistan and China as a challenge. The current realities pose a significant challenge to Pakistani policymakers as to how the relations between Islamabad and Beijing and Washington can be balanced (Roy, 2017).

Despite these tensions, when it came to ending the war in Afghanistan, there was already some alignment of interests between the two estranged allies. But the tactics of the Trump administration did not help the two sides work together. The maintenance of these strained relations has also posed a significant challenge to Pakistan's new government. Imran Khan was swept into power by parliamentary elections held in July 2018. The 25 July polls, however corrupted they may have been, had lifted the clouds of political instability, but not completely.

Among the top brass, there was a lot of goodwill for the government that had been

absent in the past. It was clear that dealing with the current civilian dispensation that did not come with any previous baggage felt much more relaxed with the generals. The grand reception at GHQ proved the point for the prime minister and his staff. Helping to stabilize the political and economic situation that also threatened its institutional interests was essential for the military leadership. The truth was that greater space had been acquired by the intelligence apparatus and there was no particular cause for it to believe that the new civilian government could rein in it.

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Reaping dividends of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Addressing Governance and Institutional Challenges

Murad Ali¹¹

Abstract

Ever since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the plan has remained the focus of significant discussions and research. Similar is the case with China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of the six corridors envisaged under the BRI. While there is a dominant consensus in Pakistan that CPEC is expected to contribute to socioeconomic development in terms of power generation, infrastructure up-gradation, industrialisation, and the creation of employment opportunities, there is also a perception that (in) security could be a major challenge for the timely completion of CPEC projects. This paper argues that although law and order and security are pivotal, there are other systemic issues that Pakistan must address to harvest the true potential of Chinese investments under CPEC. To this end, the study examines Pakistan's position as per the Belt and Road Index which has ranked the country the 11 least attractive destination for foreign investments out of 67 countries participating in the BRI. The index has been developed using reliable and internationally-recognised data sources. The index is classified into six categories: economic potential, demographic advantage, infrastructure development, institutional effectiveness, market accessibility, and resilience to natural disasters. Among these six parameters, Pakistan's performance is the worst in terms of institutional effectiveness. Among South Asian countries, its score is only better than that of Afghanistan. Besides other elements, research has shown that countries that are politically unstable or have governance issues are essentially the most underdeveloped countries in the region. Similarly, using the Trade Facilitation Index (TFI), all BRI countries (64 in this study after excluding China and New Zealand) have been compared and ranked on trade facilitation measures. A number of fundamentals that are critical to facilitate trade among countries have been employed such as port efficiency (ports, airports and the burden of custom procedures); custom environment (irregular payments and bribes, trade barriers, and corruption of various

¹¹ Assistant Professor, University of Malakand, Pakistan

kinds); regulatory environment (transparency in government policy and decision-making, judicial independence, and the reliability of the police); electronic commerce (internet users and the use of latest technologies); and financial environment (the availability and affordability of financial services). Here again, among the South Asian countries, Afghanistan is at the 55th position, India on the 44th, Pakistan at the 49th, Bangladesh on the 50th, Sri Lanka at the 40th, Bhutan on the 38th, Maldives on 60th and Nepal on the 48th. The study concludes that for harvesting the BRI's true potential, it is fundamental for all participating countries, including Pakistan to address governance and institutional challenges by ensuring adherence to rule of law, improving the business environment, eradicating corruption and enhancing the management capacity and credibility of state institutions.

Introduction

The BRI and Chinese Model of Development Cooperation

The combination of domestic reforms and the transformations that have taken place over the past several decades have made China a remarkable success story, even though it is still a developing country in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and various other development indicators. Today, China is the world's second-largest economy after the US. It is also the world's largest trading nation. According to Summers (2016), China is the largest trading partner of 124 nations while the US is the largest trading partner of 56 countries. Similarly, China has emerged as the largest exporter, manufacturer, energy consumer and auto market (Summers, 2016). On account of its unprecedented economic development and progress in other fields, China is also the world's largest user of steel, cement and copper, and the largest applicant for patents.

Following its spectacular economic progress, China came up with a new vision for the world in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, Beijing gave the outline of the BRI, which aimed at reviving the old trade routes connecting China with Asia, Europe and Africa. Aimed to cover about 65 countries and to reach "more than 60 per cent of the global population, accounting for nearly a third of global GDP and global merchandise trade and 75% of its known energy reserves" (Alon, Zhang, & Lattermann, 2018, p. 2), the Chinese initiative is

thought to be the most ambitious undertaking of the century. Some estimates suggest that “at \$ 1.4 trillion and still growing, China’s stated financial commitment to these projects is eleven times the size of the Marshall Plan, restated in current dollars” (Yang, Lewis, Roddy, & Moise, 2018, p. 56). Since the plan was revealed in 2013 and officially launched in 2015 with the release of the BRI blueprint document ‘Vision and Action’ by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, with State Council authorization, no other policy initiative has attracted so much attention at home and abroad than Xi’s ambitious foreign and economic policy plan. There is a broader consensus that the BRI is arguably “the first Chinese concept that has a lasting impact on international discourse” (Mayer, 2018, p. 9).

While the BRI is a new Chinese vision for infrastructure development and increased regional connectivity and trade, China has a proven history of providing development cooperation to different countries in different forms. In this regard, Beijing came up with the first White Paper on its foreign aid policy in 2011. The official document deliberated upon the key principles that inform Chinese foreign aid policy as well as the various forms of aid modalities that Beijing has been providing to many developing countries. The document states that Beijing’s foreign aid policy is premised on the principles such as peaceful coexistence, respect for recipient countries’ right to independently select their own model of development and belief that every country should explore a development path suitable to its actual conditions (People's Republic of China, 2011). The 2014 White Paper mentions the same principles and values and affirms that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and equality and mutual benefit as the guiding principles of Beijing’s foreign aid policy (People's Republic of China, 2014). Thus, in its official policy discourse, considerable emphasis is given to the continuity of China’s foreign policy and how international development cooperation fits in this framework.

In view of the evolving foreign aid landscape characterised by unabated demand for reform and innovation, Beijing acknowledges that its development cooperation policy adapts “to the development of both domestic and international situations” and continuously adjusts and reforms its aid allocation and delivery mechanisms to improve the efficacy of its foreign

aid (People's Republic of China, 2011, p. 3). Li et al. (2014) state that unlike aid providers in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), China does not come up with its own elaborate 'country plans' for its aid recipients. Rather, following consultations with relevant departments and ministries in aid-receiving countries, Chinese missions abroad convey to Beijing about the actual needs of its partner countries and how best can China deliver support in particular sectors and areas.

The two policy documents also identify various forms of development cooperation that China provides to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to the 2011 White Paper, "China offers foreign aid in eight forms: complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief" (People's Republic of China, 2011, p. 6). In terms of concessionality or amount of grant element in its development cooperation, there are three types of cooperation: grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. The 2014 White Paper states that between "2010 to 2012, China appropriated in total 89.34 billion Yuan (14.41 billion U.S. dollars) for foreign assistance in three types: grant (aid gratis), interest-free loan and concessional loan" (People's Republic of China, 2014, p. 2). The same document further adds that out of this amount, 36 percent was in grants, 9 percent was interest-free loans and 56 percent was concessional loans. Overall, a total of 121 countries received aid from China in various forms, including 30 in Asia, 51 in Africa, nine in Oceania, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 12 in Europe (People's Republic of China, 2014). Similarly, agriculture, education, health, industry and infrastructure are the primary sectors where most Chinese development assistance is targeted (Tang, Ma, & Li, 2015; Xu, Li, Qi, Tang, & Mukwereza, 2016).

However, unlike its traditional foreign aid programme that has been in vogue for decades, there has been unprecedented interest of academics, researchers, journalists, policymakers and political leadership of a host of countries in the BRI. A total of 57 countries participated in the BRI forum in May 2017 in Beijing, including 29 heads of states or governments. Still, several key powers including the US, EU, Japan, Australia and India

skipped the forum citing various reasons from strategic and security to financial soundness, debt and financial risks to environmental and social concerns (Alon et al., 2018; Chance, 2016; Griffiths, 2017). Hence, for multiple reasons, different countries have either welcomed or bluntly rejected to participate in the project. Some major great powers reject the BRI, overtly or covertly, including the US, the EU, Japan, India and Australia, although Japan is believed to have softened its position since mid-2017 (Lin, 2018). In general, major powers' common concerns about the BRI are economic concerns about debt and financial risk; strategic concerns about the political purpose of the infrastructure building and environmental concerns and social concerns (Lin, 2018).

In view of the above, there is no doubt that “this massive experiment has induced a host of different reactions from abroad, from welcoming embracement to outright suspicion” (Mayer, 2018, p. 3). There have been considerable policy and academic studies focusing on the various aspects and dimensions of the BRI. However, presently “consensus has not been reached about what BRI is, how it may affect others, and how it may evolve” but there is no doubt that it will have tremendous impact on trade, FDI and transport systems in numerous countries across various regions (Alon et al., 2018, p. 13). A number of “foreign policy analysts view this initiative largely through a geopolitical lens, seeing it as Beijing’s attempt to gain political leverage over its neighbors” and beyond the immediate neighborhood (Cai, 2017, p. 6). While there is no doubt that it could be the part of Beijing’s strategic compass, there are also various domestic imperatives behind the BRI. These include, alongside reducing regional disparity within the mainland China, domestic economic concerns such as sluggish growth, consistent production overcapacity, an increasingly saturated construction market, creating new markets for Chinese companies and disproportionate holdings of US (Cai, 2017; Chen, 2018). Hence, with the successful implementation of the BRI, China aims to achieve both foreign policy goals as well as to address some of the key domestic challenges faced by its economy in recent years.

CPEC’s Potential for Socioeconomic Development

During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015, the two time-tested allies signed 51 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) related to CPEC and bilateral

matters of mutual interests (Dawn, 2015). President Xi's trip to Islamabad, subsequent agreements between the two countries and the announcement of US\$ 46 billion investments in the form of the CPEC set the tenor of the future Sino-Pakistan bilateral ties. Small has aptly summed up that:

"a number of the objectives of the multifaceted One Belt, One Road scheme converge in Pakistan, including the outsourcing of industrial capacity, the search for growth drivers in the Chinese interior, the push to build up new markets for Chinese exports, efforts to stabilize China's western periphery and comprehensively address the threat of rising militancy, and plans for alternative transportation routes that diversify the usual maritime conduits" (Small, 2016, p. 169).

Because of all these factors, Small (2016, p. 170) is of the view that "CPEC has become the flagship project of Xi's flagship initiative".

Main vision and mission of CPEC is stated as "to improve the lives of people of Pakistan and China by building an economic corridor promoting bilateral connectivity, construction, explore potential bilateral investment, economic and trade, logistics and people to people contact for regional connectivity" (CPEC Secretariat, 2016b). Similarly, main objectives and potential significance of CPEC are "regional connectivity, improving transport infrastructure, energy supply, trade and commerce, peace and development, diverse investment opportunities, industrial, financial and agricultural cooperation, tourism, educational linkage, human resource development, enhanced health opportunities, increase in livelihood opportunities and enhanced security and stability of the region" (CPEC Secretariat, 2016a).

In Pakistan, no other policy initiative has received more attention than Beijing's vast investment initiative in the form of CPEC. The US\$ 46 billion package of projects contained in CPEC offers an exceptional opportunity to Pakistan for tackling some of the main barriers hindering its economic development: energy bottlenecks, poor connectivity and limited attraction for foreign investors. The government estimates that investment in the form of CPEC, which is about Rs800 billion per annum or 2.8 per cent of the current GDP, "will spur economic activity and create around 2 million direct and indirect new jobs" (Government of Pakistan, 2016, p. 51). Similarly, regional connectivity is a key element elaborated by the

government in its long-term plan ‘Pakistan Vision 2025’ (Government of Pakistan, 2014). The policy document specifically mentions the CPEC as an integral element in realizing the potential of regional connectivity and trade with member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). It is believed that “CPEC offers a unique opportunity to Pakistan to integrate with regional developments and become a hub for trade and manufacturing with Gwadar port developed as an international free port” (Government of Pakistan, 2014, p. 89). As China has been investing in various sectors in Pakistan under CPEC, it has been argued that if successfully implemented, CPEC would enable Pakistan to make huge progress in achieving a number of the internationally recognized Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Ali, 2018). As the three main elements of the CPEC illustrated, three SDGs including SDGs 7, 8 and 9 are specifically related to these components (Ali, 2018). These three SDGs are ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all (SDG 7), promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all (SDG 8) and building resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (SDG 9) (UNGA, 2015, p. 14). Thus, the execution of the CPEC will directly contribute to achieving these three SDGs. If successfully implemented, the CPEC is expected to resolve the chronic issue of energy shortfall and people will have access to reliable, sustainable and modern energy. Similarly, with upgradation and innovation in the industrial sector, people will have better job opportunities and means of earning their livelihoods. With substantial investments in the communication infrastructure, people are expected to have access to better roads and transport facilities. Thus, these three SDGs are directly related to CPEC projects and the country could significantly move ahead on these selected SDGs provided various projects and ventures planned under the corridor are successfully implemented (Ali, 2018).

Conceptual Framework: The Significance of an Enabling Environment Characterised by Good Governance and Effective Institutions

The significance of a favourable environment for aid effectiveness and overall poverty alleviation has been at the centre of academic and policy debate. Among the

pioneering works that led to a series of studies was the 1998 World Bank report on the assessment of aid. It stated that foreign aid would be more effective if given to countries with stable macroeconomic environments, open trade regimes and efficient public bureaucracies and institutions that deliver education, health, and other public services (World Bank, 1998). Emphasising the significance of a favourable and sound environment, the report argues that “a US\$ 10 billion increase in aid would lift 25 million people a year out of poverty but only if it favours countries with sound economic management” (World Bank, 1998, p. 3). On the other hand, the report adds that a similar increase of US\$ 10 billion would lift only 7 million people out of poverty if provided to regimes that have little concern about institutional and policy environment.

A number of studies dealing with the allocation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its effectiveness in poverty alleviation assessed factors such as the quality of institutions, rule of law, good governance, and prevalence of corruption and lack of accountability. The widely-cited study of Burnside and Dollar (2000) examined correlations among aid, good policies and economic growth in 56 aid-receiving countries between 1970 and 1993. They found that “the impact of aid is greater in a good policy environment than in a poor policy environment” (Burnside & Dollar, 2000, p. 859). These findings led to various models seeking a more suitable, selective or prescriptive approach of ODA allocation to maximise development impact. Collier and Dollar conceived their ‘poverty-efficient’ model in 2002 (Collier & Dollar, 2002). Their study employed the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scores comprising 20 different elements covering macroeconomic issues, structural policies, public sector management and institutions, and policies for social inclusion to measure a country’s policy environment. It argues that the impact of ODA to reduce poverty could be doubled if aid is allocated to countries and territories that have undertaken or are willing to carry out policy reforms. According to Collier and Dollar:

"In our sample of countries aid as currently allocated sustainably lifts 10 million people per year out of poverty. The same volume of assistance, allocated efficiently, would lift an estimated 19 million people out of poverty. Thus, the

productivity of aid could be nearly doubled if it were allocated more efficiently" (2002, p. 1477).

Since then, numerous studies and reports have examined factors that result in making aid effective or ineffective. According to Riddell (2014), between 1994 and 2005, no fewer than 300 studies assessed the impact of aid interventions at the country level. These studies focused on different sectors, countries and regions during different periods. One key piece of evidence is that the impact of aid on growth and on poverty alleviation is contingent on the policies and institutions of aid-receiving governments. The main message is that although ODA has worked in most countries, it has worked better in countries with better policy regimes.

Thus, the concept of an enabling environment characterised by good governance has occupied a central place in the debates and discussions about aid effectiveness and sustainable development. There has been so much emphasis on the importance of a favourable environment because without improving the governance situation, the efficient generation and management of adequate resources is an insurmountable task. Thus, the prevalence of a supportive domestic environment is the cornerstone for attracting external resources and its effective utilisation for sustainable development. Below is a discussion of how Pakistan has been ranked based on different governance indicators and how the country's ranking on different indices could hamper the proper and timely utilisation of Chinese financial resources under the CPEC.

The BRI Index and Pakistan

Ever since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by Chinese President Xi during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, the plan has remained the focus of significant discussions and research in the media, think-tanks and academia across the globe. The same is the case with CPEC, which is one of most researched topics in universities and think-tanks across the country. Although there is a dominant consensus in Pakistan that CPEC is expected to contribute to socioeconomic development in various ways in terms of power

generation, infrastructure up-gradation, industrialisation, and the creation of employment opportunities, there is also a perception that Pakistan could be in serious financial trouble when it comes to the outflow of loan payments along with payable interest and profit remittances to Chinese companies. It is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to provide a definite answer at this stage about whether the BRI and CPEC projects are a bane or a boon for participating countries. Every country has its own strengths and weaknesses, and can better exploit the massive opportunities under the BRI by capitalising on its multiple strengths and overcoming its own various frailties.

There are a number of studies that offer insights to participating countries about their governance situation and business environment. In this regard, a recent study has come up with a Belt and Road Index. According to Hu and Pan (2018), who have measured and assessed the potential of all 65 BRI countries by using key eight indicators comprising “economic development, governance, resource endowment, environmental protection, social development, business environment, economic structural change, and country size”, besides employing another 23 secondary indicators to holistically calculate eight primary indicators” (Hu & Pan, 2018, p. 13). Out of the 67 countries participating in the BRI, Pakistan was ranked the 11th least attractive country. The index has been developed by using reliable and internationally-recognised data sources. The index is classified into six categories: economic potential, demographic advantage, infrastructure development, institutional effectiveness, market accessibility, and resilience to natural disasters. Among these six parameters, Pakistan’s performance is the worst in terms of institutional effectiveness. Among South Asian countries, its score is only better than that of Afghanistan. Besides other things, the study has pointed out those countries that are politically unstable or have governance issues are essentially the most underdeveloped countries in the region. In contrast, countries characterised by political stability and the prevalence of good governance have largely ranked among countries of the highest level of overall (comprehensive) development.

For instance, in view of the overall development level, the last four countries are Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, and these four countries also rank low in terms of governance. Similarly, countries that are ranked among the last 10 in terms of overall development levels are also ranked as the last 10 countries in terms of political instability

and bad governance, such as Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries. Contrary to the above list of countries, various countries have high overall development levels because of their high level of political stability and good governance. These include Singapore, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, and Israel. Ironically, these six countries are also quite disadvantaged in terms of resources and size, and economic development (except for Singapore). But they rank in the top 10 category with regard to overall (comprehensive) development levels. The study suggests that political stability and consistency of policies is fundamental because without political stability the pace and process of economic development get disrupted. Hence, the lesson for Pakistan or any other country is that it is indispensable to make all-out efforts to promote national harmony on key issues, ensure political stability, and embark upon genuine, and not cosmetic measures and reforms to enhance the capacity of state institutions to improve the levels of good governance at various tiers.

Trade Facilitation Index and Pakistan

Based on another set of indicators known as Trade Facilitation Index (TFI), all BRI countries (64 in this study after excluding China and New Zealand) have been compared and ranked on trade facilitation measures by Zhang and Wu (2018). A number of elements that are critical to facilitate trade among countries have been employed. These include factors such as port efficiency (ports, airports and the burden of custom procedures); custom environment (irregular payments and bribes, trade barriers, and corruption of various kinds); regulatory environment (transparency in government policy and decision-making, judicial independence, and the reliability of the police); electronic commerce (internet users and the use of latest technologies); and financial environment (the availability and affordability of financial services). The study covers the period from 2011 to 2014.

In addition, dynamics such as GDP, total population, the existence or absence of the free-trade agreements (FTAs), and distance from main ports or markets have been considered. Here again, among the South Asian countries, Afghanistan is at the 55th position, India on the 44th, Pakistan at the 49th, Bangladesh on the 50th, Sri Lanka at the 40th, Bhutan on the 38th, Maldives on 60th and Nepal on the 48th. Countries that are ranked

in the top five positions are Singapore, Estonia, the UAE, Bahrain and Latvia. Once again, at the bottom of the overall rankings are Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq. Again, there should be no surprise as unabated conflicts have wreaked havoc on the state and societies in these countries. The study has found that “the impact of the TFI on bilateral trade is the biggest among these factors” (Zhang & Wu, 2018, p. 237) while GDP has the lowest impact.

Among these various components, the presence of vital infrastructure has a significant impact on bilateral trade. In many countries, including Pakistan, which is a key country where numerous projects are under various phases of implementation under CPEC, it is expected that Chinese investments can help build the necessary physical infrastructure. However, it is imperative for countries, such as Pakistan, to focus on the quality of human development and create an enabling environment in other key areas for the swift and easy cross-border movement of people, goods and services.

Conclusion

This study has examined the potential of CPEC for Pakistan’s socio-economic development and the challenges that the country is faced with regarding lack of political stability, institutional capacity and good governance. It has argued that there is potential that huge Chinese investments under the BRI could significantly boost Pakistan’s fragile economy. However, to harvest the BRI’s true potential, it is fundamental for all participating countries, including Pakistan, to ensure adherence to rule of law, guarantee the provision of better education for their people, improve the business environment, eradicate corruption, and enhance the management capacity and credibility of state institutions. The BRI or CPEC projects are neither a bane nor a boon. All participating countries have a choice to turn them to their benefit. Whether in the context of CPEC or beyond, it is commonly pointed out that upgrading and modernising the infrastructure, and adding more energy to the country’s national grid would attract more investments. However, as this study has illustrated and as per the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019 where Pakistan was ranked at the 110th position out of 141 countries, the five most challenging issues for doing business in Pakistan are corruption, tax rates, political instability, crime, and an inefficient government bureaucracy (World Economic Forum, 2019). The availability of infrastructure

is quite low in this list. It implies that there is a need to specifically focus on addressing these 'soft' but vital issues of governance. Without fixing issues that pertain to institutional effectiveness and governance, no amount of investment in other sectors will bear fruit.

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God, Charity, Reciprocity and Local Governance: The case of Zakat and Daswandh in the Social Welfare Provision in Pakistan.

Dr. Muhammad Salman Khan¹²

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on charity by developing a model of reciprocity. In doing so, the paper develops a five-legged model of reciprocity to frame charities as a subject of local governance. The paper asks: how reciprocity shapes the role of religion-inspired charities in local governance? And what are the implications of the inter-linkage between markets and civil society for social welfare provision by the state in Pakistan? To answer these questions, the paper reflects on the findings from two separate projects of the author and analyse the role of Zakat and Daswandh in the social welfare provision in the Malakand and Peshawar districts of Pakistan. The paper makes two specific contributions. First, it develops and empirically tests a five-legged model of reciprocity to understand how reciprocity with God and reciprocity with fellow human beings govern different practices of religion-based charity. Second, it shows, how religion-based charities, governed by reciprocity shape the governance of social welfare provision in the context characterised by ineffective state institutions.

Introduction

In Pakistan, the quality of government is poor (Acemoglu and Ali, 2018; Khan, in press), civil society weak (Bano, 2017), markets are an important element of local governance (Khan, 2019), and religion is an essential element of national and local social welfare mix (Ever, 1995). Within this context, this paper analyses the role of zakat and Daswandh, generated by markets and utilized by grassroots social welfare associations for the provision of social services in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP hereafter) province of Pakistan. To this end, the paper first outlines a three-legged model of reciprocity developed

¹² He is a postdoctoral research associate at the Department of Geography, School of Global Affairs, Kings College London.

by Kochuyt (2009) and suggests modifications to the model by arguing how charities inspired by religious dictates are mediated by social ties.

The rise of secular philanthropy is generally associated with a shift in sensibilities whereby ‘love of humanity’ replaces the ‘love of god’, in practice it is often impossible to disentangle religious and secular motivation for giving or receiving (Osella, 2018:432-33). This complexity increases when charity becomes the object of gift economy and reciprocity with God and with human being together governs the everyday practice of charity giving. Reading religion-inspired charities and those mediated by social ties together in a single frame of reference, one must start with the premise that all acts including religious altruism are not disinterested (but for an interesting critique see Sayer, 1999: 406-407). This enables one to conceptualise the moral economy of charity, philanthropy and social welfare provision in the exchange-centric lexicon of reciprocity that is , to give, to accept, and return. Most of the religions: Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism all have strong traditions of serving the poor and underprivileged (Kirmani and Zaidi, 2010: 2). To increase the analytical purchase of its argument on reciprocity and charity, this paper analyses Zakat (Bonner, 2005) and Daswandh (Singh, 2001), the religious obligations of giving in Islam and Sikhism respectively.

Literature on religion-inspired charities and philanthropy suggests that South Asia has emerged as one of the “most exciting non-profit and philanthropic research environments today.” (Sidel, 2001: 171). Pakistan is one of the countries where tendency to give charity is higher. Some studies even suggest that the amount of the charities donated every year in Pakistan is more than twice of the country’s GDP (Sheikh, 2015). If these charities are channelled appropriately, this can help in poverty eradication, and the delivery of services to the poor. Therefore, this paper frames charities and their use as a question of governance, instead of framing it as a purely religious question. To this end, the paper asks: how reciprocity shapes the role of religion-inspired charities in local governance? And what are the implications of the inter-linkage between markets and civil society for social welfare provision by the state in Pakistan?

To explore these questions, Pakistan offers an interesting case. According to the world giving index (2014)¹³ Pakistan ranks sixth in the world in terms of the number of charitable donations (Osella, 2018:431-2). A recent study on charitable giving (Khan and Arif, 2016: 7), based on data from the Pakistan household survey (2010) reported a high level (86%) of people's donations going to individuals and a very low level (14%) going to organisations like schools, mosques and religious charities. This context of a high level of donations to individuals due to intrinsic motivation underpinned by religious obligations, and a low frequency of giving to social welfare associations, is an outcome of the distrust associated with charity collections by voluntary associations (Khan, 2019: chapter8). It is within this context of distrust, surrounding charity collection and spending that charity, reciprocity plays an important role.

This paper reflects on the findings of two different, but interrelated research projects on markets, civil society and local governance in Pakistan. From the first project titled "Marketplaces, local governance and Social capital: the role of Batkhela Bazaar in the evolving governance of Malakand region, Pakistan" (Khan, 2019a) conducted for the author's PhD, the case of Al-Khidmat and its orphan education program is examined. Whereas, from the second project, which was on conflict, entrepreneurship and internally displaced religious minorities, the case of Peshawari Singh Saiva society (PSSS hereafter) and its support for education of the poor Internally Displaced Person's children is analysed. These cases are purposively selected for analytical purposes and for keeping the scope of the study manageable.

In the following, section two develops a theoretical frame from the literatures relevant to the argument of this study. Section three delineates empirical settings whilst Section four outlines methods of data collection and analysis. Section five presents findings on the role of reciprocity, and the implications of reciprocity-governed social service provision for local governance. Section six concludes by discussing theoretical implications and suggesting future research direction.

¹³ Started in 2009 by the UK-based charities Aid Foundation, the index measures countries in terms of the number of people giving money, volunteering time and helping strangers in 135 countries.

Quality of Government, Reciprocity, and Charities: Developing a Theoretical Framework

Before outlining our theoretical model by reviewing the most relevant literature, some key terms (local governance, government's effectiveness, reciprocity, zakat, and daswandh) employed in this paper need to be operationalized. Local governance is viewed as a phenomenon encompassing formal rules and structures and informal norms such as trust and reciprocity and informal structures such as interpersonal networks and the mutually interactive relation between these formal and informal rules and structures (Shah and Shah, 2006; Torfing et al, 2012). . Within this interactive setting, government's effectiveness is defined as the degree of successful implementation of state policy and regulations and the delivery of services (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008: 182). Actors in both formal and informal spheres of governance are embedded in social relations, and these social relations are governed by trust and reciprocity (Khan, 2019). Reciprocity is viewed as interdependence which implies a relation where complete dependence and complete independence is impossible (Cropezano and Michal, 2005; Blao, 1964). Gift-giving and requesting someone for cooperation is the mechanisms that are based on trust and expectations and which create obligations, while acts of fulfilling those obligations are the acts of reciprocity. Or in other words, reciprocity is the realization of expectations (Woo et al, 2006). Reciprocity is also the underlying principle of charities, which is an exchange between men and god whereby men give to make god happy and expect for return (Bonner, 2005).

Two types of religious charities: Zakat (Bonner, 2005) and Daswandh (Hirvi, 2013) are the subject of this paper. Zakat is an obligation, a levy paid by all the faithful as a way of solidarity with the poor. Just as Allah is generous to the faithful rich, He demands from them to be generous to the poor (Bonner, 2005:401-2). Zakat obligates rich or sahib-e-nisab Muslims to pay 2.5% of their surplus money to the poor. Zakat is the binding consequence of the reciprocal relation between god and his faithful believers, they give to the poor as god gave to them (Kochuyt, 2009:100-101). Daswandh obligates the follower of Sikh religion to spend one-tenth of their earning in the way of God to help the poor. Daswandh is a moral obligation, a service rendered by the Guru's followers to please the God who gave them (Hirvi, 2013:64; Sidhu and Singh, 2001:27-28). Though different in their mode of practice,

Both Zakat and Daswandh are underpinned by solidarity with poor to make God happy, because God has bestowed wealth to the giver.

“To understand charity, it is not sufficient to collect interesting data; one also needs a conceptual framework that makes sense of it all.” (Kochuyt, (2009:99)). Therefore, we adapt Kochuyt’s (2009) three-legged model that include: Allah (God), the rich who donate, and the poor who receive donations. For the purpose of this study, we make an addition to the third leg of Kochuyt triatic model to develop a five-legged model of charity. The category of receivers is extended to include other governance actors (state and social welfare associations). Besides Allah and the givers/donors, three types of receivers of charity in our framework are: the poor, the state (collector and distributor of charities from the rich to the poor), and social welfare associations (collector and distributors of charities from the rich to the poor). Both the state and social welfare associations can be viewed as intermediaries in the sense that the link between the actual donor and the actual recipient of charity is indirect, either through the state or the social welfare association.

A typical reciprocity model includes two players: the donor and the beneficiary and their interaction is governed by three obligations: the obligation to give, the obligation to accept, and then to return subsequently (Mauss, 1924 [1955]). In contradistinction to this typical logic linking two players in a dyadic relation, reciprocity, when applied to charities, is a chain reaction linking all the actors up in the bond of reciprocity (Kochuyt, 2009:103). Transactions in this model are typically based on the principle of generalized reciprocity. In generalized reciprocity, any action of giving creates obligations but the return is unstipulated. Moreover, the time of the return is also not fixed, that is, it can be very soon or never. And Finally, as Sahlin (1972:194) argues, time and worth of reciprocation are not alone conditional on what was given by the donor, but also upon what he will need and when, and likewise what the recipient can afford and when” (p.194). The favours exchanged are not equal, but the value of favours is determined through the viewpoint of the recipient, for instance, zakat may not be significant in material sense from the perspective of the donor as much as it will be for its beneficiary. Thus, if a reciprocal arrangement is to be characterized as balanced reciprocity, the question of value needs to be determined from the viewpoint of the recipient and his position in the exchange structure.

For having a better sense of the viewpoint of actors and their positions in the exchange structure, we deploy Bourdieu's concept of field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:97), which is a nexus of habitus and capital (Stokke, 2001). Conceptually, for our purposes it is significant in two ways. First, All the actors, donors of charities, collectors and distributors, and the beneficiaries are located within the local governance structure comprised of distinct but interlinked fields (Khan, 2019: chapter3; Stokke, 2001). Donors are located in the market, whereas collectors-distributors are located in the civil society and government's respectively. All the beneficiaries are located within this broader social space where interplay between stakes of the state (service delivery), social welfare associations (philanthropy and service delivery), and donors (religious/celestial) occurs. Interpersonal networks governed by social norm traverse through these fields to channel charities from one field to the other (Khan, 2019: chapter 8). Second, it conceptualizes social practices as constituted by different forms of habitus (dispositions), capitals and fields. Habitus is a schemata of feelings and perceptions, a generative mechanism at the base of all human actions (Lizartto, 2004). Here, it will suffice to say "that what people do (their social practices) are constituted by and constitute their dispositions (habitus), the capital they possess and the fields within which they operate." (Stokke, 2001:5).

Here, state, market, civil society and other social institutions related to charities and social welfare provision are relationally embedded (Karpic, 2014) with social norms of trust and reciprocity and religious dictates making up the governance of social welfare. The chain of reciprocity goes upward and creates obligations between immediately proximate actors in the entire circle of charity. God demands from the rich to spend their wealth in his name to help those below the threshold of poverty line (Bonner, 2002: 402-403). In return, the rich, who donate charity expect god for both worldly and otherworldly rewards (Kochuyt, 2009). Similarly, the rich, who donate charity to social welfare associations expect that the charities are used for their intended purposes and should reach the intended beneficiaries (UK charity commission, 2016). In return, the charities expect continuous flow of funds from the donor.

Empirical Settings

In Pakistan, Faith is an important element of the social welfare mix of the country (Evers, 1995). This is reflected in the collection of zakat by the state and a huge number of faith-based charities operating across the country (Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal, 2003; Kashif et al, 2018). In the last four decades, Pakistan has seen a phenomenal rise in the number of voluntary organizations (Navivala, 2010) but at the same time, trust in the social welfare associations has declined (Khan, 2019). Social welfare associations (SWAs hereafter) play an important role in collecting charities but do not enjoy trust of those citizens who donate their charities (Kashif et al, 2018). A few obvious factors account for this trade-off between rising numbers of voluntary associations and low-level of generalized trust in Pakistan. Many voluntary associations are registered only on paper but are non-existent on the ground (Ismail, 2002:13). Second, most of the foreign-funded organizations, known as NGOs, are perceived as Western invasion of local culture, source of immorality and corruption (Jamal and Baldwin, 2017; Bano et al, 2008). Third, most of the local associations, funded by national or international donors rely on local elite, which generate distrust due to elite capture of, and targeted distribution of resources by these associations. Finally, lack of technical and financial resources generates distrust in the motives and competence of these associations that increases difficulty for these associations to enlist cooperation and deliver meaningful services (Kashif et al, 2018; Giustozi, 2013). The present study focuses on local, self-help registered SWAs in the district Malakand and District Peshawar of Pakistan.

These associations generate resources from the local community to perform their social welfare activities. In other words, voluntary associations in Pakistan exist in the informal realm, and rely primarily on resources generated informally through local community ties (Suleri et al., 2017, p. 14). The reliance of SWAs on community resources as opposed to government welfare departments can be attributed to their familiarity with the strong society and weak state context in Pakistan (Kirk, 2014, p. 20). Within this context, the state is also distrusted by the citizens. A primary reason for citizen's distrust in the state is that social welfare provision by the state is sharply out of balance with the need for these services. For instance, 33% of Pakistan's population lives below the poverty line, while government-provided services cover approximately 2-3% of this population. The social

welfare programmes that do exist are poorly targeted: between 30 and 33% of the services under the food support and zakat programmes respectively are distributed among the non-poor.¹⁴ Similarly, SWAs often fail to distribute charities among the intended beneficiaries (Rafeeq, 2018; Kashif et al, 2018). Therefore, SWAs in our cases rely on charities generated from the informal markets through the interpersonal ties of their members.

The role of informal markets in local governance is seriously under-researched in the context of Pakistan, and their contemporary role in the provision of social welfare is entirely overlooked. In both of our cases (introduced below), informal markets are the major source of financial support for the activities of the grassroots SWAs (Khan, 2019; Khan, 2020). In the first case (Khan, 2019), Batkhela bazaar, comprise of over 5000 shops where every sahib-e-nisab trader pays zakat (40 out of 60 interviewees). In this case, we focus here on Al-Khidmat welfare association, a welfare wing of a religious political party, Jamat-E-Islami. Malakand district has 97 registered social welfare associations out of which only 18 were active and Al-Khidmat is the largest of the 18 active social welfare association. At the time of fieldwork for this study in 2016, Al-Khidmat was running the largest orphan care program in the district in 2016 with 160 beneficiaries. This program was purposively selected for two reasons, state –sponsored orphanage dormant and social welfare office have no capacity to generate records of the education of orphan kids. Second, it was the most active program where religious and interpersonal reciprocity and their mutual interrelation could be observed most directly. In the second case (Khan, 2020), activities of the PSSS are explored. PSSS, established by young politically active members of the Sikh community has 40 permanent members, 100 donors, and 37 conflict-affected IDP families as its permanent beneficiaries. This is the most active organization of the 250-300 households' Sikh community living in the union council 17 and 18 of Peshawar and all of whom are involved in small informal businesses. This is to say, traders donate Daswandh which is channelled through the PSSS to the poor members of the community.

¹⁴ For these statistics and other facts see www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/brief/social-protection-in-pakistan.

Data Generation and Analysis

For both the studies, a similar sequential data generation method was adopted. Both the studies were conducted for projects with a much wider scope in terms of subject coverage and population sample. However, here I draw on the qualitative methods of data generation and analysis employed in both the studies (Khan, 2019; Khan, 2020). 80 in the first case (Khan, 2019) 26 in the second case (Khan, 2020) semi-structured interviews were conducted. The interview sample in both the cases was based on the principle of respondent expertise (Pawson and tilley, 1997) and maximum variation (Miles and Huberman, 1994:17). Market traders (donors), members and officials of social welfare associations (collectors and distributors of donations), and relevant district officials were interviewed. Sample size for each project, and each category within each project was determined by the principle of information saturation (Sawnders et al, 2016). The data was analysed using flexible thematic analysis (Fletcher, 2017). Various if-then tests were performed to ensure validity of the conclusions drawn (Miles et al, 2014). The conclusions were then compared across cases. These cases are not presented separately, instead, evidence from both is presented to illustrate our key findings.

Findings

This section demonstrates that the charities are donated by traders not only as a sense of religious obligation, but also in the hope of return from god on their act of generosity. The role of reciprocity in governing the charity dynamics in the context of social welfare provision is examined. To analyse the role of reciprocity in governing social welfare provision, it is important to assess the role of trust, because trust creates expectations and reciprocity is the fulfilment of those expectations. After demonstrating the role of reciprocity in the governance of charities, its implications for local governance is demonstrated with the case of education for vulnerable children.

Low-Trusting Environment: Poor Governance of the Social Welfare Provision

The quality of governance in the KP province, in terms of social welfare provision is poor which erodes citizen's trust both in the government and in the social welfare associations (Khan, 2019: chapter8). Two factors, poor service delivery and poor governance

of grassroots social welfare associations contribute to the low levels of trust in the society. For instance, the district welfare office in Malakand does not have any statistics on the orphan children let alone any policy direction. Similarly, the government-sponsored orphanage has the capacity to provide shelter to 100 persons, but the orphanage is dysfunctional since 2012. On the other hand, education of the children of conflict-affected IDPs of the Sikh community does not receive any government's support which erodes citizen's trust in the government. Ramesh, a conflict-affected Sikh IDP, while responding to the question in what ways government is supporting you? Replies: "what does government do for us? It cannot even make a school for our kids. They [government officials] are there to protect their interest, not to serve the public." (Ramesh interview, 11/09/2019).

Low trust in government does not imply higher trust in the social welfare associations. Evidence from both the cases show that Trust in these associations is equally low. Three main factors shape citizen's distrust in social welfare associations. First, poor governance of social welfare associations. In both the districts (Peshawar and Malakand, the number of associations with the district welfare office was very high, and the number of actually active associations on the ground was very low (Khan, 2019; Khan, 2020). High number of registered and very low number of active associations give rise to suspicions about the intentions of those involved in setting up these associations. Second, sudden rise and disappearance from the scene (due to limited financial resources) is also viewed with suspicion. For instance, Sanga, a local organization established by son of a landlord began with an ambitious plan of establishing shelter for the orphanage. Equipment and furniture for the establishment was purchased, and official announcement of its inauguration was made. However, due to limited finances, the plan had to stop before coming to fruition (Interview, founder Sanga, 04/09/2016). Such incidents spur mistrust in the social welfare sector. In a conversation about social welfare associations, an interviewee while explaining distrust in social welfare associations referred to Sanga and stated, "Where is Sanga? They say that they will establish orphanage, but they disappeared. They do such activities for personal gains, and when their objectives are achieved, they disappear" (Noorullah interview, 11/08/2016). Thirdly, those active in the provision of service are distrusted by their community members and even their beneficiaries (in the case of Sikh community). For instance, while conducting

interviews with members of Sikh community, 7 respondents warn me by saying: “if you wanted to help us, make sure that whatever you are giving should be given directly to us, not through them [PSSS].” Sathwand Interview, 13/09/2019). This was a sufficient comment upon the distrust of community members in the welfare provision of an association that otherwise is the expression of the political unity of the community.

Within this context, for SWAs, state and marketplaces are two important sources of finance. SWAs clearly prefer to generate finances from the market. These SWAs avoid finances available through the state because of their low value, complex official procedures, monitoring and reporting. In the Malakand district, in 2016, only 3 SWAs applied for grant in aid available through the annual development plan (Interview with District welfare officer, 17/09/2016). For all the SWAs interviewed in Malakand, and those of Sikh communities in Peshawar, donation by traders operating in the informal market is a crucial resource that help perform their service provision activities. Despite the fact that majority of traders in Batkhela pay zakat (40 out of 60 because they are sahib-e-nisab), and in the Sikh community of Peshawar (6 out of 6) pay Daswandh. However, all of these respondents prefer to personally donate their charities to individuals instead of organizations. This is mainly because of the respondent’s lack of trust in SWAs. This does not imply complete failure of SWAs in generating charities from the market. Instead, these associations use interpersonal networks of their members to collect donations from non-members. Let us analyse, through the case of education for vulnerable children, how reciprocity operate within these dynamics of charity.

The Role of Reciprocity in the Governance of Charities

In both the cases, Zakat in the Batkhela bazaar and Daswandh in Peshawar, charity is the outcome of reciprocal relation between the donor and the God. Charity is donated either to gain God’s blessing and success in business, or to avoid God’s punishment for not sharing with the poor what God has bestowed upon the rich. For instance, a pharmacy wholesaler in the Batkhela bazaar states, “I am doing business with God, as he asks in Quran to do. He says, you give me 1, I will give you 10, if not in this world, in the other world. However, I spend 1 and because of that, I get sometimes 5 sometimes 10 times profit and barakat in my business.” (Salar interview, 10/09/2016). Similarly, Sathinder Singh, who is a regular donor of the PSSS states, “God has blessed me with this money and I give it to the poor. And If I

give five, God gives me 10.” (Sethinder Singh, August15, 2019). The motivation is not always giving for receiving returns, but sometimes to forestall the risk of punishment that comes with the gift of wealth that god has bestowed upon the rich. For instance, another donor of Peshawari Singh Seva society states, “in our Guru Granth [Sikh religious scripture], God asks us for the 10th of our earning, if I don’t do that, he can take all of what I have... and if he takes all this away, can I do something?” (Sathpal interview, 17/09/2019). This reciprocity between God and the rich is one of the most important drivers for high incidence of charity in both of our case-study sites.

The receivers of these charities born out of reciprocal relation between God and the rich are three. The State, SWAs and the Poor. As noted earlier, state and SWAs collect charities to perform their social welfare provision activities. None of our Muslim interviewees prefer to pay their Zakat’s to the state. Nor they want to pay their charities to support the social welfare provision by SWAs who claim to fill the vacuum in the delivery of social welfare services by the week state. A major reason for not paying charities to SWAs is the lack of trust in their capacity to deliver, or if they have capacity, their intensions. “Every member of Sikh community pays Daswandh, but initially when we [PSSS] started this work, we could only collect charities from the traders with whom we [PSSS members] had personal ties” (Sukhbeer interview, 11/09/2019). SWA’s members are aware of the distrust of donor in the SWAs, as a SWA member in Batkhela stated, “if you go to a stranger for asking him to donate to your organization, he will treat you just as someone treats a thief.” This is the reason that SWAs strategize to use interpersonal networks of their members to raise finances for their social welfare provision activities. In the case of Al-Khidmat’s orphan education program, a committee of 4 or 5 traders is constituted, who then generate a list of the people in each of their networks. Those member traders are selected for this purpose who are trusted to have large networks in the bazaar. When the committee is constituted, members of the committee sit together to draw a list of people in their networks. After drawing a list of 150-200 people in the bazaar, each of the committee members is tasked with contacting his network members.

Due to reciprocal relation between members of SWAs and the potential donor, those who are reluctant to donate to SWAs pay a part of their charity to these organizations. A

wholesaler, due to his political differences with Jamat-e-Islami is of the view that Al-Khidmat is doing social work to further its political objectives. Despite his distrust in Al-Khidmat's intentions, he donates to its orphan care program. The reason, as he stated, "who gives their charity to organizations like Al-Khidmat? But if a friend like Sohaib comes from their [Al-Khidmat's] side to ask for donation, I cannot refuse" (Rahmat Khan Interview, September 5, 2016).

Reliance of SWAs to generate donations through interpersonal networks of their members have implications for our reciprocity model. Those charities, mediated through interpersonal ties of SWAs members create no reciprocal obligations between SWA and the donor. Instead, it impacts upon the interpersonal ties between member of the SWA who initiates request for charity from a potential donor who is a friend, family member, customer, or supplier of the SWA member. For instance, in 2016, Shahalam was one of the committee members for generating charities for Al-Khidmat's orphan education program. He asked one of his 'rich friends' to donate charity to Al-Khidmat's orphan care program. The friend had recently returned from Middle East and Shahalam had a series of exchange of family visits. The friend donated only 10 per cent of what Shahalam expected him to donate. Under friendship obligations, the donor could not turn down Shahlam's request, despite his unwillingness to donate due to his scepticism about Al-Khidmat's use of donations for its political objectives. The incident disappointed Shahalam, who stated: "If I know that he has the capacity and he fails to cooperate repeatedly, I will think that he cannot be trusted in the future; thus I will reduce contact with him" (Shahalam interview, 15 September 2016). It should be noted however, once a person become a permanent donor of the SWA, direct reciprocal expectation between the SWA and donor are established. If a SWA aspires continuity in the flow of donations, it is obligated to maintain donor's trust. By stopping donating, the donor can punish SWA for its failure to maintain donor's trust. Failure of SWA to maintain donor's trust does not negatively impact upon interpersonal ties between the SWA member who initiated request for donation, and the donor who donated to the SWA because of his ties to the SWA's member.

These findings demonstrate three features of our model. First, receivers of charity are of three kinds: the state, social welfare associations and the poor. Second, reciprocal

obligations govern ties between immediately proximate actors and not between the actual donor of charity and its ultimate recipient. Third, charities born out of reciprocal expectation between the rich and god are mediated by reciprocal ties before reaching the ultimate beneficiary that is the poor.

Implications for Local Governance

The inter-linkage between market and SWAs, mediated by religious charities and governed by reciprocity has two major implications for the governance of social welfare provision at the local level. First, this inter-linkage substitutes ineffective state institutions with a visible welfare provision impact upon the local governance structure (see table 1). Second, SWAs, though poorly governed by the state, are more responsive to their donors and this responsiveness is dictated by the norm of reciprocity. Education of vulnerable children (of the orphan children in the Malakand district) and IDP children (in the case of Sikh idps in Peshawar) illustrates ineffectiveness of state institutions in the provision of social welfare (See table1).

Table1:
SWAs substituting ineffective state institutions of social welfare provision

The cases of Malakand and Peshawar	Unofficial statistics on vulnerable children in need of support	Official statistics on vulnerable children in need of support	Vulnerable children supported by government	Vulnerable children supported by SWAs	Source of support for SWAs
The case of orphan children in Malakand district	2000	0	0	220	Zakat donated (mainly by market traders)
The case of Sikh IDP children in Peshawar	53	0	0	53	Daswandh donated (mainly by market traders)

Source: Khan, 2019; Khan, 2020.

The table above demonstrate that SWAs, operating through charities generated from local community are the only source of support for education of vulnerable children in our respective cases. Doubtless, the services provided by SWAs vary widely in their quality and frequency. However, their ability to operate in the vacuum created by ineffective government institutions depends primarily on the economic and social capital generated by these SWAs.

Fundamental to the operation of these networks is the role of trust, reciprocity and social obligations that operate as informal regulatory mechanisms in the context of poor governance of SWAs by government institutions. Regardless of the intrinsic and extrinsic motives involved, the individual actions of SWA members and their collective strategies are guided by informal sanctioning mechanisms that regulate bazaar-SWA relations. Compliance with these informal governing mechanisms determines the success of an SWA in benefiting from the bazaar's economic and social resources. For instance, PSSS initially faced difficulties in generating charities as it lacked people's trust. However, in its four years, it earned enough trust of donors that it can generate donations without difficulty.

Those organizations fail to maintain donor's trust are not only unable to achieve their social welfare provision objectives, they also lose their existing donors which is the only source of their survival. For example, Darman Welfare society was a small SWA set up by some traders for helping the society. Like Al-Khidmat and PSSS, its major source of support was the charities donated by traders. However, its members began to use these charities to address their personal needs. When the news of misuse of funds by the members appear, Darman Welfare Society not only lost its donors but also disintegrated when it breached donors' trust and generated internal conflicts within the SWA.

Conclusion

Reciprocity governs the acts of charity, which are both intrinsic, i.e. Dictated by religious commandments, and a social norm that regulates the practices of giving and receiving in the context of service provision (Oliver, 2017, pp. 280-81). For understanding the role of reciprocity in the dynamics of charities in the context of social welfare provision in Pakistan, this paper drew upon Kochuyt's triatic model of reciprocity. In doing so, the paper makes two specific contributions. First, the paper empirically applies some of the

theoretical argument in Kochuyt's reciprocity model. Second, the paper extends Kochuyt's triatic model to develop a five-legged model to conceptualize and empirically analyse charities from local governance perspective. To the author's knowledge, this is the first empirical endeavour to apply any reciprocity model to understand the dynamics of charity in the context of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.

The model of reciprocity, presented in this paper aimed to understand the role of charity in the local governance, and the role of reciprocity in governing charities at different levels. This model encompasses state, market, civil society, religious norms, and social norms and values. Through its application to the practice of Zakat in the Malakand district and the case of Daswandh in Peshawar, This model is also expected to stand the test of cross-regional and cross-religious variations.

Despite these contributions, the study has some limitations that offer immediate direction for future research. First, our model is underdeveloped on the role of reciprocity between the SWA and the poor as its beneficiaries, and between the rich and the poor as the donor and beneficiary. In each case, the ties are asymmetric, but to what extent these ties are exploitative? What do the individual rich donors expect from the poor beneficiaries? And what do SWA expect from the beneficiaries of their social welfare provision.

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Pakistan's Aid to Afghanistan Since 2001 and Its Prospects for State Building in Afghanistan

Hashmat Ullah Khan¹⁵ & Gohar Rahman¹⁶

Abstract:

State building is the process of establishing and strengthening the institutions essential to support long term social, political and economic development. State building in Afghanistan has been passing through recurrent ups and downs since 1979 and has been badly affected by dictatorships, civil wars, ethnic conflicts and terrorism. Afghan war and later on civil war turned Afghanistan into one of the poorest and most vulnerable state of the world. This research aims to analyse the state building in the wake of 9/11 with special reference to Pakistan's aid and assistance and its prospects for the creation of new institutions, strengthening existing ones, institutional consolidation, sustainable development and stabilization in Afghanistan. Islamabad's development aid to Kabul has reached US\$1 billion and the country's development aid is geared towards investment in the fields of education, infrastructure, agriculture, health, and capacity building of Afghanistan's professionals. Since 9/11 Pakistan has setup many healthcare facilities, initiated capacity building projects in the fields of agriculture, healthcare, railways, banking, armed forces and diplomatic professionals of Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided about 6,000 fully funded scholarships to Afghan students while one hundred seats have been reserved for females annually. Only in 2018, around 750 Afghan students got admission in Pakistani universities. Pakistan had built many educational and engineering institutions, roads, hospitals and many other institutions in Afghanistan since 2001. This type of help is playing very positive role in the state building process in Afghanistan. The research paper, therefore, aims to analyse the role of Pakistan aid in state building in Afghanistan and to evaluate its strength in maintaining peace and stability in post-2001 in Afghanistan.

¹⁵ Hashmatullah Khan is a PhD fellow at PhD Scholar, School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University China.

¹⁶ Gohar Rahman is a PhD student at the University of Peshawar.

Key words: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Aid, State Building and Institutions.

Introduction

State building or institutions building is the process of establishing new institutions and strengthen the existing one, required to support long-term stability, financial, social, and political development in the targeted fragile country. State institutions including legislature, executive, Judiciary, army, police and other institutions such as the Education, Treasury, transport, telecommunication, health and many others, to control and administer the state (Barder, 2013). Foreign aid is serving as a tool of state building to advance the developmental and non-developmental goals, included policies implementations, counter terrorism, stability, establishment institutions, development of natural resources and democratization. Its size and structure depend on economic and political condition of the donor state. In other words, state building is a triggered international intervention to refine a fragile or deteriorating country by strengthening its existing institution as well as creation of new institutions required. It means you need to establish such institutions in the country through which state can be strengthened and by which the state can be functional effectively. Power should be allocated to that institutions as per the constitution and there should be no functional overlapping. It would form good governance to promote social order by the provision of social, financial, and physical security for the citizen of the targeted state. Furthermore, state building is aimed to decrease poverty, fragileness and security threats to global and regional security created by organized crimes, illegal trade, proxy wars, mass migration, extremism, terrorism, sectarianism and violent conflicts. However, state building initiative is not constantly effective to combat the above-mentioned threats and may lead to more destruction by aggravating the issues of the fragile country in the search for democratic legitimization (Karimi, 2007). As concerned Afghanistan since 2001 state building efforts initiated and through foreign aid many state institutions have been installed included, *Loia Jarga* (Parliament) Constitution drafted, Central Bank, Presidency, judiciary, Army, Police, civil service, Schools, Colleges, Universities, Hospitals, Humanitarian Aid Agencies, Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF), provincial Governor's Offices, Provincial Councils (PC), Afghanistan Independent Human Rights

Commission (AIHRC), District governments, Agriculture Department, and Communication etc.

The main functions of a state are security of citizens, justice, public service, mobilization of resources and infrastructure development which needs strong state institutions but Afghanistan is lacking such institutions. Afghanistan is a landlocked and war effected country constantly dependent upon the foreign aid and help of different donor countries including Pakistan. Even it is dependent on Pakistan to do its trade with the rest of world through Pakistani sea ports as Afghanistan has no any port. Since 2001 Pakistan is providing financial and technical aid to Afghanistan for its rehabilitation, rebuilding and development (Hanif, 2018). Foreign aid provided by Pakistan funded national priorities and helped to sustain institutional continuity and expedite economic recovery.

In Afghanistan, the post-conflict improvement course is a complex range of peace building milestone. States move through these milestones at different pace, with different degrees of risk of backslide into conflict (Ndikumana, 2015). In this regard key milestones in Afghanistan are easing of conflicts and violence, conclusion of peace agreement disarmament, demobilization, national integration, return of refugees and IDPs, establishment of foundation for a running state, reconciliation and integration and initiation of economic recovery. In Afghanistan the donors are also facing the challenges of fair disbursement and utilizations of aid. The Bonn Agreement signed on December 5, 2001, was the foundation stone of US State Building in Afghanistan. It paved way for refuges rehabilitation, Democracy, Loya Jirga (Parliament), drafting of constitution, parliamentary and presidential elections, installation of civil structure, Supreme Court, Army, Police, educational institutions, hospitals, women rights, drugs eradication, new currency, economic stability and social welfare programs etc.

State Building in Afghanistan: Prospects of Pakistan's Aids

In war effected and fragile states like Afghanistan usually peace, stability and development not taking place because of weak or failed state institutions, and such is the case of Afghanistan. When institutions became weak then it leads to the failure of the state and its citizens become vulnerable to insecurity, poverty, humanitarian crises, terrorism, disease and

political and economic upheaval. Insurgency also hampered the state-building process in Afghanistan because of the threat that it posed. Foreign Aid is competent to achieve excellent result in fragile and war affected states like Afghanistan (Chandy, 2011). State institutions in Afghanistan are weak therefore state building process is very slow but since last few years it has been improved significantly. Being a donor Pakistan has a long-term view, motivated to focus on strengthening state capacity in order to build effective state institutions and put Afghanistan on a path to long-term peace, prosperity, stability and development.

According to Gisselquist State-building commonly involves in strengthening the state capacity, authority and legitimacy of the state (Gisselquist, 2014). Economic stability of any state is the pre-requisite of State Building including Afghanistan. Instead of economic development no any country can fulfil the dream of state building. At the time of US attack on Afghanistan the economic structure of Afghanistan was totally collapsed. After occupation US started to give due attention to the Afghanistan economic development. At present Afghanistan is receiving only \$50 per person per year in foreign aid of which \$20 came from the United States (Dobbins, 2008). Foreign aid is an important source of state building in Afghanistan. Since 2001 Pakistan is providing financial, technical and institutional aid and assistance to Afghanistan for its rehabilitation, reconstruction, development and improving the capacity of state institutions. Under the planning commission of Pakistan, Afghanistan's planning cell was established to assist and evaluate projects designed for Afghanistan (Siddique, 2011). In 2002 the govt of Pakistan announced \$100 million developmental aid for the rehabilitation and renovation of Afghanistan in the Tokyo International conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, to help the state that is facing violence and destruction since long (Kiani, 2002). Pakistan financed many projects of Afghanistan including the Railway Line from Chaman to Kandahar, reconstruction of Torkham to Jalalabad road, road from Ghulam Khan to Khost city of Afghanistan, electricity transmission line to Khost, provided 200 trucks, 100 buses, 38 ambulances, aid to Kabul University, reconstruction of many schools destroyed in war, constructed a block for faculty in Bulkh University and constructed a Kidney Centre in Jalalabad city (News, 2005). All such programs aimed to encourage and promote durable development and develop infrastructure in Afghanistan to bring peace, stability and prosperity.

In the years of 2002-2003 different projects worth of total 9.528 million dollars had been completed including; Donation of 50,000 Metric Ton wheat worth of 8.12 million dollars, 0.516 million dollars paid to Pakistan International Airlines for Afghan Hajis from Kabul-Jeddah-Kabul, 0.075 million dollars paid to Kabul Radio station and 5 million text books worth of 0.817 million dollars were also delivered to Afghanistan (Affairs, 2006). In the years of 2003-2004 different projects worth of total 13.898 million dollars had been completed including; payment of 0.17 million dollars to ministry of communication, 4.808 million dollars to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the arrangement of necessary equipment, 0.30 million dollars to feasibility study of Chaman-Kandahar rail link, 8.33 million dollars to Ministry of communication for construction of Torkham-Jalalabad road, 0.2 million dollars to Ministry of water and power for establishment of Office in Kabul, 0.09 million dollars to ministry of Interior for training of Afghan officers (Hanif, 2018). In the years of 2004-2005 different projects worth total 15.828 million dollars had been completed including; 0.044 million dollars paid to Ministry of Interior for training of officers, 4.833 million dollars for supply of 100 buses, 0.139 million dollars to rail link of Chaman-Spin Boldak and 8.6 million dollars to Torkham-Jalalabad Road (Hanif, 2018). In the years of 2005-2006, 35 million dollars provided for different projects including; 34.42 million dollars to Road from Torkham to Jalalabad and 0.81 million dollars for the construction of local roads of Jalalabad (Affairs, 2006). During the visit of Shaukat Aziz the then Prime Minister of Pakistan to Kabul in 2007 he announced the increase the rehabilitation funds to Afghanistan from 250 to 300 million dollars. Since 2001 Islamabad also helping Afghanistan's manufacture aimed the objective that the citizens of Afghanistan may enter an era of industrialization.

Till now the developmental assistance of Pakistan to Afghanistan has reached to 1 billion dollars, invested in infrastructure development, health sector, education sector, agriculture sector and capacity building of professionals of Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided 6,000 fully funded scholarships to the students of Afghanistan in which 100 seats have been reserved for female annually. Only in 2018, 750 Afghani students have been enrolled in different universities of Pakistan to pursue their education. Islamabad is providing valuable aid in the field of healthcare facilities in Afghanistan. Constructed many hospitals, i.e, Naib Aminullah Khan Hospital Logar, Jinnah Hospital Kabul, Nishtar Kidney Center

Jalalabad, Zia ul Haq Artificial Limb Centre in Badakshah, 50 bed Al-Shifa Eye Hospital in Gardez, 50 beds Al-Shefa eye hospital in Kunduz and Syed Ahmad Shaheed Hospital. Pakistan has also started many capacity building programs for healthcare professionals of Afghanistan under which only in 2017, fifty-nine (59) doctors, nurses, and technicians successfully completed their training. In addition, in the year 2018 forty-two (42) more healthcare professionals started their training at the Institute of Kidney Diseases Peshawar. Islamabad is also helping Kabul in capacity building in the fields of banking, agriculture, military, railways and diplomacy. Many agricultural professionals have completed their training in the field of “Quarantine and Plant Protection” in Pakistan, and apart from this twenty (20) full funded scholarships granted only in 2018 to the officers of Afghan Ministry of Irrigation, Agriculture and Livestock to do their specialized studies at Faisalabad Agricultural University. Railway professionals also trained at Pakistan’s Railway academy, Lahore. Moreover, Pakistan and China also asked Afghanistan to identify such areas in which both the countries could offer training and capacity building for Afghani professionals in order to make them capable to contribute to the betterment of their country Afghanistan. Recently, during the Pakistani PM visit to Kabul, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an MOU for Quetta-Kandahar-Herat Railway link and Peshawar-Kabul Motorway (APP, 2018). Pakistan also constructed Allama Iqbal Faculty of Arts at Kabul with the cost of Rs. 411.256 million, Liaqat Ali Khan Engineering Faculty Block in Balkh University with the cost of Rs. 6000 million, Rehman Baba School in Kabul with the cost of Rs. 2 million. In education field, some other aids include contribution of 300,000 student kits provided in 2005, delivery of 2800 computers to different institutions in 2004 and 2,000 scholarships for Afghan students to get higher education in Pakistan (Editorial, 2010). Pakistan is also helping Afghanistan to strengthen its political institutions. During the 2005 presidential elections Pakistan provided the facility of vote to the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan (Gul, 2017).

Another key aspect in this regard of state building in Afghanistan is the economic stabilization of Afghanistan in order to make it stable and protect it from failing again. Foreign trade is key source of economic development for any country including Afghanistan. As Afghanistan is a landlocked state dependent on neighbours to do its foreign business with

the rest of the world. The trade route from Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass to the port of Karachi and port Qasim is the most economical and natural trade route of Afghanistan. However, this route has not utilized fully by Afghanistan due to worst law and order situation and its political differences with Islamabad (Hasan, 1964). If this route is fully utilized then it can give a worthy boost to the foreign trade of Afghanistan which is playing a key role in economic development, a prerequisite for state building of a country because state institutions build and develop when the country is economically stable. As concerned the trade of Afghanistan, its chief exports are fur, agricultural products and fruits which form the main source of capital in the country". The major export partners of Afghanistan are Pakistan 25.9%, India 25.5%, US 14.9%, Tajikistan 9.6%, Germany 5% and the major import partners are US 29.1%, Pakistan 23.3%, India 7.6%, Russia 4.5% and Germany 4.2% (Hasan, 1964). The Pak-Afghan trade relations have great potential. It needs strengthening the capability of Afghanistan as well as strong trade relations with Pakistan to advance the function of markets and improve production and export. The economic relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan passed through different stages since the independence of Pakistan. From 1947 to 1965 their economic ties face many ups and downs due to political environment but once it signed Transit Trade Agreement of 1965, their trade and economic relations solidified despite all odds. By signing the Transit Trade Agreement of 2010 Pak-Afghan trade and economic relations further consolidated because now they became international trade partners. Moreover, Afghanistan has been endowed with a huge amount of natural resources, including copper, gas, oil, sulphur, coal, Iron, Lead, Zinc, Chromate, Salt and precious stones but unfortunately due to continuous terrorism and conflict it could not explore its natural resources to make economy better. In 1970 USSR estimated that Afghanistan has 400 Million tons of Coal (Jalalzai, 2003). Like this the US geological survey says that Afghanistan is blessed with \$1 trillion of natural reservoirs which are including 1.6 billion barrels oil, sixteen 16 trillion cubic feet natural gas and 240 million tons Copper, Lithium and Iron. All these natural resources Afghanistan can supply to other countries through Pakistan which will defiantly give Afghanistan a huge amount of foreign exchange. Being the neighbour Pakistan is also a huge market of Afghani goods and most of its mineral resources are exported to Pakistan.

As mention above Afghanistan is situated at crossroad of the Asia therefore can serve as a major trade rout of natural resources between Central and South Asia but unfortunately law and order situation deprive it from taking benefits from its geo-strategic location. Peace is also too much necessary for state building in Afghanistan. To restore peace the indication of Islamabad's commitment to assist and facilitate the process of reconciliation has been indicated by the release of man high profile Taliban detainees including Mullah Ghani Baradar on the demand of Afghan govt to do peace negotiations, as well as the public commitments of both civilian and military personals to help Afghanistan. Islamabad is supporting peace and reconciliation process of Afghan-owned and Afghan-led. Without peace and security, it is extremely challenging for Afghanistan to provide basic services, social justice, institutions building and strengthening, attract foreign investment, increase exports or develop effective governance. Without peace and the rule of law, it is impossible to deal with other aspects of state building. Pakistan is wholeheartedly striving to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan. Islamabad is facilitating peace talks between Afghan govt and Taliban. In Murree a serious of peace talks are facilitating by Pakistan and recently a grand meeting of Afghan elder was also conducted in Lahore. If Afghan govt and Taliban reached to a conclusion and peace restore then it will be a great contribution for the state building in Afghanistan. It will be very much beneficial for modernization program as state regulation of economy, social welfare reforms, education, regularization of exports and imports and improvement in industrial sector. The recent engagement between the leadership of both countries, on full spectrum is an attempt to build trust and fasten their ties. Most important, peace in Afghanistan will stop Brain Drain, key for the state building. A lot of educated people and skilled workers fled to neighbour states including Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.

Another important point is that the future of Afghanistan is primarily depends on the potential of the Afghan Army, police and other security agencies. Though in June 2013, NATO handed over the duty of the security of whole state to the Afghanistan's security forces but the capacity and capability of the Afghanistan's forces is in serious need of improvement. Command and control issues are being streamlined and key capacities are being built. Pakistan can provide significant help in this regard to strengthen ANSF in order to bring peace and stability in the country (Khan A. , 2014). It is proving mainly training

facilities. Recently six Afghan National Army (ANA) cadets have joined the Military Academy (PMA) in Abbottabad to attend an 18-month course (Khan T. , 2015).

Another very serious hurdle in way of state building is the drug production and trafficking. Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium, producing 90% of the world's opium (UNODC, 2013). As Pakistan Sharing a 2,640 km long border with Afghanistan, therefore Pakistan is the most vulnerable state to the Afghan drugs trafficking and arms (Desk, 2018). The Pakistan-Afghanistan border witness an extraordinary movement of people. Around 56,000 people daily cross the border, with more than 90% of the flow originate from Afghanistan into Pakistan (Vyas, 2013). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 27-30 billion dollars worth of drugs per year are smuggling from Afghanistan through Pakistan to other parts of the world, of which drugs worth of 1.5 billion dollars stay in Pakistan. Pakistan is both a destination and transit for around 40% of drugs producing in Afghanistan. The drugs supply to Pakistan is an issue of dire concern because the number of drugs addicts has increased enormously in Pakistan. According to the statistics of 2012, there were 6.7 million drug users in Pakistan (Ndikumana, 2015). Now since counter terrorism operations in tribal areas and the wire fencing of Pak-Afghan border expected to be completed till the end of 2019 over the cost of \$550 million (Desk, 2018) this drugs trafficking would be controlled significantly. It is not only good for Pakistan but also for Afghanistan because the decrease of its demand in Pakistan and stoppage of its supply to other countries would slowly and gradually eliminate drugs production in Afghanistan.

Although Afghanistan is getting good progress in many fields such as education, women rights, minorities rights (Vyas, 2013), democratization and implementation of a new constitution, but it is still facing many major threats to its future. Despite eighteen years presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, it is still far from being stable. Terrorism, violence, extremism, turmoil, ineffective governance, civilian fatalities, drug production and insurgency continue. These problems are a legacy of the repeated external involvement in Afghanistan for geostrategic interests since long. To address these worst challenges a consolidated and collective national approach is required. Afghanistan is still in conflict, and both in conflict and post-conflict countries face high risks of fragility. It is in urgent needs of state building, economic development, reconstruction and development of domestic

resources. Afghanistan is unable to explore and utilize their own resources; post-conflict states like Afghanistan is therefore compel to depend on foreign aid to finance its state building. The question is that what role foreign aid can play to assist fragile states like Afghanistan to address the issues of its state building and to avoid or at least decrease the risk of new conflicts, and put it on a path of durable development. This question is mainly significant because failure of post-conflict state building increasing sometime the risk of new conflicts and fragility. The matter is not only about the quantity of the foreign aid channelled to post-conflict arena but also about how the foreign aid utilized and its contribution to state building, reforms and development (Ndikumana, 2015).

Conclusion

State building is the process of creating new and strengthening the existing institutions in order to support durable and long term political, social and economic development, infrastructure, public service delivery, law and order, resources utilization in a fragile state like Afghanistan. Therefore, donor like Pakistan interventions in Afghanistan needs to prioritize state building as a primary objective. Pakistan Aid is too much beneficial for Afghanistan as it is targeted the very key institution like education, health, infrastructure development, capacity building and economic development. Most important is the economic stabilization of Afghanistan through increasing of its foreign trade via Pakistan sea ports with the rest of the world in order to make it stable and protect it from failing again. Foreign trade is key source of economic development for any country including Afghanistan. Strong economy is key for state building while Pak-Afghan trade relation is very helpful in this regard.

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The Influence of International Public Opinion on the Border Management in Pakistan-Afghanistan Region

JIANG Sheng^{17*}

Abstract

Border management in Pakistan-Afghanistan region is one of the foremost problems for world peace and development. Since the beginning of the 21st century, and with the emergence of militant ideological movements in the region, the dynamics of the border areas have been becoming more complex. Under the background of information globalization, Pakistan-Afghanistan region has been affected by its projection by print and electronic media of different countries. The expanding of spill over effects of security and development problem in Pakistan-Afghanistan region makes the international community facing severe challenges. In view of the realistic problem in Pakistan-Afghanistan region mentioned above, this paper tries to explore the influence of international public opinion and maintain the border management of Pakistan-Afghanistan region through discussion.

Key Words: International Public Opinion, Pakistan-Afghanistan Region, Border Management

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan are two neighbouring countries with close geopolitical, economic, cultural, religious ties. The two countries take the Durand Line as the border, and whenever in history or at present, the development tendency of the two countries has been bound closely. For years, as Afghanistan's neighbour, Pakistan faces not only by the changes in the situation in Afghanistan, but also the non-traditional security threats such as drugs, refugees and water resources conflict with Afghanistan. To this end, a positive international public opinion is indispensable to the peace of a country, of a region, and even the development of the whole world, let alone to the security governance of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. The particularity of international public opinion determines the border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which will inevitably have a profound impact.

¹⁷ Jiang Sheng is a PhD. Candidate of Shanghai International Studies University.

The Impact of the International Public Opinion on Border Management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region.

The International Public Opinion refers to the sum of attitudes and opinions of nation-states (including national media and the public) on topics and objects (including people, institutions, countries, etc.) that are of common interest in international public space.

To this extent, the situation of the international public opinion has a significant impact on the border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan. And for this reason, we need to analyze the social environment of the area border such as what makes the Pakistan-Afghanistan border a sociopolitical complex boundary, to pay attention to the policy direction of international public opinion information on border management and security governance in the region, as well as to analyze how international discourse substitute for religious discourse and challenges the mainstream discourse of Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

The Border Situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region Raises the Great Concern to the International Public Opinion

The border refers to the marginal area of the territory of one nation, and it is close to the national boundary or borderline inward direction of a certain width of the area. The border is divided into the land border and coastal border. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border refers mainly to the 2430-kilometer land border. Due to historical reasons, the border environment in this area is complex, which often attracts the attention of international public opinion and becomes the focus of international public opinion.

International Public Opinion and the Environment of Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Area

Because of its unique geo-strategic position and special historical, ethnic, religious and other reasons, the Pakistan-Afghanistan has always been the focus of attention of the international community. For many years, the global media has played an extremely important role in guiding public opinion in the turbulent regional environment of the

Pakistan-Afghanistan and in the process of building the Pakistan-Afghanistan international public opinion platform.

The "Pakistan-Afghanistan border area" specifically refers to 11 border provinces in eastern and southern Afghanistan, followed by Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktya, Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Hilmand, Pakistan North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federal Tribal area (FATA) and Baluchistan Province. Pakistan has seven federal tribal districts and six provincial tribal districts, most of which are located on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Wangxiang, 2009).

The border issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan has a legacy of history. In recent years, there have been many clashes in the border areas, resulting in many deaths and injuries among the army and the people. The existence of extremism in the border areas, coupled with a large number of illegal trade and the smuggling of weapons and drugs, threatens the situation of the border of that area. While in the information dissemination of international public opinion, the views are different. From a long-term perspective, "a country can change friends and enemies, but not geographical location" (Saikal, 2017)." For this reason, the contradictions in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas cannot be avoided, nor should they be publicized and reported in a negative manner, but ought to be treated in a conciliatory manner and supported and guided by international public opinion.

At present, from the content of international public opinion, the environment in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region not only involves the threat of traditional security but also involves the challenge of non-traditional security. For example, trade imbalances affect the development of economic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the one hand, the security of border goods is an important issue in the trade between the two countries. Although the two governments have made several arrangements based on this issue, the problem of theft and damage of import and export goods still exists. On the other hand, the inadequate banking facilities and the lack of formal currency exchange institutions on both sides of the border hinder Pakistan's trade potential with Afghanistan further. Therefore, it is important to grasp the trend of international public opinion of international mainstream media and make correct decisions or create a good international environment for border trade management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.

International Public Opinion Research and the Security of Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Area

Study of the international public opinion refers to a process of analyzing and studying the value and trend of public opinion in the field of international public opinion. It is mainly composed of two parts: one is the tracking, collecting of public opinions in the field of international public opinion and formatting the database, and then to report; the other is to make the targeted research and study on the specific international crises or issues of public opinion, before forming the report. The former is systematic, stable and long-term, while the latter is temporary, sudden and thematic.

First, study the public opinion on the border management of the Pakistan-Afghanistan from unexpected events. In recent years, the influence of international public opinion on the unexpected events in the Pakistan-Afghanistan contains those news reports on the occurrence and development of traditional events, as well as extraterritorial dissemination of social responses to emergencies, coupled with the public opinion studies of the changes in the perspective for an emergency caused by international politics.

For example, in March 2001, the Taliban, in defiance of the strong condemnation of world public opinion, insisted on blowing up Buddhas of Bamiyan built in the fifth century AD. The news sent the world into shock and deep sorrow. The World Heritage Committee strongly called for "the tragedy must not be allowed to repeat!" In 2003, the Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley were registered as World Heritage. After the destruction of the Buddha, the international community has been trying to rebuild them. The case of the bombing of the Buddha of Bamiyan shows us that international public opinion plays a key role in the management of emergencies.

Secondly, study the public opinion for the border management of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region from the world pattern at different periods. International public opinion is the sum of opinions and attitudes, which is generally expressed as a direct pressure of public opinion, in the aspect of diplomatic, economic and military and so on. In practice, as the international situation in Pakistan-Afghanistan is different, international public opinion information would be different.

With the change of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border situation, the armed forces of the international community also change, and international public opinion will follow up and comment.

For example, on June 2, 2019, Afghan media reported that the United States-led coalition forces were stepping up searches in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan to contain armed remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida. The Afghan Islamic News Agency reported that as Pakistan had said it might transfer troops stationed along the border with India near the border with India, hundreds of anti-terrorism coalition forces stepped up searches on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan on June 2 to prevent Taliban and al-Qaida militants from entering Pakistan on the plane of the withdrawal of Pakistani troops.

Border Management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region is a Consequential Part of International Public Opinion Research

Border management is the management of border areas by border management departments in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations, and policies of the state and related border treaties and agreements. The security governance of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region cannot be separated from the border management of both sides.

The Border Management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Area

From the point of view of the country of border management, Pakistan's neighbours are Iran, Afghanistan, China, and India. Pakistan-Afghanistan border management is one of Pakistan's border management, but also the top priority of border management. To this end, Pakistan has given the Frontier Corps the power and responsibility to defend its borders.

For example, article 3, paragraph 1, of Pakistan's "THE FRONTIER CORPS ORDINANCE, 1959" rules: Powers to maintain Frontier Corps. There shall continue to be maintained by the 2[Federal Government] the Frontier Corps forces or units as listed in the First Schedule, primarily for the better protection and administration of the external frontiers of Pakistan within the limits of or adjoining the 3[Tribal Areas] of 4[Pakistan]. And Article 7 (1) provides that: Superintendence, command, control and administration of Frontier Corps.__(1) The superintendence of and command and control over the Frontier Corps shall

vest in the 1[Federal Government], and the Frontier Corps shall be administered, commanded and controlled by the Inspector General and the Commandants in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance and any rules made thereunder and such orders and instructions as may be made or issued by the 1[Federal Government] from time to time (The Frontier Corps Ordinance, 2016).

From the point of view of the task of border management, the basic tasks of Pakistan-Afghanistan border management are to safeguard Pakistan's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, to maintain tranquillity and stability in border areas, to handle border affairs properly, to promote economic development in border areas, and to enhance good-neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries. Accordingly, border management areas can be divided into the closed areas and the area of the management in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Pakistani state, and implement the special management system of those areas.

For instance, the problem of water resources in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area tends to show different views on the dissemination of international public opinion information. The dispute over water resources in Afghanistan is not only between Afghanistan and Pakistan but also between Afghanistan and Iran. These disputes over water resources have brought about border disputes and exacerbated the difficulties of border management.

Afghan media are filled with reports of Pakistan destroying dam construction in Afghanistan. In 2012, TIME reported on an armed killing of Khan Wali, the defender of Afghanistan's dam under construction. After Khan Wali was killed, Afghan officials pointed the finger at Pakistan, saying the killing was instructed by Pakistan, who tended to destroy the dam construction in Afghanistan (Mashal, 2012). Of course, Pakistan denies the accusations from Albania.

In contrast, India has been actively involved in water conservancy construction in Afghanistan, which has triggered a great discussion in Pakistan's domestic media about the water dispute between India and Pakistan. Pakistan believes India is stealing Pakistan's water resources, while Indian officials and media argue that it has not violated the river treaty reached between the two sides, but is only making rational use of the share allocated to it by

the treaty, which in turn criticizes Pakistan's water crisis because of its mismanagement of water resources. Pakistan's water crisis, in turn, has been criticized for its mismanagement of water resources (Akhtar, 2010). Shujat Hussain, chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League (leader) (PML - Party), also warned that Pakistan and India could go to war over water resources (Kugelman, 2009). Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari wrote in the Washington Post in January 2009 that the water crisis in Pakistan is directly related to India and that resolving the water problem between the two countries could prevent environmental disasters, even terrorism and extremism, in South Asia (Zardari, 2011).

International Public Opinion Information and Border Management between Pakistan and Afghanistan

The information on international public opinion is the written material which reflects the international public opinion. In the process of spreading public opinion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, international public opinion information plays a key role.

However, not all information can become information on international public opinion. Only when people accept some information within a certain scope, and then produce a general view and understanding, these "general views and understandings" can be called international public opinion information. Just take the nuclear terrorism as an example. Nuclear weapons themselves are not public opinion, yet when terrorist organizations acquire nuclear weapons (nuclear materials and/or related technology) produce nuclear weapons, attack civilian nuclear facilities (either on network virtual attacks or on physical nuclear facilities) that have brought nuclear panic to the community of nations, and forming the political attitude, views and opinions of the people to society, talent is the information of international public opinion.

From the consequences of terrorism, panic caused is often greater than the real destructive force. In the war against terrorism, winning requires not only the active attention of the international community and governments, but also the strong dissemination and positive reporting of the information of international public opinion, as well as the participation of every citizen.

In international public opinion, the issue of Pakistan's alleged support for terrorism has evolved from Afghan charges to being recognized by more and more countries. Terrorism is the biggest and most serious problem for South Asia, Afghanistan suffers too, and Afghanistan sees Pakistan as the main supporter of regional terrorism (Afghan Parliament Accuses Pakistan, 2017). The United States and India are also tough on the issue of terrorism in Pakistan. In his first Twitter post in 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump condemned Pakistan as a "safe haven" for terrorists and mentioned that the United States has provided more than \$33 billion in aid to Pakistan over the past 15 years, and Trump said he would suspend aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan's "fear". In response to questions and accusations from all sides, Pakistan denied one by one. Pakistan said it had suffered more losses since 2001 than the United States, and Trump's accusations on social networking sites were frustrated by the defeat of the United States in Afghanistan, which was a political gimmick, and that responding to Trump's talk of more than \$30 billion in aid to Pakistan was not true and was "deception" (Janjua, 2018).

On June 4, 2018, the Pakistan Daily reported that the armed forces of Pakistan's Ministry of Public Relations said the Pakistani armed forces repelled terrorist attacks on the Afghan border and killed six militants. Recently, as relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorate, the situation in the border areas between the two countries has become increasingly tense. The Afghan government has repeatedly accused Pakistan of sheltering Afghan rebels, while Pakistan has denied it. In nearly 24 hours, Pakistani security forces have stopped seven attempts by militants to enter the Bajol district. So far, it has been the most dangerous thing for terrorists to plan to invade along the border with Afghanistan, which has built a 43-kilometer defense to prevent Afghan militants from sneaking into Pakistan. In this regard, China urged Pakistan and Afghanistan to reconcile. During a meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Rabbani and Pakistani Foreign Minister Asif, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China and Pakistan are good friends and are willing to play a constructive role in improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan within their capabilities through the dialogue mechanism between China-Arab and Pakistani foreign ministers (Chinese, 2018).

At present, Pakistani media reflects a multi-linguistic and class-divided society. There is a clear division between Urdu and English media, particularly the print media. Urdu newspapers are widely read by the masses across the country, particularly in rural areas. The English media is urban and has a specific readership. It is more liberal and professional as compared to the Urdu media. English print, television, and radio channels have far smaller audiences than their Urdu counterparts, but have greater leverage among opinion makers, politicians, the business community and the upper strata of society. Besides the Urdu and English division, media in Pakistan is also divided linguistically with a series of local languages including Punjabi, Pashto and Sindhi languages (khan, 2018) Terrorist activities in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border make the management of the border between the two countries very difficult, which has become one of the important contents of international public opinion information. To this end, we should give full play to the role of Pakistan's mainstream media and work together on counterterrorism.

The Influence of International Public Opinion Regulation on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Management

International Public Opinion Management is an important measure of border management, through public opinion monitoring and network technology to strengthen the comprehensive use of Pakistan-Afghanistan border management means. It also makes clear that international public opinion supervision is an important reference for the border management, from the international situation, from the emergency, from the analysis of big data, to strengthen the Pakistan-Afghanistan border management of the objective analysis.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Security Needs the International Public Opinion Supervision

The regulation of international public opinion is the sum of the behaviour of supervision and the management of international public opinion. In order to strengthen the construction of international public opinion for security in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, it is necessary to "monitor", "early warn", "mine", "report", "crisis communicate" and "repair and resolve" the public opinion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. It provides a guarantee

for the Pakistan-Afghanistan countries to master the discourse power in the information age, and provides the basis for making the strategic decision of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border management.

The management of public opinion is no less important than the handling of a crisis in the Pakistan-Afghanistan. What the public opinion management to the social impact of the emergency is what the incident (emergency) to the efficiency of the rescue or reaction of the incident (emergency).

Strengthen the International Public Opinion Management of the Refugee Governance in Afghanistan by Means of the Correct Guidance

The problem of Afghan refugees has long been a difficult problem for Pakistan and Afghanistan. After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Durand Line became the national line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the Pashtun was divided into two and became citizens of the two countries. Although they belong to different countries, the links and exchanges between the Pashtun communities on both sides have always been very close. Since the 1970s, the war in Afghanistan has caused refugees to pour into Pakistan. According to media reports, 83.6 percent of the Afghan refugees who fled to Pakistan belong to the Pashtun, while the main ethnic group in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province is also the Pashtun (Jing, 2013). Whenever there are war and disaster, the Pushtu people in Afghanistan are more likely to take refuge in Pakistan, especially in the North-West border province, regardless of emotional and practical needs.

As of mid-January 2018, the total number of registered and undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan was about 2.7 million (Saifullah, 2018). In 2018, the security situation in Afghanistan was worrisome, with data showing that the successful return of terrorists to Afghanistan disguised as refugees put Afghanistan at greater risk of radicalization and recruitment of violent extremist groups. Therefore, the border conflict is the primary contradiction of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and effective border management and cooperation is a core and urgent problem to be solved in the region (Yongbiao, 2018).

To that end, in the process of security governance in the Pakistan-Afghanistan, the use of international public opinion information communication, increase the guidance toward the correct direction, reduce negative reports, and effective management is very important.

Strengthening the International Public Opinion Management of Drug Trafficking Governance in Pakistan-Afghanistan Region through Public Opinion Monitoring

The monitoring of public opinion is to obtain new information from the emerging public opinion and track it continuously. The technology of subject detection and tracking is the basis of it. Regardless of the countries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan or other countries in the world, the task of maintaining national political security has expanded from the real world to a virtual one -- cyberspace, and cyberspace has become the "fifth territory" of national security. The network is the territory, the network power is the sovereignty. The construction of network security must aim at the protection of the national political security. Therefore, the monitoring of public opinion is the need for the development of the times, as well as of world peace and security governance.

For example, years ago, the Taliban regime once gave religious legitimacy to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, but the real driver of the Taliban's legalization of opium poppy cultivation was the huge profitability of drugs (Rasheed, 2002). When the Taliban encouraged or even threatened farmers to grow opium poppy, the United Nations Drug and Crime Agency (UNODC) asked farmers if they had to pay taxes to "rebels". Respondents in the south responded in the affirmative, with 72 percent in the west (crime, 2008).

The drug problem on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan tends to be internationalized. Drug trafficking and trading financing terrorist organizations has expanded from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to the world. The drug trade is the main source of income for some terrorist organizations, who use the money they receive from drug trafficking. To eliminate the drug problem in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan need comprehensive cooperation, and international public opinion monitoring is needed to stop and combat border drug trafficking.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Security Needs International Public Opinion Involvement

International public opinion involvement is the subject of international public opinion to participate in international public opinion activities. The subject of international public opinion are the governments of various countries, international organizations and institutions, and international personages. It focuses on the influence of each main body in the decision-making process and has a strong political character. To study the border management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan, we should not only analyze the scale and source of international public opinion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan, but also study the effective action based on the international public opinion, depend upon the analyses on the degree of concern of international public opinion, the construction of international public opinion, the framework of international public opinion and the attitude of international public opinion.

Strengthening the International Public Opinion Exchange and Focus on the Border Management in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region Jointly

As a kind of information force, the communication of the international public opinion is a vital symbol of a country's soft power. However, solving issues of the Pakistan-Afghanistan via the public opinion offensive of the western powers simply is far from an effective way, and the fundamental way to solve the security dilemma in the Pakistan-Afghanistan is to strengthen the cooperation of international public opinion, to share the information of international public opinion, and to jointly manage the border dispute in the Pakistan-Afghanistan. In the era of globalization, all countries must take cooperation as the main way to get along with each other, to achieve common interests through cooperation, to avoid conflict confrontation through cooperation.

Participate in Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Management Reports by Means of the Integration of Media Technology Actively

The media convergence is making full use of the media carrier to integrate the different media -- both in common and complementary, such as radio, television, newspapers and so on -- in terms of manpower, content, propaganda and so on. The change of traditional media technology and the revolution of media technology brings us opportunities.

The communication of international public opinion is the product of the modern information revolution from the point of view of the involvement of media convergence. It is the product of the modern information revolution. The content is the transfer of the power of international public opinion through the digital communication media, and every natural person or legal person can be used as the subject of communication, and it can produce the hot spot of international public opinion field in a short time. In the era of media convergence, the producers and users of international public opinion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan are also beneficial to the security of the Pakistan-Afghanistan. Mass information is with the emergence of network public opinion, network, events, netizens, emotions, and interaction. The popularity of the Internet makes public opinion a barometer of social sentiment.

For example, Pakistan has a vibrant media that enjoys the freedom to a reasonable extent. Before the boom of private electronic media in the country, print medium played a great role to inform and educate the masses on national and international issues. The television sector experienced a media boom after 2001 and a few news channels surface on the screen. Over 70 television channels music programs, films, religious speech, political talk shows, and news of the hour. Out of 70 over 30 are news channels including national and regional television stations. In Pakistan, besides the state channel Radio Pakistan, a number of private radio stations (FMs) carry independent journalistic content including news and infotainment.¹ Hence, the Pakistani media might make full use of the role of the integrated media to guide the orientation of international public opinion to the positive side of the direction in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border reporting.

From the point of view of We Media involvement, the debate on public opinion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan has become an important means in the field of non-traditional security in cyber warfare, and has been transferred from the traditional mainstream international media field into the international Internet community. The social network is the main forms of We Media. In the era of We Media, the interaction between international public opinion and the public will be increasing, sometimes they interact with each other. Pakistan-Afghanistan border management needs to grasp the participation of We Media to achieve the participation of the whole people, together with the public opinion of the whole society.

By the Belt and Road Initiative, China Plays an Active Role in the Border Reconciliation in Pakistan

"Belt and Road Initiative", "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" and economic cooperation prospects such as economic trade with Central Asia and South Asia, and resources and energy development in Pakistan and Afghanistan not only have a strong attraction but also realize economic complementarily and win-win situation. China's economic and security considerations, coupled with its close relationship with Pakistan, could help a push for a settlement between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

For the reason mentioned above, we could make the best use of the Belt and Road Initiative to expounds the influence of international public opinion participation on the border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan and to explore further development of the areas of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as well as discuss how to carry out international public opinion exchange and cooperation, technology to create the social space of the border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistani officials also believe the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" is of great significance to Pakistan and should be fully supported; some mainstream English and Urdu media comments are relatively cautious, although a very small number of local parties and separatists criticize the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" for not benefiting Pakistan.ⁱⁱ In view of the above situation, China and Pakistan should take measures such as deepening all-round cooperation, promoting in-depth exchanges between the media of the two countries, refuting false remarks and so on.

Above all, peace and prosperity along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is highly related to the peace and development of the entire world. The success or failure of the border management is influenced by international public opinion. Because only by the approval of the international community can the international public opinion become a powerful propaganda tool. Just like the governance of a country, it must contain the highest power to carry out effective governance within its legal scope firstly, in order to be recognized by the international community and supported by international public opinion. Therefore, we need to find the reality of theoretical breakthrough and the hope of future development in the two topics of international public opinion and Pakistan-Afghanistan border management.

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Challenges to US-Afghan Policy: Obama vs. Trump Administration

Dr. Asma Rashid, Ms. Samman Fatima

Challenges to US-Afghan Policy: Obama vs. Trump Administration

Abstract

In an effort to analyze the impacts of the US approach aimed at the transition of Afghanistan started under the Obama government and continued under the Trump administration, the paper examines the internal as well as the external challenges faced by the US in Afghanistan. The paper argues that the US policies towards Afghanistan have brought some short-term benefits but it has failed to defeat, disrupt and dismantle the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as Taliban still continue to control more than seventy per cent of the total Afghan territory. There are different factors that stand responsible for this failure of the US-Afghan policy. Getting in, getting done, and getting out without leading the war to its logical conclusion is not enough. Currently, the situation is becoming more complex amid the halting of peace process which was under way between Taliban and US. Against this background, this paper raises and answers two questions: Firstly, What were the challenges that resisted in the way of smooth implementation of the US-Afghan policy under Obama and Trump administrations? What are the problems confronting Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US forces? These questions have been answered from the counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective. It asserts that US foreign policy in Afghanistan sometimes appeared confused and directionless because they neither want to stay nor withdraw completely. Every stakeholder wants its own version of peace and stability in Afghanistan. The remedy based on Afghan-led and Afghan-owned solution by giving the due representation to all groups and factions, including the Taliban through political means is likely to come up with the desired outcome.

Key Words: US, Afghanistan, Transition, 2014, Peace, Withdrawal

I-Introduction:

The year 2014 was an important year in the history of Afghanistan due to the ending of impending military withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and leaving the country to its native man for the entire control of their country as well as due to the conduct of democratic Presidential elections after the expiration of President Hamid Karzai's term and the installation of National Unity Government (NUG). The process of transition of Afghanistan is traced back to 2011 and was finished in December 2014 with the ending of US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and with the handing over of the responsibility to Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).

Under consideration, the paper explores the challenges faced by the Obama administration in Afghanistan. The US policy-makers seem confused throughout their war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Their policies are unclear and inconsistent. This war has proven counterproductive in establishing lasting stability within Afghanistan.

This paper scans the situation of Afghanistan through two research questions:

- Why and how Counterinsurgency policy could not bring in the desired results within Obama's years? And how these challenges continued to impede the success of the US-Afghan policy Trump administration?
- What are the problems confronting the US for state-building in post-2014 Afghanistan after the completion of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with the reduction of US forces?

To find an answer to these questions this chapter proceeds as follows:

First, it explores Counterinsurgency Doctrine and then it aims to cognize the practicality of the plan over the Afghan situation under Obama and Trump administrations. Then it explores the internal and external challenges faced by the US in Afghanistan. The research methodology of the study pertains to the use of related secondary sources and the official statements issued by the leaders of concerned countries in different timings.

II-Theoretical Framework:

The paper views the policy of President Obama and President Trump through the lens of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency warfare, unlike conventional warfare, is a combination of hard power as well as soft power. COIN is complex warfare and there are several programs necessary for its success. These programs are peace operations, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Stability Operations, and Counter-Terrorism. According to the defense department of the US, "COIN is a combination of the military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency." (Field Manual, 2003). Seth Jones in his book mentions General Frank Kitson who participated in several COIN campaigns in Asia, Africa, Europe. He argues that a successful COIN campaign needs to take into account three

things: the insurgents groups political structure, the insurgent group’s military structure and lastly the population. In COIN operations, the state uses the military means to physically defeat and destroy the insurgents. Then, the propaganda tools such as political, economic and psychological, are utilized to win the support of the local population against the insurgents. The parameters of success and failure in COIN are different from the parameters of conventional warfare. The following table clearly depicts the difference in the success of COIN and conventional warfare.

Table 1: Parameters of Success of COIN and Conventional Warfare

Parameters of Success of COIN	Parameters of Success of Conventional Warfare
Combination of civilian and military measures	Strong Military Capabilities
Protection of Local population by avoiding targeting civilians because insurgents often camouflage themselves in the civilian population	Effectively targeting the enemy state
Winning the Hearts and Minds with the provision of aid to civilians	Military attacks on enemy forces to make them surrender
Good governance by Host Nation (HN)	The professionally trained conventional army
Complete destruction of insurgent groups. A victory is not only the destruction of the insurgent forces and their political organizations in a given area but also their permanent isolation from the population	The defeat of the enemy state on the battlefield. A victory is complete destruction of enemy state at all front
Guerilla tactics	Conventional warfare tactics

Source: This table has been compiled by the authors.

Obama administration utilized the Kinetic approach of COIN that resided on military means to defeat the insurgents but relatively ignored the other ingredients related to reconstruction and winning of the local population of Afghanistan that was required for success.

III-Analysis of Obama's Policy in Afghanistan

President Obama assumed office in 2009. There were numerous challenges for him on the domestic as well as on the foreign front. The war against Terror in Afghanistan was the basic challenge for the administration at the foreign front. The Obama administration announced two policies regarding the Afghan war on terror, the first Af-Pak strategy was announced on 27 March 2009 and the second was announced in December 2009. The aim of the policy remained the same that was to defeat, dismantle and destroy AQ and Taliban. During his address, the president said; "I want the American People to understand that we have a clear and focused goal; to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That's the cause that could not be more just (Whitehouse government, 2017). The policy of President Obama was the counterinsurgency policy and apart from military means, it focused on the nation-building in Afghanistan. But the policy remained relatively failed to achieve its objectives owing to numerous factors behind it. Some of those factors will be discussed in this section.

Absence of Parameters of Success of COIN

The parameters of success in COIN are different from conventional warfare. Though the Obama administration announced a COIN doctrine, the administration did not apply the complete ingredients of the COIN approach. COIN is a blend of civilian as well as military measures, however, the administration remained focused only on the military measures and kinetic approach of COIN. The civilian measures and the engagement with the local population were largely missed out. The insurgency in Afghanistan is local and the insurgent groups get their support from the local population on the basis of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic tribes in Afghanistan, but they are marginalized from mainstream politics and society which of course proves calamitous as it is so called Pashtun Belt that insurgency is actively seeking recruits. Therefore, the bulk of the insurgency is composed of Pashtuns tribes. When the largest tribe of the (Whitehouse government, 2017) local population is not given the due representation in government it ultimately compels them to be on the side of the insurgents and develop hatred against Afghan government and forces. There are certain areas where the Afghan National forces and the US forces worked on the civilian measures and the

model resulted in the success in that specific area. Tagab valley is an example of such success. The valley was controlled by insurgent groups. An operation was launched in April 2008 that ended in November 2008 (Meyerle, Katt & Gavirlis, 2012). It successfully cleared the area and followed by civilian measures to restore life and development in it. Therefore, the Tagab Valley model was a success, but the Obama administration did not continue such models and focused only on the Kinetic approach of COIN. Apart from the military measures the operation was focused on civilian engagement. ANA started to engage with the local population and different reconstruction programs were initiated. The aim of the operation was not to "clear" the area, but the ANA was focused to establish good relations with the local population to get their support against the insurgents. ANA participated in the local Shuras and convinced the local population that the poppy cultivation is not allowed in Islam (Meyerle, Katt & Gavirlis, 2012). Afghanistan is the world's largest opium producer, and most opium poppies used for heroin are grown in Taliban held areas. Large portion of the financial needs of insurgent is met by the money obtained from selling drugs. Protection of the local population is another parameter of success of COIN but it was not given the priority by the administration. According to the Field Manual (FM) 3-24 "density of troops" is needed to protect the local population. The proposed recommendation by the FM 3-24 falls in the range of 20-25 counterinsurgent soldiers for 1,000 residents in the operation area and it is a minimum density of troops (Field Manual, 2006). On the basis of such a recommendation, 725,000 troops were required for Afghanistan that is five times bigger than the troops on the ground. Therefore, the administration remained relatively failed to protect the local population and 26,270 civilians were killed from 2001 to 2014 (Crawford, 2015). Winning the Hearts and Minds (HAM) is an important component of the success of COIN. However, the strategy had the same fate as other parameters. Even in the best circumstances, it is really hard for the foreign forces to win the HAM strategy because they are viewed as invaders and the local population feels alienated from them. The US forces were also viewed with skepticism by the local population, as collateral damage to homes and property resulting from an over-reliance on military means had severely damaged ISAF's legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan people. Moreover, the US forces had the superficial knowledge of the operational environment and with that limited knowledge; they were expected "to work as a social worker, as a civil engineer, a school teacher, and a boy scout (Ekinberry, 2015). The conventional forces were no trained on these grounds that's why remained relatively failed on

this front. While on the other hand, the Taliban were very cautious in their behavior and attitude towards the local population. With time, they were more tolerant of music and the beardless man than they were before 2001. Mullah Umar emphasized a lot on the respectful behavior of the fighters (Dorrnsoro, 2009). That's why the Taliban have been able to enjoy more support from the local population.

Apart from their behavior with the local population, the US forces did not focus on the socio-economic sector of Afghanistan. According to an estimate, 35% of people were unemployed, 36% lived below the poverty line and 72% of people were illiterate. As per Afghan living conditions survey, the unemployment rate rose from 9.3% to 24% in 2014. However, the Obama administration did not announce any program to improve the socio-economic conditions of the civilians, therefore, in such poor circumstances, winning the HAM strategy was nearly impossible. The role of Host Nation (HN) is an important ingredient of the success of COIN. However, Afghanistan remained unfortunate on this ground as well. The institutional structure of the Afghan government remained weak and fragile. Corruption is deeply rooted in the Afghan government. A report was released in 2010 by the UN office on drugs and Crimes and according to that report, "the Afghan citizens have to pay \$2.5billion in bribes that is equivalent to 23% of the country's GDP (Bisogno, 2010). Apart from the corruption in the government sector, the institutions were equally weak and they were not delivering. The judicial system, that is considered to be one of the main pillars of the state, was facing severe problems. Justice varied from area to area depending upon local authorities commanders who could torture and execute without fear of being held accountable. According to the World Bank report, "Afghan judicial system was one of the least effective systems, if not the least effective (McCullough, 2009). On account of the poor judicial system, people were more inclined towards the Taliban courts. According to a press report that was published in 2008, "Many Afghans who were not sympathetic with the Taliban seem to believe that the Islamic Emirate is more capable than the Afghan government" (Constable, 2008). In Taliban controlled areas murderer were executed publicly. Adulterers were stoned to death in public. Prison conditions were very poor and prisoners were often not given much food. Their relatives were to provide them with food once or twice a week. Thieves had a limb or two severed. In non-Taliban controlled areas, only municipal and provincial authorities relied on some of Islamic law (Hanfia Fiqh) and traditional tribal codes of justice

In the light of the above-mentioned facts and figures, it has been evident that the Obama administration did not fully implement the COIN doctrine. As it was planned to be completed in two phases but the reduction in troops was started in July 2011 even before the completion of the first phase and the insurgent forces were not completely destroyed and destructed at that time and the getting in and getting out strategy of Obama administration without getting done further fueled the insurgency.

Politically Influenced Decision of President Obama

President Obama, as a senator, criticized David H. Petraeus for his COIN policy in Iraq. When he became president, he adopted the policy of COIN to deal with AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan. President Obama was reluctant to increase the number of troops on the ground in Afghanistan because there was a growing public opinion in the USA against the Afghan war. He said; "I have two years with the public on this... I want an exit strategy (Baker, 2010). But, a report was published called "commander's initial assessment" in 2009 and it was a critique of the US policy in Afghanistan. At the end of the report, General McChrystal proposed a people-centric approach of COIN in Afghanistan. The COIN policy demanded an increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan. As was said in the report; "ISAF requires more forces, failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure (McChrystal, 2017). The General demanded 40,000 troops on the ground and the reconstruction efforts were estimated to cost \$1 trillion from 2010 to 2020. The president was reluctant to send troops as well as to spend such a huge amount for reconstruction. He said; "This is a ten-year trillion-dollar effort and does not match up with our interests (Baker, 2009). Counterterrorism plus approach was proposed by the vice president but it was rejected by the Pentagon. The General was clear that success required a full-blown COIN in Afghanistan. President Obama agreed to increase the troops on the ground, but the COIN policy was not fully implemented. The policy had to be completed in two phases, but the withdrawal of forces was started before the completion of these two phases. Therefore, the tensions between the Pentagon and the President resulted in the relative failure of the policy in Afghanistan.

Complex Operational Environment

The Obama administration adopted the policy of COIN in Afghanistan. Understanding of Operational Environment is an important ingredient for the success of the COIN. However, the administration did not completely understand the human as well as the geographic terrain of Afghanistan. The concept of human terrain is an important concept in COIN. As General David Petraeus termed it as the "decisive" terrain for the success of COIN operations (Carlisle, 2011). But the administration relatively ignored the human terrain. There was a continuous power struggle between different factions of Afghan society. Apart from the tussles between different ethnicities, there was unemployment, corruption, warlords, mafias and corrupt political leadership and corrupt judiciary. All these variables served as greasing factors for the insurgency and US administration pays no heed to address these issues of human terrain (Eikenberry, 2015). Geographical terrain is equally important for the success of COIN. Most of Afghanistan is rugged in hospitable mountainous landscape that creates a conducive environment for the insurgents in their hit and run phenomenon. US conventional forces were not aware of such terrain and it created hurdles in military flow, the flow of goods and weapons. Pak-Afghan border was also challenging terrain and US forces could not control this territory of "no man" (Eikenberry, 2015).

Role of Host Nation

The COIN policy was designed for Afghanistan. But, President Hamid Karzai made repeated public statements about the denial of the presence of Taliban and AQ in Afghanistan. He said; "Al-Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001. They have no base in Afghanistan. The war against terrorism is not in Afghanistan's villages and is not in Afghanistan's countryside (Eikenberry, 2015). The Afghan administration remained unwilling to support the COIN operations in Afghanistan. He would have supported the COIN policy if it would have implemented in Pakistan (Eikenberry, 2015). The success of COIN depends upon the willingness and support of the Host Nation but, in the case of Afghanistan, Host Nation did not support the decision that resulted in the relative failure of the policy.

Peace Talks with Taliban:

The Afghan government is trying to take help from neighboring countries for peaceful negotiations with the insurgent groups. The government had been able to secure some success

in arranging peace negotiations with the Taliban but by mid-2015 all these signs of success vanished away with the rising of the issue among the Taliban over the remuneration of these talks. It is also due to the fight over progression to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Umar after the disclosure of his death. He died in 2013 but his death was kept secret for two years until it was revealed in July 2015 by Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security. The disruption of the second round of peace process held in Murree in July 2015 was a strategic setback for the Afghan peace process (Iqbal, 2016) (Iqbal, 2016). Once the revelation of Mullah Omar's death publicly in August 2015, the peace process was halted and splinter groups emerged in the aftermath. It was feared that if the dialogue process was not restarted the internal situation might return to that of the 1990s where the country was embroiled in a civil war.

Taliban were no longer interested in talks during the year 2015. James R Clapper, the US director of national intelligence anticipated that war in Afghanistan in 2016 will be more forceful than 2015. Furthermore, Afghans will keep facing continuous talks by the Taliban this year. As Pentagon said, the Taliban still have the capacity and strength to contest and occupying important areas within Afghanistan. It showed a difficult and persistent trial to the Afghan national unity government during those years (Iqbal, 2015). Determinations to resume the discussions have been started as of late 2015 by the US, the government of Afghanistan, GOP (Government of Pakistan), and the Republic of China under QCG (Katzman, 2016). QCG is the quadrilateral coordination group comprises of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US, and China it was created in 2015 during the Heart of Asia conference. All these four countries have been committed to simplifying an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and settlement operation with a motive to achieve lifelong peace and solidity in Afghanistan and the region (The Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington DC, 2015). Many rounds of QCG talks have been conducted since its creation in 2015. They have asked and encouraged the Taliban to join early negotiations with the Afghan government to resolve their differences to have a lasting solution. The peace process that was started in 2015 with the establishment of QCG suffered a setback with the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor by US drone on 21st May 2016. The group had four meetings before the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. A twist was expected to come with his death as according to President Obama, he had a lack of interest in peace talks and despite all struggles of QCG countries to initiate peace talks, he only intensified attacks, (Mashal, 2016) but his successor

refused to resume talks. The drone attack came just days after representatives of QCG held another round of negotiations in Islamabad in May 2016 to revive the direct talks (Tribune, 2016). The talks resumed in 2017, however, the Taliban had no representation in the talks and it yielded no results for the Afghan peace process. Attainment of peace is a difficult task to achieve. It will not be without conditions and will take a lot more time. Four options could be tried for peaceful settlement with Taliban could be possible: first, they should form a national unity government; secondly, Taliban's participation in elections as an autonomous political party (the most important one); thirdly, the formation of a southern frontier controlled by the Taliban, like Pakistan's northwest frontier where ethnic Pashtuns are entertained with a degree of independence; or lastly, the peace process in different stages by shifting of control to Afghanistan's provinces, and enabling them to elect their chosen governor and making their selected police force. Even then all of these ways demand arrangements on basic problems that none of the party is willing or afford to make (Aljazeera, 2016). Every party needs to make some compromises for bringing durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. While the US and the Afghan government wants the Taliban and further militant associations to renounce friction, end up relations with international terrorist groups and take Afghanistan's constitution, along with its shields for the rights of women and unpopular groups. Meanwhile, they are enhancing ANDSF strengths, Afghan defense ministry capacity, and assistant Afghan leadership to enable the Afghan government to protect the country against an insistent rebellious threat (DoD, 2015). This war is proving itself to be a war without winners as the US has resorted neither to an outright victory nor failure and the same is the case with the Taliban, who neither has been able to establish their rule nor have surrendered or willing to resume peace talks. Even, Taliban are powerful enough to carry out high-profile attacks but are fragmented on various issues due to different agendas of different sub-groups of the Taliban. All this is making the US cautious about spending more resources in Afghanistan that's why it wants to get out of this war without its conclusion.

IV-Analysis of the Trump's Policy in Afghanistan.

President Trump came into the White House after President Obama. After assuming the office as president, he announced to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. However, at that time he opposed the idea of a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan. He said in his speech,"

the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable.” (The Atlantic, 2017). He said that a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum and the terrorist actors such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS would fill the vacuum. However, during the present year, President Trump announced a withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. The recent events unfolded that the US would sign a peace deal with the Taliban and withdraw from Afghanistan, but the situation is not that much simplified and the Trump administration is facing the challenges. These challenges include the challenging legacy of Obama's decisions, Challenges on the military side, the challenges on the civilian side, and the challenge of the US-Taliban peace deal.

The Challenging Legacy of Obama's COIN Policy

President Obama announced the COIN doctrine for Afghanistan in 2009 but the doctrine was not fully implemented and the administration started reducing its troops from Afghanistan even before the completion of the first phase of the policy and the policy could not meet its desired aims, therefore the COIN policy of Obama administration resulted in the relative failure. The administration remained focused on the kinetic side of the COIN approach and announced the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. The Obama administration announced the hard timetable for the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan (Weinbaum, 2014). According to that timetable, it was planned that the number of troops would be reduced to 5,500 but the Obama administration decided to keep it to 8,400 till January 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2019). Though the number of troops was not reduced to the number that was initially planned by the Obama administration, however, the troop density was less than the required number of troops. President Trump assumed the office in 2017, he criticized the hasty withdrawal and decided to increase the number of troops and the number reached 14,000 (Al Jazeera, 2019). The Trump administration followed the footprints of its predecessor and announced that the 5,000 troops would withdraw within 135 days of the proposed deal with the Taliban. Trump administration adopted the same policy of getting in and getting out without any concrete engagement with the local population of Afghanistan. Additionally, the abrupt increase-decrease policy of the two administrations could not bring peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Challenges on the Military Ground

Though President Trump in his Afghanistan policy announced an increase in the troop level and he talked about increasing the troop numbers by 3,000 to 5,000 troops. However, even

at that time the administration made no strategy and plan to actually win the war and to create a long term peace in Afghanistan and despite an increase in troop level the situation on the ground remained the same. Another challenge for the Trump administration was the situation of the Afghan security forces. In the post-withdrawal scenario, Afghan forces are not capable enough to win against the Taliban and terrorist actors. According to a report, from January 1, 2017 to May 1, 2017, 2,531 members of ANDSF were killed and 4,238 were wounded during an action (amazonaws.com, 2019). The decision to assist and train the Afghan forces did not bear fruit on the practical ground and despite the presence of combats and trainers of US forces, Afghan forces lack professional efficiency and capability. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that since 2015 more than 28000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed. Mckenzie one commented “If we left precipitously right now, I do not believe they would be able to successfully defend their country.” (Neff, Thomas, & Mashal, 2018).

Challenges on the Civilian Side

Afghanistan has become a war-torn state with a weak civilian and political setup. The civilian issue of the Afghan war has not been addressed by any US administration. The Trump administration also faces challenges on the civilian ground. Moreover, the administration has not given any indication or policy to deal with the political, civilian and economic issues of the state (Neff, Thomas, & Mashal, 2018). The situation of civil institutions in Afghanistan is complicated. Power-hungry warlords, corruption and ethnic tussle among different ethnicities are some variables that are making the situation complex and the Trump administration has neglected the civilian engagement in Afghanistan.

The Challenge of US-Taliban Peace Accord

On December 21, 2018, President Trump surprised the world by announcing the reduction in US troops in Syria and Afghanistan. He announced that the 14,000 US troops in Afghanistan would be reduced to half (warontherocks.com, 2019). In return the Taliban will guarantee that the country will not be used by Al-Qaeda or other extremist groups as a base for attacks on the west. Critics questioned that how can that be ensured if there are no troops on the ground.

However, after the announcement, the administration wants to sign a peace deal with the Taliban followed by the withdrawal of its forces from the country, but the peace deal is a real challenge for the administration. There are many rounds of negotiations between the two sides. In the most recent happenings, The US special envoy resumed talks with the Taliban on 20th August 2019 in Qatar (AlJazeera, 2019). The draft of the proposed deal was ready. According to sources, the proposed draft was not expected to get a commitment by the Taliban to hold fire on Afghan people and Afghan forces. As Bill Roggio, a senior defense analyst said that if the plan turns out as expected, it amounts to a betrayal. He further added, "I would argue the Trump administration sold the Afghan government out the minute they excluded the Afghan government from the talks and this US-Taliban ceasefire is just an extension of that" (CNN, 2019). The Afghan government was not even a part of the talks between the two parties. Moreover, the Taliban agreed to a ceasefire but only with the US forces and the US have signed bilateral security agreements with Afghan security forces that mean the US is obliged to assist their Afghan partners in the battlefield (CNN, 2019). However, President Trump announced on 9th September 2019 that the talks are dead. The talks actually ended on 7th September, when President Trump abruptly canceled the secret meeting with the Taliban leader and Afghan President. The meeting was aimed to conclude the peace talks to end the 20 years' war in Afghanistan. The President told reporters in the White House, "They're dead. They're dead" (Al Jazeera, 2019). The president cited the recent attack by the Taliban in Afghanistan that killed 12 people, including a US soldier as a reason for canceling the peace talks (Al Jazeera, 2019).

However, even if the deal would have signed, it would not have helped the peace process in Afghanistan. In the proposed deal, all the stakeholders are not involved as the Afghan government has no representation in the talks and a deal without the participation of all stakeholders would bear no fruit on the ground. Ceasefire agreement remains another challenge for the Trump administration because of the Taliban, as they are not willing to sign a ceasefire deal with the Afghan government and the Afghan people. The deal without the representation of the Afghan population is not a solution. The situation of Afghanistan is as complex as it was before the peace talks and the Taliban are still carrying out terrorist activities and targeting the civilian population of the country. The UN recorded 8239 civilian casualties in total in the first nine months of 2019 (Dawn, 2019).

V-Challenges of State-Building for Obama and Trump Administrations

The situation of Afghanistan is still disappointing as the country continues to face dire challenges, but one should remain optimistic, keeping in view that peace and stability do not come overnight. As in the words of Felbab Brown:

Afghanistan will continue to face an economic crisis, migration of people, the Taliban resurgence, and the governmental system jammed in fighting, elementary existence and supremacy game, instead of fixing crucial, unavoidable national interest in governance in the country ...The United States should continue its military and political assistance towards Afghanistan. It also needs to demand far greater answerability and far greater emphasis from Afghan politicians on governing the country as opposed to tearing it to pieces (Brown, 2016). This section explores the internal and external challenges, Afghanistan is facing in the post-transition Afghanistan.

1. Structural Problems:

There are some structural problems spanning in Afghanistan that resist the development of Afghanistan politically, socially, economically and culturally. The terrain of Afghanistan has made the full border control extremely difficult if not impossible. Local men are familiar with this terrain that's why to give a tough time to US and NATO forces fighting inside Afghanistan. The porous border Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the existence of a single ethnic community on both sides of the border strengthens local resistance against the government and the international coalition's efforts to tighten security (Nankivell, 2016). The tranquil approach through the imprudent border gives a chance to the insurgents to cause devastation inside Pakistan and Afghanistan as well (Marwat, 2016). It is due to the reason Pakistan says that it is now moving forward unilaterally to improve security in the region, and increase the monitoring of millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. Pakistan further find it necessary to build a fence along its long porous border with Afghanistan, in part because of lack of cooperation from authorities in Kabul. Afghanistan on the other hand opposes the border fencing plans.

2. Multiethnic Society:

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state. There are fourteen ethnic groups in Afghanistan that are recognized by the national anthem of Afghanistan. These include Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Balochis, Turkmens, nuristanis, Pamiris, Arabs, Gujars, Brahuis, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pashai. Governing a feasible country and upholding coherence among these groups is one of the serious challenges faced by Afghanistan today. It is key to determine the future of Afghanistan whether it is going to be of harmony and settlement or war and discordance (Siddique, 2012).

3. The Delay in Parliamentary Elections and Presidential Elections:

On January 18, 2016, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan announced October 15, 2016, for the holding of Loya Jirga elections. But the preparations for the Loya Jirga and district council (that were to be held for the first time) were hampered by the controversies related to the legitimacy of IEC and they were initially postponed to July 2018 and then elections finally held on 20th October 2018. However, the results of the elections were delayed for seven months and President Ashraf Ghani blamed election commission for the delay. He said, "In the history of democratic systems, it is unprecedented that the results of an election should take seven months. I do not speak about other aspects of it because they are judicial, but there should be no doubt that the former commission, both commissions, were inefficient. There is a consensus in the country about it" (Adili, 2019). A new parliament was inaugurated almost four years after the end of the previous parliament's term. Even after the results were announced after the delay the Jirga still not yet completed. Apart from the paramilitary elections of Loya Jirga, the presidential elections were scheduled to take place in April 2019 and they have already been delayed multiple times before (Shalizi, 2019). The presidential elections have remained postponed till September 2019 They delay in the election and delay in political transition serve as a hurdle in the stability of Afghanistan. The Afghan government has made some progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary commitments, but faces domestic criticism for its Finally, Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan on September 28, 2019. The results which were expected to be reported on October 19, 2019 have been delayed. IEC Chief Hawa Alam Nuristan made the announcement of a news conference in Kabul, that the delay would "further ensure the transparency of the electoral process and restore people's confidence in it (Radio Pakistan, 2019).

4. Fighting b/w Insurgent Groups and Governmental Forces:

Insurgent groups, particularly the Taliban still enjoy greater autonomy of power and they resort to the use of force whenever and wherever they find security lapse. Defense in the provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Kunduz, and Badghis is fragile (Siddique, 2012). Taliban are strong enough to carry out attacks in various parts of Afghanistan, which is signaling their strength. After the NATO forces withdrawal in June 2014, 800 Taliban fighters captured various police and military checkpoints in Helmand to establish their stronghold. A similar attack in August 2014 in the Harsarak district of Nangarhar by an estimated 1,000 Taliban reflected the deteriorating situation. In Kunduz too, the Afghan security forces have been struggling against the Taliban insurgents for greater control (Siddique, 2012). During the review period, the security situation has also worsened throughout Kabul province and in some northern districts. At the end of 2014, although the Afghan National Defense Forces (ANSF) had nearly reached its target size of 352,000 by the end of 2014 (97%). ANDSF have reached its target size according to the June 2019 report (USA, Defense Department, 2019). Despite the huge number of the ANDSF forces, they are not capable enough to defend the country and according to 2018 Pentagon data, Taliban still control 12% of the area in Afghanistan (USA, Defense Department, 2019). While 65% is under control of the Afghan government and US forces and the remaining area is still contested between the Taliban and Afghan government. However, the scope of professionalism, training, reliability and subsequent effectiveness varies greatly between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). It is impeding the implementation of the rule of law and making governance difficult to achieve.

5. ANDSF Capabilities:

In mid-2013 the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) took the responsibility on their shoulders for security throughout Afghanistan. In 2015 the ANDSF assumed sole responsibility for securing their country. Simultaneously, in a period of about two years, U.S. and coalition force presence was reduced from about 140,000 troops to 14,000 troops. The ANDSF is near their target end strength level of 352,000, comprising of an Afghan National Army (ANA) of 195,000 and Afghan National Police (ANP) of 157,000.

In spring 2014, the Afghan forces recorded a very important success during the first round of Afghan presidential elections as they have been able to successfully stop a major

Taliban military action to the process. But soon the weaknesses of the Afghan forces became visible in the 2015 fighting season the performance of ANDSF was uneven. Though it is struggling hard to conduct successful operations yet it is facing serious challenges in the areas of combat enablers, logistics, ministerial capacity, leadership, human capital, aerial fires, and sustainability of high casualties. It has planned and executed large-scale offensive operations across Afghanistan like the recapturing of Kunduz City. But it still does not have sufficient technical knowledge and competence especially regarding air force that only foreign forces can fill till the time these insufficiencies are filled and Afghan capability built (Brown, 2016). In February 2015 Director of US national intelligence James Clapper's testimony recognized that the ANSF will need to have more long-term foreign assistance to tackle the Taliban and other insurgent groups (Capaccio & Mehrotra, 2015). According to the report of the Defense department 2019, the current level of ANDSF authorized force level remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP) (USA, Defense Department, 2019). However, the ANDSF has been primarily defensive in its posture and is based on static checkpoints, which is a major factor of the ANDSF's high casualty rate. ANDSF leadership must prioritize efforts to lift it up to take the lead in launching strikes against insurgents and help it attain an offensive posture. In January 2019, President Ghani stated that 45000 ANDSF members had been killed since he took office in 2014.

6. Economic Environment:

Presumption dumping funds into a post-conflict state to boost up its economy and assist to eradicate problems as soon as possible has not proven true in the case of Afghanistan. The origins of the issue were sown throughout the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has been aggravated by more than thirty years of war. In the post-2001 period, a bubble economy was created that divided the state among the payees and the losers. Beneficiaries were little and mainstream lost out due to the high inflation which in turn eroded their buying power. It also isolated the Afghan government from the Afghan population (Giustozzi, 2012). Years after 1978 saw the economic transformations in Afghanistan. A war economy that was entirely dependent on the Soviet Union due to its invasion of Afghanistan was developed while the opposition was supported by America and Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s smuggling networks were also developed to the level to provide the revenues to war factions in the 1990s, as international players were not

so lavish in providing the level of aid to Afghanistan during the 1990s due to the ending of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Taliban were given foreign assistance, but majority support was in the form of income they could generate through tax collection and customs. They theoretically legalized the smuggling grids and imposed taxes on them to raise sufficient revenue to cheaply run their own state government (Dorrnsoro, 2005). According to World Bank estimates the current GDP growth rate of Afghanistan stood at 1.9 percent in 2015, up from 1.3 in 2014; it also forecasted that growth will increase slowly every year and will touch 5 in 2018 (World Bank, 2016). Due to all these efforts, Afghanistan still stands among the poor countries of the world. Its living conditions are among the lowest in the world. Licit exports include table grapes and raisins but the economy remains heavily dependent on illicit opium cultivation. The US spent \$900 billion for reconstruction and direct spending in war during FY 2019. Although they are on the way of success apparently, the majority of the citizens live below the poverty line with damaged groundwork and the countryside that is going through environmental damage (Cordesman & Lin, 2015). During the year 2016-17, the poverty level rose up to 55% and Afghanistan ranked 168 out of 189 low HDI countries. In addition to the increasing poverty level, hundreds and thousands of people are still internally displaced.

In reality, economic conditions are very fragile in Afghanistan. The leaders should take the practical step for real infrastructure development of Afghanistan that would give an economic boost to the country. Because a country without viable economic sources would not survive for long. If the continued fragility of Afghanistan's economy is not immediately addressed, it will initiate widespread social unrest on the street as happened in Kabul (Kumar, Wallace & Aulakh, 2016).

7. Civilian Casualties:

The year 2015 is known as the most violent from the time of the US invasion in 2001. In 2015 United Nations report estimated that there were 11,002 civilians murdered or wounded in Afghanistan. It was marked an increase of 4 percent over 2014 (Shankar, 2016). The war in Afghanistan killed the innocent Afghan civilian population and continues to do that. It was the largest number of total civilian deaths recorded by UNAMA since 2009. The given table illustrates the number of civilian and armed forces in the US-led Afghan war right from 2001-2014.

Table 2: Casualties in US-Afghan War under OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) US Casualty Status Fatalities As of June 15, 2016

OEF US Military	Total	KIA	Non-	Pending	WIA
Casualties	Deaths		Hostile		
Afghanistan Only	2,215	1,832	383	0	20,030
Other Locations	130	11	119	0	42
OEF DoD Civilian	4	2	2	0	
Casualties					
World Wide Total	2,349	1,845	504	0	20,072

Source: <http://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf> Accessed on June 16, 2016.

Table 3: Casualties in US-Afghan War Under OFS


The following table shows the number of casualties in Operation Freedom Sentinel.

Operation Freedom Sentinel (OFS)US Casualty Status Fatalities As of: June 15, 2016

	Total	KIA	Non-	Pending	WIA
	Deaths		Hostile		
OFS US Military	21	11	10	0	104
Casualties					
OFS US Civilian	1	1	0	0	
Casualties					
World Wide Total	22	12	10	0	104

Source: <http://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf> Accessed on June 16, 2016.

The following Graph depicts the number of Afghan civilians killed and wounded in the period between 2009-2015 according to the estimates of UNAMA.



Source:https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf, Accessed June 16, 2016.

In addition to the previous figures, the recent estimates say that since 2001, 2,400 US soldiers and 1100 allied soldiers died in the war in Afghanistan (americanprogress.org, 2019). However, the death toll of Afghanistan's population and security forces is much bigger than this. Approximately, 100,000 Afghan civilians, military personnel died in Afghanistan (americanprogress.org, 2019).

8. Demographic Pressure:

Since December 1979 Afghanistan is facing invasions and war situations, first in December 1979 by the Soviet incursion of Afghanistan, then civil war (1989-1992) till the collapse of the communist Najibullah regime then again Afghan civil war 1992-1996 till the Taliban control of Afghanistan, then again the foreign invasion by the US in October 2001. This war could not stop an increase in the Afghan population. Census Bureau of the United States of America evaluates the Afghan population more than doubled between 1979 and 2014 increasing from 15.6 million in 1979 to 31.8 million in 2014, 3.2 million in 2015 (Afghanistan Country Profile, 2016). It is also expected to rise to 36.6 million in 2020, would reach to 45.7 million in 2030 and to 54.7 million in 2040 (Cordesman & Lin, 2015).

⁷². This rising population is creating the issues of housing, shelter, food, health care, etc. on the already troubled economy of Afghanistan. This rate of growth of the population is putting a lot of pressure on the fragile and aid-dependent economy of Afghanistan. GoIRA is taking measures to curb a booming population i.e. by birth control but such efforts have been met with caution from aid groups and opposition from Islamic scholars. As per UN report, despite escalating violence and a surge in civilian casualties in the NATO led war against insurgents, the Afghan women manage to have 6.3 children on average over their lifetime.

9. Humanitarian Crisis:

Afghanistan is also facing a humanitarian and development crisis that requires a sustainable solution. Ann Vaughan, director of policy and backing for Mercy Corps found that three key developmental challenges need to be tackled first to enable Afghans to progress. These challenges include the reduction of natural resource base caused by growing drought, land erosion, and poor management; secondly a youth swell that is experiencing high unemployment and food uncertainty last but not least is the chronic energy problems that constrain economic development and make life difficult for Afghans (Vaughan, 2016). These problems, if not addressed properly, could sustain a crisis in the country.

10. Rise of ISIS and Other Insurgent Groups

According to U.S. executive's evaluation, there are more or less 300 al Qaeda militant groups in Afghanistan and between 1,000 to 3,000 ISIS fighters (Bergen, 2016). Previously presence of ISIS or ISG (Islamic State Group) has not been taken as a challenge for Afghanistan as many of the alleged sightings of ISG fighters were vague and difficult to verify (Oxford, 2015). But now as it is taking its roots, interacting with the Taliban, carrying out attacks and making attempts to carry out attacks, is alarming. Previously, ISIS presence in Afghanistan has been mostly limited to foreigners and a very few anxious Taliban commanders such as Helmand's Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim who was the deputy governor of Khorasan (Brown, 2015). In January 2015, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani spokesperson of ISG declared Hafez Saeed Khan one of the top TTP commanders, governor of Khorasan, who vowed individual allegiance in October 2014. Till 2015 ISG threat was understated it was suspected and speculated that the Afghan government would exaggerate and use the presence of ISG or ISIS to attract western

countries and the US to ensure more international aid. ISIL announced the groups formation in January 2015 and appointed former TTP militant Hafeez Saeed Khan as leader with former Afghan Taliban Commander Abdul Rauf Aliza as deputy leader. Attacks on a United Nations (UN) vehicle and the ANDSF in September 2015 are the evidence of the practically emergent threat (USA, Defense Department, 2019). ISIS is present in Afghanistan as the group claimed the responsibility of the wedding attack in Kabul in 2019 that resulted in 63 casualties (The Guardian, August 17). Therefore, the government and the international community needs to direct their attention towards this rising threat. UN reported that terrorists in Afghanistan are numbered between 2500 and 4000 fighters (Snow, 2019).

VI-Conclusion:

The US is still lacking a wider and long-term strategy in Afghanistan, they are only making use of tactics for short-term objectives. Though Afghanistan is not the primary responsibility of the US, it needs to pay for the damages incurred by its invasion and the long war in Afghanistan. It is ultimately the Afghans who need to take the lead in to have Afghan-led and Afghan-owned solutions to their problems for having greater peace and solidity to their state. The GoIRA should take the steps to give supremacy to their national interests over the interests of factions, ethnicities, and tribes, etc., to take nationalistic decisions. Consistent actions on the part of GoIRA and the International community are needed in terms to exploit the limitations and weaknesses of the Taliban and other insurgent groups and to put Afghanistan on the right path. As the war is losing but is not lost, corrections in the current tactics could turn the tide against enemies. The current situation of Afghanistan is highly misreported as the US is presenting a gloomy picture of its achievements and portraying it as it has achieved success but the matter of fact is not the same. The Obama administration adopted the policy of counterinsurgency, but it was not implemented in its true letter and spirit and it resulted in relative failure. The situation of Afghanistan has many external as well as internal challenges for the US administration. In post-transition Afghanistan, the ending of a military campaign, many support, consular, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) also had to pull out in the process. Resultantly, the US and its partners are no more able to approach many sources in the ground, have cut back sharply on official reporting. So most often these reports do not illustrate the true reality and overstate success and either cover important problems or do not mention them. On the part of the US, clear

plans are needed as only making fixes regarding the stationing of troops, funding, training is not going to work, plans must be based on a realistic assessment of Afghanistan's needs. By making the fixes regarding the complete withdrawal might lead the Taliban and insurgent groups to become sleepy for some time and become active after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops. One of the important challenges is that the United States seems to be eyeing on peace talks that are highly uncertain, the peace deal without the representation of the true stakeholders of Afghanistan could not bring peace and stability in the country. To succeed in Afghanistan and to bring Afghanistan back to the list of developing countries from failing state, long term commitment in terms of aid, technical support, training, and advising and above all patience is required. Otherwise getting in, getting done (as Obama and Trump administrations portrayed) and getting out without a total and long-term commitment for the real progress of Afghanistan is likely to lead to outright failure.

Afghanistan needs a credible plan for how to continue reconstruction and rebuilding of its economy and it needs to do the contingency planning: what would happen if parties didn't agree to come to talk and bargain. If Afghanistan is left without a realistic plan for peace, it will further endanger an already unstable region, threaten the security of its people and innocent civilian population will continue to die in ruthless and futile acts of violence. Afghan also need to get united on several issues, like the legislation based on Shari'ah, the role of women, women's rights issues related to military power, etc. People in the North and South of the country are having different views than people living in the northern regions. Afghans living in northern and central areas are a bit more liberal on these issues than the people of the south. The people should resolve these differences to take unanimous decisions at the state level. Until the peace prevails in Afghanistan the threat of terrorism will continue to haunt the broader region and neighboring countries. That is of course, not good for long term peace and stability.

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